Struct TrustRoot 

pub struct TrustRoot {
    pub log_public_key: Ed25519PublicKey,
    pub log_origin: LogOrigin,
    pub witnesses: Vec<TrustRootWitness>,
    pub signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
    pub ecdsa_log_public_key_der: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    pub independence_policy: IndependencePolicy,
}

Trust root for verifying transparency log checkpoints.

Contains the log’s signing public key and an optional witness list. For Epic 1 (fn-72), this is hardcoded in the verifier binary. TUF-based distribution comes in fn-76.

Args:

• log_public_key — The Ed25519 public key of the log operator.
• log_origin — The log origin string for checkpoint verification.
• witnesses — List of trusted witness public keys and names.

Usage:

let trust_root = TrustRoot {
    log_public_key: Ed25519PublicKey::from_bytes(key_bytes),
    log_origin: LogOrigin::new("auths.dev/log")?,
    witnesses: vec![],
};

Fields

log_public_key: Ed25519PublicKey

The log operator’s Ed25519 public key. Used only when signature_algorithm == Ed25519. Under the EcdsaP256 path, this field MUST NOT be the trust anchor — see Self::ecdsa_log_public_key_der for that.

log_origin: LogOrigin

The log origin string (e.g., “auths.dev/log”).

witnesses: Vec<TrustRootWitness>

Trusted witness keys. Empty for Epic 1.

signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm

Signature algorithm for checkpoint verification. Defaults to Ed25519. Rekor production shard uses EcdsaP256.

ecdsa_log_public_key_der: Option<Vec<u8>>

DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo for the log’s ECDSA-P256 public key. REQUIRED when signature_algorithm == EcdsaP256; the verifier compares the bundle-carried ECDSA pubkey against this pinned value byte-for-byte before using it to verify the checkpoint signature. Without this field, an attacker can submit a bundle with a self-chosen ECDSA key that verifies its own forged signature — a classic “trust the key I sent you” anti-pattern.

independence_policy: IndependencePolicy

Minimum-diversity thresholds the actual cosigning quorum must clear, layered on top of the n/2+1 count. Defaults to unconstrained (no diversity required) so a legacy trust root that pins no policy keeps its existing behavior; a commons trust root built from a pinned witness_policy.json carries real thresholds and enforces them.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for TrustRoot

fn clone(&self) -> TrustRoot

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for TrustRoot

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for TrustRoot

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Serialize for TrustRoot

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.