Struct SignedEnvelope 

pub struct SignedEnvelope {
    pub cert_chain: CertChain,
    pub recipient: Recipient,
    pub nonce: [u8; 24],
    pub sequence: u64,
    pub payload_cid: [u8; 32],
    pub payload: ByteBuf,
    pub agent_sig: SerdeSig,
}

A wire envelope, signed by the sender’s agent key.

Fields, in the order they’re produced by Self::new:

• cert_chain — proves the sender’s agent identity.
• recipient — addressing tag.
• nonce — 24 random bytes; replay-protection scope.
• sequence — monotonic per-session counter.
• payload_cid — BLAKE3 of payload.
• payload — opaque bytes (the actual message).
• agent_sig — signature over ENVELOPE_TAG || recipient_bytes || nonce || seq || payload_cid.

Fields

cert_chain: CertChain

recipient: Recipient

nonce: [u8; 24]

sequence: u64

payload_cid: [u8; 32]

payload: ByteBuf

agent_sig: SerdeSig

Implementations

impl SignedEnvelope

pub fn new( sender: &AgentKey, recipient: Recipient, sequence: u64, payload: Vec<u8>, ) -> Self

Build and sign a new envelope.

The 24-byte nonce is drawn from rand::thread_rng; callers don’t manage it. The sequence is supplied by the caller — it’s session-scoped state, not crate state.

pub fn new_with_signer<S: MeshSigner + ?Sized>( signer: &S, cert_chain: CertChain, recipient: Recipient, sequence: u64, payload: Vec<u8>, ) -> Self

Build and sign a new envelope using an explicit MeshSigner and a matching CertChain.

This is the seam that lets a non-exportable / platform key (a phone keystore) sign an envelope without the raw seed: the signer produces the signature, and the cert_chain carries the provenance (issued via AgentKey::delegate_external). For the wire envelope to verify, the signer’s verifying_key must equal cert_chain.agent_pubkey — verification checks the signature against the pubkey in the cert, so a mismatched signer simply yields a MeshError::BadSignature at verify time.

new is a thin wrapper over this, passing the AgentKey as both signer and cert source.

pub fn verify(&self) -> Result<()>

Verify the envelope end-to-end:

1. Cert chain is valid (user sig over agent metadata).
2. payload_cid matches the actual payload BLAKE3.
3. Agent signature is valid over (recipient, nonce, sequence, payload_cid).

pub fn sender_agent_fp(&self) -> Fingerprint

Fingerprint of the sending agent.

pub fn sender_user_fp(&self) -> Fingerprint

Fingerprint of the user the sender belongs to.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for SignedEnvelope

fn clone(&self) -> SignedEnvelope

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for SignedEnvelope

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for SignedEnvelope

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Eq for SignedEnvelope

impl PartialEq for SignedEnvelope

fn eq(&self, other: &SignedEnvelope) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl Serialize for SignedEnvelope

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.

impl StructuralPartialEq for SignedEnvelope