Struct AuditNotificationAuthorizationContext 

pub struct AuditNotificationAuthorizationContext {
    pub source_mac: MacAddr,
    pub source_network: Option<NpduAddress>,
    pub provenance: TransportProvenance,
    pub invoke_id: u8,
    pub audit_log_sink: ObjectIdentifier,
    pub request: AuditNotificationRequest,
}

Transport provenance and decoded content supplied to ServerPolicy::authorize_audit_notification.

The source/target identities inside request are peer-reported audit data, not authenticated transport provenance. Policy should use source_network for a usable routed origin and source_mac for the immediate data-link peer. Debug is redacted: address lengths, the sink, whether a principal is present and the notification count, never the notifications themselves.

Fields

source_mac: MacAddr

Immediate data-link peer (normally a router for routed traffic).

source_network: Option<NpduAddress>

Originating NPDU source when one was present.

provenance: TransportProvenance

Honest transport + origin provenance for this ingress; the source of the principal, if any.

invoke_id: u8

Outer Confirmed-Request invoke identifier.

audit_log_sink: ObjectIdentifier

Explicitly configured local Audit Log sink.

request: AuditNotificationRequest

Decoded peer-reported notification list, preserved verbatim.

Implementations

impl AuditNotificationAuthorizationContext

pub fn principal(&self) -> Option<ScPrincipal>

The principal of the peer that originated the request: the verified leaf certificate of a direct BACnet/SC connection, when the request carries no routed source. None for other ingress, hub-relayed and routed requests included (see crate::policy).

pub fn forwarding_peer_principal(&self) -> Option<ScPrincipal>

The principal of the direct BACnet/SC peer that handed this request over, a router included when the request was routed; None off a verified direct SC connection. Trusting it trusts everything that peer forwards.

pub fn certificate(&self) -> Option<&ScPeerCertificate>

Available on crate feature sc-tls only.

The verified leaf certificate of the peer that originated the request: the one principal fingerprints, for rules by subject, Subject Alternative Name or issuer, which survive certificate renewal. None exactly when principal() is: other ingress, hub-relayed and routed requests (see crate::policy). Its contents are the peer’s: don’t log them.

pub fn forwarding_peer_certificate(&self) -> Option<&ScPeerCertificate>

Available on crate feature sc-tls only.

The verified leaf certificate of the direct BACnet/SC peer that handed this request over, a router included when the request was routed: the one forwarding_peer_principal fingerprints. None off a verified direct SC connection.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for AuditNotificationAuthorizationContext

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for AuditNotificationAuthorizationContext

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl PartialEq for AuditNotificationAuthorizationContext

fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl StructuralPartialEq for AuditNotificationAuthorizationContext