Struct MutationAuthorizationContext 

pub struct MutationAuthorizationContext {
    pub source_mac: MacAddr,
    pub source_network: Option<NpduAddress>,
    pub provenance: TransportProvenance,
    pub trust: MutationTrust,
    pub invoke_id: Option<u8>,
    pub service_choice: MutationService,
    pub target: MutationTarget,
}

Claimed source identity, verified ingress scope, and decoded target supplied to mutation policy.

Neither address nor a subscription’s process ID authenticates an operator. source_mac identifies the immediate peer (often a router); source_network is the peer-claimed routed origin, not a verified identity. SC mTLS authenticates the channel/peer, not service authorization; neither address is a certificate principal. principal is, and only for a verified direct SC connection.

provenance is the reassembled ingress snapshot threaded from dispatch (segmentation mismatches already fail closed at reassembly, so every element of one request — including each WPM element — observes the same snapshot). trust is the channel/relay scope derived from it, never leaf identity. Debug is redacted by construction: address lengths, whether a principal is present and the target kind only, never MAC bytes, the fingerprint, property values, file payloads, or other decoded inputs.

Fields

source_mac: MacAddr

Immediate data-link peer address.

source_network: Option<NpduAddress>

Claimed originating NPDU address, when present.

provenance: TransportProvenance

Honest transport + origin provenance for this ingress snapshot.

trust: MutationTrust

Channel/relay scope derived from provenance; never leaf identity.

invoke_id: Option<u8>

A confirmed request’s invoke identifier; None for an unconfirmed request, which carries none.

service_choice: MutationService

The service that asks for the mutation.

target: MutationTarget

Decoded target and parameters; current element for WPM, current Channel for WriteGroup.

Implementations

impl MutationAuthorizationContext

pub fn principal(&self) -> Option<ScPrincipal>

The principal of the peer that originated the request: the verified leaf certificate of a direct BACnet/SC connection, when the request carries no routed source. None for other ingress, hub-relayed and routed requests included (see crate::policy).

pub fn forwarding_peer_principal(&self) -> Option<ScPrincipal>

The principal of the direct BACnet/SC peer that handed this request over, a router included when the request was routed; None off a verified direct SC connection. Trusting it trusts everything that peer forwards.

pub fn certificate(&self) -> Option<&ScPeerCertificate>

Available on crate feature sc-tls only.

The verified leaf certificate of the peer that originated the request: the one principal fingerprints, for rules by subject, Subject Alternative Name or issuer, which survive certificate renewal. None exactly when principal() is: other ingress, hub-relayed and routed requests (see crate::policy). Its contents are the peer’s: don’t log them.

pub fn forwarding_peer_certificate(&self) -> Option<&ScPeerCertificate>

Available on crate feature sc-tls only.

The verified leaf certificate of the direct BACnet/SC peer that handed this request over, a router included when the request was routed: the one forwarding_peer_principal fingerprints. None off a verified direct SC connection.

pub fn direct_sc_identity(&self) -> Option<DirectScIdentity>

The immediate direct-SC hop’s verified leaf and connection incarnation: for a routed request, the router that forwarded it. Absent off a verified direct SC connection. Separate from claimed addresses.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for MutationAuthorizationContext

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for MutationAuthorizationContext

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl PartialEq for MutationAuthorizationContext

fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl StructuralPartialEq for MutationAuthorizationContext