pub struct HttpEndpointConfig {
pub base_url: String,
pub http_method: Option<String>,
pub throw_exception_on_failure: bool,
pub ok_status_code_range: (u16, u16),
pub follow_redirects: bool,
pub connect_timeout: Duration,
pub response_timeout: Option<Duration>,
pub query_params: HashMap<String, String>,
pub allow_private_ips: bool,
pub blocked_hosts: Vec<String>,
pub max_body_size: usize,
}Expand description
Configuration for an HTTP client (producer) endpoint.
§Memory Limits
HTTP operations enforce conservative memory limits to prevent denial-of-service attacks from untrusted network sources. These limits are significantly lower than file component limits (100MB) because HTTP typically handles API responses rather than large file transfers, and clients may be untrusted.
§Default Limits
- HTTP client body: 10MB (typical API responses)
- HTTP server request: 2MB (untrusted network input - see
HttpServerConfig) - HTTP server response: 10MB (same as client - see
HttpServerConfig)
§Rationale
The 10MB limit for HTTP client responses is appropriate for most API interactions while providing protection against:
- Malicious servers sending oversized responses
- Runaway processes generating unexpectedly large payloads
- Memory exhaustion attacks
The 2MB server request limit is even more conservative because it handles input from potentially untrusted clients on the public internet.
§Overriding Limits
Override the default client body limit using the maxBodySize URI parameter:
http://api.example.com/large-data?maxBodySize=52428800For server endpoints, use maxRequestBody and maxResponseBody parameters:
http://0.0.0.0:8080/upload?maxRequestBody=52428800§Behavior When Exceeded
When a body exceeds the configured limit:
- An error is returned immediately
- No memory is exhausted - the limit is checked before allocation
- The HTTP connection is terminated cleanly
§Security Considerations
HTTP endpoints should be treated with more caution than file endpoints because:
- Clients may be unknown and untrusted
- Network traffic can be spoofed or malicious
- DoS attacks often exploit unbounded resource consumption
Only increase limits when you control both ends of the connection or when business requirements demand larger payloads.
Fields§
§base_url: String§http_method: Option<String>§throw_exception_on_failure: bool§ok_status_code_range: (u16, u16)§follow_redirects: bool§connect_timeout: Duration§response_timeout: Option<Duration>§query_params: HashMap<String, String>§allow_private_ips: bool§blocked_hosts: Vec<String>§max_body_size: usizeTrait Implementations§
Source§impl Clone for HttpEndpointConfig
impl Clone for HttpEndpointConfig
Source§fn clone(&self) -> HttpEndpointConfig
fn clone(&self) -> HttpEndpointConfig
1.0.0 · Source§fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
source. Read more