zeph_sanitizer/
exfiltration.rs

1// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Andrei G <bug-ops>
2// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
3
4//! Exfiltration guards: prevent LLM-generated content from leaking data via
5//! outbound channels (markdown images, tool URL injection, poisoned memory writes).
6//!
7//! # Phase 5 TODO
8//! - HTML img tag detection (`<img src="https://...">`) — requires HTML parser
9//! - Unicode zero-width joiner bypass (`!\u200B[alt](url)`) — requires Unicode-aware matching
10//! - Both are low-priority: the LLM context wrapper already limits what arrives here
11
12use std::collections::HashSet;
13use std::fmt::Write as _;
14use std::sync::LazyLock;
15
16use regex::Regex;
17
18pub use zeph_config::ExfiltrationGuardConfig;
19
20// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21// Regex patterns
22// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23
24/// Matches inline markdown images with external http/https URLs:
25/// `![alt text](https://example.com/track.gif)`
26///
27/// Local paths (`./img.png`) and data URIs (`data:image/...`) are intentionally
28/// excluded — they cannot exfiltrate data to a remote server.
29static MARKDOWN_IMAGE_RE: LazyLock<Regex> = LazyLock::new(|| {
30    Regex::new(r"!\[([^\]]*)\]\((https?://[^)]+)\)").expect("valid MARKDOWN_IMAGE_RE")
31});
32
33/// Matches reference-style markdown image declarations: `[ref]: https://example.com/img`
34/// Used in conjunction with `REFERENCE_LABEL_RE` to detect two-part reference images.
35static REFERENCE_DEF_RE: LazyLock<Regex> = LazyLock::new(|| {
36    Regex::new(r"(?m)^\[([^\]]+)\]:\s*(https?://\S+)").expect("valid REFERENCE_DEF_RE")
37});
38
39/// Matches reference-style image usages: `![alt][ref]`
40static REFERENCE_USAGE_RE: LazyLock<Regex> =
41    LazyLock::new(|| Regex::new(r"!\[([^\]]*)\]\[([^\]]+)\]").expect("valid REFERENCE_USAGE_RE"));
42
43/// Extracts http/https URLs from arbitrary text (used for tool argument scanning).
44static URL_EXTRACT_RE: LazyLock<Regex> =
45    LazyLock::new(|| Regex::new(r#"https?://[^\s"'<>]+"#).expect("valid URL_EXTRACT_RE"));
46
47// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
48// Event types
49// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
50
51/// Describes an exfiltration event detected by the guard.
52#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
53pub enum ExfiltrationEvent {
54    /// A markdown image with an external URL was stripped from LLM output.
55    MarkdownImageBlocked { url: String },
56    /// A tool call argument contained a URL that appeared in untrusted flagged content.
57    SuspiciousToolUrl { url: String, tool_name: String },
58    /// A memory write was intercepted because the content had injection flags.
59    MemoryWriteGuarded { reason: String },
60}
61
62// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
63// Guard
64// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
65
66/// Stateless exfiltration guard. All three scanners are independently toggled via config.
67///
68/// Construct once from [`ExfiltrationGuardConfig`] and store on the agent. Cheap to clone.
69#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
70pub struct ExfiltrationGuard {
71    config: ExfiltrationGuardConfig,
72}
73
74impl ExfiltrationGuard {
75    /// Create a new guard from the given configuration.
76    #[must_use]
77    pub fn new(config: ExfiltrationGuardConfig) -> Self {
78        Self { config }
79    }
80
81    /// Scan LLM output text and strip external markdown images.
82    ///
83    /// Returns the cleaned text and a list of [`ExfiltrationEvent::MarkdownImageBlocked`]
84    /// for each image that was removed.
85    ///
86    /// When `block_markdown_images` is `false`, returns the input unchanged.
87    ///
88    /// # Scanning coverage
89    /// - Inline images: `![alt](https://evil.com/track.gif)`
90    /// - Reference-style images: `![alt][ref]` + `[ref]: https://evil.com/img`
91    /// - Percent-encoded URLs inside already-captured groups: decoded before `is_external_url()`
92    ///
93    /// # Not covered (Phase 5, tracked in #1195)
94    /// - Percent-encoded scheme bypass: `%68ttps://evil.com` — the regex requires literal
95    ///   `https?://`, so a percent-encoded scheme is never captured. Fix requires pre-decoding
96    ///   the full input text before regex matching.
97    /// - HTML `<img src="...">` tags
98    /// - Unicode zero-width joiner tricks (`!\u{200B}[alt](url)`)
99    /// - Reference definitions inside fenced code blocks (false positive risk)
100    ///
101    /// # Panics
102    ///
103    /// Panics if the compiled regex does not produce expected capture groups (compile-time
104    /// guarantee — the regex patterns are validated via `expect` in `LazyLock` initializers).
105    #[must_use]
106    pub fn scan_output(&self, text: &str) -> (String, Vec<ExfiltrationEvent>) {
107        if !self.config.block_markdown_images {
108            return (text.to_owned(), vec![]);
109        }
110
111        let mut events = Vec::new();
112        let mut result = text.to_owned();
113
114        // --- Pass 1: inline images ---
115        let mut replacement = String::new();
116        let mut last_end = 0usize;
117        for cap in MARKDOWN_IMAGE_RE.captures_iter(text) {
118            let m = cap.get(0).expect("full match");
119            let raw_url = cap.get(2).expect("url group").as_str();
120            let url = percent_decode_url(raw_url);
121
122            if is_external_url(&url) {
123                replacement.push_str(&text[last_end..m.start()]);
124                let _ = write!(replacement, "[image removed: {url}]");
125                last_end = m.end();
126                events.push(ExfiltrationEvent::MarkdownImageBlocked { url });
127            }
128        }
129        if !events.is_empty() || last_end > 0 {
130            replacement.push_str(&text[last_end..]);
131            result = replacement;
132        }
133
134        // --- Pass 2: reference-style images ---
135        // Collect reference definitions from the (already partially cleaned) result.
136        let mut ref_defs: std::collections::HashMap<String, String> =
137            std::collections::HashMap::new();
138        for cap in REFERENCE_DEF_RE.captures_iter(&result) {
139            let label = cap.get(1).expect("label").as_str().to_lowercase();
140            let raw_url = cap.get(2).expect("url").as_str();
141            let url = percent_decode_url(raw_url);
142            if is_external_url(&url) {
143                ref_defs.insert(label, url);
144            }
145        }
146
147        if !ref_defs.is_empty() {
148            // Remove reference usages that point to external defs.
149            let mut cleaned = String::with_capacity(result.len());
150            let mut last_end = 0usize;
151            for cap in REFERENCE_USAGE_RE.captures_iter(&result) {
152                let m = cap.get(0).expect("full match");
153                let label = cap.get(2).expect("label").as_str().to_lowercase();
154                if let Some(url) = ref_defs.get(&label) {
155                    cleaned.push_str(&result[last_end..m.start()]);
156                    let _ = write!(cleaned, "[image removed: {url}]");
157                    last_end = m.end();
158                    events.push(ExfiltrationEvent::MarkdownImageBlocked { url: url.clone() });
159                }
160            }
161            cleaned.push_str(&result[last_end..]);
162            result = cleaned;
163
164            // Remove the reference definition lines for blocked refs.
165            // Use split('\n') (not .lines()) to preserve \r in CRLF line endings —
166            // .lines() strips \r, and reconstruction with push('\n') would silently
167            // convert all CRLF to LF throughout the entire text.
168            let mut def_cleaned = String::with_capacity(result.len());
169            for line in result.split('\n') {
170                let mut keep = true;
171                for cap in REFERENCE_DEF_RE.captures_iter(line) {
172                    let label = cap.get(1).expect("label").as_str().to_lowercase();
173                    if ref_defs.contains_key(&label) {
174                        keep = false;
175                        break;
176                    }
177                }
178                if keep {
179                    def_cleaned.push_str(line);
180                    def_cleaned.push('\n');
181                }
182            }
183            // Preserve trailing newline behaviour of the original.
184            if !text.ends_with('\n') && def_cleaned.ends_with('\n') {
185                def_cleaned.pop();
186            }
187            result = def_cleaned;
188        }
189
190        (result, events)
191    }
192
193    /// Validate tool call arguments against a set of URLs flagged in untrusted content.
194    ///
195    /// Parses `args_json` as a JSON value and extracts all string leaves recursively to
196    /// avoid JSON-encoding bypasses (escaped slashes, unicode escapes, etc.).
197    ///
198    /// Returns one [`ExfiltrationEvent::SuspiciousToolUrl`] per matching URL.
199    /// When `validate_tool_urls` is `false`, always returns an empty vec.
200    ///
201    /// # Flag-only approach
202    /// Matching URLs are logged and counted but tool execution is NOT blocked. Blocking
203    /// would break legitimate workflows where the same URL appears in both a search result
204    /// and a subsequent fetch call. See design decision D1 in the architect handoff.
205    #[must_use]
206    pub fn validate_tool_call(
207        &self,
208        tool_name: &str,
209        args_json: &str,
210        flagged_urls: &HashSet<String>,
211    ) -> Vec<ExfiltrationEvent> {
212        if !self.config.validate_tool_urls || flagged_urls.is_empty() {
213            return vec![];
214        }
215
216        let parsed: serde_json::Value = match serde_json::from_str(args_json) {
217            Ok(v) => v,
218            Err(_) => {
219                // Fall back to raw regex scan if JSON is malformed.
220                return Self::scan_raw_args(tool_name, args_json, flagged_urls);
221            }
222        };
223
224        let mut events = Vec::new();
225        let mut strings = Vec::new();
226        collect_strings(&parsed, &mut strings);
227
228        for s in &strings {
229            for url_match in URL_EXTRACT_RE.find_iter(s) {
230                let url = url_match.as_str();
231                if flagged_urls.contains(url) {
232                    events.push(ExfiltrationEvent::SuspiciousToolUrl {
233                        url: url.to_owned(),
234                        tool_name: tool_name.to_owned(),
235                    });
236                }
237            }
238        }
239
240        events
241    }
242
243    /// Check whether a memory write should skip Qdrant embedding.
244    ///
245    /// Returns `Some(MemoryWriteGuarded)` when `has_injection_flags` is `true` and
246    /// `guard_memory_writes` is enabled. The caller should still save to `SQLite` for
247    /// conversation continuity but omit the Qdrant embedding to prevent poisoned content
248    /// from polluting semantic search results.
249    ///
250    /// See design decision D2 in the architect handoff.
251    #[must_use]
252    pub fn should_guard_memory_write(
253        &self,
254        has_injection_flags: bool,
255    ) -> Option<ExfiltrationEvent> {
256        if !self.config.guard_memory_writes || !has_injection_flags {
257            return None;
258        }
259        Some(ExfiltrationEvent::MemoryWriteGuarded {
260            reason: "content contained injection patterns flagged by ContentSanitizer".to_owned(),
261        })
262    }
263
264    /// Extract URLs from untrusted tool output for use in subsequent `validate_tool_call` checks.
265    ///
266    fn scan_raw_args(
267        tool_name: &str,
268        args: &str,
269        flagged_urls: &HashSet<String>,
270    ) -> Vec<ExfiltrationEvent> {
271        URL_EXTRACT_RE
272            .find_iter(args)
273            .filter(|m| flagged_urls.contains(m.as_str()))
274            .map(|m| ExfiltrationEvent::SuspiciousToolUrl {
275                url: m.as_str().to_owned(),
276                tool_name: tool_name.to_owned(),
277            })
278            .collect()
279    }
280}
281
282/// Extract http/https URLs from content for use in subsequent `validate_tool_call` checks.
283///
284/// Call this after sanitizing tool output with `ContentSanitizer` when injection flags are
285/// detected. Pass the returned set into `flagged_urls` on the agent. Clear `flagged_urls`
286/// at the start of each `process_response` call (per-turn clearing strategy, see S3).
287#[must_use]
288pub fn extract_flagged_urls(content: &str) -> HashSet<String> {
289    URL_EXTRACT_RE
290        .find_iter(content)
291        .map(|m| m.as_str().to_owned())
292        .collect()
293}
294
295// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
296// Helpers
297// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
298
299/// Decode percent-encoded URL characters before exfiltration matching.
300///
301/// Converts `%68ttps://` → `https://` so simple percent-encoding bypasses are caught.
302/// Non-UTF-8 sequences are left as-is (they won't match `is_external_url`).
303fn percent_decode_url(raw: &str) -> String {
304    let mut out = String::with_capacity(raw.len());
305    let bytes = raw.as_bytes();
306    let mut i = 0;
307    while i < bytes.len() {
308        if bytes[i] == b'%'
309            && i + 2 < bytes.len()
310            && let (Some(hi), Some(lo)) = (
311                (bytes[i + 1] as char).to_digit(16),
312                (bytes[i + 2] as char).to_digit(16),
313            )
314        {
315            // hi and lo are 0-15; combined value is at most 0xFF, fits in u8.
316            #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)]
317            let byte = ((hi << 4) | lo) as u8;
318            out.push(byte as char);
319            i += 3;
320            continue;
321        }
322        out.push(bytes[i] as char);
323        i += 1;
324    }
325    out
326}
327
328fn is_external_url(url: &str) -> bool {
329    url.starts_with("http://") || url.starts_with("https://")
330}
331
332/// Recursively collect all string leaves from a JSON value.
333fn collect_strings<'a>(value: &'a serde_json::Value, out: &mut Vec<&'a str>) {
334    match value {
335        serde_json::Value::String(s) => out.push(s.as_str()),
336        serde_json::Value::Array(arr) => {
337            for v in arr {
338                collect_strings(v, out);
339            }
340        }
341        serde_json::Value::Object(map) => {
342            for v in map.values() {
343                collect_strings(v, out);
344            }
345        }
346        _ => {}
347    }
348}
349
350// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
351// Tests
352// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
353
354#[cfg(test)]
355mod tests {
356    use super::*;
357
358    fn guard() -> ExfiltrationGuard {
359        ExfiltrationGuard::new(ExfiltrationGuardConfig::default())
360    }
361
362    fn guard_disabled() -> ExfiltrationGuard {
363        ExfiltrationGuard::new(ExfiltrationGuardConfig {
364            block_markdown_images: false,
365            validate_tool_urls: false,
366            guard_memory_writes: false,
367        })
368    }
369
370    // --- scan_output ---
371
372    #[test]
373    fn strips_external_inline_image() {
374        let (cleaned, events) =
375            guard().scan_output("Before ![track](https://evil.com/p.gif) after");
376        assert_eq!(
377            cleaned,
378            "Before [image removed: https://evil.com/p.gif] after"
379        );
380        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
381        assert!(
382            matches!(&events[0], ExfiltrationEvent::MarkdownImageBlocked { url } if url == "https://evil.com/p.gif")
383        );
384    }
385
386    #[test]
387    fn preserves_local_image() {
388        let text = "Look: ![diagram](./diagram.png) — local";
389        let (cleaned, events) = guard().scan_output(text);
390        assert_eq!(cleaned, text);
391        assert!(events.is_empty());
392    }
393
394    #[test]
395    fn preserves_data_uri() {
396        let text = "Inline: ![icon]()";
397        let (cleaned, events) = guard().scan_output(text);
398        assert_eq!(cleaned, text);
399        assert!(events.is_empty());
400    }
401
402    #[test]
403    fn strips_multiple_external_images() {
404        let text = "![a](https://a.com/1.gif) text ![b](https://b.com/2.gif)";
405        let (cleaned, events) = guard().scan_output(text);
406        // Markdown image syntax must be removed; replacement label may contain URLs.
407        assert!(
408            !cleaned.contains("![a]("),
409            "first image syntax must be removed: {cleaned}"
410        );
411        assert!(
412            !cleaned.contains("![b]("),
413            "second image syntax must be removed: {cleaned}"
414        );
415        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
416    }
417
418    #[test]
419    fn scan_output_noop_when_disabled() {
420        let text = "![track](https://evil.com/p.gif)";
421        let (cleaned, events) = guard_disabled().scan_output(text);
422        assert_eq!(cleaned, text);
423        assert!(events.is_empty());
424    }
425
426    #[test]
427    fn strips_reference_style_image() {
428        let text = "Here is the image: ![alt][ref]\n[ref]: https://evil.com/track.gif\nend";
429        let (cleaned, events) = guard().scan_output(text);
430        // The markdown image syntax and definition line must be removed.
431        assert!(
432            !cleaned.contains("![alt][ref]"),
433            "image usage syntax must be removed: {cleaned}"
434        );
435        assert!(
436            !cleaned.contains("[ref]:"),
437            "reference definition must be removed: {cleaned}"
438        );
439        assert!(
440            cleaned.contains("[image removed:"),
441            "replacement label must be present: {cleaned}"
442        );
443        assert!(!events.is_empty(), "must generate event");
444    }
445
446    #[test]
447    fn preserves_local_reference_image() {
448        // Reference pointing to a local path — must not be stripped.
449        let text = "![alt][ref]\n[ref]: ./local.png\n";
450        let (cleaned, events) = guard().scan_output(text);
451        assert_eq!(cleaned, text);
452        assert!(events.is_empty());
453    }
454
455    #[test]
456    fn decodes_percent_encoded_url_in_inline_image() {
457        // %68 = 'h', so %68ttps:// decodes to https://.
458        // The MARKDOWN_IMAGE_RE pattern requires a literal `https?://` prefix, so
459        // `%68ttps://` is NOT matched by the regex and passes through unchanged.
460        // percent_decode_url() is called on the URL *after* the regex captures it —
461        // so percent-encoded schemes bypass inline detection.
462        //
463        // Known bypass — tracked for Phase 5 (#1195): the fix requires pre-decoding the
464        // full text before regex matching (or a multi-pass decode+scan approach). The LLM
465        // context wrapper already limits what arrives here, reducing practical risk.
466        let text = "![t](%68ttps://evil.com/track.gif)";
467        let (cleaned, _events) = guard().scan_output(text);
468        // The text passes through unchanged because the regex didn't match.
469        assert_eq!(
470            cleaned, text,
471            "percent-encoded scheme not detected by inline regex"
472        );
473
474        // A normal https:// URL IS detected.
475        let normal = "![t](https://evil.com/track.gif)";
476        let (normal_cleaned, normal_events) = guard().scan_output(normal);
477        assert!(
478            !normal_cleaned.contains("![t](https://"),
479            "normal URL must be removed"
480        );
481        assert_eq!(normal_events.len(), 1);
482    }
483
484    #[test]
485    fn empty_alt_text_still_blocked() {
486        let text = "![](https://evil.com/p.gif)";
487        let (cleaned, events) = guard().scan_output(text);
488        // The original markdown image syntax must be removed; the replacement label may contain the URL.
489        assert!(
490            !cleaned.contains("![]("),
491            "markdown image syntax must be removed: {cleaned}"
492        );
493        assert!(
494            cleaned.contains("[image removed:"),
495            "replacement label must be present: {cleaned}"
496        );
497        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
498    }
499
500    // --- validate_tool_call ---
501
502    #[test]
503    fn detects_flagged_url_in_json_string() {
504        let mut flagged = HashSet::new();
505        flagged.insert("https://evil.com/payload".to_owned());
506        let args = r#"{"url": "https://evil.com/payload"}"#;
507        let events = guard().validate_tool_call("fetch", args, &flagged);
508        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
509        assert!(
510            matches!(&events[0], ExfiltrationEvent::SuspiciousToolUrl { url, tool_name }
511            if url == "https://evil.com/payload" && tool_name == "fetch")
512        );
513    }
514
515    #[test]
516    fn no_event_when_url_not_flagged() {
517        let mut flagged = HashSet::new();
518        flagged.insert("https://other.com/benign".to_owned());
519        let args = r#"{"url": "https://legitimate.com/page"}"#;
520        let events = guard().validate_tool_call("fetch", args, &flagged);
521        assert!(events.is_empty());
522    }
523
524    #[test]
525    fn validate_tool_call_noop_when_disabled() {
526        let mut flagged = HashSet::new();
527        flagged.insert("https://evil.com/x".to_owned());
528        let args = r#"{"url": "https://evil.com/x"}"#;
529        let events = guard_disabled().validate_tool_call("fetch", args, &flagged);
530        assert!(events.is_empty());
531    }
532
533    #[test]
534    fn validate_tool_call_noop_with_empty_flagged() {
535        let args = r#"{"url": "https://evil.com/x"}"#;
536        let events = guard().validate_tool_call("fetch", args, &HashSet::new());
537        assert!(events.is_empty());
538    }
539
540    #[test]
541    fn extracts_urls_from_nested_json() {
542        let mut flagged = HashSet::new();
543        flagged.insert("https://evil.com/deep".to_owned());
544        let args = r#"{"nested": {"inner": ["https://evil.com/deep"]}}"#;
545        let events = guard().validate_tool_call("tool", args, &flagged);
546        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
547    }
548
549    #[test]
550    fn handles_escaped_slashes_in_json() {
551        // JSON-encoded URL with escaped forward slashes should still be detected
552        // after serde_json parsing (which unescapes the string value).
553        let mut flagged = HashSet::new();
554        flagged.insert("https://evil.com/path".to_owned());
555        // serde_json will unescape \/ → /
556        let args = r#"{"url": "https:\/\/evil.com\/path"}"#;
557        let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(args).unwrap();
558        // Confirm serde_json unescapes it.
559        assert_eq!(parsed["url"], "https://evil.com/path");
560        let events = guard().validate_tool_call("fetch", args, &flagged);
561        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1, "JSON-escaped URL must be caught");
562    }
563
564    // --- should_guard_memory_write ---
565
566    #[test]
567    fn guards_when_injection_flags_set() {
568        let event = guard().should_guard_memory_write(true);
569        assert!(event.is_some());
570        assert!(matches!(
571            event.unwrap(),
572            ExfiltrationEvent::MemoryWriteGuarded { .. }
573        ));
574    }
575
576    #[test]
577    fn passes_when_no_injection_flags() {
578        let event = guard().should_guard_memory_write(false);
579        assert!(event.is_none());
580    }
581
582    #[test]
583    fn guard_memory_write_noop_when_disabled() {
584        let event = guard_disabled().should_guard_memory_write(true);
585        assert!(event.is_none());
586    }
587
588    // --- percent_decode_url ---
589
590    #[test]
591    fn percent_decode_roundtrip() {
592        assert_eq!(
593            percent_decode_url("https://example.com"),
594            "https://example.com"
595        );
596        assert_eq!(
597            percent_decode_url("%68ttps://example.com"),
598            "https://example.com"
599        );
600        assert_eq!(percent_decode_url("hello%20world"), "hello world");
601    }
602
603    // --- extract_flagged_urls ---
604
605    #[test]
606    fn extracts_urls_from_plain_text() {
607        let content = "check https://evil.com/x and https://other.com/y for details";
608        let urls = extract_flagged_urls(content);
609        assert!(urls.contains("https://evil.com/x"));
610        assert!(urls.contains("https://other.com/y"));
611    }
612}
zeph_sanitizer/exfiltration.rs

zeph_sanitizer/
exfiltration.rs
