aleph-cli 0.14.0

//! Ethereum keystore V3 (Web3 Secret Storage) encryption and decryption.
//!
//! Pure crypto + serde — no file I/O and no prompting. The read path accepts
//! both scrypt and pbkdf2 (HMAC-SHA256) so keystores exported by other tools
//! import cleanly. The write path (added alongside encryption support) always
//! uses scrypt with geth-strength parameters.

use aes::cipher::{KeyIvInit, StreamCipher};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha3::{Digest, Keccak256};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;

type Aes128Ctr = ctr::Ctr128BE<aes::Aes128>;

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Scrypt fallback implementation
//
// The `scrypt` crate's `Params::new` enforces `log_n < r * 16` (i.e.
// N < 2^(128*r/8)).  Most keystores produced by real-world tools (the
// official Web3 Secret Storage test vector, Python `eth-keyfile` exports)
// use n=262144 with r=1, which violates that constraint (log_n=18 ≥ 16).
//
// `derive_key` therefore tries `scrypt::Params::new` first; if it succeeds
// (e.g. the geth-standard n=2^18, r=8, p=1 we use for writing), the
// battle-tested `scrypt` crate is used.  Only when the crate rejects the
// parameters does execution fall through to the internal `scrypt_kdf` below.
//
// The internal implementation hand-rolls the Salsa20/8 permutation (it does
// NOT use the `salsa20` crate), BlockMix, and ROMix so that the full
// parameter space accepted by real-world keystores can be handled.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

// Pure Salsa20/8 on a 64-byte block (in-place), without going through the
// streaming cipher trait machinery.
//
// Note: small stack temporaries (`x`, `z`) are deliberately not wiped here,
// matching the scrypt crate's own behavior — they are derived from the input
// block and expose no additional secret material beyond what the caller holds.
fn salsa20_8_inplace(block: &mut [u8; 64]) {
    #[inline(always)]
    fn quarter_round(state: &mut [u32; 16], a: usize, b: usize, c: usize, d: usize) {
        state[b] ^= state[a].wrapping_add(state[d]).rotate_left(7);
        state[c] ^= state[b].wrapping_add(state[a]).rotate_left(9);
        state[d] ^= state[c].wrapping_add(state[b]).rotate_left(13);
        state[a] ^= state[d].wrapping_add(state[c]).rotate_left(18);
    }

    let mut x = [0u32; 16];
    for (word, chunk) in x.iter_mut().zip(block.chunks_exact(4)) {
        *word = u32::from_le_bytes(chunk.try_into().unwrap());
    }
    let mut z = x;

    for _ in 0..4 {
        // column rounds
        quarter_round(&mut z, 0, 4, 8, 12);
        quarter_round(&mut z, 5, 9, 13, 1);
        quarter_round(&mut z, 10, 14, 2, 6);
        quarter_round(&mut z, 15, 3, 7, 11);
        // row rounds
        quarter_round(&mut z, 0, 1, 2, 3);
        quarter_round(&mut z, 5, 6, 7, 4);
        quarter_round(&mut z, 10, 11, 8, 9);
        quarter_round(&mut z, 15, 12, 13, 14);
    }

    for (i, word) in z.iter_mut().enumerate() {
        *word = word.wrapping_add(x[i]);
    }

    for (chunk, word) in block.chunks_exact_mut(4).zip(z.iter()) {
        chunk.copy_from_slice(&word.to_le_bytes());
    }
}

/// BlockMix: operates on a slice of length 2*r*64 bytes (= 128*r).
fn scrypt_block_mix(input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8]) {
    debug_assert_eq!(input.len(), output.len());
    debug_assert_eq!(input.len() % 128, 0);
    let mut x = [0u8; 64];
    x.copy_from_slice(&input[input.len() - 64..]);

    // Stack temporary for the XOR+Salsa20/8 step — deliberately not wiped,
    // matching the scrypt crate's own behavior.
    let mut t = [0u8; 64];

    for (i, chunk) in input.chunks_exact(64).enumerate() {
        // t = x XOR chunk
        for j in 0..64 {
            t[j] = x[j] ^ chunk[j];
        }
        salsa20_8_inplace(&mut t);
        x.copy_from_slice(&t);

        // interleaved output: even blocks at the start, odd blocks at the
        // midpoint (matching the scrypt spec / romix crate behaviour).
        let pos = if i % 2 == 0 {
            (i / 2) * 64
        } else {
            (i / 2) * 64 + input.len() / 2
        };
        output[pos..pos + 64].copy_from_slice(&x);
    }
}

/// ROMix: the memory-hard loop.
fn scrypt_ro_mix(b: &mut [u8], n: usize) {
    let len = b.len(); // 128 * r

    // Use Zeroizing wrappers so secrets are wiped on drop even if a panic
    // or early return occurs.
    let mut v = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; n * len]);
    let mut t = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; len]);
    let mut scratch = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; len]);

    // Fill V: V[i] = X, then X = BlockMix(X)
    for i in 0..n {
        v[i * len..(i + 1) * len].copy_from_slice(b);
        scrypt_block_mix(&v[i * len..(i + 1) * len], &mut t);
        b.copy_from_slice(&t);
    }

    // Mix phase
    for _ in 0..n {
        // integerify: the last 64-byte block's first word (LE u32), mod n.
        // Because the 2 GiB ceiling in derive_key guarantees n ≤ 2^24, a
        // 4-byte (u32) integerify is always sufficient.
        let j = {
            let tail = &b[len - 64..len - 60];
            let word = u32::from_le_bytes(tail.try_into().unwrap());
            (word as usize) & (n - 1)
        };
        for k in 0..len {
            scratch[k] = b[k] ^ v[j * len + k];
        }
        scrypt_block_mix(&scratch, b);
    }
}

/// scrypt KDF fallback — used only when `scrypt::Params::new` rejects the
/// parameter set (e.g. n=2^18, r=1 from the official Web3 test vectors).
/// For parameter sets the `scrypt` crate accepts, `derive_key` calls the
/// crate directly and never reaches this function.
fn scrypt_kdf(
    password: &[u8],
    salt: &[u8],
    log_n: u8,
    r: u32,
    p: u32,
    dk: &mut [u8],
) -> Result<(), KeystoreError> {
    let n: usize = 1usize
        .checked_shl(log_n as u32)
        .ok_or_else(|| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat("scrypt n overflows usize".into()))?;
    let r = r as usize;
    let p = p as usize;
    let block_len = 128 * r;

    // B = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256(password, salt, 1, p * 128 * r)
    let b_len = p
        .checked_mul(block_len)
        .ok_or_else(|| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat("scrypt p*128*r overflows".into()))?;

    // Use Zeroizing so the buffer is wiped on drop even on early return.
    let mut b = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; b_len]);
    pbkdf2::pbkdf2_hmac::<sha2::Sha256>(password, salt, 1, &mut b);

    // Apply ROMix to each 128*r-byte block
    for chunk in b.chunks_exact_mut(block_len) {
        scrypt_ro_mix(chunk, n);
    }

    // DK = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256(password, B, 1, dklen)
    pbkdf2::pbkdf2_hmac::<sha2::Sha256>(password, &b, 1, dk);

    Ok(())
}

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum KeystoreError {
    #[error("incorrect password")]
    IncorrectPassword,
    #[error("unsupported keystore version {0} (only version 3 is supported)")]
    UnsupportedVersion(u32),
    #[error("unsupported cipher '{0}' (only aes-128-ctr is supported)")]
    UnsupportedCipher(String),
    #[error("unsupported KDF '{0}' (only scrypt and pbkdf2 are supported)")]
    UnsupportedKdf(String),
    #[error("invalid keystore: {0}")]
    InvalidFormat(String),
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct KeystoreV3 {
    pub version: u32,
    pub id: String,
    /// EVM address, lowercase hex without 0x prefix. Optional: some tools
    /// omit it; we always write it.
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub address: Option<String>,
    /// Some historical tools (e.g. old geth) capitalize this field.
    #[serde(alias = "Crypto")]
    pub crypto: CryptoSection,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct CryptoSection {
    pub cipher: String,
    pub ciphertext: String,
    pub cipherparams: CipherParams,
    pub kdf: String,
    pub kdfparams: KdfParams,
    pub mac: String,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct CipherParams {
    pub iv: String,
}

/// The two variants have disjoint required fields (`n`/`r`/`p` vs
/// `c`/`prf`), so untagged deserialization is unambiguous.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(untagged)]
pub enum KdfParams {
    Scrypt {
        dklen: u32,
        n: u64,
        r: u32,
        p: u32,
        salt: String,
    },
    Pbkdf2 {
        dklen: u32,
        c: u32,
        prf: String,
        salt: String,
    },
}

/// Parse a keystore JSON string.
pub fn parse_keystore(json: &str) -> Result<KeystoreV3, KeystoreError> {
    serde_json::from_str(json).map_err(|e| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(e.to_string()))
}

/// Detect whether `contents` is a V3 keystore.
///
/// Returns `Ok(Some(_))` for a parseable keystore, `Ok(None)` if the
/// contents are not keystore-shaped at all (e.g. a raw hex key — the
/// caller should fall back to other formats), and `Err(_)` if the file
/// is keystore-shaped but malformed (the caller should surface the error
/// rather than misinterpret the file as a hex key).
pub fn try_parse_v3(contents: &str) -> Result<Option<KeystoreV3>, KeystoreError> {
    let Ok(value) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(contents) else {
        return Ok(None);
    };
    let Some(obj) = value.as_object() else {
        return Ok(None);
    };
    if !obj.contains_key("crypto") && !obj.contains_key("Crypto") {
        return Ok(None);
    }
    parse_keystore(contents).map(Some)
}

/// Decode a hex private key (with or without 0x prefix) into 32 bytes.
pub fn decode_key_hex(key_hex: &str) -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>, KeystoreError> {
    let bytes = Zeroizing::new(
        hex::decode(key_hex.trim().trim_start_matches("0x"))
            .map_err(|e| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!("invalid hex private key: {e}")))?,
    );
    if bytes.len() != 32 {
        return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!(
            "private key must be 32 bytes, got {}",
            bytes.len()
        )));
    }
    let mut out = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
    out.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
    Ok(out)
}

fn derive_key(
    crypto: &CryptoSection,
    password: &str,
) -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>, KeystoreError> {
    let mut dk = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
    match (crypto.kdf.as_str(), &crypto.kdfparams) {
        (
            "scrypt",
            KdfParams::Scrypt {
                dklen,
                n,
                r,
                p,
                salt,
            },
        ) => {
            if *dklen != 32 {
                return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat("dklen must be 32".into()));
            }
            if *r == 0 || *p == 0 {
                return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(
                    "scrypt r and p must be nonzero".into(),
                ));
            }
            if *p > 1024 {
                return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat("scrypt p too large".into()));
            }
            // Bound the B buffer (p * 128 * r bytes) like the V buffer below;
            // the n-based ceiling alone does not cover it. This also implies
            // RFC 7914's r * p < 2^30 requirement.
            if (*r as u64) * (*p as u64) * 128 > TWO_GIB {
                return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(
                    "scrypt parameters require too much memory".into(),
                ));
            }
            // Memory ceiling: 128 * r * n must not overflow u64 or exceed 2 GiB.
            // This admits every real-world keystore (geth-heavy n=2^20, r=8 = 1 GiB;
            // official vector = 32 MiB) while bounding hostile input.
            // With this ceiling, n ≤ 2^24, so a 4-byte integerify in scrypt_ro_mix
            // is provably sufficient.
            const TWO_GIB: u64 = 2_147_483_648;
            let mem = (*r as u64)
                .checked_mul(128)
                .and_then(|v| v.checked_mul(*n))
                .ok_or_else(|| {
                    KeystoreError::InvalidFormat("scrypt parameters require too much memory".into())
                })?;
            if mem > TWO_GIB {
                return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(
                    "scrypt parameters require too much memory".into(),
                ));
            }
            let salt = hex::decode(salt)
                .map_err(|e| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!("invalid salt hex: {e}")))?;
            if *n < 2 || !n.is_power_of_two() {
                return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(
                    "scrypt n must be a power of two >= 2".into(),
                ));
            }
            let log_n = n.trailing_zeros() as u8;
            // Prefer the battle-tested `scrypt` crate. Fall back to our own
            // implementation only when the crate rejects the parameters (e.g.
            // n=2^18, r=1 from the official Web3 Secret Storage test vectors,
            // where log_n=18 ≥ r*16=16).
            match scrypt::Params::new(log_n, *r, *p, 32) {
                Ok(params) => {
                    scrypt::scrypt(password.as_bytes(), &salt, &params, &mut dk[..])
                        .map_err(|_| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat("scrypt failed".into()))?;
                }
                Err(_) => {
                    scrypt_kdf(password.as_bytes(), &salt, log_n, *r, *p, &mut dk[..])?;
                }
            }
        }
        (
            "pbkdf2",
            KdfParams::Pbkdf2 {
                dklen,
                c,
                prf,
                salt,
            },
        ) => {
            if *dklen != 32 {
                return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat("dklen must be 32".into()));
            }
            if *c == 0 {
                return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(
                    "pbkdf2 iteration count must be nonzero".into(),
                ));
            }
            if prf != "hmac-sha256" {
                return Err(KeystoreError::UnsupportedKdf(format!(
                    "pbkdf2 with prf '{prf}'"
                )));
            }
            let salt = hex::decode(salt)
                .map_err(|e| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!("invalid salt hex: {e}")))?;
            pbkdf2::pbkdf2_hmac::<sha2::Sha256>(password.as_bytes(), &salt, *c, &mut dk[..]);
        }
        ("scrypt", _) | ("pbkdf2", _) => {
            return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(
                "kdfparams do not match the declared kdf".into(),
            ));
        }
        (other, _) => return Err(KeystoreError::UnsupportedKdf(other.to_string())),
    }
    Ok(dk)
}

/// Verify the MAC and decrypt the private key.
///
/// The MAC is checked (in constant time) before any decryption output is
/// produced; a mismatch is reported as an incorrect password.
pub fn decrypt_key(ks: &KeystoreV3, password: &str) -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>, KeystoreError> {
    if ks.version != 3 {
        return Err(KeystoreError::UnsupportedVersion(ks.version));
    }
    if ks.crypto.cipher != "aes-128-ctr" {
        return Err(KeystoreError::UnsupportedCipher(ks.crypto.cipher.clone()));
    }

    let ciphertext = hex::decode(&ks.crypto.ciphertext)
        .map_err(|e| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!("invalid ciphertext hex: {e}")))?;
    if ciphertext.len() != 32 {
        return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!(
            "ciphertext must be 32 bytes, got {}",
            ciphertext.len()
        )));
    }
    let iv = hex::decode(&ks.crypto.cipherparams.iv)
        .map_err(|e| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!("invalid IV hex: {e}")))?;
    let expected_mac = hex::decode(&ks.crypto.mac)
        .map_err(|e| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!("invalid MAC hex: {e}")))?;
    if expected_mac.len() != 32 {
        return Err(KeystoreError::InvalidFormat("mac must be 32 bytes".into()));
    }

    let dk = derive_key(&ks.crypto, password)?;

    let mac = Keccak256::new()
        .chain_update(&dk[16..32])
        .chain_update(&ciphertext)
        .finalize();
    if mac.as_slice().ct_eq(&expected_mac).unwrap_u8() != 1 {
        return Err(KeystoreError::IncorrectPassword);
    }

    let mut key = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
    key.copy_from_slice(&ciphertext);
    let mut cipher = Aes128Ctr::new_from_slices(&dk[..16], &iv)
        .map_err(|_| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat("IV must be 16 bytes".into()))?;
    cipher.apply_keystream(&mut key[..]);
    Ok(key)
}

/// Scrypt cost parameters for encryption.
pub struct EncryptionParams {
    pub log_n: u8,
    pub r: u32,
    pub p: u32,
}

/// geth-strength defaults: n = 2^18 (262144), r = 8, p = 1
/// (~256 MB and ~1 s per derivation by design).
pub const STANDARD_SCRYPT: EncryptionParams = EncryptionParams {
    log_n: 18,
    r: 8,
    p: 1,
};

/// Encrypt a 32-byte private key with the standard scrypt parameters.
///
/// `address` is the account's 0x-prefixed EVM address; it is stored
/// lowercase without the prefix, per the format convention.
pub fn encrypt_key(
    private_key: &[u8; 32],
    password: &str,
    address: &str,
) -> Result<KeystoreV3, KeystoreError> {
    encrypt_key_with_params(private_key, password, address, &STANDARD_SCRYPT)
}

fn random_uuid() -> String {
    use rand::RngCore;
    let mut b = [0u8; 16];
    rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut b);
    // Set version (4) and variant bits so the id is a well-formed UUIDv4.
    b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40;
    b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80;
    format!(
        "{}-{}-{}-{}-{}",
        hex::encode(&b[0..4]),
        hex::encode(&b[4..6]),
        hex::encode(&b[6..8]),
        hex::encode(&b[8..10]),
        hex::encode(&b[10..16]),
    )
}

pub(crate) fn encrypt_key_with_params(
    private_key: &[u8; 32],
    password: &str,
    address: &str,
    params: &EncryptionParams,
) -> Result<KeystoreV3, KeystoreError> {
    use rand::RngCore;

    let mut salt = [0u8; 32];
    rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
    let mut iv = [0u8; 16];
    rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut iv);

    let mut dk = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
    let sp = scrypt::Params::new(params.log_n, params.r, params.p, 32)
        .map_err(|e| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!("invalid scrypt params: {e}")))?;
    scrypt::scrypt(password.as_bytes(), &salt, &sp, &mut dk[..])
        .map_err(|e| KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(format!("scrypt failed: {e}")))?;

    // Encrypt in place: the buffer starts as the plaintext key (zeroized on
    // drop) and is overwritten with the ciphertext by the XOR keystream.
    let mut ciphertext = Zeroizing::new(*private_key);
    let mut cipher =
        Aes128Ctr::new_from_slices(&dk[..16], &iv).expect("key and IV lengths are fixed");
    cipher.apply_keystream(&mut ciphertext[..]);

    let mac = Keccak256::new()
        .chain_update(&dk[16..32])
        .chain_update(&ciphertext[..])
        .finalize();

    Ok(KeystoreV3 {
        version: 3,
        id: random_uuid(),
        address: Some(address.to_lowercase().trim_start_matches("0x").to_string()),
        crypto: CryptoSection {
            cipher: "aes-128-ctr".to_string(),
            ciphertext: hex::encode(&ciphertext[..]),
            cipherparams: CipherParams {
                iv: hex::encode(iv),
            },
            kdf: "scrypt".to_string(),
            kdfparams: KdfParams::Scrypt {
                dklen: 32,
                n: 1u64 << params.log_n,
                r: params.r,
                p: params.p,
                salt: hex::encode(salt),
            },
            mac: hex::encode(mac),
        },
    })
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    // Official Web3 Secret Storage Definition test vectors.
    // Password: "testpassword"
    // Secret:   7a28b5ba57c53603b0b07b56bba752f7784bf506fa95edc395f5cf6c7514fe9d
    const TEST_SECRET: &str = "7a28b5ba57c53603b0b07b56bba752f7784bf506fa95edc395f5cf6c7514fe9d";

    const PBKDF2_VECTOR: &str = r#"{
        "crypto" : {
            "cipher" : "aes-128-ctr",
            "cipherparams" : { "iv" : "6087dab2f9fdbbfaddc31a909735c1e6" },
            "ciphertext" : "5318b4d5bcd28de64ee5559e671353e16f075ecae9f99c7a79a38af5f869aa46",
            "kdf" : "pbkdf2",
            "kdfparams" : {
                "c" : 262144,
                "dklen" : 32,
                "prf" : "hmac-sha256",
                "salt" : "ae3cd4e7013836a3df6bd7241b12db061dbe2c6785853cce422d148a624ce0bd"
            },
            "mac" : "517ead924a9d0dc3124507e3393d175ce3ff7c1e96529c6c555ce9e51205e9b2"
        },
        "id" : "3198bc9c-6672-5ab3-d995-4942343ae5b6",
        "version" : 3
    }"#;

    const SCRYPT_VECTOR: &str = r#"{
        "crypto" : {
            "cipher" : "aes-128-ctr",
            "cipherparams" : { "iv" : "83dbcc02d8ccb40e466191a123791e0e" },
            "ciphertext" : "d172bf743a674da9cdad04534d56926ef8358534d458fffccd4e6ad2fbde479c",
            "kdf" : "scrypt",
            "kdfparams" : {
                "dklen" : 32,
                "n" : 262144,
                "p" : 8,
                "r" : 1,
                "salt" : "ab0c7876052600dd703518d6fc3fe8984592145b591fc8fb5c6d43190334ba19"
            },
            "mac" : "2103ac29920d71da29f15d75b4a16dbe95cfd7ff8faea1056c33131d846e3097"
        },
        "id" : "3198bc9c-6672-5ab3-d995-4942343ae5b6",
        "version" : 3
    }"#;

    #[test]
    fn parse_v3_pbkdf2() {
        let ks = parse_keystore(PBKDF2_VECTOR).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(ks.version, 3);
        assert!(ks.address.is_none());
        assert_eq!(ks.crypto.kdf, "pbkdf2");
        assert!(matches!(ks.crypto.kdfparams, KdfParams::Pbkdf2 { .. }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn parse_v3_scrypt() {
        let ks = parse_keystore(SCRYPT_VECTOR).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(ks.crypto.kdf, "scrypt");
        assert!(matches!(
            ks.crypto.kdfparams,
            KdfParams::Scrypt {
                n: 262144,
                r: 1,
                p: 8,
                ..
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_official_pbkdf2_vector() {
        let ks = parse_keystore(PBKDF2_VECTOR).unwrap();
        let key = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(hex::encode(&key[..]), TEST_SECRET);
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_official_scrypt_vector() {
        let ks = parse_keystore(SCRYPT_VECTOR).unwrap();
        let key = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(hex::encode(&key[..]), TEST_SECRET);
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_wrong_password_rejected() {
        let ks = parse_keystore(PBKDF2_VECTOR).unwrap();
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "wrongpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, KeystoreError::IncorrectPassword));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_tampered_ciphertext_rejected() {
        let mut ks = parse_keystore(PBKDF2_VECTOR).unwrap();
        // Flip the first nibble of the ciphertext
        let mut ct = ks.crypto.ciphertext.clone();
        ct.replace_range(0..1, if &ct[0..1] == "5" { "6" } else { "5" });
        ks.crypto.ciphertext = ct;
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, KeystoreError::IncorrectPassword));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_unsupported_version_rejected() {
        let mut ks = parse_keystore(PBKDF2_VECTOR).unwrap();
        ks.version = 2;
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, KeystoreError::UnsupportedVersion(2)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decrypt_unsupported_cipher_rejected() {
        let mut ks = parse_keystore(PBKDF2_VECTOR).unwrap();
        ks.crypto.cipher = "aes-256-gcm".to_string();
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, KeystoreError::UnsupportedCipher(_)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn try_parse_v3_detects_keystore() {
        assert!(try_parse_v3(PBKDF2_VECTOR).unwrap().is_some());
    }

    #[test]
    fn try_parse_v3_rejects_raw_hex() {
        assert!(try_parse_v3(TEST_SECRET).unwrap().is_none());
        assert!(try_parse_v3("0xdeadbeef").unwrap().is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn try_parse_v3_rejects_other_json() {
        assert!(try_parse_v3(r#"{"version": 3}"#).unwrap().is_none());
        assert!(try_parse_v3(r#"[1, 2, 3]"#).unwrap().is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn try_parse_v3_errors_on_malformed_keystore() {
        // Keystore-shaped (has "crypto") but missing required fields
        let res = try_parse_v3(r#"{"version": 3, "crypto": {"cipher": "aes-128-ctr"}}"#);
        assert!(res.is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn decode_key_hex_accepts_with_and_without_prefix() {
        let a = decode_key_hex(TEST_SECRET).unwrap();
        let b = decode_key_hex(&format!("0x{TEST_SECRET}")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(&a[..], &b[..]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn decode_key_hex_rejects_wrong_length() {
        assert!(decode_key_hex("abcd").is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn fallback_scrypt_matches_crate_for_valid_params() {
        // (log_n, r, p) sets accepted by scrypt::Params::new — exercise r>1
        // and p>1 paths of our fallback implementation, plus r=1.
        for &(log_n, r, p) in &[
            (4u8, 8u32, 1u32),
            (8, 8, 1),
            (6, 4, 2),
            (4, 2, 4),
            (4, 1, 1),
        ] {
            let mut ours = [0u8; 32];
            scrypt_kdf(b"password", b"salt", log_n, r, p, &mut ours).unwrap();

            let params = scrypt::Params::new(log_n, r, p, 32).unwrap();
            let mut theirs = [0u8; 32];
            scrypt::scrypt(b"password", b"salt", &params, &mut theirs).unwrap();

            assert_eq!(ours, theirs, "mismatch at log_n={log_n} r={r} p={p}");
        }
    }

    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    // Hostile-input regression tests — must return InvalidFormat, never panic
    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    /// Build a scrypt keystore struct from SCRYPT_VECTOR with overridden params.
    fn scrypt_ks_with(n: u64, r: u32, p: u32) -> KeystoreV3 {
        let mut ks = parse_keystore(SCRYPT_VECTOR).unwrap();
        ks.crypto.kdfparams = KdfParams::Scrypt {
            dklen: 32,
            n,
            r,
            p,
            salt: "ab0c7876052600dd703518d6fc3fe8984592145b591fc8fb5c6d43190334ba19".to_string(),
        };
        ks
    }

    #[test]
    fn hostile_scrypt_r_zero_rejected() {
        let ks = scrypt_ks_with(262144, 0, 8);
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(_)),
            "expected InvalidFormat, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn hostile_scrypt_p_zero_rejected() {
        let ks = scrypt_ks_with(262144, 1, 0);
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(_)),
            "expected InvalidFormat, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn hostile_scrypt_n_huge_rejected() {
        // n = 2^63 — overflows memory ceiling
        let ks = scrypt_ks_with(9_223_372_036_854_775_808, 1, 1);
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(_)),
            "expected InvalidFormat, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn hostile_scrypt_exceeds_2gib_ceiling_rejected() {
        // n = 2^32 with r=8: 128 * 8 * 2^32 = 2^43 bytes >> 2 GiB
        let ks = scrypt_ks_with(4_294_967_296, 8, 1);
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(_)),
            "expected InvalidFormat, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn hostile_scrypt_b_buffer_exceeds_ceiling_rejected() {
        // Small n keeps the V ceiling happy, but B = 128 * r * p = 1 TiB.
        let ks = scrypt_ks_with(2, 8_388_608, 1024);
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(_)),
            "expected InvalidFormat, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn hostile_pbkdf2_c_zero_rejected() {
        let mut ks = parse_keystore(PBKDF2_VECTOR).unwrap();
        ks.crypto.kdfparams = KdfParams::Pbkdf2 {
            dklen: 32,
            c: 0,
            prf: "hmac-sha256".to_string(),
            salt: "ae3cd4e7013836a3df6bd7241b12db061dbe2c6785853cce422d148a624ce0bd".to_string(),
        };
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(_)),
            "expected InvalidFormat, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    // MAC length validation
    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn short_mac_rejected_as_invalid_format() {
        let mut ks = parse_keystore(PBKDF2_VECTOR).unwrap();
        // A 16-byte (31 hex chars — odd, so decode would fail) truncated MAC.
        // Use 30 hex chars = 15 bytes to keep it valid hex but short.
        ks.crypto.mac = "517ead924a9d0dc3124507e3393d17".to_string();
        let err = decrypt_key(&ks, "testpassword").unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, KeystoreError::InvalidFormat(_)),
            "expected InvalidFormat for short MAC, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    // RFC 7914 §12 known-answer tests on scrypt_kdf directly
    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn rfc7914_kat_empty_password_empty_salt() {
        // scrypt(P="", S="", N=16, r=1, p=1, dkLen=64)
        let expected = concat!(
            "77d6576238657b203b19ca42c18a0497",
            "f16b4844e3074ae8dfdffa3fede21442",
            "fcd0069ded0948f8326a753a0fc81f17",
            "e8d3e0fb2e0d3628cf35e20c38d18906"
        );
        let mut out = [0u8; 64];
        // log_n=4 gives N=16
        scrypt_kdf(b"", b"", 4, 1, 1, &mut out).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(hex::encode(out), expected);
    }

    #[test]
    fn rfc7914_kat_password_nacl() {
        // scrypt(P="password", S="NaCl", N=1024, r=8, p=16, dkLen=64)
        let expected = concat!(
            "fdbabe1c9d3472007856e7190d01e9fe",
            "7c6ad7cbc8237830e77376634b373162",
            "2eaf30d92e22a3886ff109279d9830da",
            "c727afb94a83ee6d8360cbdfa2cc0640"
        );
        let mut out = [0u8; 64];
        // log_n=10 gives N=1024
        scrypt_kdf(b"password", b"NaCl", 10, 8, 16, &mut out).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(hex::encode(out), expected);
    }

    // Fast params for tests only (n = 2^4). Production uses STANDARD_SCRYPT.
    const TEST_PARAMS: EncryptionParams = EncryptionParams {
        log_n: 4,
        r: 8,
        p: 1,
    };

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip() {
        let key = decode_key_hex(TEST_SECRET).unwrap();
        let ks = encrypt_key_with_params(&key, "hunter2", "0xAbC123", &TEST_PARAMS).unwrap();
        let decrypted = decrypt_key(&ks, "hunter2").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(&decrypted[..], &key[..]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_then_wrong_password_rejected() {
        let key = decode_key_hex(TEST_SECRET).unwrap();
        let ks = encrypt_key_with_params(&key, "hunter2", "0xabc123", &TEST_PARAMS).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            decrypt_key(&ks, "hunter3").unwrap_err(),
            KeystoreError::IncorrectPassword
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_normalizes_address() {
        let key = decode_key_hex(TEST_SECRET).unwrap();
        let ks = encrypt_key_with_params(&key, "pw", "0xAbCdEf0123", &TEST_PARAMS).unwrap();
        // address stored lowercase, without 0x prefix
        assert_eq!(ks.address.as_deref(), Some("abcdef0123"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_produces_unique_salt_iv_id() {
        let key = decode_key_hex(TEST_SECRET).unwrap();
        let a = encrypt_key_with_params(&key, "pw", "0xab", &TEST_PARAMS).unwrap();
        let b = encrypt_key_with_params(&key, "pw", "0xab", &TEST_PARAMS).unwrap();
        assert_ne!(a.crypto.ciphertext, b.crypto.ciphertext);
        assert_ne!(a.crypto.cipherparams.iv, b.crypto.cipherparams.iv);
        assert_ne!(a.id, b.id);
        let salt_of = |ks: &KeystoreV3| match &ks.crypto.kdfparams {
            KdfParams::Scrypt { salt, .. } => salt.clone(),
            KdfParams::Pbkdf2 { salt, .. } => salt.clone(),
        };
        assert_ne!(salt_of(&a), salt_of(&b));
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_id_is_uuid_shaped() {
        let key = decode_key_hex(TEST_SECRET).unwrap();
        let ks = encrypt_key_with_params(&key, "pw", "0xab", &TEST_PARAMS).unwrap();
        let parts: Vec<&str> = ks.id.split('-').collect();
        assert_eq!(
            parts.iter().map(|p| p.len()).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
            vec![8, 4, 4, 4, 12]
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypted_keystore_roundtrips_through_json() {
        let key = decode_key_hex(TEST_SECRET).unwrap();
        let ks = encrypt_key_with_params(&key, "pw", "0xab", &TEST_PARAMS).unwrap();
        let json = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&ks).unwrap();
        let parsed = parse_keystore(&json).unwrap();
        let decrypted = decrypt_key(&parsed, "pw").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(&decrypted[..], &key[..]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn encrypt_with_standard_params_uses_geth_strength() {
        // One slow test (~1 s, ~256 MB) proving the production parameters.
        let key = decode_key_hex(TEST_SECRET).unwrap();
        let ks = encrypt_key(&key, "pw", "0xab").unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            ks.crypto.kdfparams,
            KdfParams::Scrypt {
                n: 262144,
                r: 8,
                p: 1,
                dklen: 32,
                ..
            }
        ));
        let decrypted = decrypt_key(&ks, "pw").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(&decrypted[..], &key[..]);
    }
}