agentcell 0.2.2

Unprivileged Linux sandbox for AI agents — namespaces, Landlock, seccomp, cgroups
Documentation

agentcell

crates.io docs.rs

Rust bindings for AgentCell — an unprivileged Linux sandbox built on kernel primitives (user/mount/pid/net namespaces, Landlock, seccomp-BPF, cgroup v2). No Docker, no daemon for the common path.

Linux only (x86_64 and aarch64). The crate compiles on other OSes so workspaces can depend on it; spawn returns Error::Unsupported there.

Install

[dependencies]
agentcell = "0.2"

Usage

use agentcell::{Config, Stdio};

fn main() -> agentcell::Result<()> {
    let output = Config::new()
        .mem_bytes(512 * 1024 * 1024)
        .cpu_cores(1.0)
        .pids(32)
        .stdout(Stdio::Piped)
        .stderr(Stdio::Piped)
        .spawn(["sh", "-c", "echo hi-from-rust; id -u; exit 7"])?
        .wait_with_output()?;

    assert_eq!(output.status.code(), Some(7));
    Ok(())
}

Config maps 1:1 onto the C ABI in agentcell.h:

method C field default
workdir workdir ~/agent-work
rootfs rootfs live /usr /etc /opt
mem_bytes mem_bytes 60% of RAM
cpu_cores cpu_cores host default quota
pids pids 256
net net loopback only
egress egress_list off (repeatable HOST[:PORT], all A records)
secure secure off (agentlsm extra denies)

Raw FFI is under agentcell::ffi (Linux) if you want to drive libagentcell yourself.

Limits

  • Spawns are not thread-safe in the C library. This crate serializes spawn / release with a process-wide mutex.
  • At most 16 live cells per process; wait or drop one before spawning more.
  • Needs unprivileged user namespaces (kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1). On Ubuntu 24.04 also kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0 or the packaged AppArmor profile.
  • agentlsm (root, eBPF LSM) is optional and only required for --secure / --egress / Net::Veth. Config::egress is repeatable; the port defaults to 443.

License

MIT. The in-tree eBPF monitors (agentmon / agentlsm) are GPL-2.0 and are not linked by this crate.