ai-memory 0.7.0

AI-agnostic persistent memory system — MCP server, HTTP API, and CLI for any AI platform
Documentation
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// Copyright 2026 AlphaOne LLC
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

use axum::{
    Json,
    extract::{FromRef, FromRequest, Request, State, rejection::JsonRejection},
    http::StatusCode,
    middleware::Next,
    response::{IntoResponse, Response},
};
use serde::de::DeserializeOwned;
use serde_json::json;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, RwLock};

use crate::config::{ResolvedTtl, TierConfig};
use crate::db;
use crate::embeddings::{Embed, Embedder};
use crate::hnsw::VectorIndex;
use crate::profile::Family;

pub type Db = Arc<Mutex<(rusqlite::Connection, std::path::PathBuf, ResolvedTtl, bool)>>;

/// v0.7.0 PERF-1 (FX-3) — `spawn_blocking` helper for HTTP handler DB I/O.
///
/// Wraps a synchronous `rusqlite` operation in `tokio::task::spawn_blocking`
/// so it runs on the blocking pool instead of pinning a tokio worker thread.
/// Pre-fix every HTTP handler held the `tokio::sync::Mutex` AND executed
/// synchronous `rusqlite` calls (FTS5 scans, multi-row UPDATEs on touch,
/// trigger fires) on the tokio worker that picked up the request. With
/// the default multi-threaded runtime (`#tokio = ncpu`), N concurrent
/// recalls serialised completely on the single-connection mutex AND stole
/// worker slots from non-DB tasks (federation receive, webhook dispatch,
/// metrics scrape). p99 floor under N concurrent recalls was
/// `N × wall_time(FTS+touch)` rather than `max(wall_time)`.
///
/// Helper contract:
///
/// - Takes a `Db` clone (the `Arc<Mutex<...>>` extractor handle) and an
///   `FnOnce(&mut (Connection, PathBuf, ResolvedTtl, bool)) -> T` closure
///   so callers can access every field the existing pattern reads
///   (`lock.0` = Connection, `lock.1` = DB path, `lock.2` = `ResolvedTtl`,
///   `lock.3` = SAL-enabled flag).
/// - Uses `Mutex::blocking_lock` inside `spawn_blocking` — the
///   `tokio::sync::Mutex` API explicitly supports this from a
///   spawn_blocking worker; the worker is OFF the tokio runtime threads
///   so no await-deadlock risk.
/// - Returns `T` directly. Join errors from `spawn_blocking` (panic
///   propagation, runtime shutdown) surface via `expect`; a panic
///   inside the closure unwinds the blocking worker and the join error
///   is logged before the handler aborts with a 500 — the caller's
///   `Result<T, _>` is the right shape to surface domain errors. Join
///   failures are runtime bugs, not request-shape failures.
///
/// The helper deliberately does NOT take `headers: HeaderMap` /
/// `caller: &str` etc. — every closure already captures whatever extra
/// context it needs by move. The helper is the narrow waist: lock +
/// run + drop, no business logic.
///
/// Limit-of-applicability: closures that hold `await` points inside
/// CANNOT use this helper (the `spawn_blocking` worker is a sync
/// context). Handlers that interleave SQL with vector-index
/// `Mutex::lock().await` or federation `broadcast_*().await` must
/// either restructure to drop the DB lock first (the common case),
/// or keep the legacy `.lock().await` pattern when the interleave is
/// load-bearing (e.g. `recall` keeps the lock across `decorate_memory`
/// re-queries). The recall + create hot paths carry follow-up
/// trackers (the in-tree `#982` docstring at `src/handlers/recall.rs:485`
/// already calls out the deeper restructure).
///
/// Type parameter `T` requires `Send + 'static` because the closure's
/// return value crosses the spawn_blocking boundary back to the tokio
/// runtime.
pub async fn db_op<T, F>(db: Db, op: F) -> T
where
    T: Send + 'static,
    F: FnOnce(&mut (rusqlite::Connection, std::path::PathBuf, ResolvedTtl, bool)) -> T
        + Send
        + 'static,
{
    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
        let mut guard = db.blocking_lock();
        op(&mut guard)
    })
    .await
    .expect("PERF-1: db_op spawn_blocking worker panicked or runtime shut down")
}

/// v0.7.0 Wave-3 — declared storage backend for the daemon.
///
/// Surfaced through the `/capabilities` payload so operators and clients
/// can detect whether the daemon is backed by the bundled SQLite path
/// (the historical default) or by the SAL-routed Postgres adapter.
///
/// The variant resolves once at `serve()` startup from the
/// `--store-url` flag (when set) or the `--db` path (when absent), and
/// is stable across the process lifetime.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum StorageBackend {
    /// Bundled SQLite — the production default. Every handler operates
    /// on the `Db` connection directly and the SAL handle in `AppState`
    /// wraps the same connection for parity tests + the v0.7.0 Wave-3
    /// trait-routed code paths.
    Sqlite,
    /// Postgres — selected when `serve --store-url postgres://...` is
    /// passed and the binary was built with `--features sal-postgres`.
    /// Handlers that have been migrated to dispatch through the
    /// [`crate::store::MemoryStore`] trait operate against the
    /// `PostgresStore` adapter; handlers that have not yet migrated
    /// surface `501 Not Implemented` with a clear `storage_backend`
    /// hint so operators can plan the rollout.
    Postgres,
}

impl StorageBackend {
    /// Stable lowercase tag for log lines, the `/capabilities`
    /// `storage_backend` field, and the `ai-memory doctor` report.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::Sqlite => "sqlite",
            Self::Postgres => "postgres",
        }
    }
}

/// Composite daemon state (issue #219/v0.7 prep).
///
/// Previously the Axum router held only `Db`. Closing the HTTP embedding gap
/// (semantic recall silently missed HTTP-stored memories because the daemon
/// never generated embeddings) requires the embedder and the in-memory HNSW
/// index to be reachable from write handlers. We introduce `AppState` and
/// use `FromRef` so every existing `State<Db>` handler keeps working
/// unchanged — only the write paths opt into `State<AppState>` to pick up
/// the embedder and vector index.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AppState {
    pub db: Db,
    pub embedder: Arc<Option<Embedder>>,
    pub vector_index: Arc<Mutex<Option<VectorIndex>>>,
    /// v0.7 federation config — `Some` when `--quorum-writes N` +
    /// `--quorum-peers` are configured at serve time. Writes fan out
    /// to peers via `FederationConfig::broadcast_store_quorum` when
    /// this is `Some`.
    pub federation: Arc<Option<crate::federation::FederationConfig>>,
    /// Resolved [`TierConfig`] for this daemon. Exposed so HTTP
    /// endpoints that mirror MCP tools (notably `/capabilities`) can
    /// reuse the MCP-side report builder without re-parsing config.
    pub tier_config: Arc<TierConfig>,
    /// v0.6.2 (S18): resolved recall scoring config — tier half-lives,
    /// legacy-scoring toggle. Exposed so `recall_memories_get` /
    /// `recall_memories_post` can call `db::recall_hybrid` (semantic
    /// blend) when the embedder is loaded, mirroring how the MCP
    /// `memory_recall` handler already wires it (crate::mcp::handle_recall).
    /// Prior to this, HTTP recall was keyword-only regardless of
    /// embedder availability — scenario-18 surfaced the gap.
    pub scoring: Arc<crate::config::ResolvedScoring>,
    /// v0.7.0 A5 — resolved tool [`Profile`] for this daemon. The
    /// HTTP `/capabilities` endpoint needs it to compute the v3
    /// `summary` / `to_describe_to_user` / `tools[].callable_now`
    /// fields, which reflect the profile the running server actually
    /// advertises in `tools/list`. Mirrors the MCP-dispatch threading
    /// at `crate::mcp::handle_search`.
    pub profile: Arc<crate::profile::Profile>,
    /// v0.7.0 A5 — resolved [`McpConfig`] for this daemon. Carries
    /// the optional `[mcp.allowlist]` table that v3's per-tool
    /// `callable_now` and top-level `agent_permitted_families` honor.
    /// `Arc<Option<...>>` rather than `Option<Arc<...>>` so cloning
    /// the AppState stays cheap; absent allowlist (the v0.6.4 default)
    /// shows up as `Arc<None>`.
    pub mcp_config: Arc<Option<crate::config::McpConfig>>,
    /// v0.7 Track H — H2 outbound link signing. The keypair loaded at
    /// daemon startup (or `None` when the operator hasn't generated
    /// one yet). When `Some`, every `db::create_link_signed` call from
    /// HTTP handlers signs the link with this key and stamps
    /// `attest_level = "self_signed"`; when `None`, links go in
    /// unsigned, preserving v0.6.4 behaviour for unmigrated deployments.
    /// H3 will reuse this handle for outbound writes that need to
    /// carry the same signing identity.
    pub active_keypair: Arc<Option<crate::identity::keypair::AgentKeypair>>,
    /// v0.7.0 B3 — pre-computed embeddings for each [`Family`]
    /// descriptor. Filled asynchronously after boot from
    /// [`family_descriptors`] and reused by B2's
    /// `memory_smart_load(intent)` to do a fast cosine match between
    /// an intent string and the eight family descriptors.
    ///
    /// **CI fix (v0.7 B3-fix)**: held behind `RwLock<Option<…>>` and
    /// filled by a detached `tokio::spawn` task launched from
    /// `bootstrap_serve` rather than synchronously on the serve
    /// startup path. The original synchronous precompute would block
    /// HTTP `/health` past the integration suite's 5 s
    /// `wait_for_health` budget on CI runners without a pre-warmed
    /// `hf-hub` model cache. `None` means "not yet populated"; an
    /// empty inner `Vec` means "embedder unavailable, will never be
    /// populated"; either case makes `best_family_match` return
    /// `None` and B2's smart loader degrades to its non-embedding
    /// match path.
    pub family_embeddings: Arc<RwLock<Option<Vec<(Family, Vec<f32>)>>>>,

    // ----- v0.7.0 Wave-3 — adapter selection ------------------------
    /// v0.7.0 Wave-3 — declared storage backend for this daemon.
    ///
    /// Resolved once from `--store-url` (or `--db` fallback) at
    /// `serve()` startup; stable across the process lifetime.
    /// Surfaced through `/api/v1/capabilities.storage_backend` and
    /// consulted by trait-eligible handlers to decide whether to
    /// dispatch through `app.store` or fall back to the legacy
    /// `db::*` free-function code path.
    pub storage_backend: StorageBackend,
    /// v0.7.0 Wave-3 — polymorphic [`MemoryStore`] handle.
    ///
    /// Always populated. For [`StorageBackend::Sqlite`] it wraps a
    /// `SqliteStore` opened against the same on-disk database as the
    /// [`AppState::db`] connection (the two views see the same rows).
    /// For [`StorageBackend::Postgres`] it wraps a `PostgresStore`
    /// connected to the operator-supplied URL.
    ///
    /// Only available under `--features sal`. Standard builds keep
    /// the legacy `db::*` free-function path verbatim.
    ///
    /// [`MemoryStore`]: crate::store::MemoryStore
    #[cfg(feature = "sal")]
    pub store: Arc<dyn crate::store::MemoryStore>,

    // ----- v0.7.0 L5 — LLM client for autonomy hooks ----------------
    /// v0.7.0 L5 — optional LLM client used by the HTTP `create_memory`
    /// handler to fire the `auto_tag` autonomy hook on stores, matching
    /// the behaviour the MCP `handle_store` path has provided since
    /// v0.6.0.0 (`crate::mcp::handle_store` (auto-tag block)). `None` when the daemon's
    /// configured [`FeatureTier`] does not request an LLM (keyword /
    /// semantic) or when Ollama is unreachable at startup; in either
    /// case the create_memory handler silently skips the hook so the
    /// store still succeeds.
    pub llm: Arc<Option<crate::llm::OllamaClient>>,

    /// v0.7.0 L15 — dedicated model id for `auto_tag` (and other short
    /// structured-output LLM calls). When `Some`, [`maybe_auto_tag`]
    /// passes the value as `OllamaClient::auto_tag(.., Some(model))` so
    /// the call hits a fast tag-friendly model (default config recommends
    /// `gemma3:4b`, ~0.7s p50) instead of the reasoning-tier `llm_model`
    /// (Gemma 4 thinking can take 15s to emit a 5-tag list). When `None`
    /// the call falls back to the client's configured model. Wrapped in
    /// `Arc<Option<...>>` so cloning the AppState stays cheap and the
    /// absent case (the v0.7.0.0 default) is a cheap `Arc<None>`.
    pub auto_tag_model: Arc<Option<String>>,

    /// v0.7.0 H8 (round-2) — per-LLM-call wall-clock timeout. Wraps
    /// every `tokio::task::spawn_blocking` invocation of an Ollama
    /// call (`auto_tag`, `expand_query`, `summarize_memories`, ...)
    /// in `tokio::time::timeout`. On timeout the handler logs at
    /// `warn` and continues on the LLM-absent fallback path
    /// (already exists per L5/L7). Resolved at boot from
    /// `AppConfig::effective_llm_call_timeout_secs` (default 30s).
    pub llm_call_timeout: std::time::Duration,

    /// v0.7.0 H5 (round-2) — bounded in-memory LRU keyed on
    /// `(link_id, signature, verification_nonce)`. Consulted by
    /// [`verify_link_handler`] to reject exact-repeat verify
    /// requests with 409 Conflict. See
    /// [`crate::identity::replay::ReplayCache`] for the memory bound
    /// (~512 KB at the 10 000-entry capacity) + threat model.
    pub replay_cache: Arc<crate::identity::replay::ReplayCache>,

    /// v0.7.0 H5 (round-2) — strict mode for the verify replay
    /// guard. When `true`, every `POST /api/v1/links/verify` request
    /// body MUST include a `verification_nonce` field; missing or
    /// empty nonces produce 400 Bad Request. Default `false` keeps
    /// the v0.6.x verify-anytime semantics and logs a deprecation
    /// WARN on the missing-nonce path instead. Operators opt into
    /// strict mode via `[verify] require_nonce = true` in
    /// `config.toml`.
    pub verify_require_nonce: bool,

    /// v0.7.0 #922 — per-peer LRU keyed on `(peer_id, X-Memory-Nonce)`.
    pub federation_nonce_cache: Arc<crate::identity::replay::FederationNonceCache>,

    /// v0.7.0 (issue #519) — resolved `autonomous_hooks` flag (from
    /// config.toml + `AI_MEMORY_AUTONOMOUS_HOOKS` env). Consulted by
    /// the HTTP `create_memory` path's [`maybe_detect_conflicts`]
    /// helper as the global default when a request omits the per-call
    /// `detect_conflicts` override. `false` preserves the v0.6.x
    /// post-hoc-only contradiction surface.
    pub autonomous_hooks: bool,

    /// v0.7.0 (issue #518) — resolved
    /// `[agents.defaults.recall_scope]` block. `Some` carries the
    /// session-default namespace / since / tier / limit filters
    /// spliced into recall requests that pass `session_default=true`
    /// and omit one or more filter fields. `None` (the default for
    /// existing single-tenant deployments) preserves v0.6.x recall
    /// semantics — every cross-session recall must spell its filters
    /// out explicitly.
    ///
    /// Wrapped in `Arc<Option<...>>` so cloning the AppState stays
    /// cheap and the absent case (every deployment that hasn't
    /// opted in yet) is a single `Arc<None>`.
    pub recall_scope: Arc<Option<crate::config::RecallScope>>,

    /// v0.7.0 Policy-Engine Item 3 (2026-05-14) — deferred-audit
    /// queue handle. Captures every `governance.refusal` event
    /// from the storage `GOVERNANCE_PRE_WRITE` hook and submits it
    /// to a background drainer task that chain-logs the refusal to
    /// `signed_events` on a FRESH `Connection` (separate from the
    /// substrate writer's connection — closes the re-entrant-deadlock
    /// gap the old `_no_audit` variant traded the chain-log property
    /// for).
    ///
    /// The queue is `Clone` (cheap `Arc` semantics over an mpsc
    /// sender) so each callsite (storage hook closure, future MCP
    /// `governance_state` tool, future Prometheus scrape) can hold
    /// its own producer handle without contention.
    ///
    /// Always present on `bootstrap_serve` — the drainer is spawned
    /// unconditionally before the storage hook installs. The
    /// `Option<...>` shape lets tests inject `None` in scaffolds
    /// that don't need the audit chain.
    pub deferred_audit_queue: Arc<Option<crate::governance::deferred_audit::DeferredAuditQueue>>,

    /// v0.7.0 SHIP cluster (#946 / #957 / #960 / #961, 2026-05-20) —
    /// resolved `[admin].agent_ids` allowlist from `config.toml`. The
    /// shared admin-role gate (see [`crate::handlers::admin_role`])
    /// consults this list before any admin-class endpoint
    /// (`/api/v1/export`, `/api/v1/agents`, `/api/v1/stats`, the
    /// `/api/v1/quota/status` list path) honors the request.
    ///
    /// Default-empty closes those endpoints to all callers, matching
    /// the `pm-v3` safe-by-default posture. Operators opt callers in
    /// via `[admin] agent_ids = [...]` in `config.toml`.
    ///
    /// `Arc<Vec<String>>` rather than `Arc<HashSet<String>>` so the
    /// shape stays cheap to clone (per the AppState contract) and the
    /// list is short by design — admin-role allowlists are
    /// operator-curated, typically <10 entries.
    pub admin_agent_ids: Arc<Vec<String>>,

    /// v0.7.0 #991 — per-instance enabled-rule cache. Owned by this
    /// `AppState`; cloned by reference (`Arc<RuleCache>`) into the
    /// substrate `GOVERNANCE_PRE_WRITE` storage hook closure and the
    /// `wire_check::GOVERNANCE_PRE_ACTION` action hook closure so
    /// every governance read on the hot write path (and every action
    /// wire-point in the daemon) shares ONE cache for the lifetime of
    /// this daemon. The cache is per-instance (not a process-wide
    /// singleton) so multi-`AppState` test fixtures don't cross-pollute
    /// — same isolation contract that the post-#990 revert restored
    /// in the test suite. See `governance/rule_cache.rs` for the
    /// design rationale + the cross-instance isolation regression
    /// pinning.
    pub rule_cache: Arc<crate::governance::rule_cache::RuleCache>,

    /// v0.7.x (issue #1168) — operator-resolved LLM / embeddings /
    /// reranker triple. Threaded into the HTTP `/api/v1/capabilities`
    /// handler so the wire-reported `models.*` block mirrors the
    /// running daemon's actual model wiring (matching the boot banner)
    /// instead of the compiled tier preset. Built once at
    /// `bootstrap_serve` via [`crate::config::AppConfig::resolve_models`]
    /// and reused for every request — the resolver folds CLI / env /
    /// `[llm]` / legacy / compiled-default precedence, so the resulting
    /// triple is process-stable.
    pub resolved_models: Arc<crate::config::ResolvedModels>,

    /// v0.7.x (issue #1174 follow-up #1192 / #1196) — cross-surface
    /// [`crate::runtime_context::RuntimeContext`] handle. Holds the
    /// process-wide K7 HMAC override, I1 decompression cap, V-4 audit
    /// chain state, session-recall tracker, and X25519 keypair cache
    /// — i.e. every substrate static that the HTTP daemon, MCP stdio
    /// binary, and CLI need to observe identically.
    ///
    /// Always populated. Cloned by reference (`Arc::clone`) so storing
    /// it on `AppState` is cheap and the wire / chain / cache
    /// semantics across surfaces stay byte-equivalent: every accessor
    /// (`crate::config::active_hooks_hmac_secret`, `crate::audit::emit`,
    /// `crate::reranker::global_session_recall_tracker`,
    /// `crate::encryption::get_or_create_keypair`) delegates to the
    /// same `RuntimeContext::global()` singleton.
    pub runtime: Arc<crate::runtime_context::RuntimeContext>,

    /// Operator-resolved per-request page-size / bulk-materialization cap
    /// (the `[limits].max_page_size` knob, env `AI_MEMORY_MAX_PAGE_SIZE`).
    /// Bounds how many rows a single list / search response page and a
    /// single bulk-create / federation-sync request may materialize in
    /// memory at once — it is NOT a rate limit. Resolved once at
    /// `bootstrap_serve` from [`crate::config::AppConfig::resolve_limits`];
    /// falls back to the compiled [`MAX_BULK_SIZE`] default when unset.
    /// Operators with genuinely large per-request payloads raise this
    /// knob, but the correct tool for large datasets is pagination
    /// (`offset` / `since`), not an unbounded page size — a single
    /// unbounded request would materialize the whole result set in RAM.
    pub max_page_size: usize,
}

/// v0.7.0 B3 — canonical 1-2 sentence English descriptors for each
/// [`Family`]. Used at boot to pre-compute embeddings that B2's
/// `memory_smart_load(intent)` cosine-matches against an intent
/// string. Order tracks [`Family::all()`] (declaration order) so the
/// returned slice is stable across releases. Wording is chosen to
/// reflect the *user-facing* purpose of each family, not its tool
/// names — the embedder needs natural-language signal, not enum
/// labels, for the cosine match to be meaningful.
#[must_use]
pub fn family_descriptors() -> &'static [(Family, &'static str)] {
    &[
        (
            Family::Core,
            "Store, recall, list, get, and search memories. The basic \
             read and write operations for saving facts and looking \
             them up later.",
        ),
        (
            Family::Lifecycle,
            "Update, delete, forget, garbage-collect, and promote \
             memories. Operations that change a memory's state, tier, \
             or visibility over time.",
        ),
        (
            Family::Graph,
            "Knowledge-graph queries, timelines, links between \
             memories, entity registration, taxonomy lookup, and \
             replay or verification of stored relationships.",
        ),
        (
            Family::Governance,
            "Approval workflows, namespace standards, and \
             subscriptions. Operations that gate or shape what other \
             agents are allowed to write or see.",
        ),
        (
            Family::Power,
            "Advanced reasoning helpers: consolidate duplicates, \
             detect contradictions, check for duplicates, auto-tag, \
             expand a query, and inspect the inbox.",
        ),
        (
            Family::Meta,
            "Server capabilities, agent registration and listing, \
             session bootstrap, and aggregate stats. Operations that \
             describe the memory system itself rather than its \
             contents.",
        ),
        (
            Family::Archive,
            "List, restore, purge, and report stats on archived \
             memories. The cold-storage tier where forgotten or aged-out \
             memories live until they are pruned.",
        ),
        (
            Family::Other,
            "Subscription listing and out-of-band notifications. \
             Auxiliary operations that don't fit the other families.",
        ),
    ]
}

impl AppState {
    /// v0.7.0 B3 — pre-compute the family-descriptor embedding cache.
    /// Iterates the eight descriptors from [`family_descriptors`] and
    /// runs each through the embedder once. Returns an empty vector
    /// when the embedder is `None` (keyword-only deployments) or when
    /// any single descriptor fails to embed — the latter is logged at
    /// `warn` and the cache is still returned empty so boot stays
    /// fault-tolerant. The returned vector is intended to be wrapped
    /// in `Arc::new(...)` and stored in [`AppState::family_embeddings`].
    #[must_use]
    pub fn precompute_family_embeddings(embedder: Option<&dyn Embed>) -> Vec<(Family, Vec<f32>)> {
        let Some(embedder) = embedder else {
            return Vec::new();
        };
        let descriptors = family_descriptors();
        let mut out: Vec<(Family, Vec<f32>)> = Vec::with_capacity(descriptors.len());
        for (family, descriptor) in descriptors {
            match embedder.embed(descriptor) {
                Ok(v) => out.push((*family, v)),
                Err(e) => {
                    tracing::warn!(
                        family = family.name(),
                        error = %e,
                        "B3: failed to embed family descriptor; \
                         family_embeddings will be empty",
                    );
                    return Vec::new();
                }
            }
        }
        out
    }

    /// v0.7.0 B3 — embed `intent` and return the family-descriptor
    /// with the highest cosine similarity, paired with its score.
    /// Returns `None` if the cache is not yet populated (the
    /// asynchronous precompute task has not finished, or the
    /// embedder is unavailable so the cache will never populate) or
    /// if the embedder is unavailable now. This is the entry point
    /// B2's `memory_smart_load(intent)` uses to pick which family to
    /// load.
    ///
    /// Uses `try_read()` so a slow concurrent writer (the boot-time
    /// precompute task still finalising its write) cannot block the
    /// caller — on contention we degrade to `None` and the smart
    /// loader's non-embedding fallback path takes over.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn best_family_match(&self, intent: &str) -> Option<(Family, f32)> {
        let guard = self.family_embeddings.try_read().ok()?;
        let cache = guard.as_ref()?;
        if cache.is_empty() {
            return None;
        }
        let embedder = self.embedder.as_ref().as_ref()?;
        let intent_vec = embedder.embed_query(intent).ok()?;
        let mut best: Option<(Family, f32)> = None;
        for (family, descriptor_vec) in cache.iter() {
            let score = Embedder::cosine_similarity(&intent_vec, descriptor_vec);
            match best {
                Some((_, prev)) if prev >= score => {}
                _ => best = Some((*family, score)),
            }
        }
        best
    }
}

impl FromRef<AppState> for Db {
    fn from_ref(app: &AppState) -> Self {
        app.db.clone()
    }
}

/// Compiled-default per-request page / bulk-materialization cap.
///
/// This is the fallback value for the operator-tunable
/// [`AppState::max_page_size`] knob (`[limits].max_page_size` /
/// `AI_MEMORY_MAX_PAGE_SIZE`). It bounds how many rows a single
/// list / search page and a single bulk-create / federation-sync
/// request may materialize in memory at once — it is NOT a rate
/// limit. Exposed `pub` so integration-test `AppState` scaffolds
/// can seed `max_page_size` from the same named constant instead of
/// a magic literal.
pub const MAX_BULK_SIZE: usize = 1000;

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// v0.7.0 Round-2 F9 — JSON body extractor that returns 400 (not axum's
// default 422) for missing/malformed fields, with a sanitized response
// envelope `{ "error": "...", "fields": ["..."] }` so callers can switch
// on the field name without parsing a free-form serde message.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Wrapping extractor that delegates to `axum::Json<T>` but rewrites
/// every rejection to `400 Bad Request` with a structured body shaped
/// like the rest of the daemon's error envelopes
/// (`{"error": ..., "fields": [...]}`).
///
/// Applied to the HTTP store path so a body missing `content` (or any
/// other required field) returns 400 + a field-name hint instead of
/// axum's default 422 Unprocessable Entity. The 422 default leaks the
/// raw serde error string ("Failed to deserialize the JSON body...
/// missing field `content` at line 1 column 14"), which forces clients
/// into substring matching on a non-stable diagnostic message; the
/// `fields` array is the structured replacement.
pub struct JsonOrBadRequest<T>(pub T);

impl<S, T> FromRequest<S> for JsonOrBadRequest<T>
where
    S: Send + Sync,
    T: DeserializeOwned,
    Json<T>: FromRequest<S, Rejection = JsonRejection>,
{
    type Rejection = Response;

    async fn from_request(req: Request, state: &S) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
        match Json::<T>::from_request(req, state).await {
            Ok(Json(value)) => Ok(Self(value)),
            Err(rej) => Err(json_rejection_to_400(&rej)),
        }
    }
}

/// Convert an axum `JsonRejection` into a `400 Bad Request` response
/// with the daemon's standard `{"error": ..., "fields": [...]}` shape.
/// The `fields` array best-effort-extracts missing field names from
/// the underlying serde error message; on parse failure it is left
/// empty so callers can still rely on the envelope shape.
fn json_rejection_to_400(rej: &JsonRejection) -> Response {
    let raw_msg = rej.body_text();
    // serde_json's "missing field" diagnostic: `missing field \`<name>\``.
    // We extract the backtick-quoted identifier and surface it both as
    // a sanitized human message and as the structured `fields` array.
    let fields = extract_missing_fields(&raw_msg);
    let error_msg = if let Some(first) = fields.first() {
        format!("missing required field: {first}")
    } else {
        // Generic malformed-body fallback (syntax error, type error,
        // etc.). Sanitized to avoid leaking the raw serde diagnostic
        // (which can include positional info from the request body).
        match rej {
            JsonRejection::JsonSyntaxError(_) => "malformed JSON body".to_string(),
            JsonRejection::MissingJsonContentType(_) => {
                "expected Content-Type: application/json".to_string()
            }
            _ => "invalid request body".to_string(),
        }
    };
    (
        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
        Json(json!({
            "error": error_msg,
            "fields": fields,
        })),
    )
        .into_response()
}

/// Best-effort scan of a serde-error message for `missing field
/// \`<name>\`` occurrences. Returns the de-duplicated list of field
/// names in order of appearance. When no match is found (e.g. a type
/// error or syntax error) the returned vector is empty so the caller
/// falls back to the generic "invalid request body" message.
fn extract_missing_fields(msg: &str) -> Vec<String> {
    // #1022 (LOW, 2026-05-21): cap the result vector at 16 entries.
    // Pre-#1022 a pathologically long body returning a serde error
    // containing N `missing field` patterns yielded an O(N)
    // Vec<String>. Serde's own diagnostics are short in practice so
    // the cap is belt-and-suspenders against future serde upgrades
    // that might change diagnostic shape OR a hostile actor crafting
    // a body that produces many missing-field reports. 16 entries is
    // already more than any caller needs in a 400-Bad-Request
    // envelope.
    const MAX_MISSING_FIELDS: usize = 16;
    let needle = "missing field `";
    let mut out: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
    let mut rest = msg;
    while let Some(idx) = rest.find(needle) {
        if out.len() >= MAX_MISSING_FIELDS {
            break;
        }
        let after = &rest[idx + needle.len()..];
        if let Some(end) = after.find('`') {
            let name = &after[..end];
            // Light validation — reject anything that doesn't look like
            // a serde field identifier so a hostile body cannot smuggle
            // arbitrary content into the response envelope.
            if !name.is_empty()
                && name
                    .chars()
                    .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_' || c == '-')
                && !out.iter().any(|existing| existing == name)
            {
                out.push(name.to_string());
            }
            rest = &after[end + 1..];
        } else {
            break;
        }
    }
    out
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// v0.7.0 Round-2 F10 — embed-status surface for the HTTP store path.
//
// When the embedder times out / refuses oversized content / otherwise
// fails to produce a vector, the row still commits (correct — embeddings
// are an enhancement layer, not a write-path gate) but the HTTP response
// must surface that fact so the caller can tell semantic recall will
// silently miss this memory until a re-index. Prior to F10 the daemon
// returned 201 with no signal whatsoever.
//
// The canonical [`crate::embeddings::EmbedStatus`] enum + the
// [`crate::embeddings::Embedder::embed_with_status`] producer were
// landed by Fix-Agent α (Round-2 F6); the HTTP wiring below is the
// F10 consumer side that turns the producer's signal into a response
// field on non-`Indexed` outcomes.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// v0.6.2 (S40): maximum number of per-row `broadcast_store_quorum` fanouts
/// in flight at once during `bulk_create`. Replaces the prior sequential
/// for-loop (which paid 100ms × N rows of wall time and blew past the
/// testbook's 20s settle on N=500) with bounded concurrency. The bound
/// balances speedup against peer-side `SQLite` Mutex contention and the
/// leader-side reqwest connection-pool / ephemeral-port envelope. See the
/// comment above the loop in `bulk_create` for the full rationale.
pub(crate) const BULK_FANOUT_CONCURRENCY: usize = 8;

/// Shared state for API key authentication middleware.
///
/// v0.7.0 fold-A2A1.4 (#702) — `mtls_enforced` carries whether the
/// listener this state is mounted on enforces mTLS at the rustls layer
/// (i.e. `--tls-cert + --tls-key + --mtls-allowlist`). When true, the
/// federation endpoints (`/api/v1/sync/*`) are allowed without an
/// `x-api-key` header because the rustls server has already verified
/// the client cert against the operator-pinned allowlist — adding an
/// api-key check on top would force every peer to also carry the
/// shared api-key secret, which is exactly the auth-matrix gap
/// procurement deployments hit (a peer with valid mTLS but no
/// `x-api-key` got 401 and quorum never converged across hosts).
/// Non-federation paths still demand the api-key when configured.
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct ApiKeyState {
    pub key: Option<String>,
    pub mtls_enforced: bool,
}

/// Constant-time byte-slice equality. Doesn't short-circuit on the
/// Percent-decode a URL-encoded query value in place. Invalid `%XX`
/// escapes are passed through verbatim (lossy). Ultrareview #337.
#[inline]
pub(crate) fn percent_decode_lossy(input: &str) -> String {
    let bytes = input.as_bytes();
    let mut out: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(bytes.len());
    let mut i = 0;
    while i < bytes.len() {
        if bytes[i] == b'%' && i + 2 < bytes.len() {
            let h = (bytes[i + 1] as char).to_digit(16);
            let l = (bytes[i + 2] as char).to_digit(16);
            if let (Some(h), Some(l)) = (h, l) {
                // h and l are single hex digits (0..=15), so h*16 + l
                // is always in 0..=255. Cast is lossless.
                out.push(u8::try_from(h * 16 + l).unwrap_or(0));
                i += 3;
                continue;
            }
        }
        out.push(bytes[i]);
        i += 1;
    }
    String::from_utf8_lossy(&out).into_owned()
}

/// first mismatched byte, preventing timing-oracle leaks of secret
/// material. Used for API-key comparison (#301 hardening item 3).
///
/// v0.7.0 #1060 (Agent-2 #7) — the length-mismatch early-return at
/// the top of this function leaks `len(a) == len(b)` via timing,
/// which an attacker timing many requests with varying-length
/// `X-API-Key` headers can use to learn the configured key's exact
/// byte length, reducing the brute-force search space.
///
/// We close the leak by running the constant-time compare over
/// `max(a.len(), b.len())` bytes regardless of length match.
/// The shorter side is XORed against zero (effectively
/// `b[i] ^ 0 != 0` whenever `b[i] != 0`), and a separate
/// `len_mismatch` flag is OR'd into the diff accumulator so the
/// final `diff == 0` test fires only when both the lengths match
/// AND every byte matches. The runtime is dominated by the longer
/// of the two slices, so an attacker can't distinguish "length
/// mismatch" from "byte mismatch on the same length" via timing.
#[inline]
pub(crate) fn constant_time_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
    let len_a = a.len();
    let len_b = b.len();
    let max_len = len_a.max(len_b);
    let mut diff: u8 = 0;
    // OR a length-mismatch flag into the diff so a final-byte XOR
    // can't accidentally produce diff=0 when the lengths differ.
    // Cast is safe: `(len_a ^ len_b) != 0` collapses to a bool.
    diff |= u8::from(len_a != len_b);
    for i in 0..max_len {
        let x = a.get(i).copied().unwrap_or(0);
        let y = b.get(i).copied().unwrap_or(0);
        diff |= x ^ y;
    }
    diff == 0
}

/// Middleware: reject requests with 401 if `api_key` is configured and request
/// doesn't provide a matching `X-API-Key` header or `?api_key=` query param.
/// The `/api/v1/health` endpoint is exempt.
pub async fn api_key_auth(
    State(auth): State<ApiKeyState>,
    req: Request,
    next: Next,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
    let Some(ref expected) = auth.key else {
        // No API key configured — allow all requests
        return next.run(req).await.into_response();
    };

    // Exempt health endpoint
    if req.uri().path() == super::routes::HEALTH {
        return next.run(req).await.into_response();
    }

    // v0.7.0 fold-A2A1.4 (#702) — mTLS bypass for federation endpoints.
    //
    // The federation peer mesh authenticates via mTLS cert-fingerprint
    // pinning (see `tls::FingerprintAllowlistVerifier` — rustls rejects
    // any TLS connect whose client cert isn't on the operator's
    // allowlist). When that's enforced, a request reaching this
    // middleware has already cleared a stronger authentication step
    // than `x-api-key`. Demanding the api-key on top forces every peer
    // to ALSO carry the shared secret, which causes the cross-host
    // quorum gap procurement-grade deployments hit (the peer's
    // outbound forgets the header → 401 → quorum_not_met). The
    // bypass is scoped to `/api/v1/sync/*` so non-federation surfaces
    // still require the api-key when configured (defense in depth).
    //
    // v0.7.0 #1040 (Agent-5 #7) — the bypass is signature-gated
    // downstream:
    //
    //   - `/api/v1/sync/push` requires `X-Memory-Sig` over the body
    //     under `AI_MEMORY_FED_REQUIRE_SIG=1` (#791 default).
    //   - `/api/v1/sync/since` requires `X-Memory-Sig` over canonical
    //     GET bytes (`method || path || query`) under the same env
    //     gate (#1031, v0.7.0).
    //
    // So with the v0.7.0 secure defaults (`AI_MEMORY_FED_REQUIRE_SIG=1`),
    // an mTLS peer cannot spoof `X-Peer-Id` because the signed-message
    // gate downstream verifies the sig against the claimed peer-id's
    // enrolled key — the claim is bound to a cryptographic identity
    // separate from the cert fingerprint. Operators running with
    // `AI_MEMORY_FED_REQUIRE_SIG=0` (legacy peer-rollout posture) lose
    // this defense and trust X-Peer-Id verbatim; that mode is
    // explicitly documented as UNSAFE in the CLAUDE.md env-var table.
    //
    // A deeper hardening — extract peer-id from the client cert's
    // Subject CN / SAN and cross-check against X-Peer-Id — requires
    // axum to expose the peer certificate via request extensions; a
    // focused follow-up tracks that v0.8 surface change. For v0.7.0
    // the #1031 signed-GET gate + the env-default-secure posture
    // close the acute exploitability surface.
    let path = req.uri().path();
    if auth.mtls_enforced && path.starts_with("/api/v1/sync/") {
        return next.run(req).await.into_response();
    }

    // Check X-API-Key header
    if let Some(header_val) = req.headers().get(crate::HEADER_API_KEY)
        && let Ok(val) = header_val.to_str()
        && constant_time_eq(val.as_bytes(), expected.as_bytes())
    {
        return next.run(req).await.into_response();
    }

    // Check ?api_key= query param (ultrareview #337: URL-decode
    // before comparison. A key with reserved chars like `+`, `%`,
    // `&` must be percent-encoded by the caller per RFC 3986; the
    // previous raw-compare path silently mismatched those keys and
    // opened an encoded-bypass surface where a key containing `%2B`
    // would compare against `%2B` rather than `+`, producing a
    // different trust decision depending on caller quoting.)
    if let Some(query) = req.uri().query() {
        for pair in query.split('&') {
            if let Some(val) = pair.strip_prefix("api_key=") {
                let decoded = percent_decode_lossy(val);
                if constant_time_eq(decoded.as_bytes(), expected.as_bytes()) {
                    // v0.7.0 de-silencing: a credential in the URL query
                    // string leaks into access logs, the Referer header,
                    // and proxy logs. Accept it (the v0.7.0 back-compat
                    // contract) but emit a once-per-process
                    // operator-visible warn naming the header
                    // alternative + the deprecation intent (#1574).
                    static QUERY_KEY_WARN_ONCE: std::sync::Once = std::sync::Once::new();
                    QUERY_KEY_WARN_ONCE.call_once(|| {
                        tracing::warn!(
                            target: "http::auth",
                            "a request authenticated via the `?api_key=` query \
                             parameter; URL-embedded credentials leak into access \
                             logs, Referer headers, and proxy logs. Migrate callers \
                             to the `x-api-key` request header — the `?api_key=` \
                             query form is DEPRECATED and will be removed in a \
                             future release (still accepted for the v0.7.0 \
                             back-compat contract)."
                        );
                    });
                    return next.run(req).await.into_response();
                }
            }
        }
    }

    (
        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
        Json(json!({"error": "missing or invalid API key"})),
    )
        .into_response()
}

pub async fn health(State(app): State<AppState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
    // v0.7.0 ARCH-2 followup (FX-C2-batch3) — Postgres-backed daemons
    // ride the new `MemoryStore::health_check` trait method which is
    // natively async (sqlx round-trip), so we can skip the blocking
    // pool for that path entirely. SQLite-backed daemons stay on the
    // `db_op` blocking-pool route per PERF-1 (FX-3); /health is the
    // most-frequently scraped endpoint and pinning a tokio worker on
    // a sync sqlite PRAGMA query would starve the runtime under
    // concurrent scrape load.
    #[cfg(feature = "sal-postgres")]
    let ok = if matches!(app.storage_backend, StorageBackend::Postgres) {
        app.store.health_check().await.unwrap_or(false)
    } else {
        db_op(app.db.clone(), |guard| {
            db::health_check(&guard.0).unwrap_or(false)
        })
        .await
    };
    #[cfg(not(feature = "sal-postgres"))]
    let ok = db_op(app.db.clone(), |guard| {
        db::health_check(&guard.0).unwrap_or(false)
    })
    .await;
    let embedder_ready = app.embedder.as_ref().is_some();
    let federation_enabled = app.federation.as_ref().is_some();
    let code = if ok {
        StatusCode::OK
    } else {
        StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
    };
    // v0.6.2 (#327): expose embedder status so operators can tell from
    // /health alone whether semantic recall is wired up on this node.
    (
        code,
        Json(json!({
            "status": if ok { "ok" } else { "error" },
            "service": "ai-memory",
            "version": crate::PKG_VERSION,
            "embedder_ready": embedder_ready,
            "federation_enabled": federation_enabled,
        })),
    )
        .into_response()
}

/// v0.6.0.0 — Prometheus scrape endpoint. Refreshes gauge samples
/// (`ai_memory_memories`) against the current DB before rendering so
/// scrapers see up-to-date counts without needing a background refresh
/// task.
pub async fn prometheus_metrics(State(state): State<Db>) -> impl IntoResponse {
    // PERF-1 (FX-3): route the rusqlite stats query through `db_op`.
    // The stats query touches `memories` + `archived_memories` for COUNTs
    // and can take 10-50ms on a populated DB; scrape cadence is every
    // 10-30s, so without spawn_blocking this would periodically pin a
    // tokio worker mid-scrape.
    db_op(state, |guard| {
        if let Ok(stats) = db::stats(&guard.0, &guard.1) {
            crate::metrics::registry()
                .memories_gauge
                .set(stats.total.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::MAX));
        }
    })
    .await;
    let body = crate::metrics::render();
    (
        StatusCode::OK,
        [(
            axum::http::header::CONTENT_TYPE,
            "text/plain; version=0.0.4; charset=utf-8",
        )],
        body,
    )
        .into_response()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod transport_helpers_tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn percent_decode_handles_typical_keys() {
        assert_eq!(percent_decode_lossy("abc"), "abc");
        assert_eq!(percent_decode_lossy("a%2Bb"), "a+b");
        assert_eq!(percent_decode_lossy("hello%20world"), "hello world");
        assert_eq!(percent_decode_lossy("%2F%3D%3F"), "/=?");
    }

    #[test]
    fn percent_decode_passes_through_invalid_escapes() {
        // Invalid hex digits => pass through verbatim.
        assert_eq!(percent_decode_lossy("a%ZZb"), "a%ZZb");
        // Truncated escape at end => verbatim.
        assert_eq!(percent_decode_lossy("a%2"), "a%2");
    }

    #[test]
    fn constant_time_eq_handles_equal_and_diff_inputs() {
        assert!(constant_time_eq(b"abc", b"abc"));
        assert!(!constant_time_eq(b"abc", b"abd"));
        assert!(!constant_time_eq(b"abc", b"abcd"));
        assert!(constant_time_eq(b"", b""));
    }

    #[test]
    fn constant_time_eq_no_length_short_circuit_1060() {
        // v0.7.0 #1060 (Agent-2 #7) — pin the post-fix invariant:
        // length-mismatch comparison must NOT short-circuit on len
        // alone. Pre-#1060 the function returned `false` immediately
        // when `a.len() != b.len()`, leaking the configured key's
        // exact byte length via timing. Post-#1060 the compare runs
        // over `max(a.len(), b.len())` bytes regardless, and the
        // length mismatch is OR'd into the diff accumulator.
        //
        // We pin the algorithmic shape by asserting the structural
        // properties:
        //
        // - `("abc", "abcd")` and `("abcd", "abc")` both return false
        //   (length mismatch detected).
        // - `("abc", "abc")` returns true (no diff).
        // - Empty vs empty returns true.
        // - Empty vs non-empty returns false (len mismatch).
        // - Differing length AND differing bytes returns false.
        assert!(!constant_time_eq(b"abc", b"abcd"));
        assert!(!constant_time_eq(b"abcd", b"abc"));
        assert!(constant_time_eq(b"abc", b"abc"));
        assert!(constant_time_eq(b"", b""));
        assert!(!constant_time_eq(b"", b"x"));
        assert!(!constant_time_eq(b"xxxx", b"yy"));
        // Edge case: same byte sequence ends in same byte but
        // shorter slice — must still detect the mismatch via the
        // zero-fill XOR.
        assert!(!constant_time_eq(b"aa", b"aaaa"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn storage_backend_as_str_round_trip() {
        assert_eq!(StorageBackend::Sqlite.as_str(), "sqlite");
        assert_eq!(StorageBackend::Postgres.as_str(), "postgres");
    }

    #[test]
    fn family_descriptors_returns_eight_entries() {
        // Order must match Family::all() declaration order — see the
        // upstream `family_descriptors` doc comment.
        let d = family_descriptors();
        assert_eq!(d.len(), 8, "expected 8 family descriptors, got {}", d.len());
        // Every descriptor is a non-empty English sentence.
        for (family, text) in d {
            assert!(!text.is_empty(), "descriptor for {family:?} is empty");
            assert!(
                text.len() > 20,
                "descriptor for {family:?} too short: {text}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn precompute_family_embeddings_no_embedder_returns_empty() {
        // The fast path of `precompute_family_embeddings`: when the
        // embedder is `None` (keyword tier or load failure) the
        // function returns an empty vector and never touches the
        // descriptor list. Pin the contract here so a future refactor
        // that swaps the early return for a panic catches the test.
        let out = AppState::precompute_family_embeddings(None);
        assert!(out.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_missing_fields_finds_single_field() {
        let msg =
            "Failed to deserialize the JSON body: missing field `content` at line 1 column 14";
        let fields = extract_missing_fields(msg);
        assert_eq!(fields, vec!["content".to_string()]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_missing_fields_finds_multiple_fields() {
        let msg = "missing field `title` and missing field `content`";
        let fields = extract_missing_fields(msg);
        assert_eq!(fields, vec!["title".to_string(), "content".to_string()]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_missing_fields_dedups_repeats() {
        let msg = "missing field `name` ... missing field `name` again";
        let fields = extract_missing_fields(msg);
        assert_eq!(fields, vec!["name".to_string()]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_missing_fields_returns_empty_for_clean_message() {
        assert!(extract_missing_fields("no missing fields here").is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_missing_fields_rejects_non_identifier_content() {
        // The function light-validates so a hostile body cannot smuggle
        // arbitrary content into the response envelope.
        let msg = "missing field `<script>` injection attempt";
        let fields = extract_missing_fields(msg);
        // The `<script>` payload contains `<` and `>` which are not
        // ascii_alphanumeric / _ / - so the field is dropped.
        assert!(fields.is_empty(), "non-ident content must be rejected");
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_missing_fields_accepts_underscores_and_dashes() {
        let msg = "missing field `agent_id-x` here";
        let fields = extract_missing_fields(msg);
        assert_eq!(fields, vec!["agent_id-x".to_string()]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_missing_fields_handles_unterminated_backtick() {
        // No trailing backtick → break the loop without panicking.
        let msg = "missing field `unterminated";
        let fields = extract_missing_fields(msg);
        assert!(fields.is_empty());
    }
}