Struct VerifyArtifactArgs 

pub struct VerifyArtifactArgs {
    pub signature: Option<PathBuf>,
    pub identity_bundle: Option<PathBuf>,
    pub witness_receipts: Option<PathBuf>,
    pub witness_keys: Vec<String>,
    pub witness_threshold: usize,
    pub verify_commit: bool,
    pub ephemeral_anchor: EphemeralAnchor,
    pub oidc_policy: Option<PathBuf>,
    pub oidc_policy_did: Option<String>,
    pub log_evidence: Option<PathBuf>,
    pub log_key: Option<String>,
    pub expect_signer: Option<String>,
}

Inputs for handle_verify beyond the artifact path — named fields (the AttestationInput pattern) so call sites stay readable as the verify surface grows.

Fields

signature: Option<PathBuf>

Path to the signature file (defaults to <FILE>.auths.json).

identity_bundle: Option<PathBuf>

Identity bundle for stateless verification.

witness_receipts: Option<PathBuf>

Witness receipts file.

witness_keys: Vec<String>

Witness public keys as DID:hex pairs.

witness_threshold: usize

Number of witnesses required.

verify_commit: bool

Also verify the source commit’s signing attestation.

ephemeral_anchor: EphemeralAnchor

How to treat an ephemeral attestation’s commit-anchor leg.

oidc_policy: Option<PathBuf>

OIDC-subject policy to JOIN against the signed OIDC binding.

oidc_policy_did: Option<String>

Org did:keri: whose KEL-anchored OIDC-subject policy to resolve and JOIN — the witnessed log as the policy’s source of truth.

log_evidence: Option<PathBuf>

Offline transparency-log inclusion evidence (auths log prove --out).

log_key: Option<String>

The log operator’s pinned Ed25519 key (64 hex chars); paired with log_evidence at the clap boundary.

expect_signer: Option<String>

Require the cryptographically-verified signer (the attestation issuer) to be exactly this identity. Applied AFTER verification as an allowlist — it can only narrow a valid verdict to invalid on a signer mismatch, never widen it.