Struct SubmitResponseRequest 

pub struct SubmitResponseRequest {
    pub device_ephemeral_pubkey: Base64UrlEncoded,
    pub device_signing_pubkey: Base64UrlEncoded,
    pub curve: CurveTag,
    pub device_did: String,
    pub signature: Base64UrlEncoded,
    pub device_name: Option<String>,
    pub subkey_chain: Option<SubkeyChain>,
    pub initiator_inception_event: String,
    pub responder_inception_event: String,
    pub shared_kel_inception_event: Option<String>,
}

Request to submit a pairing response.

Fields

device_ephemeral_pubkey: Base64UrlEncoded

device_signing_pubkey: Base64UrlEncoded

curve: CurveTag

Signing curve for device_signing_pubkey / signature. Carried in-band per the workspace wire-format curve-tagging rule — verifiers must never infer curve from pubkey byte length. Defaults to P-256 when absent.

device_did: String

Responder’s DID string (e.g. did:key:z6Mk...).

signature: Base64UrlEncoded

device_name: Option<String>

subkey_chain: Option<SubkeyChain>

Optional per-pairing subkey chain for controller-correlation privacy. When present, device_signing_pubkey is a fresh session-only subkey and subkey_chain.bootstrap_pubkey holds the stable phone-level key that signed the subkey binding. A daemon built with the subkey-chain-v1 feature verifies the chain and records bootstrap_pubkey as the stable phone identifier; a daemon built without the feature rejects any Some(_) with an explicit unsupported-extension error.

initiator_inception_event: String

The initiator’s device-KEL inception event, base64url-no-pad JSON.

Both sides validate the other’s icp before either side signs the shared-KEL change. The daemon is an untrusted relay and does not inspect this field. #[serde(default)] so legacy pair responses that pre-date mutual inception exchange continue to deserialize (the responder-side code must still enforce presence when it expects the inception data).

responder_inception_event: String

The responder’s device-KEL inception event, base64url-no-pad JSON.

shared_kel_inception_event: Option<String>

Shared-KEL inception event — populated by the Mac (initiator) when no shared identity KEL exists yet (first-ever pair). The responder validates self-consistency + Mac’s signature, then replicates. Size-capped at 1 KB on serialize to guard against future multi-sig KEL inceptions overflowing QR capacity.

Implementations

impl SubmitResponseRequest

pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), String>

Validate payload-size invariants that must hold before transmission.

Args:

• self: The request to check.

Returns Err with a diagnostic string when shared_kel_inception_event exceeds SHARED_KEL_INCEPTION_EVENT_MAX_BYTES.

Usage:

req.validate()?;

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for SubmitResponseRequest

fn clone(&self) -> SubmitResponseRequest

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for SubmitResponseRequest

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), Error>

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for SubmitResponseRequest

fn deserialize<__D>( __deserializer: __D, ) -> Result<SubmitResponseRequest, <__D as Deserializer<'de>>::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Serialize for SubmitResponseRequest

fn serialize<__S>( &self, __serializer: __S, ) -> Result<<__S as Serializer>::Ok, <__S as Serializer>::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.