adhammer 1.3.9

ADhammer — Active Directory security assessment and offensive tradecraft in Rust, with a from-scratch DCE/RPC · NTLM · SMB2 · Kerberos stack.
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<p align="center">
  <img src="docs/logo.svg" alt="ADhammer logo" width="140"/>
</p>

<p align="center">
  <img src="docs/banner.svg" alt="ADhammer — Active Directory Security Toolkit" width="100%"/>
</p>

<h3 align="center">The Active Directory offensive stack in pure Rust.</h3>
<p align="center"><sub>One static binary. Kali or Windows. Audits a domain in under a second, then <b>proves</b> every finding with a live PoC.</sub></p>

<p align="center">
  <a href="https://github.com/icedracon/adhammer/actions/workflows/ci.yml"><img src="https://github.com/icedracon/adhammer/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg" alt="CI"/></a>
  <a href="https://github.com/icedracon/adhammer/releases"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/icedracon/adhammer?sort=semver&color=00ffd5&style=flat-square" alt="Release"/></a>
  <a href="https://crates.io/crates/adhammer"><img src="https://img.shields.io/crates/v/adhammer.svg?color=f7c948&style=flat-square" alt="crates.io"/></a>
  <a href="https://github.com/icedracon/adhammer/stargazers"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/icedracon/adhammer?style=flat-square&color=ffd166" alt="stars"/></a>
  <a href="LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-7b2ff7?style=flat-square" alt="License: MIT"/></a>
  <a href="https://dev.to/pumadracon/i-built-a-full-active-directory-pentest-audit-tool-in-rust-on-a-protocol-stack-i-wrote-from-fl5"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/write--up-dev.to-0A0A0A?style=flat-square&logo=devdotto" alt="Write-up"/></a>
</p>

<br/>

<p align="center">
  <img src="docs/demo.gif" alt="ADhammer live: audit → Zerologon safe-detect → DCSync krbtgt → golden ticket → pass-the-ticket to SYSTEM" width="88%"/>
</p>

<p align="center">
  <sub>One binary. From Kali. Live against a hardened Server 2025 DC. Audit → detect → DCSync → golden ticket → SYSTEM.</sub>
</p>

<br/>

<p align="center">
  <img src="docs/tour.gif" alt="ADhammer 30-second capability tour — help, scan, posture, roast, ADCS" width="88%"/>
</p>

<p align="center">
  <sub>Or the 30-second capability tour — audit, posture, Kerberoast, ADCS rule pack.</sub>
</p>

<br/>

## 🚀 Try it in 30 seconds

```sh
cargo install adhammer

adhammer scan  --url ldaps://dc.corp.local:636 \
               --user 'CORP\svc' --password ... \
               --insecure --bloodhound out.zip
```

Under 100 ms per operation, JSON + HTML report, BloodHound-compatible graph bundle — from a low-privileged domain user account. See the [full command list](#usage) below or grab prebuilt binaries (musl / glibc / macOS / Windows) from **[Releases](https://github.com/icedracon/adhammer/releases)**.

<br/>

> [!CAUTION]
> **Authorized use only.** ADhammer implements working offensive techniques — DCSync, golden / silver / diamond tickets, pass-the-ticket, NTLM relay, ADCS abuse, remote code execution. Use only against systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).

<br/>

<p align="center">
  <img src="docs/stats-banner.svg" alt="ADhammer at a glance" width="100%"/>
</p>

<br/>

<p align="center">
  <img src="docs/comparison.svg" alt="ADhammer capability overview — audit, attack, wire, report + DA kill chain" width="100%"/>
</p>

<br/>

<img src="docs/divider.svg" width="100%" alt=""/>

<br/>

<img src="docs/section-how.svg" width="100%" alt="How it works"/>

<br/>

**Two commands. One binary. Everything else is a subcommand.**

### 1 &mdash; `adhammer scan` &nbsp;·&nbsp; audit a domain

Collects a domain over LDAP as a **low-privileged user** (via the `SD_FLAGS` control), builds a control-path graph in-process, and runs the check pack across four categories — privileged accounts, trusts, stale objects, anomalies — plus **15 of the 16 AD CS ESC classes**, ADIDNS exposure, and SYSVOL / GPP. Every finding is scored, MITRE-tagged, and exportable in a BloodHound-compatible JSON bundle.

### 2 &mdash; `adhammer auto` &nbsp;·&nbsp; validate every finding with a live PoC

A report shouldn't say a path *might* be exploitable. `auto` walks each finding, asks "*validate this one?*" — on yes runs the matching tradecraft, marks the finding **validated only when real proof is present** (an actual `$krb5tgs$` hash, a replicated `krbtgt` secret, an `ISSUED` cert). Everything lands in a Markdown assessment report with the exact command + evidence per PoC.

<br/>

<p align="center">
  <img src="docs/vulns.gif" alt="ADhammer guided output — severity-coded findings validated with live PoCs" width="88%"/>
</p>

<p align="center">
  <sub><i>Guided <code>auto</code> output — severity-coded findings, each optionally confirmed with a live PoC.</i></sub>
</p>

<br/>

<img src="docs/divider.svg" width="100%" alt=""/>

<br/>

<img src="docs/section-benchmark.svg" width="100%" alt="Performance"/>

<br/>

## ⚡ Performance

Every operation on a warm cache against a fully-patched **Windows Server 2025** domain controller, cold-timed at the command boundary. Compiled Rust binary — cold-start under a second, most operations under **100 ms**.

| Operation | Median |
|:---|---:|
| Zerologon safe-detect | **54 ms** |
| RBCD write (`msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity`) | **49 ms** |
| BadSuccessor (Server 2025 dMSA succession) | **48 ms** |
| LDAP query (name → SID) | **59 ms** |
| SAMR user enumeration | **63 ms** |
| AD CS enterprise CA enumeration | **67 ms** |
| DCSync `krbtgt` secret | **73 ms** |
| RRP secretsdump (SAM + SECURITY + SYSTEM) | **74 ms** |
| Kerberoast one SPN | **79 ms** |
| AS-REP roast one account | **80 ms** |
| Full LDAP audit + control-path graph (500-object domain) | **88 ms** |
| AD CS ESC1 enrollment end-to-end (submit → issued PEM) | **315 ms** |

Reproduce in one command — driver ([`bench/run_bench.sh`](bench/run_bench.sh)) · renderer ([`bench/render_results.py`](bench/render_results.py)) · TSV output ([`bench/results.tsv`](bench/results.tsv)) · methodology ([`docs/BENCHMARKS.md`](docs/BENCHMARKS.md)).

<br/>

<img src="docs/divider.svg" width="100%" alt=""/>

<br/>

## 📥 Install

<table>
<tr>
<td width="50%">

**From crates.io** — always latest:

```sh
cargo install adhammer
```

**As a library** — every module importable:

```sh
cargo add adhammer-sdk
```

</td>
<td width="50%">

**Prebuilt binaries** per release:

- musl (static, no glibc)
- glibc (Linux)
- macOS (arm64 + x64)
- Windows (x64)

Grab the latest from **[Releases →](https://github.com/icedracon/adhammer/releases)**

</td>
</tr>
</table>

Requires **Rust 1.80+** to build from source. Tested on Kali, Ubuntu, Debian, macOS, and native Windows.

<br/>

<img src="docs/divider.svg" width="100%" alt=""/>

<br/>

## 🎯 Usage

Run `adhammer` with **no arguments** for the **guided interactive menu** — asks for user → password (or NT hash) → domain → DC, saves the session, walks every action with prompts. For golden / silver / pass-the-ticket it auto-fetches the krbtgt / service AES256 key (via DCSync) and the domain SID (via LSAT). Add `--no-save` to keep credentials off disk.

<p align="center">
  <img src="docs/interactive.gif" alt="ADhammer setup wizard and guided menu" width="88%"/>
</p>

<br/>

### Session hunting — three complementary primitives

`enum sessions` (SRVSVC), `enum wkssvc` (WKSSVC), and `enum hku` (HKU registry walk) each answer the *who is on this box* question from a different angle — different auth requirements, different result granularity. Dedup + machine-account filtering are on by default (`--include-machine` shows the count marker for what was hidden).

<p align="center">
  <img src="docs/sessions.gif" alt="ADhammer 1.3.9 session hunting — SRVSVC, WKSSVC, HKU, and --json envelope" width="88%"/>
</p>

<p align="center">
  <sub>SRVSVC + WKSSVC + HKU registry — one target, three angles. <code>--json</code> pipes cleanly into <code>jq</code>.</sub>
</p>

<br/>

**Power-user subcommands:**

```
scan                                        passive audit -> JSON/HTML (+ --sysvol, --bloodhound out.zip)
auto                                         guided: scan -> confirm each weakness -> validate + PoC report
enum   {samr, lsa, net, dns, adcs, esc, posture, sessions}
                                            RPC / net / ADIDNS / AD-CS / ESC-registry / DC-posture / SRVSVC
attack {roast, spray, abuse, coerce, rbcd, constrained, unconstrained, dcsync, exec, atexec, wmiexec,
        secretsdump, gmsa, laps, esc1, esc4, certipy, golden, silver, pth, asktgt, winrm, capture,
        poison, relay, zerologon, shadowcred, dcshadow, badsuccessor}
```

<details>
<summary><b>💡 Example commands</b></summary>
<br/>

```sh
# Audit a domain (low-priv creds are enough), export a BloodHound bundle:
adhammer scan --url ldaps://dc.corp.local:636 --user 'CORP\svc' --password ... --insecure --bloodhound out.zip

# ADIDNS + AD CS recon:
adhammer enum dns  --url ldaps://dc:636 --user 'CORP\svc' --password ... --insecure
adhammer enum adcs --url ldaps://dc:636 --user 'CORP\svc' --password ... --insecure

# DCSync the krbtgt key, forge a golden ticket, pass-the-ticket to SYSTEM:
adhammer attack dcsync --host dc --domain CORP --user Administrator --password ... --target krbtgt
adhammer attack pth    --host dc --realm CORP.LOCAL --krbtgt-aes256 <64-hex> --domain-sid S-1-5-21-... \
                       --spn cifs/dc.corp.local --command whoami

# AD CS ESC1 / ESC3 / ESC6 / ESC15 enrollment through a unified certipy flow:
adhammer attack certipy --ca CORP-CA --template User --target-upn administrator@corp.local \
                        --host dc --domain CORP --user 'CORP\svc' --password ... \
                        --esc esc6 --san-upn administrator@corp.local

# Server 2025 dMSA succession (BadSuccessor):
adhammer attack badsuccessor --dmsa-name pwn --target <victim>
```

</details>

<br/>

<img src="docs/divider.svg" width="100%" alt=""/>

<br/>

<img src="docs/section-coverage.svg" width="100%" alt="Coverage"/>

<br/>

## 📋 Coverage

### Audit checks — 4 categories, 15/16 AD CS ESC classes

| Category | Coverage |
|:---------|:---------|
| **Privileged accounts** | AS-REP / Kerberoast exposure · unconstrained delegation · DCSync control paths (graph) · sensitive-group membership · gMSA read ACL · SID history · RBCD · LAPS coverage · `PASSWD_NOTREQD` |
| **Trusts** | SID filtering · selective auth · cross-forest TGT delegation · RC4 downgrade · transitivity |
| **Stale objects** | Inactive users / computers · old passwords · EOL OS · duplicate SPNs · stale machine passwords |
| **Anomalies** | `MachineAccountQuota` · krbtgt age · RC4 Kerberos · reversible encryption · BadSuccessor (dMSA) · password policy · anonymous LDAP · Pre-Windows 2000 · Guest · GPP `cpassword` (MS14-025) · LM / NTLMv1 · LDAP / SMB signing |
| **AD CS (15/16 ESC)** | Passive: ESC1-5, 9, 13-15 / EKUwu (CVE-2024-49019) · Active: ESC1, ESC3, ESC6, ESC8, ESC15 · Registry: ESC6-7, 10-11, 16 · Only ESC12 (hardware token) out of scope |
| **ADIDNS** | Zone + record enumeration with wildcard (mitm6 / WPAD) exposure detection |

Every finding carries a **MITRE ATT&CK** technique (T1558.003, T1003.006, T1649, T1484, …).

<br/>

<details>
<summary><b>🔍 Recon / export</b></summary>
<br/>

- LDAP audit (paged, `SD_FLAGS`-scoped) → JSON / HTML report
- BloodHound-CE compatible bundle export
- SAMR / LSAT / SRVSVC / MS-RRP enumeration
- ADIDNS zone dump + wildcard record detection
- AD CS enterprise CA discovery + ESC8 web-enrollment probe
- DC posture: LDAP signing / channel binding / Spooler / RemoteRegistry

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>🔑 Kerberos</b></summary>
<br/>

- AS-REP roast + Kerberoast (RC4 + AES256)
- Ask-TGT (`--asktgt`) + password spray
- Pass-the-ticket over sealed SMB2 + AP-REQ
- Golden ticket (RC4 + AES256, PAC KB5020805-compliant)
- Silver ticket (per-service)
- **Diamond ticket** — identity-swap on a real TGT envelope (detection evasion)
- FAST armor (RFC 6113)
- PKINIT + Shadow Credentials

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>🎭 Delegation abuse</b></summary>
<br/>

- Unconstrained delegation
- Constrained delegation (S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy)
- RBCD write + exploit chain (`msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity`)

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>📜 AD CS enrollment — full ESC pack</b></summary>
<br/>

- **ESC1** — enrollee-supplied UPN SAN in CSR
- **ESC3** — CMC EnrollOnBehalfOf via caller-supplied Enrollment Agent cert
- **ESC6** — SAN as CA `pctbAttribs` request-attribute
- **ESC8** — Web-enrollment relay chain
- **ESC15** — EKUwu / CVE-2024-49019 via Microsoft Application Policies extension
- **ESC4** — write template attributes to make a template ESC1-vulnerable

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>🗝️ Secrets extraction</b></summary>
<br/>

- DCSync (DRSUAPI, single-account or full domain)
- RRP secretsdump (local SAM + SECURITY + SYSTEM offline decrypt)
- LSASS minidump credential hunt (offline)
- LAPS v1 (`ms-Mcs-AdmPwd`) + LAPS v2 (`msLAPS-EncryptedPassword` via GKDI)
- gMSA `msDS-ManagedPassword` decrypt

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>🕸️ Coercion + relay + lateral movement</b></summary>
<br/>

- Coerce (RPRN / EFSR / DFSNM / FSRVP)
- NTLM relay → LDAP / SMB / AD CS Web (ESC8)
- LLMNR + NBT-NS poison → NetNTLMv2 capture
- Remote exec: SVCCTL · TSCH (atexec) · WMI (DCOM) · WinRM
- Zerologon **safe-detect** (never modifies)
- DCShadow (rights enumeration; push not implemented)
- Server 2025 **BadSuccessor** (dMSA)

</details>

<br/>

<img src="docs/divider.svg" width="100%" alt=""/>

<br/>

## 🧱 Built on a from-scratch Rust ecosystem

ADhammer is one binary on top of **40+ standalone crates**, each doing one job well and each `cargo add`-able on its own. Every crate ships an explicit *"what this does NOT do"* section, MIT-licensed, works standalone.

<details open>
<summary><b>The load-bearing crates</b></summary>
<br/>

| Layer | Crates |
|:---|:---|
| **Transport** | [`dcerpc`](https://crates.io/crates/dcerpc) · [`smb2-client`](https://crates.io/crates/smb2-client) · [`ms-ndr`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-ndr) |
| **Auth / crypto** | [`ntlmssp`](https://crates.io/crates/ntlmssp) · [`credssp`](https://crates.io/crates/credssp) · [`dpapi-ng`](https://crates.io/crates/dpapi-ng) · [`dpapi-offline`](https://crates.io/crates/dpapi-offline) · [`ms-gkdi`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-gkdi) |
| **Kerberos** | [`ms-pac`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-pac) · [`ms-pac-forge`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-pac-forge) · [`ms-kile-fast`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-kile-fast) · [`ms-pkca`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-pkca) |
| **DCE/RPC protocols** | [`ms-drsr`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-drsr) · [`ms-nrpc`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-nrpc) · [`ms-samr`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-samr) · [`ms-lsat`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-lsat) · [`ms-tsch`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-tsch) · [`ms-even6`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-even6) · [`ms-tds`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-tds) · [`ms-coerce`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-coerce) |
| **AD CS** | [`ms-crtd`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-crtd) · [`ms-icpr`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-icpr) · [`ms-csra`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-csra) |
| **NTDS / secrets** | [`ese-parser`](https://crates.io/crates/ese-parser) · [`ntds-parse`](https://crates.io/crates/ntds-parse) · [`lsass-parse`](https://crates.io/crates/lsass-parse) |
| **AD / GPO / audit** | [`ad-acl`](https://crates.io/crates/ad-acl) · [`msldap-ext`](https://crates.io/crates/msldap-ext) · [`gpo`](https://crates.io/crates/gpo) · [`gpo-forge`](https://crates.io/crates/gpo-forge) · [`preg`](https://crates.io/crates/preg) · [`ms-dnsp`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-dnsp) · [`ms-fve`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-fve) · [`ms-rodc`](https://crates.io/crates/ms-rodc) |
| **Relay / lateral** | [`ntlm-relay`](https://crates.io/crates/ntlm-relay) · [`llmnr-poison`](https://crates.io/crates/llmnr-poison) · [`winrm-pentest`](https://crates.io/crates/winrm-pentest) |
| **Windows-local (host-side)** | [`windows-sddl`](https://crates.io/crates/windows-sddl) · [`windows-lsa`](https://crates.io/crates/windows-lsa) · [`windows-scm`](https://crates.io/crates/windows-scm) · [`windows-token`](https://crates.io/crates/windows-token) · [`windows-wmi-com`](https://crates.io/crates/windows-wmi-com) · [`windows-sspi-shim`](https://crates.io/crates/windows-sspi-shim) · [`windows-eventlog-native`](https://crates.io/crates/windows-eventlog-native) |
| **BloodHound export** | [`bloodhound-export`](https://crates.io/crates/bloodhound-export) |

</details>

Full crate list on **[crates.io/users/zevs](https://crates.io/users/zevs)**.

<br/>

<img src="docs/divider.svg" width="100%" alt=""/>

<br/>

## 📚 Deep dives

- **Write-up** — *[I built a full Active Directory pentest + audit tool in Rust on a from-scratch protocol stack](https://dev.to/pumadracon/i-built-a-full-active-directory-pentest-audit-tool-in-rust-on-a-protocol-stack-i-wrote-from-fl5)* (dev.to)
- **Changelog** — per-release notes live in **[GitHub Releases](https://github.com/icedracon/adhammer/releases)** and [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md)
- **Benchmarks** — full methodology + raw log in [`docs/BENCHMARKS.md`](docs/BENCHMARKS.md)
- **Ecosystem tour** — [`crates.io/users/zevs`](https://crates.io/users/zevs)

<br/>

## 🧪 Test

CI runs the full workspace test suite on every push (100+ unit + integration tests across the CLI and 11 sub-crates). Green means ship. Reproduce locally:

```sh
cargo test --workspace
```

<br/>

## 🤝 Contributing

PRs welcome — especially for new AD CS ESC variants, additional coerce endpoints, and cross-forest trust auditing. Open an issue first for anything larger than a bug fix.

## 🛡️ Security

Vulnerabilities: report privately per [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). ADhammer contains working offensive techniques — use only against systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test.

## 📄 License

MIT © the [`icedracon`](https://github.com/icedracon) project.

<br/>

<p align="center">
  <sub>Built by <a href="https://github.com/zevs">@zevs</a> · <a href="https://crates.io/users/zevs">crates.io/users/zevs</a></sub>
</p>