ark-lib 0.7.0

//! Types for using the Unified Mailbox feature of the bark server.
//!
//! For more information on the mailbox, check the `docs/mailbox.md` file.

use std::time::Duration;
use std::{fmt, io};
use std::str::FromStr;
use bitcoin::hashes::{sha256, Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{ecdh, schnorr, Keypair, Message, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;

use crate::SECP;
use crate::encode::{ProtocolDecodingError, ProtocolEncoding, ReadExt, WriteExt};

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum MailboxType {
	ArkoorReceive,
	RoundParticipationCompleted,
	LnRecvPendingPayment,
	RecoveryVtxoId,
	LnSendFinished,
}

impl MailboxType {
	#[inline]
	pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
		match self {
			MailboxType::ArkoorReceive => "arkoor-receive",
			MailboxType::RoundParticipationCompleted => "round-participation-completed",
			MailboxType::LnRecvPendingPayment => "ln-recv-pending",
			MailboxType::RecoveryVtxoId => "recovery-vtxo-id",
			MailboxType::LnSendFinished => "ln-send-finished",
		}
	}

}

impl fmt::Display for MailboxType {
	fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
		f.write_str(self.as_str())
	}
}

impl TryFrom<u32> for MailboxType {
	type Error = &'static str;

	fn try_from(i: u32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
		match i {
			0 => Ok(MailboxType::ArkoorReceive),
			1 => Ok(MailboxType::RoundParticipationCompleted),
			2 => Ok(MailboxType::LnRecvPendingPayment),
			3 => Ok(MailboxType::RecoveryVtxoId),
			4 => Ok(MailboxType::LnSendFinished),
			_ => Err("invalid mailbox type"),
		}
	}
}

impl From<MailboxType> for u32 {
	fn from(t: MailboxType) -> Self {
		match t {
			MailboxType::ArkoorReceive => 0,
			MailboxType::RoundParticipationCompleted => 1,
			MailboxType::LnRecvPendingPayment => 2,
			MailboxType::RecoveryVtxoId => 3,
			MailboxType::LnSendFinished => 4,
		}
	}
}

impl From<MailboxType> for String {
	fn from(t: MailboxType) -> Self {
		t.as_str().to_string()
	}
}

impl FromStr for MailboxType {
	type Err = &'static str;

	fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
		match s {
			v if v == MailboxType::ArkoorReceive.as_str() => Ok(MailboxType::ArkoorReceive),
			v if v == MailboxType::RoundParticipationCompleted.as_str() => Ok(MailboxType::RoundParticipationCompleted),
			v if v == MailboxType::LnRecvPendingPayment.as_str() => Ok(MailboxType::LnRecvPendingPayment),
			v if v == MailboxType::RecoveryVtxoId.as_str() => Ok(MailboxType::RecoveryVtxoId),
			v if v == MailboxType::LnSendFinished.as_str() => Ok(MailboxType::LnSendFinished),
			_ => Err("invalid mailbox type"),
		}
	}
}


/// Identifier for a mailbox
///
/// Represented as a curve point.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
pub struct MailboxIdentifier(PublicKey);

impl MailboxIdentifier {
	/// Convert to public key
	pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
		self.0
	}

	/// Convert from a public key
	pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
		Self(pubkey)
	}

	/// Blind the mailbox id with the server pubkey and the VTXO privkey
	pub fn to_blinded(
		&self,
		server_pubkey: PublicKey,
		vtxo_key: &Keypair,
	) -> Result<BlindedMailboxIdentifier, MailboxBlindingError> {
		BlindedMailboxIdentifier::new(*self, server_pubkey, vtxo_key)
	}

	/// Unblind a blinded mailbox identifier.
	///
	/// Returns [MailboxBlindingError] when the peer-supplied blinded point
	/// cancels the ECDH tweak (the sum is the point at infinity, which
	/// libsecp256k1 rejects). Callers must treat this as invalid peer input.
	pub fn from_blinded(
		blinded: BlindedMailboxIdentifier,
		vtxo_pubkey: PublicKey,
		server_key: &Keypair,
	) -> Result<MailboxIdentifier, MailboxBlindingError> {
		let dh = ecdh::shared_secret_point(&vtxo_pubkey, &server_key.secret_key());
		let neg_dh_pk = point_to_pubkey(&dh).negate(&SECP);
		let ret = PublicKey::combine_keys(&[&blinded.as_pubkey(), &neg_dh_pk])
			.map_err(|_| MailboxBlindingError)?;
		Ok(Self(ret))
	}
}

/// The blinded mailbox point and the ECDH tweak sum to the point at
/// infinity, which is not a valid curve point. This happens when the peer
/// chose the blinded point equal to the ECDH-derived tweak, so treat it as
/// an invalid peer input.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("mailbox blinding produced the point at infinity")]
pub struct MailboxBlindingError;

impl fmt::Display for MailboxIdentifier {
	fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
		write!(f, "{}", self.0)
	}
}

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("invalid mailbox identifier: {0}")]
pub struct InvalidMailboxIdentifier(String);

impl FromStr for MailboxIdentifier {
	type Err = InvalidMailboxIdentifier;

	fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
		let pubkey = PublicKey::from_str(s).map_err(|_| InvalidMailboxIdentifier(s.to_string()))?;
		Ok(Self(pubkey))
	}
}

impl From<PublicKey> for MailboxIdentifier {
	fn from(pk: PublicKey) -> Self {
		Self::from_pubkey(pk)
	}
}

impl ProtocolEncoding for MailboxIdentifier {
	fn encode<W: io::Write + ?Sized>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
		w.emit_slice(self.0.serialize().as_slice())
	}

	fn decode<R: io::Read + ?Sized>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, ProtocolDecodingError> {
		let bytes: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = r.read_byte_array()?;
		let pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&bytes).map_err(|e| {
			ProtocolDecodingError::invalid_err(e, "invalid mailbox identifier public key")
		})?;
		Ok(Self(pubkey))
	}
}

/// Blinded identifier for a mailbox
///
/// It is blinded by adding to the mailbox public key point the
/// Diffie-Hellman secret between the server's key and the VTXO key from
/// the address.
///
/// Represented as a curve point.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
pub struct BlindedMailboxIdentifier([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);

impl_byte_newtype!(BlindedMailboxIdentifier, PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);

impl BlindedMailboxIdentifier {
	pub fn new(
		mailbox_id: MailboxIdentifier,
		server_pubkey: PublicKey,
		vtxo_key: &Keypair,
	) -> Result<BlindedMailboxIdentifier, MailboxBlindingError> {
		let dh = ecdh::shared_secret_point(&server_pubkey, &vtxo_key.secret_key());
		let dh_pk = point_to_pubkey(&dh);
		let ret = PublicKey::combine_keys(&[&mailbox_id.as_pubkey(), &dh_pk])
			.map_err(|_| MailboxBlindingError)?;
		Ok(Self(ret.serialize()))
	}

	/// Convert to public key
	pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
		PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0).expect("invalid pubkey")
	}

	/// Convert from a public key
	pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
		Self(pubkey.serialize())
	}
}

impl From<PublicKey> for BlindedMailboxIdentifier {
	fn from(pk: PublicKey) -> Self {
		Self::from_pubkey(pk)
	}
}

impl ProtocolEncoding for BlindedMailboxIdentifier {
	fn encode<W: io::Write + ?Sized>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
		w.emit_slice(self.as_ref())
	}

	fn decode<R: io::Read + ?Sized>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, ProtocolDecodingError> {
		let bytes: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = r.read_byte_array()?;
		PublicKey::from_slice(&bytes).map_err(|e| {
			ProtocolDecodingError::invalid_err(e, "invalid blinded mailbox identifier public key")
		})?;
		Ok(Self(bytes))
	}
}

/// Authorization to read a VTXO mailbox
///
/// It is tied to an expiry UNIX timestamp and is only valid before that time.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
pub struct MailboxAuthorization {
	id: MailboxIdentifier,
	expiry: i64,
	sig: schnorr::Signature,
}

impl MailboxAuthorization {
	const CHALENGE_MESSAGE_PREFIX: &'static [u8; 32] = b"Ark VTXO mailbox authorization: ";

	fn signable_message(expiry: i64) -> Message {
		let mut eng = sha256::Hash::engine();
		eng.input(Self::CHALENGE_MESSAGE_PREFIX);
		eng.input(&expiry.to_le_bytes());
		Message::from_digest(sha256::Hash::from_engine(eng).to_byte_array())
	}

	pub fn new(
		mailbox_key: &Keypair,
		expiry: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Local>,
	) -> MailboxAuthorization {
		let expiry = expiry.timestamp();
		let msg = Self::signable_message(expiry);
		MailboxAuthorization {
			id: MailboxIdentifier::from_pubkey(mailbox_key.public_key()),
			expiry: expiry,
			sig: SECP.sign_schnorr_with_aux_rand(&msg, mailbox_key, &rand::random()),
		}
	}

	/// The mailbox ID for which this authorization is signed
	pub fn mailbox(&self) -> MailboxIdentifier {
		self.id
	}

	/// The time at which this authorization expires
	pub fn expiry(&self) -> chrono::DateTime<chrono::Local> {
		chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp_secs(self.expiry)
			.expect("we guarantee valid timestamp")
			.with_timezone(&chrono::Local)
	}

	/// Verify the signature for the mailbox and block hash
	pub fn verify(&self) -> bool {
		let msg = Self::signable_message(self.expiry);
		SECP.verify_schnorr(&self.sig, &msg, &self.id.as_pubkey().into()).is_ok()
	}

	/// Check if the authorization is expired
	///
	/// Allows for a 5 second expiration to be flexible.
	pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
		// Give some leeway so that clients can check against their now() without issue.
		const LEEWAY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
		self.expiry() < (chrono::Local::now() - LEEWAY)
	}
}

impl ProtocolEncoding for MailboxAuthorization {
	fn encode<W: io::Write + ?Sized>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
		self.id.encode(w)?;
		w.emit_slice(&self.expiry.to_le_bytes())?;
		self.sig.encode(w)?;
		Ok(())
	}

	fn decode<R: io::Read + ?Sized>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, ProtocolDecodingError> {
		Ok(Self {
			id: ProtocolEncoding::decode(r)?,
			expiry: {
				let timestamp = i64::from_le_bytes(r.read_byte_array()?);
				// enforce that timestamp is a valid one
				let _ = chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp_secs(timestamp)
					.ok_or_else(|| ProtocolDecodingError::invalid("invalid timestamp"))?;
				timestamp
			},
			sig: ProtocolEncoding::decode(r)?,
		})
	}
}

/// Convert the raw x,y coordinate pair into a [PublicKey]
fn point_to_pubkey(point: &[u8; 64]) -> PublicKey {
	//TODO(stevenroose) try to get an official api for this
	let mut uncompressed = [0u8; 65];
	uncompressed[0] = 0x04;
	uncompressed[1..].copy_from_slice(point);
	PublicKey::from_slice(&uncompressed).expect("invalid uncompressed pk")
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
	use std::time::Duration;
	use bitcoin::secp256k1::rand;
	use super::*;

	#[test]
	fn mailbox_blinding() {
		let mailbox_key = Keypair::new(&SECP, &mut rand::thread_rng());
		let server_mailbox_key = Keypair::new(&SECP, &mut rand::thread_rng());
		let vtxo_key = Keypair::new(&SECP, &mut rand::thread_rng());

		let mailbox = MailboxIdentifier::from_pubkey(mailbox_key.public_key());

		let blinded = mailbox.to_blinded(server_mailbox_key.public_key(), &vtxo_key)
			.expect("blinding a random mailbox id should succeed");

		let unblinded = MailboxIdentifier::from_blinded(
			blinded, vtxo_key.public_key(), &server_mailbox_key,
		).expect("unblinding a valid blinded id should succeed");

		assert_eq!(unblinded, mailbox);
	}

	/// A peer that chooses `blinded_id` equal to the ECDH-derived tweak
	/// makes the unblind sum land on the point at infinity. libsecp256k1
	/// rejects that, so `from_blinded` must surface the error rather than
	/// panicking. Prior to the fix this reproduced a public gRPC panic on
	/// `post_arkoor_message`.
	#[test]
	fn from_blinded_rejects_point_at_infinity() {
		let server_mailbox_key = Keypair::new(&SECP, &mut rand::thread_rng());
		let vtxo_key = Keypair::new(&SECP, &mut rand::thread_rng());

		// The attacker knows both its own vtxo_key and the server's public
		// mailbox key, so it can compute the ECDH point itself and submit
		// it as the blinded id.
		let dh = ecdh::shared_secret_point(
			&server_mailbox_key.public_key(), &vtxo_key.secret_key(),
		);
		let blinded = BlindedMailboxIdentifier::from_pubkey(point_to_pubkey(&dh));

		let res = MailboxIdentifier::from_blinded(
			blinded, vtxo_key.public_key(), &server_mailbox_key,
		);
		assert!(res.is_err(), "expected identity-point error, got {:?}", res);
	}

	/// Blinding is client-side, but a hostile address that publishes a
	/// mailbox point equal to the negation of the sender's ECDH tweak
	/// would push the sum to infinity. `to_blinded` must surface the
	/// error rather than panicking.
	#[test]
	fn to_blinded_rejects_point_at_infinity() {
		let server_mailbox_key = Keypair::new(&SECP, &mut rand::thread_rng());
		let vtxo_key = Keypair::new(&SECP, &mut rand::thread_rng());

		let dh = ecdh::shared_secret_point(
			&server_mailbox_key.public_key(), &vtxo_key.secret_key(),
		);
		let neg_dh = point_to_pubkey(&dh).negate(&SECP);
		let mailbox = MailboxIdentifier::from_pubkey(neg_dh);

		let res = mailbox.to_blinded(server_mailbox_key.public_key(), &vtxo_key);
		assert!(res.is_err(), "expected identity-point error, got {:?}", res);
	}

	#[test]
	fn mailbox_authorization() {
		let mailbox_key = Keypair::new(&SECP, &mut rand::thread_rng());
		let mailbox = MailboxIdentifier::from_pubkey(mailbox_key.public_key());

		let expiry = chrono::Local::now() + Duration::from_secs(60);
		let auth = MailboxAuthorization::new(&mailbox_key, expiry);
		assert_eq!(auth.mailbox(), mailbox);
		assert!(auth.verify());

		assert_eq!(auth, MailboxAuthorization::deserialize(&auth.serialize()).unwrap());

		// an old one
		let decoded = MailboxAuthorization::deserialize_hex("023f6712126b93bd479baec93fa4b6e6eb7aa8100b2e818954a351e2eb459ccbeac3380369000000000163b3184156804eb26ffbad964a70840229c4ac80da5da9f9a7557874c45259af48671aa26f567c3c855092c51a1ceeb8a17c7540abe0a50e89866bdb90ece9").unwrap();
		assert_eq!(decoded.expiry, 1761818819);
		assert_eq!(decoded.id.to_string(), "023f6712126b93bd479baec93fa4b6e6eb7aa8100b2e818954a351e2eb459ccbea");
		assert!(decoded.verify());
	}

	#[test]
	fn mailbox_type_round_trip() {
		let ar = MailboxType::ArkoorReceive;
		let rpc = MailboxType::RoundParticipationCompleted;
		let ln = MailboxType::LnRecvPendingPayment;
		let rvi = MailboxType::RecoveryVtxoId;
		let lsf = MailboxType::LnSendFinished;

		let cases = [
			(ar, u32::from(ar), ar.as_str()),
			(rpc, u32::from(rpc), rpc.as_str()),
			(ln, u32::from(ln), ln.as_str()),
			(rvi, u32::from(rvi), rvi.as_str()),
			(lsf, u32::from(lsf), lsf.as_str()),
		];

		let mut seen_u32 = std::collections::HashSet::new();

		for (variant, expected_u32, expected_str) in cases {
			let actual = u32::from(variant);
			assert_eq!(actual, expected_u32, "wrong u32 for {:?}", variant);

			let actual = String::from(variant);
			assert_eq!(actual, expected_str, "wrong str for {:?}", variant);

			let round_trip = actual.parse::<MailboxType>().unwrap();
			assert_eq!(round_trip, variant);

			assert!(seen_u32.insert(expected_u32), "duplicate u32 value: {}", expected_u32);
		}

		assert!(MailboxType::try_from(cases.len() as u32).is_err());
		assert!(MailboxType::try_from(u32::MAX).is_err());
		assert!(MailboxType::try_from(999_999).is_err());
		assert!(MailboxType::from_str("arkor_receive").is_err()); // typo
		assert!(MailboxType::from_str("").is_err());
		assert!(MailboxType::from_str("ARKOOR_RECEIVE").is_err()); // case-sensitive
	}
}