# Session Key Derivation via HKDF
When applications stream personalized or user-scoped components, each user session requires an isolated signing key to prevent cross-tenant message forgery.
## 1. HKDF-SHA256 Derivation Architecture
Instead of storing ephemeral signing keys in Redis or server memory, Anza derives deterministic 32-byte stream keys from the user's session token or JWT signature using HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation (HKDF-SHA256, RFC 5869).
```
User Session Token / JWT Signature
│
▼ (IKM: Input Keying Material)
┌────────────────────────┐
│ HKDF-Extract │ ◄── Master Salt (Configured on Engine)
└───────────┬────────────┘
│ (PRK: Pseudorandom Key)
▼
┌────────────────────────┐
│ HKDF-Expand │ ◄── Info: "anza-stui-user-stream-v1"
└───────────┬────────────┘
│
▼
User-Scoped 32-byte Stream Key
```
## 2. Rust API Usage
Located in `src/crypto/hkdf/derive.rs`:
```rust
use anza::crypto::hkdf::derive as derive_key;
let session_token = b"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...";
let engine_salt = b"anza-cluster-salt-2026";
let info = b"user-live-feed";
let user_stream_key = derive_key(session_token, engine_salt, info, 32)?;
assert_eq!(user_stream_key.len(), 32);
```
### Properties
1. **Stateless**: The server re-derives the stream key on incoming SSE requests without cache lookups or database hits.
2. **Cryptographic Isolation**: Knowing one user's derived key provides zero information about other users' keys.