Struct DeviceCommunicationControlAuthorizationContext 

pub struct DeviceCommunicationControlAuthorizationContext {
    pub source_mac: MacAddr,
    pub source_network: Option<NpduAddress>,
    pub provenance: TransportProvenance,
    pub invoke_id: u8,
    pub requested_state: DccState,
    pub duration_minutes: Option<u16>,
}

Network identity and the requested change supplied to ServerPolicy::authorize_device_communication_control.

The policy is asked only once the password, the static DccPolicy and the source restriction pass, and before the disable rate limit is charged. The password is never part of the context. Debug is redacted: address lengths and whether a principal is present, never addresses or certificate data.

Fields

source_mac: MacAddr

Immediate data-link peer (or router) address.

source_network: Option<NpduAddress>

Originating NPDU source when the request was routed.

provenance: TransportProvenance

Immutable ingress snapshot; the source of the principal, if any.

invoke_id: u8

Confirmed-request invoke identifier.

requested_state: DccState

The state the request asks for. The deprecated DISABLE never gets this far: the server refuses it first.

duration_minutes: Option<u16>

The requested duration in minutes; None asks for no time limit.

Implementations

impl DeviceCommunicationControlAuthorizationContext

pub fn principal(&self) -> Option<ScPrincipal>

The principal of the peer that originated the request: the verified leaf certificate of a direct BACnet/SC connection, when the request carries no routed source. None for other ingress, hub-relayed and routed requests included (see crate::policy).

pub fn forwarding_peer_principal(&self) -> Option<ScPrincipal>

The principal of the direct BACnet/SC peer that handed this request over, a router included when the request was routed; None off a verified direct SC connection. Trusting it trusts everything that peer forwards.

pub fn certificate(&self) -> Option<&ScPeerCertificate>

Available on crate feature sc-tls only.

The verified leaf certificate of the peer that originated the request: the one principal fingerprints, for rules by subject, Subject Alternative Name or issuer, which survive certificate renewal. None exactly when principal() is: other ingress, hub-relayed and routed requests (see crate::policy). Its contents are the peer’s: don’t log them.

pub fn forwarding_peer_certificate(&self) -> Option<&ScPeerCertificate>

Available on crate feature sc-tls only.

The verified leaf certificate of the direct BACnet/SC peer that handed this request over, a router included when the request was routed: the one forwarding_peer_principal fingerprints. None off a verified direct SC connection.

pub fn direct_sc_identity(&self) -> Option<DirectScIdentity>

The immediate direct-SC hop’s verified leaf and connection incarnation: for a routed request, the router that forwarded it. Absent off a verified direct SC connection. Separate from claimed addresses.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for DeviceCommunicationControlAuthorizationContext

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for DeviceCommunicationControlAuthorizationContext

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Eq for DeviceCommunicationControlAuthorizationContext

impl PartialEq for DeviceCommunicationControlAuthorizationContext

fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl StructuralPartialEq for DeviceCommunicationControlAuthorizationContext