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# A declarative tool loop — no Rust, and the tools come from an MCP server the
# operator names on the command line:
#
# agentplane run examples/tool-calling.yaml \
# --input '{"ticket": "T-1"}' \
# --mcp "tickets=python3 examples/mcp-server.py"
#
# The manifest grants `tool://tickets/read`. **Which transport reaches
# `tickets` is not in here**, and that is deliberate: an agent's declaration —
# and therefore its digest — must not change when it moves between a laptop and
# a cluster. Grants are reviewed; wiring is deployed.
apiVersion: agentplane.hupe1980.github.io/v1alpha1
kind: Agent
metadata:
spec:
execution:
identity:
role: "Answer a support question using the ticket tool"
constraints: "One sentence. Cite the ticket id."
capabilities:
models:
privileged:
tools:
# `mutates: false` is a claim the *operator's* catalogue is held to as well:
# a server calling its own tool read-only cannot make it so, and a catalogue
# laxer than this grant refuses the build.
- ref: "tool://tickets/read"
mutates: false
# What the model asks for is untrusted and at least `internal`, so a tool
# that may be shown only `public` data refuses every call a model makes.
max_sensitivity: internal
description: "Read a ticket by id"
arguments:
type: object
additionalProperties: false
required:
properties:
# A tool's answer is `internal` too, and it goes back to the model on the
# next turn: without this, the model sink's `public` default refuses it.
security:
budgets: