aethel-core 0.7.5

//! # SAAP Selective Attribute Verification Engine
//!
//! This module implements the **Selective Attribute Attestation Protocol (SAAP)**
//! prove/verify engine for Aethel-ID. This code has had no independent security
//! audit (see the README's audit status), and its pathway is retired (D-13).
//! It also covers a narrower surface than the full SAAP design: `saap_prove`
//! and `verify_saap_proof` operate over an already-parsed credential; issuing
//! one in the first place (BDLOP commitment issuance, an issuer signature) is
//! not implemented here.
//!
//! ## Purpose
//!
//! Verifies SAAP proof transcripts generated by credential holders performing
//! selective attribute disclosure. The verifier checks:
//!
//! 1. **Norm Bound**: Response vector `z` satisfies `∥z∥_∞ < (γ₁ - β)`.
//! 2. **Commitment Reconstruction**: Recomputes `w' = A · z - c · t_attr`.
//! 3. **Challenge Validation**: Verifies Fiat-Shamir challenge consistency.
//!
//! ## Key Structures
//!
//! - [`Polynomial`] — Ring element in R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256 + 1)
//! - [`VectorK`] — k-dimensional module vector over R_q
//! - [`SaapProof`] — Complete SAAP proof transcript
//! - [`SaapValidationError`] — Typed verification failure reasons
//! - [`AttributePayload`] — Disclosed attribute values
//!
//! ## Domain Separators
//!
//! - Challenge hash: `"AETHEL_SAAP_CHALLENGE_V1"`

// The single-response prove and verify pathway below is retired (D-13 in
// docs/DEVIATIONS.md, 0X3-110): nothing outside this file's tests calls it.
// It is marked rather than deleted because `SaapProof` and
// `SaapValidationError` are public, so removing it belongs in a breaking
// release.
#![allow(dead_code)]
// Ring arithmetic indexes several coefficient arrays in step, so an index
// loop is the clear form here (as in `component.rs`).
#![allow(clippy::needless_range_loop)]

use core::sync::atomic::{compiler_fence, Ordering};
use sha3::{Shake256, digest::{Update, ExtendableOutput, XofReader}};
use zeroize::Zeroize;

use crate::identity_error::IdentityError;

pub const RING_N: usize = 256;
pub const MODULE_K: usize = 4;
pub const MAX_ATTRIBUTES: usize = 8;
pub const PARAM_Q: i32 = 8_380_417;
pub const PARAM_GAMMA1: i32 = 131_072;
pub const PARAM_BETA: i32 = 78;
pub const REJECTION_BOUND: i32 = PARAM_GAMMA1 - PARAM_BETA;

/// Ring element in R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256 + 1).
///
/// Used both for public proof data (challenge, commitment) and, as a
/// component of [`VectorK`], for caller-supplied secret key material passed
/// into [`saap_prove`]. Because this crate's own `saap_prove` signature uses
/// `VectorK` to carry a raw secret, neither type derives `Debug`/`Display`
/// (P3-03) — see the `assert_not_impl_any!` checks in `tests/no_debug_leak.rs`.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Zeroize)]
#[repr(align(64))]
pub struct Polynomial {
    pub coeffs: [i32; RING_N],
}

impl Polynomial {
    pub const fn zero() -> Self {
        Self { coeffs: [0; RING_N] }
    }
}

/// k-dimensional module vector over R_q. See [`Polynomial`] for why this
/// type has no `Debug`/`Display` impl: it is the type this crate's own API
/// uses to carry a raw SAAP secret key (`saap_prove`'s `secret_key` parameter).
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Zeroize)]
#[repr(align(64))]
pub struct VectorK {
    pub vec: [Polynomial; MODULE_K],
}

impl VectorK {
    pub const fn zero() -> Self {
        Self { vec: [Polynomial::zero(); MODULE_K] }
    }
}

/// Bitmask of disclosed attributes.
pub type AttributeMask = u64;

/// Disclosed attribute values.
///
/// Keeps its `Debug` derive: these are the attribute values the credential
/// holder has *chosen to disclose* — deliberately revealed by SAAP's own
/// selective-disclosure design, never the secret key itself. Safe to
/// format-print by construction (P3-03).
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct AttributePayload {
    pub values: [u64; MAX_ATTRIBUTES],
}

impl AttributePayload {
    pub const fn zero() -> Self {
        Self { values: [0u64; MAX_ATTRIBUTES] }
    }
}

/// Complete SAAP proof transcript.
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
#[repr(C)]
pub struct SaapProof {
    /// Context tag τ.
    pub context_tag: [u8; 32],
    /// Bitmask of disclosed attributes.
    pub disclosure_mask: AttributeMask,
    /// Disclosed attribute values.
    pub attributes: AttributePayload,
    /// Fiat-Shamir challenge polynomial c.
    pub challenge: Polynomial,
    /// Response vector z = r + c · secret_key.
    pub z: VectorK,
    /// BDLOP commitment hash (SHA3-256 of commitment vector).
    pub commitment_hash: [u8; 32],
    /// Commitment vector w = A · r.
    pub commitment_w: VectorK,
}

impl SaapProof {
    /// An all-zero proof, used as an output buffer.
    pub const fn zero() -> Self {
        Self {
            context_tag: [0u8; 32],
            disclosure_mask: 0,
            attributes: AttributePayload::zero(),
            challenge: Polynomial::zero(),
            z: VectorK::zero(),
            commitment_hash: [0u8; 32],
            commitment_w: VectorK::zero(),
        }
    }
}

/// Typed verification failure reasons.
#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SaapValidationError {
    /// A response coefficient is at or above the rejection bound.
    NormBoundViolation,
    /// The recomputed Fiat-Shamir challenge differs from the proof's.
    ChallengeMismatch,
    /// A disclosed attribute does not match its commitment.
    InvalidAttributeCommitment,
}

// ── Polynomial arithmetic ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Negacyclic polynomial multiplication in R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^N + 1).
pub fn poly_mul_negacyclic(a: &Polynomial, b: &Polynomial) -> Polynomial {
    let pc = crate::plp::poly_mul_ntt(&to_plp_poly(a), &to_plp_poly(b));

    let mut result = Polynomial::zero();
    for i in 0..RING_N {
        result.coeffs[i] = mod_q(pc.coeffs[i] as i64);
    }
    result
}

/// Convert a centered SAAP polynomial into PLP's unsigned representation.
///
/// SAAP carries coefficients centered in `(-q/2, q/2]` (see [`mod_q`]); PLP
/// carries them in `[0, q)`. The NTT is PLP's, so the bridge lives here rather
/// than making PLP aware of a second convention.
fn to_plp_poly(p: &Polynomial) -> crate::plp::Poly {
    let mut out = crate::plp::Poly::zero();
    for i in 0..RING_N {
        let c = p.coeffs[i];
        out.coeffs[i] = if c < 0 { (c + PARAM_Q) as u32 } else { c as u32 };
    }
    out
}

/// Schoolbook negacyclic multiplication, retained as the reference.
///
/// [`poly_mul_negacyclic`] is the fast path and this is what it is checked
/// against, by `ntt_and_schoolbook_agree_over_saap_polynomials`. Keeping the
/// O(N^2) version is the only way that check means anything: a fast path with no
/// independent reference is a fast path nobody can falsify.
pub fn poly_mul_schoolbook(a: &Polynomial, b: &Polynomial) -> Polynomial {
    let mut result = Polynomial::zero();
    for i in 0..RING_N {
        for j in 0..RING_N {
            let idx = i + j;
            let product = (a.coeffs[i] as i64) * (b.coeffs[j] as i64);
            if idx < RING_N {
                let acc = (result.coeffs[idx] as i64) + product;
                result.coeffs[idx] = mod_q(acc);
            } else {
                let wrap_idx = idx - RING_N;
                let acc = (result.coeffs[wrap_idx] as i64) - product;
                result.coeffs[wrap_idx] = mod_q(acc);
            }
        }
    }
    result
}

/// Polynomial addition mod q (centered).
pub fn poly_add(a: &Polynomial, b: &Polynomial) -> Polynomial {
    let mut result = Polynomial::zero();
    for i in 0..RING_N {
        let acc = (a.coeffs[i] as i64) + (b.coeffs[i] as i64);
        result.coeffs[i] = mod_q(acc);
    }
    result
}

/// Polynomial subtraction mod q (centered).
pub fn poly_sub(a: &Polynomial, b: &Polynomial) -> Polynomial {
    let mut result = Polynomial::zero();
    for i in 0..RING_N {
        let acc = (a.coeffs[i] as i64) - (b.coeffs[i] as i64);
        result.coeffs[i] = mod_q(acc);
    }
    result
}

/// Centered reduction modulo q.
#[inline(always)]
pub fn mod_q(x: i64) -> i32 {
    let q = PARAM_Q as i64;
    let r = x % q;
    let r = if r < 0 { r + q } else { r };
    let r = if r > q / 2 { r - q } else { r };
    r as i32
}

// ── Norm verification ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Constant-time response norm verification.
///
/// Returns 0 if all coefficients satisfy `|coeff| < REJECTION_BOUND`,
/// or a non-zero mask if any coefficient violates the bound.
pub fn verify_response_norm(z: &VectorK) -> u32 {
    let mut bad_mask: u32 = 0;
    for k in 0..MODULE_K {
        for n in 0..RING_N {
            let coeff = z.vec[k].coeffs[n];
            let sign_mask = coeff >> 31;
            let abs_coeff = (coeff + sign_mask) ^ sign_mask;
            let diff = (REJECTION_BOUND - 1) - abs_coeff;
            bad_mask |= ((diff >> 31) & 1) as u32 * 0xFFFF_FFFF;
        }
    }
    bad_mask
}

// ── SHAKE-256 Fiat-Shamir challenge ───────────────────────────────────────────

/// Derive a sparse ternary challenge polynomial from an XOF reader.
///
/// Produces exactly [`crate::plp::CHALLENGE_WEIGHT`] coefficients in `{±1}`
/// using rejection sampling. The weight is shared with `plp` deliberately:
/// `BETA` is derived from it, and two challenge spaces with one bound would
/// mean the bound is wrong for at least one of them.
pub fn hash_to_challenge_from_xof(xof: &mut impl XofReader) -> Polynomial {
    let mut c_poly = Polynomial::zero();

    let mut signs = [0u8; 8];
    xof.read(&mut signs);
    let mut sign_bit = 0usize;

    let mut count = 0usize;
    let mut used = [false; RING_N];
    let mut pos_buf = [0u8; 1];

    while count < crate::plp::CHALLENGE_WEIGHT {
        xof.read(&mut pos_buf);
        let pos = pos_buf[0] as usize;
        if pos >= RING_N {
            continue;
        }
        if used[pos] {
            continue;
        }
        used[pos] = true;
        let sign_byte = signs[sign_bit / 8];
        let sign: i32 = if (sign_byte >> (sign_bit % 8)) & 1 == 0 { 1 } else { -1 };
        sign_bit += 1;
        if sign_bit >= 64 {
            xof.read(&mut signs);
            sign_bit = 0;
        }
        c_poly.coeffs[pos] = sign;
        count += 1;
    }
    c_poly
}

/// Recompute the SAAP Fiat-Shamir challenge using SHAKE-256.
///
/// c = SHAKE-256("AETHEL_SAAP_CHALLENGE_V1" ∥ commitment_w ∥ tau ∥ disclosure_mask)
/// Derive the Fiat-Shamir challenge.
///
/// Binds the disclosed attribute values (`m_pub` in SAAP-SPEC.md §7 step 3)
/// alongside the commitment, context and mask. Without them in the hash, the
/// disclosed values ride in the transcript unbound and can be rewritten after
/// proof generation while the proof still verifies — see
/// `disclosed_attributes_are_bound_into_the_challenge`.
///
/// Only the values selected by `disclosure_mask` are bound. Undisclosed slots
/// are skipped rather than hashed, so the challenge cannot act as an oracle on
/// attributes the proof is meant to withhold (§11.5).
pub fn recompute_challenge(
    commitment_w: &VectorK,
    tau: &[u8],
    disclosure_mask: AttributeMask,
    attributes: &AttributePayload,
) -> Polynomial {
    let mut hasher = Shake256::default();
    hasher.update(b"AETHEL_SAAP_CHALLENGE_V1");
    for poly in commitment_w.vec.iter() {
        for coeff in poly.coeffs.iter() {
            hasher.update(&coeff.to_le_bytes());
        }
    }
    hasher.update(tau);
    hasher.update(&disclosure_mask.to_le_bytes());
    for i in 0..MAX_ATTRIBUTES {
        if (disclosure_mask >> i) & 1 == 1 {
            hasher.update(&(i as u8).to_le_bytes());
            hasher.update(&attributes.values[i].to_le_bytes());
        }
    }
    let mut xof = hasher.finalize_xof();
    hash_to_challenge_from_xof(&mut xof)
}

// ── SAAP Prover ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Derive the SAAP context matrix A from tau using SHAKE-256.
fn derive_saap_matrix(tau: &[u8]) -> [VectorK; MODULE_K] {
    let mut matrix = [VectorK::zero(); MODULE_K];
    for i in 0..MODULE_K {
        for j in 0..MODULE_K {
            let mut hasher = Shake256::default();
            hasher.update(b"AETHEL_SAAP_MATRIX_V1");
            hasher.update(tau);
            hasher.update(&[i as u8, j as u8]);
            let mut xof = hasher.finalize_xof();

            let mut coeff_idx = 0usize;
            while coeff_idx < RING_N {
                let mut buf = [0u8; 3];
                xof.read(&mut buf);
                let val = (buf[0] as u32)
                    | ((buf[1] as u32) << 8)
                    | ((buf[2] as u32 & 0x7F) << 16);
                if (val as i32) < PARAM_Q {
                    let centered = if val > (PARAM_Q as u32 / 2) {
                        val as i32 - PARAM_Q
                    } else {
                        val as i32
                    };
                    matrix[i].vec[j].coeffs[coeff_idx] = centered;
                    coeff_idx += 1;
                }
            }
        }
    }
    matrix
}

/// Sample a masking vector r from uniform [-γ₁, γ₁]^k using SHAKE-256.
/// Sample the sigma-protocol masking vector `r ← [-γ₁, γ₁]^k`.
///
/// `rho` MUST be fresh, secret entropy, distinct per proof. The mask is the
/// only thing hiding `sk` in the response `z = r + c·sk`: an earlier version
/// derived `r` from the public context tag, so a transcript's `w = A·r` could
/// be replayed to recover `r` and hence `c·sk`. Worse, `r` did not depend on
/// the disclosure mask, so two proofs of one credential under one τ disclosing
/// different attribute sets shared `r` and leaked `sk` via `z₁ − z₂ = (c₁−c₂)·sk`.
/// Both are closed by sampling `r` from fresh `rho` here.
/// Sample the sigma-protocol masking vector.
///
/// `rho` is caller-supplied fresh randomness and is the primary defence. `tau`
/// is bound as well so that a caller who *reuses* `rho` across two contexts
/// still cannot be attacked: without it, two proofs sharing `rho` but under
/// different contexts share `r` while their challenges differ, and
/// `z1 - z2 = (c1 - c2)*sk` recovers the secret key. That exact attack was
/// demonstrated against PLP, which had no fresh randomness at all
/// (P3-15 / 0X3-85); binding tau here makes the same mistake unreachable
/// through this path regardless of caller behaviour.
fn sample_saap_masking_vector(rho: &[u8], tau: &[u8; 32], nonce: u8) -> VectorK {
    let mut r = VectorK::zero();
    let range = 2 * PARAM_GAMMA1 as u32 + 1;

    for k in 0..MODULE_K {
        let mut hasher = Shake256::default();
        hasher.update(b"AETHEL_SAAP_MASK_V3");
        hasher.update(rho);
        hasher.update(tau);
        hasher.update(&[nonce, k as u8]);
        let mut xof = hasher.finalize_xof();

        let mut coeff_idx = 0usize;
        while coeff_idx < RING_N {
            let mut buf = [0u8; 3];
            xof.read(&mut buf);
            let val = (buf[0] as u32)
                | ((buf[1] as u32) << 8)
                | ((buf[2] as u32 & 0x7F) << 16);
            if val < range {
                let centered = val as i32 - PARAM_GAMMA1;
                r.vec[k].coeffs[coeff_idx] = centered;
                coeff_idx += 1;
            }
        }
    }
    r
}

/// Generate the SAAP proof. **L1-internal**: `secret_key` is caller-supplied
/// raw key material, taken by reference and never stored or returned — only
/// the public [`SaapProof`] (challenge/commitment/response, safe to disclose
/// by construction) leaves this function. This function does not zeroize the
/// caller's `secret_key` itself (it's borrowed, not owned — wiping the
/// caller's memory out from under them would be a correctness bug, not a
/// safety improvement); it does zeroize every local intermediate derived from
/// it (`r`, `cs_k`), and on a **rejected** iteration also `w`/`c`/`z` before
/// looping — same reasoning as `plp::Prover::prove_identity`: a rejected
/// response must never be observable, so it must be wiped, not merely
/// dropped. `Polynomial`/`VectorK` are `Copy` and cannot implement `Drop`, so
/// none of this happens automatically.
///
/// Implements the BDLOP commitment scheme with Fiat-Shamir ZK proof.
///
/// Returns the first response that satisfies the norm bound, or
/// `Err(RejectionSamplingFailed)` if all 16 iterations are rejected. There is
/// deliberately **no fallback proof**: see the note above the error return for
/// why emitting a candidate there was a soundness hazard rather than a
/// convenience.
pub fn saap_prove(
    credential: &[u8],
    disclosure_mask: AttributeMask,
    tau: &[u8],
    secret_key: &VectorK,
    rho: &[u8],
) -> Result<SaapProof, IdentityError> {
    // 1. Parse credential into attribute vector (up to MAX_ATTRIBUTES u64 values)
    let mut attributes = AttributePayload::zero();
    for i in 0..MAX_ATTRIBUTES {
        let offset = i * 8;
        if offset + 8 <= credential.len() {
            let mut bytes = [0u8; 8];
            bytes.copy_from_slice(&credential[offset..offset + 8]);
            attributes.values[i] = u64::from_le_bytes(bytes);
        }
    }

    // 2. Derive context matrix A
    let matrix_a = derive_saap_matrix(tau);

    // 3. Context tag (first 32 bytes of tau, padded)
    let mut context_tag = [0u8; 32];
    let len = tau.len().min(32);
    context_tag[..len].copy_from_slice(&tau[..len]);

    // 4. Fixed 16-iteration rejection sampling loop
    for iter in 0u8..16 {
        // Sample masking vector r ← S_{γ₁}^k
        let mut r = sample_saap_masking_vector(rho, &context_tag, iter);

        // Compute commitment w = A · r
        let mut w = VectorK::zero();
        for i in 0..MODULE_K {
            for j in 0..MODULE_K {
                let prod = poly_mul_negacyclic(&matrix_a[i].vec[j], &r.vec[j]);
                w.vec[i] = poly_add(&w.vec[i], &prod);
            }
        }

        // Compute Fiat-Shamir challenge c using padded context_tag (same as verifier)
        let mut c = recompute_challenge(&w, &context_tag, disclosure_mask, &attributes);

        // Compute response z = r + c · secret_key
        let mut z = VectorK::zero();
        for k in 0..MODULE_K {
            let mut cs_k = poly_mul_negacyclic(&c, &secret_key.vec[k]);
            z.vec[k] = poly_add(&r.vec[k], &cs_k);
            cs_k.zeroize();
        }
        r.zeroize();

        // Rejection check: ||z||∞ < γ₁ - β
        if verify_response_norm(&z) == 0 {
            // Compute commitment hash
            let mut commitment_hash = [0u8; 32];
            let mut hasher = Shake256::default();
            hasher.update(b"AETHEL_SAAP_COMMIT_V1");
            for poly in w.vec.iter() {
                for coeff in poly.coeffs.iter() {
                    hasher.update(&coeff.to_le_bytes());
                }
            }
            let mut xof = hasher.finalize_xof();
            xof.read(&mut commitment_hash);

            return Ok(SaapProof {
                context_tag,
                disclosure_mask,
                attributes,
                challenge: c,
                z,
                commitment_hash,
                commitment_w: w,
            });
        }

        // Rejected: w/c/z must not survive to the next iteration unwiped.
        w.zeroize();
        c.zeroize();
        z.zeroize();
    }

    // No fallback, and specifically not the one that used to be here.
    //
    // This path rebuilt a candidate by re-deriving the mask as
    // `sample_saap_masking_vector(rho, &context_tag, 0)` — nonce zero, which is
    // iteration 0's mask. The derivation is a pure function of
    // `(rho, context_tag, nonce)`, so `w`, `c` and `z` all recomputed to
    // iteration 0's values and the function returned, verbatim, the response
    // iteration 0 had already rejected. It did not compute a fresh candidate; it
    // re-emitted a rejected one, without re-checking the bound.
    //
    // That is precisely the value rejection sampling exists to withhold. A
    // response outside the bound verifies nowhere, so it could only leak, never
    // authenticate: an out-of-bound `z` is how a sigma protocol gives up its
    // secret, which is the whole reason the bound is there.
    //
    // "Negligible probability" is the wrong frame for how reachable this was.
    // All 16 iterations rejecting is negligible by chance, but the derivation is
    // deterministic in `(rho, context_tag)`, so an attacker searches for a
    // context that lands here rather than waiting for one. `plp::Prover::
    // prove_identity` (0X3-85) and `credential::prove` already refuse for this
    // reason; this brings the third implementation of the same primitive in
    // line with them.
    Err(IdentityError::RejectionSamplingFailed)
}

// ── SAAP Verifier ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Compute `t = A_τ · sk` for the **superseded** SAAP construction.
///
/// # This is not an anchor any more
///
/// The question this function used to raise, whether `t` could be published, is
/// now moot rather than open. `t = A·sk` carries no error term, so it is an
/// exact linear image of the secret and recovering `sk` from it is linear
/// algebra over the ring rather than an M-LWE instance. It was never
/// distributable.
///
/// [`crate::credential`] replaces it. That construction anchors verification on
/// the PLP projection `b_τ = A_τ·s + e_τ`, which is an M-LWE sample and is
/// publishable precisely because of the noise this value lacks. Nothing needs a
/// SAAP-local public key any more.
///
/// Retained only so the characterisation tests in `tests/saap_soundness.rs`
/// stay executable: they pin the defects of the superseded verifier as running
/// code rather than prose. It disappears when they do. Not part of the shipped
/// surface, and not reachable through the WIT world.
#[doc(hidden)]
#[deprecated(
    since = "0.1.1",
    note = "superseded by the credential module, which anchors on the PLP projection b_tau.             This value was never safe to publish and is now unnecessary."
)]
pub fn saap_public_key(tau: &[u8], secret_key: &VectorK) -> VectorK {
    let matrix_a = derive_saap_matrix(tau);
    let mut t = VectorK::zero();
    for i in 0..MODULE_K {
        for j in 0..MODULE_K {
            let prod = poly_mul_negacyclic(&matrix_a[i].vec[j], &secret_key.vec[j]);
            t.vec[i] = poly_add(&t.vec[i], &prod);
        }
    }
    t
}

/// Verify a SAAP proof against a caller-supplied context and public key.
///
/// This is the verification the module documentation always described. Unlike
/// [`verify_saap_proof`], every check is anchored outside the proof:
///
/// 1. Norm bound on `z`
/// 2. Fiat-Shamir consistency, with the challenge recomputed against the
///    **caller's** τ, and the proof's own `context_tag` required to match it —
///    so a proof cannot certify its own context
/// 3. The verification equation `A_τ · z - c · t == w`
///
/// Step 3 is an exact equality rather than an approximate one because this
/// construction adds no error term: `A·z = A·(r + c·sk) = A·r + c·(A·sk) = w +
/// c·t`. PLP's analogous check is approximate because its `public_b` is an LWE
/// sample carrying noise.
pub fn verify_saap_proof_against(
    proof: &SaapProof,
    tau: &[u8],
    public_key: &VectorK,
) -> Result<(), SaapValidationError> {
    // 1. Norm bound.
    if verify_response_norm(&proof.z) != 0 {
        return Err(SaapValidationError::NormBoundViolation);
    }

    // 2. Challenge consistency, against the caller's context.
    let mut context_tag = [0u8; 32];
    let len = tau.len().min(32);
    context_tag[..len].copy_from_slice(&tau[..len]);

    let recomputed_c =
        recompute_challenge(&proof.commitment_w, &context_tag, proof.disclosure_mask, &proof.attributes);
    let mut mismatch = 0u32;
    for i in 0..RING_N {
        mismatch |= (recomputed_c.coeffs[i] ^ proof.challenge.coeffs[i]) as u32;
    }
    // The proof's own tag must match the caller's, or a proof issued for one
    // context could be replayed under another.
    let mut tag_mismatch = 0u8;
    for i in 0..32 {
        tag_mismatch |= proof.context_tag[i] ^ context_tag[i];
    }
    if mismatch != 0 || tag_mismatch != 0 {
        return Err(SaapValidationError::ChallengeMismatch);
    }

    // 3. Verification equation: A_τ · z - c · t == w.
    let matrix_a = derive_saap_matrix(tau);
    let mut equation_mismatch = 0u32;
    for i in 0..MODULE_K {
        let mut az_i = Polynomial::zero();
        for j in 0..MODULE_K {
            let prod = poly_mul_negacyclic(&matrix_a[i].vec[j], &proof.z.vec[j]);
            az_i = poly_add(&az_i, &prod);
        }
        let ct = poly_mul_negacyclic(&proof.challenge, &public_key.vec[i]);
        let w_prime = poly_sub(&az_i, &ct);
        for n in 0..RING_N {
            equation_mismatch |= (w_prime.coeffs[n] ^ proof.commitment_w.vec[i].coeffs[n]) as u32;
        }
    }
    if equation_mismatch != 0 {
        return Err(SaapValidationError::InvalidAttributeCommitment);
    }

    compiler_fence(Ordering::SeqCst);
    Ok(())
}

/// Verify a SAAP proof transcript.
///
/// Checks:
/// 1. Norm bound: ||z||∞ < γ₁ - β
/// 2. Challenge consistency: c' = SHAKE-256("AETHEL_SAAP_CHALLENGE_V1" ∥ w ∥ τ ∥ mask)
/// 3. Commitment hash consistency
#[deprecated(
    since = "0.1.1",
    note = "unsound: ignores its public parameters and checks the proof only against \
            itself, so it accepts proofs forged with no secret key. Use \
            verify_saap_proof_against(proof, tau, public_key). See P3-10 / 0X3-78."
)]
pub fn verify_saap_proof(
    proof: &SaapProof,
    _matrix_a: &[VectorK; MODULE_K],
    _public_attribute_commitments: &[Polynomial; MAX_ATTRIBUTES],
) -> Result<(), SaapValidationError> {
    // Step 1: Norm Bound Check
    let norm_failure = verify_response_norm(&proof.z);
    if norm_failure != 0 {
        return Err(SaapValidationError::NormBoundViolation);
    }

    // Step 2: Reconstruct w' = A * z - c * t_attr
    // For the verifier, we use the stored commitment_w and verify the challenge
    // matches the recomputed challenge from commitment_w.
    let recomputed_c = recompute_challenge(
        &proof.commitment_w,
        &proof.context_tag,
        proof.disclosure_mask,
        &proof.attributes,
    );

    // Step 3: Challenge Consistency Verification (constant-time)
    let mut mismatch = 0u32;
    for i in 0..RING_N {
        let a = recomputed_c.coeffs[i];
        let b = proof.challenge.coeffs[i];
        mismatch |= (a ^ b) as u32;
    }
    if mismatch != 0 {
        return Err(SaapValidationError::ChallengeMismatch);
    }

    // Step 4: Verify commitment hash
    let mut expected_hash = [0u8; 32];
    let mut hasher = Shake256::default();
    hasher.update(b"AETHEL_SAAP_COMMIT_V1");
    for poly in proof.commitment_w.vec.iter() {
        for coeff in poly.coeffs.iter() {
            hasher.update(&coeff.to_le_bytes());
        }
    }
    let mut xof = hasher.finalize_xof();
    xof.read(&mut expected_hash);

    let mut hash_mismatch = 0u8;
    for i in 0..32 {
        hash_mismatch |= proof.commitment_hash[i] ^ expected_hash[i];
    }
    if hash_mismatch != 0 {
        return Err(SaapValidationError::InvalidAttributeCommitment);
    }

    compiler_fence(Ordering::SeqCst);
    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn make_test_secret_key() -> VectorK {
        let mut sk = VectorK::zero();
        for k in 0..MODULE_K {
            for n in 0..RING_N {
                sk.vec[k].coeffs[n] = (n % 5) as i32 - 2;
            }
        }
        sk
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_mod_q_range() {
        let q = PARAM_Q as i64;
        for x in [-q - 1, -q, -1, 0, 1, q - 1, q, q + 1] {
            let r = mod_q(x);
            assert!((-(PARAM_Q / 2)..=PARAM_Q / 2).contains(&r),
                "mod_q({}) = {} out of range", x, r);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_recompute_challenge_deterministic() {
        let w = VectorK::zero();
        let tau = b"test_tau";
        let mask = 0b00001111u64;
        let c1 = recompute_challenge(&w, tau, mask, &AttributePayload::zero());
        let c2 = recompute_challenge(&w, tau, mask, &AttributePayload::zero());
        assert_eq!(c1.coeffs, c2.coeffs, "challenge should be deterministic");
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_recompute_challenge_sparse() {
        let w = VectorK::zero();
        let c = recompute_challenge(&w, b"tau", 0u64, &AttributePayload::zero());
        let nonzero = c.coeffs.iter().filter(|&&x| x != 0).count();
        assert_eq!(
            nonzero, crate::plp::CHALLENGE_WEIGHT,
            "challenge should have exactly CHALLENGE_WEIGHT non-zero coefficients"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_saap_prove_verify() {
        let sk = make_test_secret_key();
        let credential = [0u8; 64]; // 8 attributes of 8 bytes each
        let disclosure_mask = 0b00001111u64;
        let tau = b"test_context_tau_saap";

        let proof = saap_prove(&credential, disclosure_mask, tau, &sk, &[0x7cu8; 32])
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");

        // Verify norm bound
        assert_eq!(verify_response_norm(&proof.z), 0, "response norm should be within bound");

        // Verify challenge consistency — use proof.context_tag (padded) not raw tau
        let recomputed = recompute_challenge(&proof.commitment_w, &proof.context_tag, disclosure_mask, &proof.attributes);
        let mut mismatch = 0u32;
        for i in 0..RING_N {
            mismatch |= (recomputed.coeffs[i] ^ proof.challenge.coeffs[i]) as u32;
        }
        assert_eq!(mismatch, 0, "challenge should be consistent");
    }
}

// ── Characterisation and soundness tests ────────────────────────
//
// Moved here from tests/saap_soundness.rs and tests/randomness_is_secret.rs
// when this module became crate-private (P3-10 / 0X3-78). An integration test
// cannot reach a pub(crate) module, and this module had to stop being public
// because saap_prove's signature takes a raw u64 disclosure mask, which the
// WIT world is explicit about never putting on the wire.
//
// They are kept, not deleted: they pin the superseded verifier's defects as
// executable characterisation rather than prose, and they disappear when it
// does.

#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(deprecated)]
mod soundness_tests {
    use super::*;

    fn test_sk() -> VectorK {
        let mut sk = VectorK::zero();
        for k in 0..MODULE_K {
            for n in 0..RING_N {
                sk.vec[k].coeffs[n] = ((k * 31 + n * 7) % 5) as i32 - 2;
            }
        }
        sk
    }
    use sha3::{digest::{ExtendableOutput, Update, XofReader}, Shake256};

    const RHO_A: [u8; 32] = [0x11u8; 32];

    const RHO_B: [u8; 32] = [0x22u8; 32];


    /// Build a proof with no secret key, no credential, and no key material of any
    /// kind — only public knowledge of the verification procedure.
    ///
    /// Strategy: every check in `verify_saap_proof` derives its expected value from
    /// a field of the proof. So pick the free fields first, then compute the
    /// dependent ones the same way the verifier will.
    fn forge(context_tag: [u8; 32], disclosure_mask: u64) -> SaapProof {
        let mut proof = SaapProof::zero();

        proof.context_tag = context_tag;
        proof.disclosure_mask = disclosure_mask;
        proof.attributes = AttributePayload::zero();

        // Free choice: the commitment vector. The verifier never checks it against
        // A·z, because `matrix_a` is ignored. Zero is the simplest witness that the
        // choice is unconstrained.
        proof.commitment_w = VectorK::zero();

        // Free choice: the response vector. Only its norm is checked, and the norm
        // of zero trivially passes the bound.
        proof.z = VectorK::zero();

        // Dependent: the challenge is whatever `recompute_challenge` produces from
        // fields we already control.
        proof.challenge = recompute_challenge(
            &proof.commitment_w,
            &proof.context_tag,
            proof.disclosure_mask,
            &proof.attributes,
        );

        // Dependent: the commitment hash is SHAKE-256 over the commitment vector,
        // recomputed by the verifier from the same field.
        let mut hasher = Shake256::default();
        hasher.update(b"AETHEL_SAAP_COMMIT_V1");
        for poly in proof.commitment_w.vec.iter() {
            for coeff in poly.coeffs.iter() {
                hasher.update(&coeff.to_le_bytes());
            }
        }
        let mut xof = hasher.finalize_xof();
        xof.read(&mut proof.commitment_hash);

        proof
    }

    /// Characterises the defect in the deprecated verifier, executably.
    ///
    /// This asserts the **known-bad** behaviour deliberately: `verify_saap_proof`
    /// accepts a proof forged with no secret key. It is written as a passing test so
    /// the defect is pinned rather than merely described, and so it disappears
    /// together with the function it characterises. The correctness assertions live
    /// in `corrected_verifier_*` above.
    #[test]
    #[allow(deprecated)]
    fn deprecated_verifier_accepts_forgeries_known_defect() {
        let matrix_a = [VectorK::zero(); MODULE_K];
        let attr_commits = [Polynomial::zero(); MAX_ATTRIBUTES];

        let proof = forge([7u8; 32], 0b0000_0011);

        assert!(
            verify_saap_proof(&proof, &matrix_a, &attr_commits).is_ok(),
            "the deprecated verifier now rejects the forgery — if it was fixed, delete \
             this characterisation test along with the function"
        );
    }

    /// Positive control for the forgery methodology above.
    ///
    /// PLP's verifier performs the same three-step shape as SAAP's — norm bound,
    /// Fiat-Shamir challenge consistency, verification equation — but its third
    /// step actually uses the projection's public parameters:
    ///
    /// ```text
    /// W' = A_τ · z - c · b_τ    then    ||W' - W||∞ < 2β
    /// ```
    ///
    /// So the analogous forgery must fail there. If this test passes while the
    /// SAAP forgery is accepted, the difference is in the verifiers, not in the
    /// way these tests construct a forgery.
    #[test]
    fn plp_rejects_the_analogous_forgery() {
        use crate::plp::{MasterIdentity, Poly, Verifier, ZkIdentityProof};

        // The forger is allowed to know the public projection — that is the point
        // of a public key. It has no access to the master secret.
        let identity = MasterIdentity::from_seed(&[0x11u8; 32]);
        let projection = identity.project_at_context(b"context-under-attack", &[0xa5u8; 32]);

        // Same free choices as the SAAP forgery: zero commitment, zero response,
        // challenge recomputed the way the verifier will recompute it.
        let commitment_w = [Poly::zero(); crate::plp::MODULE_K];
        let challenge_c = crate::plp::hash_to_challenge(
            &commitment_w,
            &projection.public_b,
            &projection.tau,
            &projection.salt,
        );
        let proof = ZkIdentityProof {
            commitment_w,
            challenge_c,
            response_z: [Poly::zero(); crate::plp::MODULE_K],
        };

        assert!(
            !Verifier::verify(&projection, &proof),
            "PLP accepted the same style of forgery SAAP accepts — in that case the \
             forgery helper is what is wrong, not the SAAP verifier, and the SAAP \
             finding must be re-derived before it is reported."
        );
    }

    // ── The corrected verifier ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    const TAU: &[u8] = b"context-alpha";
    const CREDENTIAL: &[u8] = b"attribute-block-0123456789abcdef";

    fn test_secret_key() -> VectorK {
        let mut sk = VectorK::zero();
        for k in 0..MODULE_K {
            for n in 0..RING_N {
                sk.vec[k].coeffs[n] = (n % 5) as i32 - 2;
            }
        }
        sk
    }

    /// The load-bearing test: an honestly generated proof must satisfy
    /// `A_τ · z - c · t == w`. If this fails, the verification equation is wrong and
    /// nothing built on it can be trusted.
    #[test]
    fn honest_proof_satisfies_the_verification_equation() {
        let sk = test_secret_key();
        let proof = saap_prove(CREDENTIAL, 0b0000_0011, TAU, &sk, &[0x7cu8; 32])
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");
        let public_key = saap_public_key(TAU, &sk);

        assert_eq!(
            verify_saap_proof_against(&proof, TAU, &public_key),
            Ok(()),
            "an honestly generated proof failed the verification equation"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn corrected_verifier_rejects_the_forgery() {
        let sk = test_secret_key();
        let public_key = saap_public_key(TAU, &sk);
        let forged = forge_for(TAU, 0b0000_0011);

        assert!(
            verify_saap_proof_against(&forged, TAU, &public_key).is_err(),
            "the corrected verifier still accepts a proof forged with no secret key"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn corrected_verifier_rejects_a_proof_from_another_context() {
        let sk = test_secret_key();
        let proof = saap_prove(CREDENTIAL, 0b0000_0011, TAU, &sk, &[0x7cu8; 32])
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");

        // Same identity, different context: derive the public key for the context
        // the verifier actually cares about.
        let other_tau: &[u8] = b"context-beta";
        let public_key_beta = saap_public_key(other_tau, &sk);

        assert!(
            verify_saap_proof_against(&proof, other_tau, &public_key_beta).is_err(),
            "a proof issued for one context verified under another"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn corrected_verifier_rejects_a_tampered_response() {
        let sk = test_secret_key();
        let mut proof = saap_prove(CREDENTIAL, 0b0000_0011, TAU, &sk, &[0x7cu8; 32])
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");
        let public_key = saap_public_key(TAU, &sk);

        proof.z.vec[0].coeffs[0] = proof.z.vec[0].coeffs[0].wrapping_add(1);

        assert!(
            verify_saap_proof_against(&proof, TAU, &public_key).is_err(),
            "a tampered response vector still verified"
        );
    }

    /// SAAP-SPEC.md §7 step 3 requires the Fiat-Shamir challenge to bind the
    /// disclosed attribute values:
    ///
    /// ```text
    /// c' = Hash(W_1' ∥ W_2' ∥ b_τ ∥ t_blind ∥ m_pub ∥ τ)
    /// ```
    ///
    /// `recompute_challenge` hashes only `(commitment_w, τ, disclosure_mask)`. The
    /// disclosed values ride in the transcript as `proof.attributes` and never enter
    /// the challenge, so they can be rewritten after the fact.
    ///
    /// This is a gap in the corrected verifier too — fixing the verification
    /// equation did not fix attribute binding, because the two are independent.
    #[test]
    fn disclosed_attributes_are_bound_into_the_challenge() {
        let sk = test_secret_key();
        let mut proof = saap_prove(CREDENTIAL, 0b0000_0011, TAU, &sk, &[0x7cu8; 32])
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");
        let public_key = saap_public_key(TAU, &sk);

        // Sanity: the untampered proof verifies.
        assert_eq!(
            verify_saap_proof_against(&proof, TAU, &public_key),
            Ok(()),
            "test setup: the honest proof should verify before tampering"
        );

        // Rewrite a disclosed attribute value. Nothing else is touched.
        let original = proof.attributes.values[0];
        proof.attributes.values[0] = original.wrapping_add(0xDEAD_BEEF);

        assert!(
            verify_saap_proof_against(&proof, TAU, &public_key).is_err(),
            "a disclosed attribute value was rewritten after proof generation and the \
             proof still verified. SAAP-SPEC.md §7 step 3 binds m_pub into the \
             challenge; recompute_challenge does not. The verifier therefore attests \
             to attribute values the prover never committed to, which is the property \
             SAAP exists to provide."
        );
    }

    /// Same construction as `forge`, parameterised by τ so it can be aimed at the
    /// corrected verifier.
    fn forge_for(tau: &[u8], disclosure_mask: u64) -> SaapProof {
        let mut context_tag = [0u8; 32];
        let len = tau.len().min(32);
        context_tag[..len].copy_from_slice(&tau[..len]);
        forge(context_tag, disclosure_mask)
    }

    /// Characterises the second defect in the deprecated verifier: it takes no
    /// caller-supplied τ at all, so a proof certifies its own context. Asserted as
    /// known-bad for the same reason as above.
    #[test]
    #[allow(deprecated)]
    fn deprecated_verifier_is_self_certifying_known_defect() {
        let matrix_a = [VectorK::zero(); MODULE_K];
        let attr_commits = [Polynomial::zero(); MAX_ATTRIBUTES];

        let proof = forge([0xAAu8; 32], 0b0000_0001);

        assert!(
            verify_saap_proof(&proof, &matrix_a, &attr_commits).is_ok(),
            "the deprecated verifier has no τ parameter, so it cannot answer 'is this \
             valid for MY context?' — it accepts whatever context the proof asserts \
             about itself. The WIT world declares \
             saap-verify(proof, tau) -> result<bool, identity-error>."
        );
    }

    /// Fresh randomness changes the proof commitment; the same randomness reproduces
    /// it. The commitment `w = A·r` moves with `r`, so it carries per-call entropy.
    #[test]
    fn saap_mask_is_fresh_per_rho_and_reproducible_given_rho() {
        let sk = test_sk();
        // A fixed array, not a Vec: this module is no_std and `alloc` is not
        // imported here. The wasm job builds test targets with
        // --no-default-features, so a Vec here fails only there.
        let credential: [u8; 64] = core::array::from_fn(|i| i as u8);
        let tau = b"verifier-session-tau-0001";

        let p_a1 = saap_prove(&credential, 0b0000_0011, tau, &sk, &RHO_A)
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");
        let p_a2 = saap_prove(&credential, 0b0000_0011, tau, &sk, &RHO_A)
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");
        let p_b = saap_prove(&credential, 0b0000_0011, tau, &sk, &RHO_B)
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");

        let commitments_equal = |x: &SaapProof, y: &SaapProof| {
            (0..MODULE_K).all(|i| {
                (0..RING_N).all(|n| x.commitment_w.vec[i].coeffs[n] == y.commitment_w.vec[i].coeffs[n])
            })
        };

        assert!(
            commitments_equal(&p_a1, &p_a2),
            "same rho must reproduce the same commitment"
        );
        assert!(
            !commitments_equal(&p_a1, &p_b),
            "different rho must change the commitment — r carries per-call entropy"
        );
    }

    /// Proofs of one credential under one τ disclosing different attribute sets,
    /// each with its own fresh `rho`, carry independent masks — their commitments
    /// differ, so nothing links the two presentations through a shared mask.
    #[test]
    fn saap_distinct_rho_gives_distinct_masks_across_disclosures() {
        let sk = test_sk();
        // A fixed array, not a Vec: this module is no_std and `alloc` is not
        // imported here. The wasm job builds test targets with
        // --no-default-features, so a Vec here fails only there.
        let credential: [u8; 64] = core::array::from_fn(|i| i as u8);
        let tau = b"verifier-session-tau-0001";

        let p1 = saap_prove(&credential, 0b0000_0001, tau, &sk, &RHO_A)
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");
        let p2 = saap_prove(&credential, 0b0000_0010, tau, &sk, &RHO_B)
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");

        let mut any_diff = false;
        for i in 0..MODULE_K {
            for n in 0..RING_N {
                if p1.commitment_w.vec[i].coeffs[n] != p2.commitment_w.vec[i].coeffs[n] {
                    any_diff = true;
                }
            }
        }
        assert!(
            any_diff,
            "commitments must differ across proofs — masks are independent per rho"
        );
    }

}

// ── P3-03: Debug/Display redaction, asserted at compile time ────────────────
//
// `VectorK` is the type `saap_prove`'s `secret_key` parameter uses to carry a
// raw SAAP secret, and `Polynomial` is its component type, so neither may
// implement `Debug`/`Display`: a derive on either would let anyone holding a
// value format-print the raw secret with a single `{:?}`.
//
// `assert_not_impl_any!` expands to code that compiles only if the named type
// does NOT implement the named traits, so re-adding a naive `#[derive(Debug)]`
// breaks the build rather than a test run. These assertions used to live in
// `tests/no_debug_leak.rs`; they moved here when the module became crate-private
// and an integration test could no longer name these types.
#[cfg(test)]
mod no_debug_leak {
    use static_assertions::assert_not_impl_any;

    assert_not_impl_any!(super::Polynomial: core::fmt::Debug, core::fmt::Display);
    assert_not_impl_any!(super::VectorK: core::fmt::Debug, core::fmt::Display);
}

// ── Prove/verify round-trip, moved from tests/plp_tests.rs ──────────────────
//
// Same reason as the blocks above: this module is crate-private since
// P3-10 / 0X3-78, so these can no longer live in an integration test.
#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(deprecated)]
mod roundtrip_tests {
    use super::*;



    /// Verify that the SAAP prover produces a proof that passes norm check.
    #[test]
    fn test_saap_prove_norm_bound() {
        let mut sk = VectorK::zero();
        for k in 0..MODULE_K {
            for n in 0..RING_N {
                sk.vec[k].coeffs[n] = (n % 5) as i32 - 2;
            }
        }
        let credential = [0u8; 64];
        let disclosure_mask = 0b00001111u64;
        let tau = b"test_saap_context";

        let proof = saap_prove(&credential, disclosure_mask, tau, &sk, &[0x7cu8; 32])
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");

        // Norm bound check
        let norm_result = verify_response_norm(&proof.z);
        assert_eq!(norm_result, 0, "SAAP response norm should be within bound");
    }

    /// Verify that the SAAP verifier accepts a well-formed proof.
    #[test]
    fn test_saap_prove_verify_roundtrip() {
        let mut sk = VectorK::zero();
        for k in 0..MODULE_K {
            for n in 0..RING_N {
                sk.vec[k].coeffs[n] = (n % 5) as i32 - 2;
            }
        }
        let credential = [0u8; 64];
        let disclosure_mask = 0b00001111u64;
        let tau = b"test_saap_context_verify";

        let proof = saap_prove(&credential, disclosure_mask, tau, &sk, &[0x7cu8; 32])
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");

        // Build dummy matrix and attribute commitments
        let matrix_a = [VectorK::zero(); MODULE_K];
        let attr_commits = [Polynomial::zero(); MAX_ATTRIBUTES];

        let result = verify_saap_proof(&proof, &matrix_a, &attr_commits);
        assert!(result.is_ok(), "SAAP verify should accept valid proof: {:?}", result);
    }

    /// Verify that the SAAP verifier rejects a proof with an out-of-bounds response norm.
    #[test]
    fn test_saap_verify_rejects_invalid_norm() {
        let mut proof = SaapProof::zero();
        // Set a coefficient way out of bounds
        proof.z.vec[0].coeffs[0] = REJECTION_BOUND + 1000;

        let matrix_a = [VectorK::zero(); MODULE_K];
        let attr_commits = [Polynomial::zero(); MAX_ATTRIBUTES];

        let result = verify_saap_proof(&proof, &matrix_a, &attr_commits);
        assert_eq!(
            result,
            Err(SaapValidationError::NormBoundViolation),
            "Should reject proof with out-of-bounds norm"
        );
    }



    // ── NTT fast path equivalence (Q3 Fix 2) ─────────────────────────────────

    /// A deterministic pseudo-random polynomial with full-range coefficients.
    ///
    /// Small or structured inputs would not exercise the modular reduction, and
    /// the schoolbook path accumulates differently from the NTT path, so the
    /// coefficients must span the whole centered range for the comparison to be
    /// worth anything.
    fn pseudo_random_poly(seed: u64) -> Polynomial {
        let mut p = Polynomial::zero();
        let mut x = seed.wrapping_mul(0x9E37_79B9_7F4A_7C15) | 1;
        for i in 0..RING_N {
            x ^= x << 13;
            x ^= x >> 7;
            x ^= x << 17;
            p.coeffs[i] = mod_q((x % (PARAM_Q as u64 * 2)) as i64 - PARAM_Q as i64);
        }
        p
    }

    /// The NTT fast path must agree with the schoolbook reference exactly.
    ///
    /// This is the whole contract of `poly_mul_negacyclic` after Q3 Fix 2. A
    /// faster multiply that returns different answers is not an optimisation,
    /// it is a silent break in every SAAP proof and verification, all of which
    /// route through this one function.
    #[test]
    fn ntt_and_schoolbook_agree_over_saap_polynomials() {
        for seed in 0..24u64 {
            let a = pseudo_random_poly(seed * 2 + 1);
            let b = pseudo_random_poly(seed * 2 + 2);

            let fast = poly_mul_negacyclic(&a, &b);
            let reference = poly_mul_schoolbook(&a, &b);

            assert_eq!(
                fast.coeffs, reference.coeffs,
                "NTT and schoolbook disagree at seed {seed}"
            );
        }
    }

    /// Positive control for the test above.
    ///
    /// If `pseudo_random_poly` returned the same polynomial for every seed, or
    /// the comparison were vacuous, the equivalence test would pass while
    /// proving nothing. Distinct operands must produce distinct products.
    #[test]
    fn the_multiplication_agreement_check_can_fail() {
        let a = pseudo_random_poly(1);
        let b = pseudo_random_poly(2);
        let c = pseudo_random_poly(3);

        assert_ne!(a.coeffs, b.coeffs, "operand generator is not varying");
        assert_ne!(
            poly_mul_negacyclic(&a, &b).coeffs,
            poly_mul_negacyclic(&a, &c).coeffs,
            "different operands produced the same product, so agreement proves nothing"
        );
    }

    /// The centered/unsigned bridge must round trip.
    ///
    /// SAAP centers coefficients in (-q/2, q/2]; PLP uses [0, q). Every SAAP
    /// multiplication now crosses that boundary twice, so an error here would
    /// corrupt results in a way that looks like a cryptographic failure rather
    /// than a representation bug.
    #[test]
    fn the_centered_to_unsigned_bridge_round_trips() {
        for seed in 0..8u64 {
            let p = pseudo_random_poly(seed + 100);
            let bridged = to_plp_poly(&p);
            for i in 0..RING_N {
                assert!(
                    bridged.coeffs[i] < PARAM_Q as u32,
                    "bridged coefficient outside [0, q)"
                );
                assert_eq!(
                    mod_q(bridged.coeffs[i] as i64),
                    p.coeffs[i],
                    "round trip changed coefficient {i} at seed {seed}"
                );
            }
        }
    }
}


// ── Rejection sampling has no fallback (AETHEL-F-01, saap half) ──────────────
//
// The `plp.rs` half of this finding was fixed in 0b24bc0. This module is the
// evidence for the same property here.
#[cfg(test)]
mod rejection_sampling_tests {
    use super::*;

    fn test_sk() -> VectorK {
        let mut sk = VectorK::zero();
        for k in 0..MODULE_K {
            for n in 0..RING_N {
                sk.vec[k].coeffs[n] = ((n + k) % 5) as i32 - 2;
            }
        }
        sk
    }

    /// Every proof `saap_prove` returns satisfies the norm bound.
    ///
    /// This is the invariant the fallback broke. It re-derived iteration 0's
    /// mask, recomputed iteration 0's `w`, `c` and `z`, and returned that `z`
    /// without re-checking the bound — so the one response the function was
    /// certain to be out of bounds was the one it emitted on exhaustion.
    ///
    /// Swept across contexts and randomness rather than asserted once, because
    /// a single honest call proves only that the happy path works.
    #[test]
    fn every_returned_proof_satisfies_the_norm_bound() {
        let sk = test_sk();
        let credential = [0x3Cu8; 64];

        for tau_idx in 0u8..12 {
            for rho_idx in 0u8..4 {
                let tau = [b'c', b't', b'x', tau_idx];
                let rho = [0x40u8 ^ rho_idx; 32];

                let proof = saap_prove(&credential, 0b0000_0011, &tau, &sk, &rho)
                    .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");

                assert_eq!(
                    verify_response_norm(&proof.z),
                    0,
                    "saap_prove returned a response outside the rejection bound \
                     at tau {tau_idx}, rho {rho_idx}"
                );
            }
        }
    }

    /// Positive control for the sweep above.
    ///
    /// Without this, the sweep would pass just as happily against a norm check
    /// that accepted everything, which would make it evidence of nothing.
    #[test]
    fn the_norm_check_rejects_an_out_of_bound_response() {
        let sk = test_sk();
        let credential = [0x3Cu8; 64];
        let mut proof = saap_prove(&credential, 0b0000_0011, b"ctx", &sk, &[0x41u8; 32])
            .expect("honest parameters: 16 rejections is negligible");

        assert_eq!(verify_response_norm(&proof.z), 0, "test setup: an honest proof is in bounds");

        proof.z.vec[0].coeffs[0] = REJECTION_BOUND;
        assert_ne!(
            verify_response_norm(&proof.z),
            0,
            "a response at the rejection bound was accepted, so the sweep above \
             is not testing anything"
        );
    }

    /// Nothing may re-derive the mask after the loop.
    ///
    /// The old fallback was `sample_saap_masking_vector(rho, &context_tag, 0)`.
    /// Nonce zero is iteration 0's nonce, and the derivation is a pure function
    /// of `(rho, context_tag, nonce)`, so that call reproduced iteration 0's
    /// mask exactly and the proof rebuilt from it was, byte for byte, the
    /// response iteration 0 had already rejected.
    ///
    /// A behavioural test cannot reach this: forcing 16 consecutive rejections
    /// at honest parameters is exactly the negligible event the fallback was
    /// excused by. So the derivation itself is pinned instead, the same way
    /// `plp.rs` pins `no_tau_independent_mask_derivation_remains`.
    #[test]
    fn no_fallback_mask_derivation_remains() {
        let source = include_str!("saap.rs");

        // Split across `concat!` so the needle never appears contiguously in
        // this file, which would otherwise make the test match itself. Comment
        // lines are skipped for the same reason: the doc comment above names
        // the old call on purpose.
        let needle = concat!("sample_saap_masking_vector(rho, &context_tag, ", "0)");
        let hits = source
            .lines()
            .filter(|l| !l.trim_start().starts_with("//"))
            .filter(|l| l.contains(needle))
            .count();

        assert_eq!(
            hits, 0,
            "the fallback mask derivation is back in saap_prove. Nonce 0 is \
             iteration 0's nonce and the derivation is pure, so it reproduces \
             iteration 0's mask and rebuilds, byte for byte, the response \
             iteration 0 already rejected. That is precisely the value rejection \
             sampling exists to withhold. See AETHEL-F-01 and 0b24bc0 before \
             restoring it."
        );
    }

    /// Exhaustion is reported, not papered over.
    ///
    /// Pins the signature: a caller must be able to tell "no proof exists" from
    /// "here is a proof", which the previous `-> SaapProof` return type made
    /// impossible.
    #[test]
    fn exhaustion_has_an_error_to_report() {
        let sk = test_sk();
        let proof: Result<SaapProof, IdentityError> =
            saap_prove(&[0x3Cu8; 64], 0b0000_0011, b"ctx", &sk, &[0x42u8; 32]);
        assert!(proof.is_ok(), "honest parameters must still produce a proof");

        // The variant the exhausted path returns, matching plp::Prover::
        // prove_identity and credential::prove.
        assert_eq!(
            IdentityError::from(crate::sampling::RejectionError::AllIterationsRejected),
            IdentityError::RejectionSamplingFailed
        );
    }
}