Struct NotarizationEnvelope 

pub struct NotarizationEnvelope {
    pub aph_version: String,
    pub context: Vec<String>,
    pub type: Vec<String>,
    pub id: String,
    pub issuer: String,
    pub valid_from: String,
    pub valid_until: String,
    pub credential_subject: CredentialSubject,
    pub linked_mandate: Option<LinkedMandate>,
    pub credential_status: Option<CredentialStatusEntry>,
    pub proof: EnvelopeProofs,
}

Top-level APH envelope. JSON-LD compatible W3C VC 2.0 credential.

Fields

aph_version: String

APH version pin ("0.1").

context: Vec<String>

JSON-LD @context array. Always begins with W3C VC 2.0 context.

type: Vec<String>

JSON-LD type array; MUST include "VerifiableCredential" and "AgentSendAuthorizationCredential".

id: String

urn:uuid:... envelope identifier.

issuer: String

DID of the notary service.

valid_from: String

RFC 3339 issuance timestamp.

valid_until: String

RFC 3339 expiry timestamp.

credential_subject: CredentialSubject

Inner credential subject (the notarized claim).

linked_mandate: Option<LinkedMandate>

Optional link to an AP2 IntentMandate (for cross-protocol mandates).

credential_status: Option<CredentialStatusEntry>

Revocation status reference for the parent Delegation Mandate named by credentialSubject.policy.delegationMandateId — NOT for this envelope (spec §6.3.3.1 narrows the W3C reading, and crate::credential_status carries the argument).

skip_serializing_if is load-bearing, not tidiness. Unlike linked_mandate directly above — which §7.1.1 permits to appear as an explicit null — this field is OMITTED when absent, so an envelope carrying no status reference is BYTE-IDENTICAL to one written before the field existed. That identity is what keeps every published example, every golden fixture and all four real Ed25519 signatures valid without regeneration: the signing base is this struct serialized and canonicalized (crate::crypto::proof_base::signing_base), so a bare #[serde(default)] here would emit "credentialStatus":null, change those bytes, and invalidate every signature over them.

proof: EnvelopeProofs

Cryptographic proof: a single notary proof, or a two-element proof chain (spec §7.1.11). See EnvelopeProofs.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for NotarizationEnvelope

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for NotarizationEnvelope

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for NotarizationEnvelope

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Eq for NotarizationEnvelope

impl PartialEq for NotarizationEnvelope

fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl Serialize for NotarizationEnvelope

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.

impl StructuralPartialEq for NotarizationEnvelope