pub fn same_origin(left: &url::Url, right: &url::Url) -> bool {
left.origin() == right.origin()
}
pub fn url_origin_for_logging(raw_url: &str) -> String {
let Ok(mut url) = url::Url::parse(raw_url) else {
return "<invalid URL>".to_string();
};
url.set_username("").ok();
url.set_password(None).ok();
url.set_path("/");
url.set_query(None);
url.set_fragment(None);
url.to_string()
}
pub fn is_sensitive_header(name: &str) -> bool {
if ["authorization", "proxy-authorization", "cookie", "cookie2"]
.iter()
.any(|sensitive| name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(sensitive))
{
return true;
}
name.split(|character: char| !character.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
.any(|part| {
[
"auth",
"authentication",
"bearer",
"credential",
"credentials",
"csrf",
"key",
"password",
"passwd",
"secret",
"session",
"signature",
"token",
"xsrf",
]
.iter()
.any(|sensitive| part.eq_ignore_ascii_case(sensitive))
})
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RedirectOriginScope {
initial_url: url::Url,
crossed_origin: bool,
}
impl RedirectOriginScope {
pub fn new(initial_url: url::Url) -> Self {
Self {
initial_url,
crossed_origin: false,
}
}
pub fn with_sensitive_headers_allowed(mut self, allowed: bool) -> Self {
self.crossed_origin = !allowed;
self
}
pub fn allows_sensitive_headers(&self, target: &url::Url) -> bool {
!self.crossed_origin && same_origin(&self.initial_url, target)
}
pub fn follow_redirect(&mut self, current: &url::Url, target: &url::Url) {
self.crossed_origin |= !same_origin(current, target);
}
pub fn remove_sensitive_headers(&mut self) {
self.crossed_origin = true;
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{RedirectOriginScope, is_sensitive_header, same_origin, url_origin_for_logging};
#[test]
fn logging_url_keeps_only_origin_and_hides_invalid_input() {
assert_eq!(
url_origin_for_logging(
"https://user:password@example.test:8443/private/file?token=secret#fragment"
),
"https://example.test:8443/"
);
assert_eq!(
url_origin_for_logging("not a URL with secret data"),
"<invalid URL>"
);
}
#[test]
fn origin_comparison_includes_scheme_host_and_effective_port() {
let initial = url::Url::parse("https://example.test/file").unwrap();
assert!(same_origin(
&initial,
&url::Url::parse("https://example.test:443/other").unwrap()
));
assert!(!same_origin(
&initial,
&url::Url::parse("http://example.test/file").unwrap()
));
assert!(!same_origin(
&initial,
&url::Url::parse("https://cdn.example.test/file").unwrap()
));
assert!(!same_origin(
&initial,
&url::Url::parse("https://example.test:8443/file").unwrap()
));
}
#[test]
fn crossing_an_origin_boundary_strips_credentials_for_the_rest_of_the_chain() {
let initial = url::Url::parse("https://example.test/file").unwrap();
let other = url::Url::parse("https://cdn.example.test/file").unwrap();
let mut scope = RedirectOriginScope::new(initial.clone());
assert!(scope.allows_sensitive_headers(&initial));
scope.follow_redirect(&initial, &other);
assert!(!scope.allows_sensitive_headers(&other));
scope.follow_redirect(&other, &initial);
assert!(!scope.allows_sensitive_headers(&initial));
}
#[test]
fn recognizes_standard_and_conventional_sensitive_headers() {
for name in [
"Authorization",
"Cookie",
"X-API-Key",
"X-Session-Token",
"X-CSRF-Token",
] {
assert!(is_sensitive_header(name), "{name}");
}
assert!(!is_sensitive_header("X-Trace-ID"));
}
}