agent-code-lib 0.15.2

//! Integration tests for process-level sandboxing.
//!
//! The real end-to-end test is macOS-only because Seatbelt is the only
//! shipping strategy. On other platforms we still run a smoke test against
//! the disabled executor to guard the pass-through path.

use std::sync::Arc;

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use agent_code_lib::config::SandboxConfig;
use agent_code_lib::permissions::PermissionChecker;
use agent_code_lib::sandbox::SandboxExecutor;
use agent_code_lib::tools::bash::BashTool;
use agent_code_lib::tools::{Tool, ToolContext};
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;

fn make_ctx(cwd: std::path::PathBuf, sandbox: Option<Arc<SandboxExecutor>>) -> ToolContext {
    ToolContext {
        cwd,
        cancel: CancellationToken::new(),
        permission_checker: Arc::new(PermissionChecker::allow_all()),
        verbose: false,
        plan_mode: false,
        file_cache: None,
        denial_tracker: None,
        task_manager: None,
        session_allows: None,
        permission_prompter: None,
        sandbox,
    }
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bash_runs_normally_with_disabled_sandbox() {
    // Regression guard: wrapping with a disabled sandbox must not change
    // command behavior — `echo hello` still returns `hello` on stdout.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let ctx = make_ctx(
        tmp.path().to_path_buf(),
        Some(Arc::new(SandboxExecutor::disabled())),
    );
    let bash = BashTool;
    let result = bash
        .call(serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hello"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .expect("bash echo hello should succeed");
    assert!(
        result.content.contains("hello"),
        "expected stdout to contain 'hello', got: {}",
        result.content
    );
    assert!(!result.is_error);
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn bash_runs_normally_without_sandbox_context() {
    // Second guard for the no-sandbox-threaded path (ctx.sandbox = None).
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let ctx = make_ctx(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), None);
    let bash = BashTool;
    let result = bash
        .call(serde_json::json!({"command": "echo goodbye"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .expect("bash echo goodbye should succeed");
    assert!(result.content.contains("goodbye"));
}

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn seatbelt_blocks_writes_outside_project_dir() {
    // End-to-end: enable sandbox, try to write to /etc, expect failure.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let cfg = SandboxConfig {
        enabled: true,
        strategy: "seatbelt".to_string(),
        allowed_write_paths: vec![],
        forbidden_paths: vec![],
        allow_network: false,
    };
    let exec = Arc::new(SandboxExecutor::from_config(&cfg, tmp.path()));

    // Skip if seatbelt is unavailable (e.g. a minimal macOS CI image).
    if !exec.is_active() {
        eprintln!("skipping: seatbelt not available on this runner");
        return;
    }

    let ctx = make_ctx(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), Some(exec));
    let bash = BashTool;
    let marker = "/etc/agent-code-sandbox-test-marker";
    let result = bash
        .call(
            serde_json::json!({
                "command": format!("echo test > {marker}"),
            }),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .expect("bash tool call should return a ToolResult even on sandbox denial");

    assert!(
        result.is_error
            || result.content.contains("Operation not permitted")
            || result.content.contains("sandbox")
            || result.content.contains("denied"),
        "expected sandbox denial, got: {}",
        result.content
    );

    // Defense in depth: confirm the marker file was not actually created.
    assert!(
        !std::path::Path::new(marker).exists(),
        "sandbox should have blocked creation of {marker}"
    );
}

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn seatbelt_allows_writes_inside_project_dir() {
    // Regression guard: writes inside the project directory must still
    // succeed when the sandbox is active, otherwise the sandbox is useless.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let cfg = SandboxConfig {
        enabled: true,
        strategy: "seatbelt".to_string(),
        allowed_write_paths: vec![],
        forbidden_paths: vec![],
        allow_network: false,
    };
    let exec = Arc::new(SandboxExecutor::from_config(&cfg, tmp.path()));

    if !exec.is_active() {
        eprintln!("skipping: seatbelt not available on this runner");
        return;
    }

    let ctx = make_ctx(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), Some(exec));
    let bash = BashTool;
    let result = bash
        .call(
            serde_json::json!({
                "command": "echo sandboxed > inside.txt && cat inside.txt",
            }),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .expect("bash tool call should succeed");
    assert!(
        !result.is_error,
        "inside-project write failed: {}",
        result.content
    );
    assert!(result.content.contains("sandboxed"));
}

// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//  Bypass-flag regression tests
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn dangerously_disable_sandbox_bypasses_when_allowed() {
    // With allow_bypass=true (the default), setting
    // `dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true` must let the command through
    // the sandbox wrapper — verified by successfully writing to /tmp,
    // which is not in the sandbox policy's allow list.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let cfg = SandboxConfig {
        enabled: true,
        strategy: "seatbelt".to_string(),
        allowed_write_paths: vec![],
        forbidden_paths: vec![],
        allow_network: false,
    };
    let exec = Arc::new(SandboxExecutor::from_config(&cfg, tmp.path()));
    if !exec.is_active() {
        eprintln!("skipping: seatbelt not available");
        return;
    }
    assert!(exec.allow_bypass());

    let ctx = make_ctx(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), Some(exec));
    let bash = BashTool;
    // Probe path: a writable location outside the temp project dir.
    let probe = format!("/tmp/agent-code-bypass-{}", std::process::id());
    let result = bash
        .call(
            serde_json::json!({
                "command": format!("echo bypass > {probe} && rm {probe} && echo ok"),
                "dangerouslyDisableSandbox": true,
            }),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .expect("bash call should succeed");
    assert!(
        !result.is_error,
        "bypass path should succeed; got: {}",
        result.content
    );
    assert!(result.content.contains("ok"));
}

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn dangerously_disable_sandbox_is_ignored_when_bypass_denied() {
    // With allow_bypass=false (e.g. security.disable_bypass_permissions=true),
    // `dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true` must still wrap the command.
    // Writing to /etc should fail exactly like the non-bypassed case.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let cfg = SandboxConfig {
        enabled: true,
        strategy: "seatbelt".to_string(),
        allowed_write_paths: vec![],
        forbidden_paths: vec![],
        allow_network: false,
    };
    let exec = Arc::new(SandboxExecutor::from_config_with_bypass(
        &cfg,
        tmp.path(),
        false, // disable bypass
    ));
    if !exec.is_active() {
        eprintln!("skipping: seatbelt not available");
        return;
    }
    assert!(!exec.allow_bypass());

    let ctx = make_ctx(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), Some(exec));
    let bash = BashTool;
    let marker = "/etc/agent-code-sandbox-bypass-denied-marker";
    let result = bash
        .call(
            serde_json::json!({
                "command": format!("echo test > {marker}"),
                "dangerouslyDisableSandbox": true,
            }),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .expect("bash call should return a ToolResult");

    assert!(
        result.is_error || result.content.contains("Operation not permitted"),
        "write should have been blocked despite bypass flag, got: {}",
        result.content
    );
    assert!(!std::path::Path::new(marker).exists());
}

// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//  Environment / cwd / allow-list regression tests
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandboxed_bash_preserves_cwd() {
    // Regression: wrapping the command via sandbox-exec must not drop
    // the current_dir setting. Verified by running `pwd` and comparing.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let cfg = SandboxConfig {
        enabled: true,
        strategy: "seatbelt".to_string(),
        allowed_write_paths: vec![],
        forbidden_paths: vec![],
        allow_network: false,
    };
    let exec = Arc::new(SandboxExecutor::from_config(&cfg, tmp.path()));
    if !exec.is_active() {
        eprintln!("skipping: seatbelt not available");
        return;
    }
    let ctx = make_ctx(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), Some(exec));
    let bash = BashTool;
    let result = bash
        .call(serde_json::json!({"command": "pwd"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .expect("pwd should succeed");
    assert!(!result.is_error, "pwd failed: {}", result.content);
    // Canonicalize because macOS tempdirs live under /private/var but
    // bash prints the unresolved form.
    let expected = std::fs::canonicalize(tmp.path()).unwrap();
    assert!(
        result.content.contains(&*expected.display().to_string())
            || result.content.contains(&*tmp.path().display().to_string()),
        "pwd output did not match temp dir: {}",
        result.content
    );
}

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandboxed_bash_can_write_to_allowed_path() {
    // Regression: an explicit entry in allowed_write_paths must be
    // honored, not just the project directory.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let extra = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let cfg = SandboxConfig {
        enabled: true,
        strategy: "seatbelt".to_string(),
        allowed_write_paths: vec![extra.path().display().to_string()],
        forbidden_paths: vec![],
        allow_network: false,
    };
    let exec = Arc::new(SandboxExecutor::from_config(&cfg, tmp.path()));
    if !exec.is_active() {
        eprintln!("skipping: seatbelt not available");
        return;
    }
    let ctx = make_ctx(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), Some(exec));
    let bash = BashTool;
    let target = extra.path().join("probe.txt");
    let result = bash
        .call(
            serde_json::json!({
                "command": format!("echo allowed > {}", target.display()),
            }),
            &ctx,
        )
        .await
        .expect("bash call should succeed");
    assert!(
        !result.is_error,
        "write to allowed_write_paths entry should succeed: {}",
        result.content
    );
    assert!(
        target.exists(),
        "target file should exist at {}",
        target.display()
    );
}

#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandboxed_bash_reads_remain_broadly_allowed() {
    // The sandbox grants broad read access so tools can introspect the
    // filesystem. Reading /etc/hosts (present on every macOS box) must
    // still work under the sandbox.
    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let cfg = SandboxConfig {
        enabled: true,
        strategy: "seatbelt".to_string(),
        allowed_write_paths: vec![],
        forbidden_paths: vec![],
        allow_network: false,
    };
    let exec = Arc::new(SandboxExecutor::from_config(&cfg, tmp.path()));
    if !exec.is_active() {
        eprintln!("skipping: seatbelt not available");
        return;
    }
    let ctx = make_ctx(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), Some(exec));
    let bash = BashTool;
    let result = bash
        .call(serde_json::json!({"command": "head -1 /etc/hosts"}), &ctx)
        .await
        .expect("read should succeed");
    assert!(
        !result.is_error,
        "reading /etc/hosts should be allowed: {}",
        result.content
    );
}