ant-node 0.14.2

//! Threat-model proof-of-concept tests for the gossip-triggered
//! contiguous-subtree storage audit (ADR-0002,
//! `docs/adr/ADR-0002-gossip-triggered-contiguous-subtree-audit.md`).
//!
//! Each test models a specific storage-binding attack from the security
//! review that motivated ADR-0002 and asserts that the subtree-audit
//! mechanisms reject it. This file is the single canonical place to look for
//! "does the subtree audit actually close the storage-binding holes?" — each
//! `#[test]` docstring describes the attack it closes.
//!
//! ## How the auditor is modelled here
//!
//! The production auditor's `verify_subtree_response` (in
//! `src/replication/storage_commitment_audit.rs`) is private, so this file
//! reproduces the exact ordered gates it runs — pin, peer-id binding,
//! signature, structural [`verify_subtree_proof`], then the **round-2 byte
//! challenge**: the auditor demands the ORIGINAL chunk bytes for a
//! nonce-selected sample of the just-proven leaves FROM THE RESPONDER and
//! verifies the served content against each leaf's committed `bytes_hash`
//! (content address) and `nonced_hash` (freshness). Possession is
//! non-delegable: the auditor needs to hold NONE of the responder's chunks,
//! and a committed key the responder cannot serve is a deterministic,
//! confirmed failure (`DigestMismatch` in production — never inconclusive,
//! never graced). The helper [`auditor_accepts`] runs these gates in the same
//! order with the same failure semantics, so a reviewer can see each attack
//! is caught at the same gate the network code would catch it.
//!
//! ## What changed from the old per-key audit (and why)
//!
//! The OLD audit named individual keys and sampled a per-key Merkle inclusion
//! proof + digest. The subtree audit names NO keys: the nonce alone selects one
//! contiguous subtree, the responder must expand it in full, and a few leaves
//! are byte-checked. Consequently these per-key-only attacks were DROPPED — they
//! have no analogue under subtree sampling:
//!
//!   * "key not in commitment" / overclaim-via-partial-commitment — the auditor
//!     never names a key, so a responder can't be asked to prove an uncommitted
//!     key; it proves whatever the nonce selects from its own committed tree.
//!   * per-key digest order / per-key path tamper — replaced by the subtree
//!     structural checks (leaf count, ascending order, cut-hash count, root
//!     rebuild) and the per-leaf real-bytes spot-check.
//!   * `RecentProvers` holder-credit revocation/rotation tests — those exercised
//!     the cache binding, not the audit proof, and now live with the cache; the
//!     subtree auditor credits per proven leaf (`AuditCredit`) but the credit
//!     binding itself is unchanged and tested elsewhere.
//!
//! Attacks PRESERVED in spirit, ported to the subtree model: fresh-commitment
//! substitution, cross-peer commitment substitution, throwaway-key
//! substitution, wrong-signer, replay-under-fresh-nonce, repudiation of a
//! recently gossiped pin, and the lazy/relay "holds addresses not bytes"
//! fabricated-possession attack. Plus subtree-native structural attacks:
//! tampered cut-hash, wrong leaf count, reordered leaves.

#![allow(
    clippy::unwrap_used,
    clippy::expect_used,
    clippy::panic,
    clippy::missing_panics_doc,
    clippy::redundant_clone,
    clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
    clippy::doc_markdown,
    clippy::needless_borrows_for_generic_args
)]

use ant_node::replication::commitment::{
    commitment_hash, leaf_hash, sign_commitment, verify_commitment_signature, MerkleTree,
    StorageCommitment,
};
use ant_node::replication::commitment_state::{BuiltCommitment, ResponderCommitmentState};
use ant_node::replication::config::AUDIT_SPOTCHECK_COUNT;
use ant_node::replication::subtree::{
    build_subtree_proof, nonced_leaf_hash, select_spotcheck_indices, select_subtree_path,
    verify_subtree_proof, StructureVerdict, SubtreeProof,
};
use rand::Rng;
use saorsa_pqc::api::sig::{ml_dsa_65, MlDsaPublicKey, MlDsaSecretKey};

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fixtures
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

fn keypair() -> (MlDsaPublicKey, MlDsaSecretKey) {
    ml_dsa_65().generate_keypair().unwrap()
}

/// Deterministic chunk bytes for key index `i`. The committed tree is built
/// from `BLAKE3(content(i))`, so an honest proof — which hashes the same bytes —
/// reconstructs the committed root and passes the real-bytes spot-check.
fn content(i: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
    let mut v = key(i).to_vec();
    v.extend_from_slice(b"subtree-audit-chunk-body");
    v.extend_from_slice(&i.to_le_bytes());
    v
}

fn content_hash(i: u32) -> [u8; 32] {
    *blake3::hash(&content(i)).as_bytes()
}

/// Big-endian key so numeric order matches the MerkleTree sort order; this lets
/// us reason about leaf positions when we tamper with them.
fn key(i: u32) -> [u8; 32] {
    let mut k = [0u8; 32];
    k[..4].copy_from_slice(&i.to_be_bytes());
    k
}

/// A responder identity (real ML-DSA keypair) plus its retention state. Peer
/// identity is derived from the public key exactly as in production
/// (saorsa-core `peer_id_from_public_key` = `BLAKE3(pubkey_bytes)`).
struct Responder {
    state: ResponderCommitmentState,
    public_key: MlDsaPublicKey,
    secret_key: MlDsaSecretKey,
    peer_id_bytes: [u8; 32],
}

impl Responder {
    fn new() -> Self {
        let (public_key, secret_key) = keypair();
        let peer_id_bytes = *blake3::hash(&public_key.to_bytes()).as_bytes();
        Self {
            state: ResponderCommitmentState::new(),
            public_key,
            secret_key,
            peer_id_bytes,
        }
    }

    /// Commit to keys `[0, n)` and rotate that commitment into `current`.
    /// Returns the new commitment hash.
    fn commit_to_range(&self, n: u32) -> [u8; 32] {
        let entries: Vec<_> = (0..n).map(|i| (key(i), content_hash(i))).collect();
        let built = BuiltCommitment::build(
            entries,
            &self.peer_id_bytes,
            &self.secret_key,
            &self.public_key.to_bytes(),
        )
        .unwrap();
        let h = built.hash();
        self.state.rotate(built);
        h
    }
}

/// Bytes source for an HONEST responder: it really holds every chunk it
/// committed to, so it can always produce a correct `nonced_hash`.
fn honest_bytes(k: &[u8; 32]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
    for i in 0..4096u32 {
        if &key(i) == k {
            return Some(content(i));
        }
    }
    None
}

/// The auditor's full ordered verification, mirroring the production
/// `verify_subtree_response` gates. Returns `Ok(byte_checked_count)` on accept.
///
/// `responder_serves(k)` models round 2 (`SubtreeByteChallenge`): what the
/// RESPONDER returns when the auditor demands the original bytes of sampled
/// leaf `k`. `Some(bytes)` is a `SubtreeByteItem::Present`; `None` is an
/// explicit `Absent` or an omitted key — a committed key the responder will
/// not serve, which production `verify_byte_response` counts as a confirmed
/// `DigestMismatch`. The auditor verifies the SERVED content, so it needs to
/// hold none of the responder's chunks and no inconclusive lane exists.
fn auditor_accepts(
    challenged_peer_id: &[u8; 32],
    expected_commitment_hash: &[u8; 32],
    nonce: &[u8; 32],
    commitment: &StorageCommitment,
    proof: &SubtreeProof,
    responder_serves: impl Fn(&[u8; 32]) -> Option<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<usize, AuditError> {
    // -- Gate: pin + peer-id binding + signature ----------------------------
    if commitment.sender_peer_id != *challenged_peer_id {
        return Err(AuditError::SenderPeerIdMismatch);
    }
    let derived = *blake3::hash(&commitment.sender_public_key).as_bytes();
    if derived != commitment.sender_peer_id {
        return Err(AuditError::PeerIdKeyMismatch);
    }
    match commitment_hash(commitment) {
        Some(h) if &h == expected_commitment_hash => {}
        _ => return Err(AuditError::CommitmentHashMismatch),
    }
    if !verify_commitment_signature(commitment) {
        return Err(AuditError::SignatureInvalid);
    }

    // -- Gate: structure ----------------------------------------------------
    if let StructureVerdict::Invalid(why) = verify_subtree_proof(proof, nonce, commitment) {
        return Err(AuditError::StructureInvalid(why));
    }

    // -- Gate: round-2 byte challenge (responder-served possession) ----------
    // Mirrors `verify_subtree_response` round 2: the sample is chosen with FRESH
    // randomness over the RECEIVED proof leaves (NOT nonce-derived), AFTER round
    // 1, so the responder cannot predict which leaves will be opened (§1
    // cut-and-choose soundness). EVERY sampled leaf must verify from the bytes
    // the responder serves. There is no skip and no inconclusive lane: a
    // committed key the responder cannot serve is a provable lie.
    let spot = random_sample_indices(
        proof.leaves.len(),
        AUDIT_SPOTCHECK_COUNT.clamp(3, 5) as usize,
    );
    if spot.is_empty() {
        // Cannot happen after a valid structure (the subtree is never empty),
        // but mirror the production guard: never credit an unproven peer.
        return Err(AuditError::StructureInvalid("empty spot-check sample"));
    }
    let mut checked = 0usize;
    for idx in spot {
        let leaf = proof
            .leaves
            .get(idx)
            .ok_or(AuditError::StructureInvalid("spot index out of range"))?;
        let Some(bytes) = responder_serves(&leaf.key) else {
            // Absent/omitted committed key → confirmed failure (production
            // maps this to `DigestMismatch`), NOT a skip.
            return Err(AuditError::CommittedKeyUnserved);
        };
        let plain = *blake3::hash(&bytes).as_bytes();
        let nonced = nonced_leaf_hash(nonce, &commitment.sender_peer_id, &leaf.key, &bytes);
        if leaf.bytes_hash != plain || leaf.nonced_hash != nonced {
            return Err(AuditError::RealBytesMismatch);
        }
        checked += 1;
    }
    Ok(checked)
}

/// `count` distinct random indices in `0..n` — the auditor's FRESH round-2
/// sample, chosen after the proof is in hand (mirrors production
/// `random_spotcheck_leaves`). Not nonce-derived: that is the whole point of
/// the §1 fix.
fn random_sample_indices(n: usize, count: usize) -> Vec<usize> {
    if n == 0 {
        return Vec::new();
    }
    let want = count.min(n);
    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
    let mut picked = std::collections::BTreeSet::new();
    while picked.len() < want {
        picked.insert(rng.gen_range(0..n));
    }
    picked.into_iter().collect()
}

#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum AuditError {
    SenderPeerIdMismatch,
    PeerIdKeyMismatch,
    CommitmentHashMismatch,
    SignatureInvalid,
    StructureInvalid(&'static str),
    /// Round 2: the responder served content that does not hash to the
    /// committed address / freshness hash (production: `DigestMismatch`).
    RealBytesMismatch,
    /// Round 2: the responder would not serve a committed, sampled key
    /// (production: `DigestMismatch` — a deterministic, confirmed failure).
    CommittedKeyUnserved,
}

/// Build an honest subtree proof for `nonce` against the responder's current
/// committed tree, returning `(proof, commitment)` as the auditor would receive
/// them in a `SubtreeAuditResponse::Proof`.
fn honest_proof_and_commitment(
    r: &Responder,
    nonce: &[u8; 32],
) -> (SubtreeProof, StorageCommitment) {
    let built = r.state.current().unwrap();
    let proof = build_subtree_proof(built.tree(), nonce, &r.peer_id_bytes, honest_bytes).unwrap();
    (proof, built.commitment().clone())
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Sanity: the honest path the attack tests are measured against actually passes
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Anchor: an honest responder that committed to its keys and still holds the
/// bytes produces a proof the (modelled) auditor accepts. Without this, the
/// rejection assertions below could pass vacuously.
#[test]
fn honest_responder_passes_audit() {
    let nonce = [0xCD; 32];
    let honest = Responder::new();
    let pin = honest.commit_to_range(64);
    let (proof, commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&honest, &nonce);

    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &honest.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &nonce,
        &commitment,
        &proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert!(res.is_ok(), "honest path must pass, got {res:?}");
    assert!(res.unwrap() >= 1, "must byte-check at least one leaf");
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Storage-binding path A: lazy/relay node holds chunk ADDRESSES, not bytes
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Attack 1a (path A) — the storage-binding heart of the subtree
/// audit. A lazy/relay node retained the gossiped commitment and knows every
/// leaf's `bytes_hash` (that value IS the chunk's network address, which is
/// public), but it DROPPED the actual bytes. It fabricates a proof: correct
/// `key` and correct `bytes_hash` for every selected leaf (so the structural
/// root rebuild passes), but it cannot compute the `nonced_hash`, which requires
/// the real bytes under a fresh nonce. It fills in a forged `nonced_hash`.
///
/// The structural gate PASSES (addresses alone rebuild the root), proving that
/// structure is NOT sufficient — exactly the storage-binding hole. Round 2 is what
/// catches it: the auditor demands the original bytes FROM THE RELAY, and the
/// relay has nothing to serve. Refusing/omitting a sampled committed key is a
/// confirmed failure, and serving fabricated bytes cannot hash to the
/// committed content address (a preimage break) — both lanes are asserted.
#[test]
fn relay_holding_only_addresses_caught_by_real_bytes_check() {
    let nonce = [0x77; 32];
    let honest_keyset = Responder::new();
    let pin = honest_keyset.commit_to_range(100);
    let built = honest_keyset.state.current().unwrap();

    // The lazy node fabricates the proof from PUBLIC data only: it knows each
    // leaf key and its bytes_hash (== address), but NOT the bytes, so it forges
    // every nonced_hash.
    let path = select_subtree_path(&nonce, built.commitment().key_count).unwrap();
    let mut leaves = Vec::new();
    for idx in path.leaf_start..path.leaf_end {
        let k = built.tree().key_at(idx as usize).unwrap();
        // bytes_hash is public (== the chunk address); the responder fakes the
        // possession hash because it lacks the bytes.
        let forged_nonced = *blake3::hash(b"i-do-not-have-the-bytes").as_bytes();
        leaves.push(ant_node::replication::subtree::SubtreeLeaf {
            key: k,
            bytes_hash: content_hash(idx),
            nonced_hash: forged_nonced,
        });
    }
    // Real sibling cut-hashes from the committed tree (public, derivable).
    let plan = ant_node::replication::subtree::subtree_plan(built.tree(), &nonce).unwrap();
    let forged = SubtreeProof {
        leaves,
        sibling_cut_hashes: plan.sibling_cut_hashes,
    };

    // Structure alone PASSES — addresses are enough to rebuild the root. This
    // is the precise reason structure is insufficient on its own.
    assert_eq!(
        verify_subtree_proof(&forged, &nonce, built.commitment()),
        StructureVerdict::Valid,
        "address-only proof rebuilds the root (structure cannot bind possession)"
    );

    // Lane 1: the relay cannot serve the sampled bytes (it holds none). An
    // unserved committed key is a deterministic, confirmed failure.
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &honest_keyset.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &nonce,
        built.commitment(),
        &forged,
        |_k| None, // the relay has no bytes to serve
    );
    assert_eq!(
        res,
        Err(AuditError::CommittedKeyUnserved),
        "a relay that cannot serve sampled bytes must fail round 2, got {res:?}"
    );

    // Lane 2: the relay serves fabricated bytes instead. They cannot hash to
    // the committed content address, so the served-content check catches it.
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &honest_keyset.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &nonce,
        built.commitment(),
        &forged,
        |_k| Some(b"fabricated-not-the-chunk".to_vec()),
    );
    assert_eq!(
        res,
        Err(AuditError::RealBytesMismatch),
        "fabricated served bytes must fail the content-address check, got {res:?}"
    );
}

/// Attack 1a' (§1 fix — the predict-and-fetch relay). The sharpest version of
/// the relay attack, and the one the §1 review found: a relay holds only public
/// addresses, but it knows the round-1 nonce, so under the OLD nonce-derived
/// sampling it could compute EXACTLY which 3..=5 leaves round 2 would open,
/// fetch only those few chunks from neighbours, fill in correct `nonced_hash`
/// for them, and fabricate `nonced_hash` for every other leaf — passing the
/// audit while holding almost nothing.
///
/// With the fix, the auditor draws the sample with fresh randomness AFTER the
/// proof is committed, so the relay's bet on the nonce-derived indices is
/// uncorrelated with what actually gets opened. We model the relay holding the
/// nonce-derived prediction set and nothing else: the random sample lands on a
/// leaf the relay did NOT fetch with overwhelming probability, and the audit
/// fails. Repeated across many nonces to make the probabilistic catch a
/// near-certainty in aggregate.
#[test]
fn predict_and_fetch_relay_is_caught_by_fresh_random_sample() {
    let r = Responder::new();
    let n: u32 = 400;
    let pin = r.commit_to_range(n);
    let built = r.state.current().unwrap();

    let mut escaped = 0u32;
    let trials = 200u32;
    for t in 0..trials {
        let mut nonce = [0u8; 32];
        nonce[..4].copy_from_slice(&t.to_le_bytes());

        // The relay builds a structurally-valid proof from PUBLIC data, forging
        // every leaf's nonced_hash (it holds no bytes).
        let plan = ant_node::replication::subtree::subtree_plan(built.tree(), &nonce).unwrap();
        let path = select_subtree_path(&nonce, n).unwrap();
        let mut leaves = Vec::new();
        for idx in path.leaf_start..path.leaf_end {
            let k = built.tree().key_at(idx as usize).unwrap();
            leaves.push(ant_node::replication::subtree::SubtreeLeaf {
                key: k,
                bytes_hash: content_hash(idx),
                nonced_hash: *blake3::hash(b"forged").as_bytes(),
            });
        }
        let forged = SubtreeProof {
            leaves,
            sibling_cut_hashes: plan.sibling_cut_hashes,
        };

        // The relay PREDICTS the old nonce-derived sample and fetches exactly
        // those chunks (correct bytes for them only).
        let predicted: std::collections::HashSet<[u8; 32]> =
            select_spotcheck_indices(&nonce, &path, AUDIT_SPOTCHECK_COUNT.clamp(3, 5))
                .into_iter()
                .filter_map(|i| forged.leaves.get(i as usize).map(|l| l.key))
                .collect();

        // Responder serves real bytes ONLY for the predicted set; everything
        // else it cannot serve (it holds no other bytes).
        let res = auditor_accepts(
            &r.peer_id_bytes,
            &pin,
            &nonce,
            built.commitment(),
            &forged,
            |k| {
                // The relay can only serve bytes for the chunks it fetched (the
                // predicted set); for those it returns the real content.
                if predicted.contains(k) {
                    (0..n).find(|&i| &key(i) == k).map(content)
                } else {
                    None
                }
            },
        );
        if res.is_ok() {
            escaped += 1;
        }
    }
    // The fresh-random sample must catch the predict-and-fetch relay in the
    // overwhelming majority of audits (it only slips when the random sample
    // happens to fall entirely inside the small predicted set — vanishingly
    // rare and never sustained, since each audit redraws).
    assert!(
        escaped <= trials / 20,
        "fresh-random sampling let the predict-and-fetch relay pass too often: \
         {escaped}/{trials} (the §1 fix should make this ~0)"
    );
}

/// Attack 1a, detection-probability framing: a responder that fabricates a
/// FRACTION of leaves (holds some bytes, forged the rest) survives one audit
/// only with probability `(1 - x)^k` over `k` byte-challenged leaves. Because
/// the auditor now picks the sample with FRESH randomness after the proof is in
/// hand (§1), the attacker cannot aim its forgeries away from the sample. We
/// model the worst case for the attacker — every leaf's freshness forged — so
/// any random sample is fatal; round 2 re-derives the freshness hash from the
/// served bytes and exposes it.
#[test]
fn fabricated_fraction_is_caught_when_a_forged_leaf_is_sampled() {
    let nonce = [0x31; 32];
    let r = Responder::new();
    let pin = r.commit_to_range(400);
    let (mut proof, commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&r, &nonce);

    // Forge every leaf's nonced hash. Under fresh-random sampling the auditor
    // is guaranteed to open a forged leaf, so the audit must fail.
    for leaf in &mut proof.leaves {
        leaf.nonced_hash[0] ^= 0xFF;
    }

    // Even if the responder serves the REAL bytes in round 2, the freshness
    // hash recomputed from that served content exposes the forgery.
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &r.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &nonce,
        &commitment,
        &proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert_eq!(
        res,
        Err(AuditError::RealBytesMismatch),
        "a forged leaf landing under the byte challenge must fail, got {res:?}"
    );
}

/// Attack 1a, non-delegable possession (the lane that replaced "inconclusive"):
/// a relay returns a structurally-valid, address-only proof and the AUDITOR
/// holds none of the chunks — the pre-ADR-0002 design had to call this
/// inconclusive because it byte-checked against the auditor's own copies.
/// Under the shipped two-round audit there is no such lane: round 2 demands
/// the bytes from the RESPONDER, so auditor overlap is irrelevant and a relay
/// that cannot serve its committed bytes fails DETERMINISTICALLY (a confirmed
/// failure in production, not idle/inconclusive, and never a free pass).
#[test]
fn relay_unable_to_serve_bytes_fails_deterministically_regardless_of_auditor_overlap() {
    let nonce = [0x19; 32];
    let r = Responder::new();
    let pin = r.commit_to_range(100);
    // Honest structure (real bytes existed at commit time), so round 1 passes;
    // the point is the responder dropped the bytes and cannot serve them.
    let (proof, commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&r, &nonce);

    let relay_serves_nothing = |_k: &[u8; 32]| -> Option<Vec<u8>> { None };
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &r.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &nonce,
        &commitment,
        &proof,
        relay_serves_nothing,
    );
    assert_eq!(
        res,
        Err(AuditError::CommittedKeyUnserved),
        "an unserved sampled key ⇒ deterministic confirmed failure, got {res:?}"
    );
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Storage-binding path B: fresh-commitment substitution
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Attack 1b (path B): a responder builds a FRESH commitment over a
/// different key set and answers with a valid proof against THAT commitment,
/// while the auditor pinned the hash of the commitment the peer actually
/// gossiped. The auditor's pin (`commitment_hash == expected_commitment_hash`)
/// rejects the substitution before any structural work.
#[test]
fn fresh_commitment_substitution_rejected_by_pin() {
    let nonce = [0xCD; 32];

    let original = Responder::new();
    let pinned_hash = original.commit_to_range(64);

    // Same peer rotates to a fresh commitment over a different range; it can
    // build a perfectly valid proof against the NEW commitment.
    let fresh_hash = original.commit_to_range(32);
    assert_ne!(pinned_hash, fresh_hash);
    let (proof, fresh_commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&original, &nonce);

    // Auditor still pins the ORIGINAL hash.
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &original.peer_id_bytes,
        &pinned_hash, // <- original pin, not fresh_hash
        &nonce,
        &fresh_commitment,
        &proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert_eq!(
        res,
        Err(AuditError::CommitmentHashMismatch),
        "fresh-commitment substitution must trip the pin, got {res:?}"
    );
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Storage-binding path C: cross-peer commitment substitution
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Attack 1c (peer impersonation): peer Q lifts peer P's signed
/// commitment from gossip and embeds it in its own response, hoping the auditor
/// verifies P's signature by mistake. The auditor binds the commitment's
/// `sender_peer_id` to the challenged peer; the stolen commitment names P, not
/// Q, so it is rejected before any signature/structure work.
#[test]
fn cross_peer_commitment_substitution_rejected_by_sender_id() {
    let nonce = [0xCD; 32];

    let real_p = Responder::new();
    let p_hash = real_p.commit_to_range(64);
    let (p_proof, p_commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&real_p, &nonce);

    // Auditor is challenging Q (a different peer id) but somehow holds p_hash in
    // its pin (modelling a mis-binding); Q replays P's commitment + proof.
    let q_peer_id = [0xCC; 32];
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &q_peer_id, // challenged peer is Q
        &p_hash,
        &nonce,
        &p_commitment, // sender_peer_id == P, not Q
        &p_proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert_eq!(
        res,
        Err(AuditError::SenderPeerIdMismatch),
        "cross-peer substitution must trip the sender-id binding, got {res:?}"
    );
}

/// Attack 1c': throwaway-key substitution. An adversary wants to answer as peer
/// P (whose pubkey it does NOT control). It builds a commitment naming P's
/// peer_id but embedding a throwaway pubkey it can sign with — the signature
/// verifies under the embedded key. The peer-id↔key binding
/// (`peer_id == BLAKE3(embedded_pubkey)`) rejects it: the embedded throwaway key
/// does not hash to P's peer_id.
#[test]
#[allow(clippy::similar_names)]
fn throwaway_key_substitution_rejected_by_pubkey_binding() {
    let nonce = [0xCD; 32];

    // P's real identity (adversary does not hold P's secret key).
    let (p_pubkey, _p_secret) = keypair();
    let p_peer_id = *blake3::hash(&p_pubkey.to_bytes()).as_bytes();

    // Adversary's throwaway keypair.
    let (throwaway_pk, throwaway_sk) = keypair();
    let throwaway_pk_bytes = throwaway_pk.to_bytes();

    // Build a commitment naming P's peer_id but embedding+signing with the
    // throwaway key.
    let entries: Vec<_> = (0..8u32).map(|i| (key(i), content_hash(i))).collect();
    let tree = MerkleTree::build(entries).unwrap();
    let root = tree.root();
    let key_count = tree.key_count();
    let sig = sign_commitment(
        &throwaway_sk,
        &root,
        key_count,
        &p_peer_id, // claims P (the lie)
        &throwaway_pk_bytes,
    )
    .unwrap();
    let bad_commit = StorageCommitment {
        root,
        key_count,
        sender_peer_id: p_peer_id,
        sender_public_key: throwaway_pk_bytes,
        signature: sig,
    };
    let pin = commitment_hash(&bad_commit).unwrap();

    // A perfectly valid proof against the bad commitment's own tree.
    let proof = build_subtree_proof(&tree, &nonce, &p_peer_id, honest_bytes).unwrap();

    let res = auditor_accepts(&p_peer_id, &pin, &nonce, &bad_commit, &proof, honest_bytes);
    assert_eq!(
        res,
        Err(AuditError::PeerIdKeyMismatch),
        "throwaway-key attack must trip the peer-id↔key binding, got {res:?}"
    );
}

/// Attack 1c'' — wrong signer at the signature gate. To isolate the signature
/// gate from the bindings above, the adversary swaps BOTH the embedded pubkey
/// and the sender_peer_id to a consistent (wrong) identity, and re-pins the
/// auditor to the mutated commitment. Now the peer-id binding and pin pass, but
/// the signature was produced under the ORIGINAL secret key over the ORIGINAL
/// payload — it cannot verify under the swapped key.
#[test]
fn wrong_signer_rejected_at_signature_gate() {
    let nonce = [0xCD; 32];

    let responder = Responder::new();
    responder.commit_to_range(16);
    let (proof, commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&responder, &nonce);

    let (wrong_pk, _wrong_sk) = keypair();
    let wrong_pk_bytes = wrong_pk.to_bytes();
    let wrong_peer_id = *blake3::hash(&wrong_pk_bytes).as_bytes();

    let mut bad_commit = commitment.clone();
    bad_commit.sender_public_key = wrong_pk_bytes;
    bad_commit.sender_peer_id = wrong_peer_id;
    let new_pin = commitment_hash(&bad_commit).unwrap();

    // The proof's leaves bind the ORIGINAL peer_id in their nonced hashes, but
    // the signature gate fires BEFORE the structural/real-bytes gates, so it is
    // the first (and asserted) failure.
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &wrong_peer_id,
        &new_pin,
        &nonce,
        &bad_commit,
        &proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert_eq!(
        res,
        Err(AuditError::SignatureInvalid),
        "swapped embedded key must trip the signature gate, got {res:?}"
    );
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Storage-binding path D: replay an old response under a fresh nonce
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Attack 1d (replay): the auditor issues a fresh nonce each audit.
/// The nonce both selects the subtree AND freshens every leaf's possession hash,
/// so a response captured under an old nonce cannot be replayed: the new nonce
/// selects a different subtree (wrong leaf set / cut-hash count) and the stale
/// nonced hashes no longer match. Asserts the structural gate alone already
/// rejects the stale proof under the new nonce.
#[test]
fn audit_response_replay_blocked_by_fresh_nonce() {
    let old_nonce = [0xCD; 32];
    let fresh_nonce = [0xEF; 32];

    let r = Responder::new();
    let pin = r.commit_to_range(256);
    let (stale_proof, commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&r, &old_nonce);

    // Sanity: the stale proof was valid under its own (old) nonce.
    assert_eq!(
        verify_subtree_proof(&stale_proof, &old_nonce, &commitment),
        StructureVerdict::Valid
    );

    // Replayed verbatim under the fresh nonce, it fails — the new nonce selects
    // a different subtree, so even the structure no longer reconstructs.
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &r.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &fresh_nonce, // <- different nonce
        &commitment,
        &stale_proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert!(
        matches!(res, Err(AuditError::StructureInvalid(_))),
        "replay under a fresh nonce must fail the structural gate, got {res:?}"
    );
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Subtree-native structural attacks (replace the old per-key path/order tamper)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Tampering a sibling cut-hash breaks the root rebuild. (Subtree analogue of
/// the old per-key "tamper the inclusion path" attack.)
#[test]
fn tampered_cut_hash_rejected() {
    let nonce = [0x0B; 32];
    let r = Responder::new();
    let pin = r.commit_to_range(256);
    let (mut proof, commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&r, &nonce);
    assert!(
        !proof.sibling_cut_hashes.is_empty(),
        "a 256-leaf tree selects a deep subtree with cut-hashes"
    );
    if let Some(c) = proof.sibling_cut_hashes.first_mut() {
        c[0] ^= 0x01;
    }
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &r.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &nonce,
        &commitment,
        &proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert!(
        matches!(res, Err(AuditError::StructureInvalid(_))),
        "tampered cut-hash must fail structure, got {res:?}"
    );
}

/// Dropping a leaf yields the wrong leaf count for the agreed subtree. The
/// auditor re-derives the exact expected count from `(nonce, key_count)` and
/// rejects.
#[test]
fn wrong_leaf_count_rejected() {
    let nonce = [0x0C; 32];
    let r = Responder::new();
    let pin = r.commit_to_range(100);
    let (mut proof, commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&r, &nonce);
    proof.leaves.pop();
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &r.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &nonce,
        &commitment,
        &proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert_eq!(
        res,
        Err(AuditError::StructureInvalid("wrong leaf count")),
        "dropped leaf must fail the leaf-count check, got {res:?}"
    );
}

/// Reordering leaves violates the strict ascending-key order the committed tree
/// enforces (and would otherwise let a responder shuffle leaves to dodge the
/// spot-check). Rejected structurally.
#[test]
fn reordered_leaves_rejected() {
    let nonce = [0x0D; 32];
    let r = Responder::new();
    let pin = r.commit_to_range(100);
    let (mut proof, commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&r, &nonce);
    assert!(proof.leaves.len() >= 2);
    proof.leaves.swap(0, 1);
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &r.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &nonce,
        &commitment,
        &proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert!(
        matches!(res, Err(AuditError::StructureInvalid(_))),
        "reordered leaves must fail structure, got {res:?}"
    );
}

/// Tampering a leaf's `bytes_hash` (claiming a different chunk at a committed
/// position) breaks the root rebuild — the leaf hash binds (key, bytes_hash).
#[test]
fn tampered_leaf_bytes_hash_rejected() {
    let nonce = [0x0E; 32];
    let r = Responder::new();
    let pin = r.commit_to_range(100);
    let (mut proof, commitment) = honest_proof_and_commitment(&r, &nonce);
    proof.leaves[0].bytes_hash[0] ^= 0x01;
    let res = auditor_accepts(
        &r.peer_id_bytes,
        &pin,
        &nonce,
        &commitment,
        &proof,
        honest_bytes,
    );
    assert!(
        matches!(res, Err(AuditError::StructureInvalid(_))),
        "tampered bytes_hash must fail structure, got {res:?}"
    );
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Repudiation: rejecting a recently-gossiped pinned commitment
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Attack: a responder repudiates a commitment it just gossiped — it answers a
/// pin for a commitment it no longer retains. Because the auditor only ever pins
/// a commitment the peer JUST gossiped, and an honest responder retains its last
/// two GOSSIPED commitments, a `lookup_by_hash` miss for a gossiped pin is a
/// confirmed failure. This test pins the retention contract: a gossiped pin
/// stays answerable across the next rotation, but a NEVER-gossiped commitment is
/// dropped on the next rotation (so the responder rightly cannot answer a pin it
/// never put on the wire).
#[test]
fn repudiating_a_gossiped_pin_is_detectable_via_lookup_miss() {
    let r = Responder::new();
    let state = &r.state;

    // c1 is gossiped → must stay answerable across one rotation.
    let h1 = r.commit_to_range(8);
    state.mark_gossiped(h1);
    assert!(
        state.lookup_by_hash(&h1).is_some(),
        "gossiped pin must be answerable immediately"
    );

    // Rotate + gossip c2. c1 is within the last-2-gossiped window → still here.
    let h2 = r.commit_to_range(16);
    state.mark_gossiped(h2);
    assert!(
        state.lookup_by_hash(&h1).is_some(),
        "a gossiped commitment must survive one rotation (no false repudiation)"
    );

    // Rotate + gossip c3. Now the last-2-gossiped are {h3, h2}; h1 has aged out
    // and is legitimately dropped (the auditor would no longer pin it).
    let h3 = r.commit_to_range(24);
    state.mark_gossiped(h3);
    assert!(
        state.lookup_by_hash(&h1).is_none(),
        "h1 aged out of the gossip window"
    );
    assert!(state.lookup_by_hash(&h2).is_some());
    assert!(state.lookup_by_hash(&h3).is_some());

    // The detection edge: a commitment that was NEVER gossiped is dropped on the
    // very next rotation, so a responder asked to answer a pin for an
    // ungossiped-then-rotated commitment returns a lookup MISS — which the
    // auditor (since it only pins gossiped roots) reads as repudiation.
    let r2 = Responder::new();
    let ungossiped = r2.commit_to_range(8);
    assert!(r2.state.lookup_by_hash(&ungossiped).is_some());
    let _next = r2.commit_to_range(16); // rotate without gossiping `ungossiped`
    assert!(
        r2.state.lookup_by_hash(&ungossiped).is_none(),
        "an ungossiped commitment is dropped on the next rotation"
    );
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Cross-check lemmas: the primitives the rejection tests rest on
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// The commitment-hash pin is sensitive to every field. This underwrites every
/// "pin doesn't match" assertion above.
#[test]
fn commitment_hash_is_field_sensitive() {
    let (pk, sk) = keypair();
    let pk_bytes = pk.to_bytes();
    let sig = sign_commitment(&sk, &[0; 32], 1, &[0; 32], &pk_bytes).unwrap();
    let c1 = StorageCommitment {
        root: [0; 32],
        key_count: 1,
        sender_peer_id: [0; 32],
        sender_public_key: pk_bytes,
        signature: sig,
    };
    let h1 = commitment_hash(&c1).unwrap();

    for mutate in 0..5u8 {
        let mut c = c1.clone();
        match mutate {
            0 => c.root[0] ^= 1,
            1 => c.key_count += 1,
            2 => c.sender_peer_id[0] ^= 1,
            3 => c.signature[0] ^= 1,
            4 => c.sender_public_key[0] ^= 1,
            _ => unreachable!(),
        }
        let h = commitment_hash(&c).unwrap();
        assert_ne!(h, h1, "mutation {mutate} should change commitment_hash");
    }
}

/// The leaf hash binds (key, bytes_hash): same key + different bytes → different
/// leaf → different root. Underwrites the structural rejections.
#[test]
fn leaf_hash_binds_key_and_bytes() {
    let h1 = leaf_hash(&key(1), &content_hash(1));
    let h2 = leaf_hash(&key(1), &content_hash(2));
    let h3 = leaf_hash(&key(2), &content_hash(1));
    assert_ne!(h1, h2);
    assert_ne!(h1, h3);
    assert_ne!(h2, h3);
}

/// The signature verifies under the embedded key and only that key.
#[test]
fn signature_round_trips_correctly() {
    let (pk1, sk1) = keypair();
    let (pk2, _sk2) = keypair();
    let pk1_bytes = pk1.to_bytes();
    let pk2_bytes = pk2.to_bytes();
    let sig = sign_commitment(&sk1, &[7; 32], 42, &[3; 32], &pk1_bytes).unwrap();
    let c = StorageCommitment {
        root: [7; 32],
        key_count: 42,
        sender_peer_id: [3; 32],
        sender_public_key: pk1_bytes,
        signature: sig,
    };
    assert!(verify_commitment_signature(&c));
    let mut c2 = c.clone();
    c2.sender_public_key = pk2_bytes;
    assert!(!verify_commitment_signature(&c2));
}

/// The per-leaf possession hash binds nonce, peer, key, and bytes — the
/// foundation of the real-bytes spot-check. Changing any input changes it, so a
/// responder cannot reuse a possession hash across nonces/peers/keys/chunks.
#[test]
fn nonced_leaf_hash_binds_all_inputs() {
    let base = nonced_leaf_hash(&[1; 32], &[2; 32], &key(3), b"chunk");
    assert_ne!(
        base,
        nonced_leaf_hash(&[9; 32], &[2; 32], &key(3), b"chunk")
    );
    assert_ne!(
        base,
        nonced_leaf_hash(&[1; 32], &[9; 32], &key(3), b"chunk")
    );
    assert_ne!(
        base,
        nonced_leaf_hash(&[1; 32], &[2; 32], &key(9), b"chunk")
    );
    assert_ne!(
        base,
        nonced_leaf_hash(&[1; 32], &[2; 32], &key(3), b"other")
    );
}