acme-proxy-admin 0.6.1

//! `/ui/account` — the operator's own page: password, second factor, and
//! their own live sessions.
//!
//! Everything here acts on whoever is holding the cookie, which is why no path
//! carries an id — the one apparent exception, `/ui/account/sessions/{id}`,
//! still names only *which session*, never a different account. Managing
//! *another* operator is `pages::operators`, not this module: the two are kept
//! apart because every route there sits behind a password re-entry
//! (`check_step_up`) this operator's own actions never need. `create`/`passwd`
//! stay a shell command on the host either way — this panel has no sign-up
//! page, and minting a credential is where that line is drawn.

use axum::extract::{Path, State};
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde_json::{Map, Value, json};

use crate::admin;
use crate::admin::{mfa, totp};
use crate::webadmin::AdminState;
use crate::webadmin::error::AdminError;
use crate::webadmin::handlers::Caller;
use crate::webadmin::handlers::account::apply_revoke_own_session;
use crate::webadmin::handlers::mfa::verify_current_password;
use crate::webadmin::handlers::paging::PageParams;
use crate::webadmin::pages::auth::{PageEnrolWrite, PageSelfServiceWrite, PageSession};
use crate::webadmin::pages::error::PageError;
use crate::webadmin::pages::{chrome, respond, respond_fragment};
use crate::webadmin::session::{AdminClientIp, clearing_cookie};
use acme_proxy_store::admin_session::AdminSession;
use acme_proxy_store::admin_user::AdminUser;

/// The form of `POST /ui/account/mfa/totp/confirm`, the `/ui` twin of
/// [`crate::webadmin::handlers::mfa::ConfirmRequest`].
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct ConfirmForm {
    pub code: String,
}

/// The `/ui` twin of [`crate::webadmin::handlers::mfa::StepUpRequest`]: the
/// password the card's own field collects, pulled in by `hx-include`.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
pub struct StepUpForm {
    #[serde(default)]
    pub password: String,
}

/// [`check_step_up`] with the refusal rendered as this card's banner.
///
/// The module's rule -- "the row's state is a banner, the server's problem is a
/// page" -- puts a wrong password on the banner side: the session is live and
/// the page is the right page, only this one action was refused. The same now
/// holds for the rate limit `check_step_up` applies, which is why the status and
/// the wording are taken from the error rather than hardcoded: a lockout renders
/// at 429 and says how long to wait, exactly as `post_login` re-renders its own
/// refusals at their real status.
async fn refuse_on_the_card(
    state: &AdminState,
    user: &AdminUser,
    csrf_token: &str,
    error: &AdminError,
) -> Result<Response, PageError> {
    // `refuse_with_card` keeps this page's own wording for the wrong-password
    // case (`AdminError`'s is "invalid username or password", a script's answer
    // to a sign-in, naming a field this card does not have) and carries every
    // other refusal's message through — the rate limit, which says how long to
    // wait, and the two the shared actions raise. It also keeps the error's
    // *headers*, which a rebuilt response lost: a `429` without its
    // `Retry-After`.
    let context = card_context(state, user, csrf_token).await?;
    super::refuse_with_card(state, "account/_mfa.html", context, error)
}

/// `GET /ui/account` — the second-factor status card, the password card, and
/// this operator's own live sessions.
pub async fn get_account(
    State(state): State<AdminState>,
    session: PageSession,
) -> Result<Response, PageError> {
    let mut context = chrome(&session, "account", "Your account");
    context.insert("mfa".to_string(), status(&state, &session.auth.user).await?);
    context.insert(
        "require_mfa".to_string(),
        Value::Bool(state.config.admin.require_mfa),
    );
    context.insert("period".to_string(), json!(totp::PERIOD_SECONDS));
    context.insert(
        "min_password_length".to_string(),
        json!(crate::admin::password::MIN_PASSWORD_LEN),
    );
    insert_own_sessions(&mut context, &state, &session.auth).await?;

    Ok(respond(
        &state,
        session.hx,
        "account/index.html",
        "account/_mfa.html",
        context,
    )?
    .into_response())
}

/// `POST /ui/account/mfa/totp` — begin (or resume) an enrolment.
///
/// Resumes rather than restarts when one is already pending: an operator who
/// reloads after scanning the secret into an app must not be handed a different
/// one.
///
/// Takes the account password when a factor already exists — the card's own
/// field, pulled in by `hx-include`. The check itself is the shared action's,
/// which `/api` makes too.
pub async fn begin_totp(
    State(state): State<AdminState>,
    AdminClientIp(client): AdminClientIp,
    session: PageEnrolWrite,
    axum::Form(body): axum::Form<StepUpForm>,
) -> Result<Response, PageError> {
    let mut user = session.enrol.user;
    let enrolment = match crate::webadmin::handlers::mfa::begin_totp_for(
        &state,
        &mut user,
        &body.password,
        client,
    )
    .await
    {
        Ok(enrolment) => enrolment,
        Err(error) => {
            return refuse_on_the_card(&state, &user, &session.enrol.session.csrf_token, &error)
                .await;
        }
    };

    let mut context = Map::new();
    context.insert(
        "csrf_token".to_string(),
        Value::String(session.enrol.session.csrf_token.clone()),
    );
    context.insert(
        "enrolment".to_string(),
        json!({
            "secret": enrolment.secret_base32,
            "uri": enrolment.uri,
            "algorithm": "SHA1",
            "digits": totp::DIGITS,
            "period": totp::PERIOD_SECONDS,
        }),
    );

    Ok(respond_fragment(&state, "account/_enrol.html", context)?.into_response())
}

/// `POST /ui/account/mfa/totp/confirm` — prove a code, and receive the recovery
/// codes once.
///
/// A wrong code is a banner on the enrolment step, not an error page: the row's
/// state is a banner, the server's problem is a page.
pub async fn confirm_totp(
    State(state): State<AdminState>,
    AdminClientIp(client): AdminClientIp,
    session: PageEnrolWrite,
    request_context: acme_proxy_core::audit::RequestContext,
    axum::Form(body): axum::Form<ConfirmForm>,
) -> Result<Response, PageError> {
    let mut user = session.enrol.user;
    let keep = session.enrol.session.token_hash.clone();

    let Some(codes) = crate::webadmin::handlers::mfa::confirm_totp_for(
        &state,
        &request_context,
        &mut user,
        &body.code,
        &keep,
        client,
    )
    .await?
    else {
        // Re-render the enrolment step with the same secret still pending, so
        // the operator can simply try the next code their app shows.
        let enrolment = mfa::resume_or_begin_totp_enrolment(
            &mut user,
            &state.config.admin.base_url,
            state.database.clone(),
        )
        .await?;

        let mut context = Map::new();
        context.insert(
            "csrf_token".to_string(),
            Value::String(session.enrol.session.csrf_token.clone()),
        );
        context.insert(
            "enrolment".to_string(),
            json!({
                "secret": enrolment.secret_base32,
                "uri": enrolment.uri,
                "algorithm": "SHA1",
                "digits": totp::DIGITS,
                "period": totp::PERIOD_SECONDS,
            }),
        );
        context.insert(
            "flash".to_string(),
            super::flash_error("bad_request", "That code did not match. Try the next one."),
        );

        return Ok((
            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
            respond_fragment(&state, "account/_enrol.html", context)?,
        )
            .into_response());
    };

    let mut context = card_context(&state, &user, &session.enrol.session.csrf_token).await?;
    context.insert("recovery_codes".to_string(), json!(codes));
    Ok(respond_fragment(&state, "account/_codes.html", context)?.into_response())
}

/// `POST /ui/account/mfa/totp/disable` — turn the factor off.
///
/// Takes the account password, as the shared action requires: this is the most
/// consequential thing a stolen cookie could do here.
pub async fn disable_totp(
    State(state): State<AdminState>,
    AdminClientIp(client): AdminClientIp,
    session: PageSelfServiceWrite,
    request_context: acme_proxy_core::audit::RequestContext,
    axum::Form(body): axum::Form<StepUpForm>,
) -> Result<Response, PageError> {
    let mut user = session.auth.user;
    // A banner, not a page: every refusal here — the server requiring a factor,
    // a wrong password, a rate limit — is about this card's own state.
    if let Err(error) = crate::webadmin::handlers::mfa::disable_totp_for(
        &state,
        &request_context,
        &mut user,
        &body.password,
        &session.auth.session.token_hash,
        client,
    )
    .await
    {
        return refuse_on_the_card(&state, &user, &session.auth.session.csrf_token, &error).await;
    }

    let mut context = card_context(&state, &user, &session.auth.session.csrf_token).await?;
    context.insert(
        "flash".to_string(),
        super::flash(
            "warn",
            "Two-factor authentication is off. Your recovery codes were destroyed \
             and every other session of yours was signed out.",
        ),
    );
    Ok(respond_fragment(&state, "account/_mfa.html", context)?.into_response())
}

/// `POST /ui/account/mfa/recovery-codes` — mint a fresh set, **shown once**.
///
/// Takes the account password, as the shared action requires: superseding the
/// set the rightful operator would recover with is the same lockout as
/// replacing the factor itself.
pub async fn regenerate_recovery_codes(
    State(state): State<AdminState>,
    AdminClientIp(client): AdminClientIp,
    session: PageSelfServiceWrite,
    request_context: acme_proxy_core::audit::RequestContext,
    axum::Form(body): axum::Form<StepUpForm>,
) -> Result<Response, PageError> {
    let codes = match crate::webadmin::handlers::mfa::regenerate_recovery_codes_for(
        &state,
        &request_context,
        &session.auth.user,
        &body.password,
        client,
    )
    .await
    {
        Ok(codes) => codes,
        Err(error) => {
            return refuse_on_the_card(
                &state,
                &session.auth.user,
                &session.auth.session.csrf_token,
                &error,
            )
            .await;
        }
    };

    let mut context =
        card_context(&state, &session.auth.user, &session.auth.session.csrf_token).await?;
    context.insert("recovery_codes".to_string(), json!(codes));

    Ok(respond_fragment(&state, "account/_codes.html", context)?.into_response())
}

/// The form of `POST /ui/account/password`, the `/ui` twin of
/// [`crate::webadmin::handlers::account::ChangePasswordRequest`].
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct ChangePasswordForm {
    pub current_password: String,
    pub new_password: String,
}

/// The notification-address form. A blank `contact` clears the address.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
pub struct ContactForm {
    #[serde(default)]
    pub current_password: String,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub contact: String,
}

/// Everything `account/_contact.html` reads: the token (a fragment rendered
/// standalone cannot inherit `<body>`'s `hx-headers`) and the operator.
/// `typed` is what the form last sent, echoed back on a refusal so a mistyped
/// address can be corrected rather than retyped.
fn contact_card_context(
    csrf_token: &str,
    user: &AdminUser,
    typed: Option<&str>,
) -> Map<String, Value> {
    let mut context = Map::new();
    context.insert(
        "csrf_token".to_string(),
        Value::String(csrf_token.to_string()),
    );
    context.insert(
        "user".to_string(),
        crate::admin::render_admin_user_json(user),
    );
    if let Some(typed) = typed {
        context.insert(
            "contact_input".to_string(),
            Value::String(typed.to_string()),
        );
    }
    context
}

/// `POST /ui/account/contact` — set or clear the address this operator's own
/// security notifications go to.
///
/// The `/ui` twin of [`crate::webadmin::handlers::account::change_contact`],
/// which says why the password is asked for. A wrong password, a rate limit and
/// an address that is not a mailbox are all this card's own banner.
pub async fn change_contact(
    State(state): State<AdminState>,
    AdminClientIp(client): AdminClientIp,
    session: PageSelfServiceWrite,
    request_context: acme_proxy_core::audit::RequestContext,
    axum::Form(form): axum::Form<ContactForm>,
) -> Result<Response, PageError> {
    let caller = session.auth.user.clone();
    let csrf_token = session.auth.session.csrf_token.clone();

    if let Err(error) =
        verify_current_password(&caller, &form.current_password, client, &state.logins).await
    {
        return super::refuse_with_card(
            &state,
            "account/_contact.html",
            contact_card_context(&csrf_token, &caller, Some(&form.contact)),
            &error,
        );
    }

    let mut target = caller.clone();
    if let Err(error) = crate::webadmin::handlers::operators::apply_contact_change(
        &state,
        &caller,
        &mut target,
        Some(form.contact.as_str()),
        client,
        &request_context,
        "ui",
    )
    .await
    {
        if error.status.is_server_error() {
            return Err(error.into());
        }
        return super::refuse_with_card(
            &state,
            "account/_contact.html",
            contact_card_context(&csrf_token, &caller, Some(&form.contact)),
            &error,
        );
    }

    let mut context = contact_card_context(&csrf_token, &target, None);
    let banner = match &target.contact_email {
        Some(address) => super::flash("ok", format!("Security notifications now go to {address}.")),
        None => super::flash(
            "warn",
            "No address is on file: security notifications cannot reach you.",
        ),
    };
    context.insert("flash".to_string(), banner);
    Ok(respond_fragment(&state, "account/_contact.html", context)?.into_response())
}

/// Everything `account/_password_card.html` reads. Unlike [`card_context`]
/// there is no second-factor state to report, but the `csrf_token` rule is
/// the same: a fragment rendered standalone cannot inherit `<body>`'s
/// `hx-headers`, so this card's own form carries it explicitly.
fn password_card_context(csrf_token: &str) -> Map<String, Value> {
    let mut context = Map::new();
    context.insert(
        "csrf_token".to_string(),
        Value::String(csrf_token.to_string()),
    );
    // A client-side hint only -- `check_password_policy` is what actually
    // enforces it, so tying the two together is about the message staying
    // true rather than about anything security-relevant.
    context.insert(
        "min_password_length".to_string(),
        json!(crate::admin::password::MIN_PASSWORD_LEN),
    );
    context
}

/// `POST /ui/account/password` — change this operator's own password.
///
/// Takes the current password and the new one; on success every *other*
/// session of this operator is revoked and the one making this request stays
/// signed in. The change itself is
/// `handlers::account::change_own_password_for`, which `/api` calls too.
pub async fn change_password(
    State(state): State<AdminState>,
    AdminClientIp(client): AdminClientIp,
    session: PageSelfServiceWrite,
    request_context: acme_proxy_core::audit::RequestContext,
    axum::Form(body): axum::Form<ChangePasswordForm>,
) -> Result<Response, PageError> {
    let mut user = session.auth.user;
    let csrf_token = session.auth.session.csrf_token.clone();
    let mut fragment_context = password_card_context(&csrf_token);

    // Every refusal is a banner on this card, and its wording is the API's:
    // one change, one set of sentences, whichever surface asked.
    if let Err(error) = crate::webadmin::handlers::account::change_own_password_for(
        &state,
        &request_context,
        &mut user,
        &body.current_password,
        &body.new_password,
        &session.auth.session.token_hash,
        client,
    )
    .await
    {
        return super::refuse_with_card(&state, "account/_password.html", fragment_context, &error);
    }

    fragment_context.insert(
        "flash".to_string(),
        super::flash(
            "ok",
            "Your password was changed. Every other session of yours was signed out.",
        ),
    );
    Ok(respond_fragment(&state, "account/_password.html", fragment_context)?.into_response())
}

/// `POST /ui/account/sessions/{id}/revoke` — end one of this operator's own
/// sessions.
///
/// No step-up: the same trust level as `/ui/logout` (sign out here, or
/// everywhere), not the operators surface's "act on someone else's account".
/// Revoking the session making *this* request is not a special case to guard
/// against — it behaves exactly like `/ui/logout` without `?all=true`, landing
/// back on the sign-in page with the cookie cleared, rather than re-rendering a
/// fragment for a session that no longer exists.
pub async fn revoke_own_session(
    State(state): State<AdminState>,
    Path(id): Path<String>,
    session: PageSelfServiceWrite,
    request_context: acme_proxy_core::audit::RequestContext,
) -> Result<Response, PageError> {
    let was_current =
        apply_revoke_own_session(&state, &Caller::ui(&session.auth, &request_context), &id).await?;

    if was_current {
        let mut response = crate::webadmin::pages::error::redirect(
            crate::webadmin::pages::error::LOGIN_PATH,
            session.hx,
        );
        if let Ok(value) = axum::http::HeaderValue::from_str(&clearing_cookie()) {
            response
                .headers_mut()
                .insert(axum::http::header::SET_COOKIE, value);
        }
        return Ok(response);
    }

    let mut context = Map::new();
    context.insert(
        "csrf_token".to_string(),
        Value::String(session.auth.session.csrf_token.clone()),
    );
    insert_own_sessions(&mut context, &state, &session.auth).await?;
    context.insert("flash".to_string(), super::flash("ok", "Session revoked."));
    Ok(respond_fragment(&state, "account/_sessions.html", context)?.into_response())
}

/// Everything `partials/_sessions_table.html` reads for this operator's own
/// sessions -- newest first, each marked whether it is the one making the
/// current request (see [`admin::render_admin_session_detail_json`]), and no
/// step-up prefix: revoking one's own session sits at "sign out" trust level,
/// not the operators surface's.
///
/// One page's worth: an operator accumulates a handful of browser sessions,
/// never enough to need the pager the CLI's unbounded `admin session list`
/// does.
async fn insert_own_sessions(
    context: &mut Map<String, Value>,
    state: &AdminState,
    auth: &crate::webadmin::session::Authenticated,
) -> Result<(), PageError> {
    let page = PageParams::default().resolve(&state.config);
    let (sessions, _total) =
        AdminSession::search(Some(auth.user.id), page.limit, page.offset, &state.database).await?;
    let rows: Vec<Value> = sessions
        .iter()
        .map(|s| admin::render_admin_session_detail_json(s, &auth.session.token_hash))
        .collect();

    context.insert("sessions".to_string(), Value::Array(rows));
    context.insert(
        "sessions_revoke_prefix".to_string(),
        Value::String("/ui/account/sessions".to_string()),
    );
    context.insert(
        "sessions_target".to_string(),
        Value::String("#account-sessions".to_string()),
    );
    Ok(())
}

/// What `GET /api/mfa` answers, for the template.
async fn status(state: &AdminState, user: &AdminUser) -> Result<Value, PageError> {
    let remaining = mfa::recovery_codes_remaining(user.id, state.database.clone()).await?;
    Ok(json!({
        "totpEnabled": user.has_totp(),
        "enrolmentPending": user.has_pending_totp(),
        "recoveryCodesRemaining": remaining,
    }))
}

/// Everything `account/_card.html` reads.
///
/// A fragment is rendered standalone, so it cannot inherit the `hx-headers` on
/// `<body>` — the `csrf_token` has to be inserted by hand or every control in
/// the swapped fragment answers `403`. Same rule as `pages::accounts::card`.
async fn card_context(
    state: &AdminState,
    user: &AdminUser,
    csrf_token: &str,
) -> Result<Map<String, Value>, PageError> {
    let mut context = Map::new();
    context.insert(
        "csrf_token".to_string(),
        Value::String(csrf_token.to_string()),
    );
    context.insert(
        "user".to_string(),
        crate::admin::render_admin_user_json(user),
    );
    context.insert("mfa".to_string(), status(state, user).await?);
    context.insert(
        "require_mfa".to_string(),
        Value::Bool(state.config.admin.require_mfa),
    );
    context.insert("period".to_string(), json!(totp::PERIOD_SECONDS));
    Ok(context)
}

// No `not_found` here, unlike every sibling in this directory: none of these
// routes takes an id. There is exactly one account this page can be about, and
// the session names it.