acme-proxy 0.2.0

use serde_json::Value;
use sqlx::Row;
use sqlx::sqlite::SqliteRow;
use tracing::{debug, info};
use uuid::Uuid;

use crate::sqlite::db::Database;
use crate::sqlite::nonce::now_secs;
use crate::sqlite::order::rfc3339;

/// An operator of the web admin interface.
///
/// Not an ACME concept and never joined to one: an [`AdminUser`] is a person
/// with a password, an `accounts` row is a client key. There is no `profile`
/// column -- an admin user sees every endpoint this process serves.
///
/// ## Methods
///
/// - `create`: persist a new operator, `active`
/// - `find_by_id` / `find_by_username`: lookup (the latter is the login path)
/// - `list_all`: every operator, oldest first
/// - `set_password_hash` / `set_status` / `mark_logged_in`: in-place updates
/// - `set_totp_pending` / `confirm_totp` / `clear_totp` / `claim_totp_step`:
///   the second factor's lifecycle, and RFC 6238 §5.2's replay guard
/// - `delete`: remove, cascading to the operator's sessions and recovery codes
/// - `to_json`: admin-facing rendering (never the password hash, never a secret)
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AdminUser {
    pub id: String,
    /// Always lowercase: [`AdminUser::create`] normalizes before writing, so
    /// `Alice` and `alice` cannot become two logins that read as one.
    pub username: String,
    /// The encoded KDF output -- see `crate::admin::password`. Never rendered.
    pub password_hash: String,
    pub status: String,
    /// Set once the owner has proven a code against a pending enrolment.
    /// `None` means no second factor is configured.
    pub totp_secret: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    /// An enrolment begun but not yet confirmed. Not a usable second factor.
    pub totp_pending_secret: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    /// The last TOTP time step accepted, so a code cannot be replayed inside
    /// its own window.
    pub totp_last_step: Option<i64>,
    pub created_at: i64,
    pub updated_at: i64,
    pub last_login_at: Option<i64>,
}

/// Every column of `admin_users`, in one place: each read must select the same set
/// or `from_row` fails on whichever forgot one.
///
/// A `macro_rules!` rather than a `const` so the expansion is a string
/// *literal*, which is what `sqlx::query`'s `SqlSafeStr` bound requires.
macro_rules! columns {
    () => {
        "id, username, password_hash, status, totp_secret, totp_pending_secret, \
         totp_last_step, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at"
    };
}

impl AdminUser {
    fn from_row(row: SqliteRow) -> Result<Self, sqlx::Error> {
        Ok(AdminUser {
            id: row.try_get("id")?,
            username: row.try_get("username")?,
            password_hash: row.try_get("password_hash")?,
            status: row.try_get("status")?,
            totp_secret: row.try_get("totp_secret")?,
            totp_pending_secret: row.try_get("totp_pending_secret")?,
            totp_last_step: row.try_get("totp_last_step")?,
            created_at: row.try_get("created_at")?,
            updated_at: row.try_get("updated_at")?,
            last_login_at: row.try_get("last_login_at")?,
        })
    }

    /// Persists a new operator, `active`. `username` is lowercased and trimmed
    /// here rather than at the call sites, so every path -- the CLI, a future
    /// API -- stores the same thing.
    ///
    /// `password_hash` is already encoded by `crate::admin::password`: this
    /// layer never sees a plaintext password and cannot hash one.
    ///
    /// A duplicate username surfaces as the UNIQUE violation it is; the caller
    /// (`admin::users::create_user`) checks first and reports it in words.
    pub async fn create(
        username: &str,
        password_hash: &str,
        database: &Database,
    ) -> Result<AdminUser, sqlx::Error> {
        let now = now_secs();
        let user = AdminUser {
            id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
            username: username.trim().to_lowercase(),
            password_hash: password_hash.to_string(),
            status: "active".to_string(),
            totp_secret: None,
            totp_pending_secret: None,
            totp_last_step: None,
            created_at: now,
            updated_at: now,
            last_login_at: None,
        };

        debug!(event = "db_admin_user_create_started", outcome = "progress", username = %user.username);
        sqlx::query(
            "INSERT INTO admin_users (id, username, password_hash, status, created_at, updated_at) \
             VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);",
        )
        .bind(&user.id)
        .bind(&user.username)
        .bind(&user.password_hash)
        .bind(&user.status)
        .bind(user.created_at)
        .bind(user.updated_at)
        .execute(&database.pool)
        .await?;

        info!(event = "db_admin_user_created", outcome = "success", user_id = %user.id, username = %user.username);
        Ok(user)
    }

    pub async fn find_by_id(
        id: &str,
        database: &Database,
    ) -> Result<Option<AdminUser>, sqlx::Error> {
        debug!(event = "db_admin_user_find_by_id_started", outcome = "progress", id = ?id);
        let row = sqlx::query(concat!(
            "SELECT ",
            columns!(),
            " FROM admin_users WHERE id = ?;"
        ))
        .bind(id)
        .fetch_optional(&database.pool)
        .await?;

        row.map(AdminUser::from_row).transpose()
    }

    /// The login path. Lowercases the argument for the same reason
    /// [`AdminUser::create`] does -- a login typed `Alice` must find `alice`.
    pub async fn find_by_username(
        username: &str,
        database: &Database,
    ) -> Result<Option<AdminUser>, sqlx::Error> {
        debug!(
            event = "db_admin_user_find_by_username_started",
            outcome = "progress"
        );
        let row = sqlx::query(concat!(
            "SELECT ",
            columns!(),
            " FROM admin_users WHERE username = ?;"
        ))
        .bind(username.trim().to_lowercase())
        .fetch_optional(&database.pool)
        .await?;

        row.map(AdminUser::from_row).transpose()
    }

    /// Every operator, oldest first -- `admin user list`.
    pub async fn list_all(database: &Database) -> Result<Vec<AdminUser>, sqlx::Error> {
        debug!(
            event = "db_admin_user_list_all_started",
            outcome = "progress"
        );
        let rows = sqlx::query(concat!(
            "SELECT ",
            columns!(),
            " FROM admin_users ORDER BY created_at ASC, id ASC;"
        ))
        .fetch_all(&database.pool)
        .await?;

        rows.into_iter().map(AdminUser::from_row).collect()
    }

    /// Replaces the stored hash. Callers are responsible for invalidating the
    /// owner's sessions -- `admin::users::set_password` does, and a password
    /// change that left them alive would be a change in name only.
    pub async fn set_password_hash(
        &mut self,
        password_hash: &str,
        database: &Database,
    ) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
        let now = now_secs();
        sqlx::query("UPDATE admin_users SET password_hash = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?;")
            .bind(password_hash)
            .bind(now)
            .bind(&self.id)
            .execute(&database.pool)
            .await?;

        self.password_hash = password_hash.to_string();
        self.updated_at = now;
        info!(event = "db_admin_user_password_changed", outcome = "success", user_id = %self.id, username = %self.username);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Moves between `active` and `disabled`. A disabled operator cannot log
    /// in, and an existing session of theirs is refused on its next use --
    /// the session rows are left for the reaper rather than deleted here, so
    /// re-enabling is a single UPDATE either way.
    pub async fn set_status(
        &mut self,
        status: &str,
        database: &Database,
    ) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
        let now = now_secs();
        sqlx::query("UPDATE admin_users SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?;")
            .bind(status)
            .bind(now)
            .bind(&self.id)
            .execute(&database.pool)
            .await?;

        self.status = status.to_string();
        self.updated_at = now;
        info!(event = "db_admin_user_status_changed", outcome = "success", user_id = %self.id, username = %self.username, status = %status);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Stores an enrolment the owner has not yet proven a code against.
    ///
    /// Not a usable second factor: [`AdminUser::has_totp`] stays `false` until
    /// [`AdminUser::confirm_totp`] moves it across, which is what stops an
    /// abandoned enrolment from locking its own owner out.
    pub async fn set_totp_pending(
        &mut self,
        secret: &[u8],
        database: &Database,
    ) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
        let now = now_secs();
        sqlx::query("UPDATE admin_users SET totp_pending_secret = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?;")
            .bind(secret)
            .bind(now)
            .bind(&self.id)
            .execute(&database.pool)
            .await?;

        self.totp_pending_secret = Some(secret.to_vec());
        self.updated_at = now;
        info!(event = "db_admin_totp_enrolment_started", outcome = "progress", user_id = %self.id, username = %self.username);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Promotes the pending secret to the real one.
    ///
    /// One statement, deliberately: a half-applied enrolment would leave the
    /// operator believing they have a factor that nothing checks, or holding a
    /// pending secret alongside a live one. `totp_last_step` is cleared with
    /// them -- the replay guard belongs to the secret it was recorded against.
    ///
    /// A no-op when nothing is pending, so a double-submit cannot clear a live
    /// factor.
    pub async fn confirm_totp(&mut self, database: &Database) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
        let Some(pending) = self.totp_pending_secret.clone() else {
            return Ok(());
        };

        let now = now_secs();
        sqlx::query(
            "UPDATE admin_users SET totp_secret = totp_pending_secret, \
             totp_pending_secret = NULL, totp_last_step = NULL, updated_at = ? \
             WHERE id = ? AND totp_pending_secret IS NOT NULL;",
        )
        .bind(now)
        .bind(&self.id)
        .execute(&database.pool)
        .await?;

        self.totp_secret = Some(pending);
        self.totp_pending_secret = None;
        self.totp_last_step = None;
        self.updated_at = now;
        info!(event = "db_admin_totp_enabled", outcome = "success", user_id = %self.id, username = %self.username);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Removes the factor, any half-finished enrolment and the replay guard
    /// together. Callers drop the recovery codes too -- a code that recovers
    /// access to a factor that no longer exists is a second password.
    pub async fn clear_totp(&mut self, database: &Database) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
        let now = now_secs();
        sqlx::query(
            "UPDATE admin_users SET totp_secret = NULL, totp_pending_secret = NULL, \
             totp_last_step = NULL, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?;",
        )
        .bind(now)
        .bind(&self.id)
        .execute(&database.pool)
        .await?;

        self.totp_secret = None;
        self.totp_pending_secret = None;
        self.totp_last_step = None;
        self.updated_at = now;
        info!(event = "db_admin_totp_disabled", outcome = "success", user_id = %self.id, username = %self.username);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Records `step` as accepted, refusing one that is not strictly newer than
    /// the stored value -- RFC 6238 §5.2's replay guard.
    ///
    /// The comparison lives in the `WHERE` clause rather than in Rust: a code
    /// observed in flight and resubmitted inside its own 30-second window must
    /// not be accepted twice, and with two requests racing it is
    /// `rows_affected` that decides which one was first. Same primitive as
    /// `Nonce::verify`.
    pub async fn claim_totp_step(
        &mut self,
        step: i64,
        database: &Database,
    ) -> Result<bool, sqlx::Error> {
        let now = now_secs();
        let result = sqlx::query(
            "UPDATE admin_users SET totp_last_step = ?, updated_at = ? \
             WHERE id = ? AND (totp_last_step IS NULL OR totp_last_step < ?);",
        )
        .bind(step)
        .bind(now)
        .bind(&self.id)
        .bind(step)
        .execute(&database.pool)
        .await?;

        let claimed = result.rows_affected() == 1;
        if claimed {
            self.totp_last_step = Some(step);
            self.updated_at = now;
        }
        Ok(claimed)
    }

    /// Stamps `last_login_at`. Advisory only -- nothing authorises on it.
    ///
    /// Called when a login *completes*, which for an operator with a second
    /// factor is one request later than the password being accepted.
    pub async fn mark_logged_in(&mut self, database: &Database) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
        let now = now_secs();
        sqlx::query("UPDATE admin_users SET last_login_at = ? WHERE id = ?;")
            .bind(now)
            .bind(&self.id)
            .execute(&database.pool)
            .await?;

        self.last_login_at = Some(now);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Removes the operator. Their sessions go with them via the schema's
    /// `ON DELETE CASCADE`, which needs `foreign_keys` on -- `Database::connect`
    /// and `connect_in_memory` both pin it. Returns whether a row existed.
    pub async fn delete(id: &str, database: &Database) -> Result<bool, sqlx::Error> {
        debug!(event = "db_admin_user_delete_started", outcome = "progress", id = ?id);
        let result = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM admin_users WHERE id = ?;")
            .bind(id)
            .execute(&database.pool)
            .await?;

        let deleted = result.rows_affected() > 0;
        if deleted {
            info!(event = "db_admin_user_deleted", outcome = "success", user_id = %id);
        }
        Ok(deleted)
    }

    /// Whether this operator may log in and hold a session.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn is_active(&self) -> bool {
        self.status == "active"
    }

    /// Whether a confirmed second factor is configured. A pending enrolment
    /// does not count -- it has never been proven against a code.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn has_totp(&self) -> bool {
        self.totp_secret.is_some()
    }

    /// Whether an enrolment is half-finished: a secret was generated and shown,
    /// and no code has proven it yet.
    ///
    /// Deliberately not folded into [`AdminUser::has_totp`] and deliberately
    /// not in [`AdminUser::to_json`]: the login path must treat this operator as
    /// having *no* factor, and the only surface that cares is the enrolment
    /// page deciding whether to offer "start over".
    #[must_use]
    pub fn has_pending_totp(&self) -> bool {
        self.totp_pending_secret.is_some()
    }

    /// The admin-facing rendering. **Never** includes `password_hash`, nor
    /// either TOTP secret -- only whether one is configured.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn to_json(&self) -> Value {
        serde_json::json!({
            "id": self.id,
            "username": self.username,
            "status": self.status,
            "totpEnabled": self.has_totp(),
            "createdAt": rfc3339(self.created_at),
            "updatedAt": rfc3339(self.updated_at),
            "lastLoginAt": self.last_login_at.map(rfc3339),
        })
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use std::sync::Arc;

    async fn db() -> Arc<Database> {
        Arc::new(Database::connect_in_memory().await.unwrap())
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn create_persists_an_active_user_with_a_lowercased_username() {
        let db = db().await;
        let user = AdminUser::create("  Alice  ", "hash", &db).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(user.username, "alice");
        assert_eq!(user.status, "active");
        assert!(user.is_active());
        assert!(user.last_login_at.is_none());
        assert!(!user.has_totp());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn find_by_username_is_case_insensitive_and_round_trips() {
        let db = db().await;
        let created = AdminUser::create("alice", "hash", &db).await.unwrap();
        let found = AdminUser::find_by_username("ALICE", &db)
            .await
            .unwrap()
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(found.id, created.id);
        assert_eq!(found.password_hash, "hash");

        let by_id = AdminUser::find_by_id(&created.id, &db)
            .await
            .unwrap()
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(by_id.username, "alice");
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn lookups_of_unknown_users_return_none() {
        let db = db().await;
        assert!(
            AdminUser::find_by_username("nobody", &db)
                .await
                .unwrap()
                .is_none()
        );
        assert!(AdminUser::find_by_id("nope", &db).await.unwrap().is_none());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_duplicate_username_is_refused_by_the_unique_constraint() {
        let db = db().await;
        AdminUser::create("alice", "hash", &db).await.unwrap();
        // Also proves the normalization above is a real constraint, not a
        // near-miss: `Alice` collides with the stored `alice`.
        let error = AdminUser::create("Alice", "other", &db).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            error.to_string().to_lowercase().contains("unique"),
            "expected a UNIQUE violation, got: {error}"
        );
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn list_all_returns_every_user_and_empty_is_empty() {
        let db = db().await;
        assert!(AdminUser::list_all(&db).await.unwrap().is_empty());

        AdminUser::create("a", "h", &db).await.unwrap();
        AdminUser::create("b", "h", &db).await.unwrap();
        let all = AdminUser::list_all(&db).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(all.len(), 2);
        // Deliberately not asserting *which* comes first: two users created in
        // the same second tie on `created_at`, and the `id ASC` tiebreak is a
        // random UUID. The order is stable across reads, which is all a list
        // owes its caller -- it is not insertion order, and asserting it was
        // is how this test failed one run in two.
        let mut names: Vec<&str> = all.iter().map(|u| u.username.as_str()).collect();
        names.sort_unstable();
        assert_eq!(names, ["a", "b"]);
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn list_all_orders_oldest_first() {
        let db = db().await;
        let older = AdminUser::create("older", "h", &db).await.unwrap();
        let newer = AdminUser::create("newer", "h", &db).await.unwrap();
        // Backdate one so the two no longer tie and `created_at ASC` is what
        // decides, rather than the UUID tiebreak.
        sqlx::query("UPDATE admin_users SET created_at = ? WHERE id = ?;")
            .bind(older.created_at - 60)
            .bind(&older.id)
            .execute(&db.pool)
            .await
            .unwrap();

        let all = AdminUser::list_all(&db).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(all[0].id, older.id);
        assert_eq!(all[1].id, newer.id);
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn set_password_hash_persists_and_syncs_in_memory() {
        let db = db().await;
        let mut user = AdminUser::create("alice", "old", &db).await.unwrap();
        user.set_password_hash("new", &db).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(user.password_hash, "new");

        let reloaded = AdminUser::find_by_id(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(reloaded.password_hash, "new");
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn set_status_persists_and_disables() {
        let db = db().await;
        let mut user = AdminUser::create("alice", "h", &db).await.unwrap();
        user.set_status("disabled", &db).await.unwrap();
        assert!(!user.is_active());

        let reloaded = AdminUser::find_by_id(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert!(!reloaded.is_active());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn the_totp_setters_persist_and_sync_in_memory() {
        let db = db().await;
        let mut user = AdminUser::create("alice", "h", &db).await.unwrap();

        user.set_totp_pending(b"secret-bytes", &db).await.unwrap();
        assert!(user.has_pending_totp());
        assert!(
            !user.has_totp(),
            "a pending enrolment must not read as a second factor"
        );
        let reloaded = AdminUser::find_by_id(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            reloaded.totp_pending_secret.as_deref(),
            Some(&b"secret-bytes"[..])
        );
        assert!(!reloaded.has_totp());

        user.confirm_totp(&db).await.unwrap();
        assert!(user.has_totp());
        assert!(!user.has_pending_totp());
        let reloaded = AdminUser::find_by_id(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(reloaded.totp_secret.as_deref(), Some(&b"secret-bytes"[..]));
        assert_eq!(reloaded.totp_pending_secret, None);

        user.clear_totp(&db).await.unwrap();
        let reloaded = AdminUser::find_by_id(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(reloaded.totp_secret, None);
        assert_eq!(reloaded.totp_pending_secret, None);
        assert_eq!(reloaded.totp_last_step, None);
    }

    /// A double-submit of the confirm form must not clear a live factor by
    /// promoting a pending column that is already empty.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn confirming_with_nothing_pending_leaves_a_live_factor_alone() {
        let db = db().await;
        let mut user = AdminUser::create("alice", "h", &db).await.unwrap();
        user.set_totp_pending(b"live", &db).await.unwrap();
        user.confirm_totp(&db).await.unwrap();

        user.confirm_totp(&db).await.unwrap();

        assert!(user.has_totp());
        let reloaded = AdminUser::find_by_id(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(reloaded.totp_secret.as_deref(), Some(&b"live"[..]));
    }

    /// RFC 6238 §5.2's replay guard, and the reason the comparison is in SQL:
    /// two requests carrying one code must not both be accepted.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn claim_totp_step_refuses_a_step_it_has_already_seen() {
        let db = db().await;
        let mut user = AdminUser::create("alice", "h", &db).await.unwrap();

        assert!(user.claim_totp_step(100, &db).await.unwrap());
        assert_eq!(user.totp_last_step, Some(100));

        // The same step, and any earlier one, are spent.
        assert!(!user.claim_totp_step(100, &db).await.unwrap());
        assert!(!user.claim_totp_step(99, &db).await.unwrap());
        assert_eq!(
            user.totp_last_step,
            Some(100),
            "a refused claim must not move the guard"
        );

        // Strictly newer advances it, and persists.
        assert!(user.claim_totp_step(101, &db).await.unwrap());
        let reloaded = AdminUser::find_by_id(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(reloaded.totp_last_step, Some(101));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn the_status_check_refuses_a_value_outside_the_schema() {
        let db = db().await;
        let mut user = AdminUser::create("alice", "h", &db).await.unwrap();
        assert!(user.set_status("banished", &db).await.is_err());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn mark_logged_in_stamps_last_login_at() {
        let db = db().await;
        let mut user = AdminUser::create("alice", "h", &db).await.unwrap();
        user.mark_logged_in(&db).await.unwrap();
        assert!(user.last_login_at.is_some());

        let reloaded = AdminUser::find_by_id(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(reloaded.last_login_at, user.last_login_at);
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn delete_reports_whether_a_row_existed() {
        let db = db().await;
        let user = AdminUser::create("alice", "h", &db).await.unwrap();
        assert!(AdminUser::delete(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap());
        assert!(!AdminUser::delete(&user.id, &db).await.unwrap());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn to_json_never_leaks_the_hash_or_the_totp_secret() {
        let db = db().await;
        let user = AdminUser::create("alice", "super-secret-hash", &db)
            .await
            .unwrap();
        let json = user.to_json();
        assert!(json.get("password_hash").is_none());
        assert!(json.get("passwordHash").is_none());
        assert!(json.get("totpSecret").is_none());
        assert!(!json.to_string().contains("super-secret-hash"));
        assert_eq!(json["username"], "alice");
        assert_eq!(json["status"], "active");
        assert_eq!(json["totpEnabled"], false);
        assert_eq!(json["lastLoginAt"], Value::Null);
    }
}