Expand description
§X509Validator
X.509 certificate chain validator.
§Overview
This library validates an X.509 certificate chain against a set of root certificates and a policy. This is an essential building block for a wide range of PKI applications. It ships with a default verifier and a number of built-in verifier policies.
This library is heavily inspired by, and follows the design of, the verifier from the swift-certificates library. Some pragmatic ideas and project structure have been taken from rustls.
§Requirements
- Rust 1.88 or newer, edition 2024.
§Installation
Add the dependency and pick a crypto backend:
x509-validator = { version = "0.3.0", features = ["aws_lc"] }| Feature | Backend | Notes |
|---|---|---|
aws_lc | aws-lc-rs | Fastest. |
ring | ring | Close to aws_lc. |
rust_crypto | RustCrypto | Pure Rust. Slowest. |
There is no default backend: without one of these features enabled, the crate compiles
but verifies nothing. You can also provide your own by implementing
SignatureVerifier — see the custom_crypto_backend example.
§Example code
use x509_validator::rfc5280::RFC5280Policy;
use x509_validator::store::CertificateStore;
use x509_validator::Validator;
use x509_validator::rfc5280::Timestamp;
use x509_validator::{Certificate, FromDer};
fn example(root_der: &[u8], intermediate_der: &[u8], leaf_der: &[u8], now: Timestamp) {
let parse = |der| Certificate::from_der(der).expect("parse").1;
let (root, intermediate, leaf) = (parse(root_der), parse(intermediate_der), parse(leaf_der));
// Roots are trusted a priori. Intermediates are only available to build
// through — each still has to be signed by something leading back to a root.
let roots = CertificateStore::from_iter([root]);
let intermediates = CertificateStore::from_iter([intermediate]);
let policy = RFC5280Policy::new(now);
let validator = Validator::with_policy(roots, policy);
match validator.validate_with_diagnostics(&leaf, &intermediates, &mut |_| {}) {
Ok(chain) => {
// Leaf first, root last.
for cert in chain.iter() {
println!("{}", cert.tbs_certificate.subject);
}
}
Err(reasons) => {
// Empty means no candidate chain reached a root, so the policy was
// never asked.
for reason in reasons {
println!("rejected: {reason}");
}
}
}
}The closure is the diagnostic channel: chain building reports every issuer it considers and every candidate it discards through it. If you don’t need any of that, call
validate(&leaf, &intermediates)instead.
More are in examples:
| Example | Shows |
|---|---|
webpki | What a TLS client checks: platform trust store, serverAuth, hostname |
apple_x5c | Validating the x5c chain from an App Store JWS |
client_certificate | The mutual-TLS server side |
pinned_root | Trusting one private CA instead of the public web PKI |
diagnostics | Reading the diagnostic callback to find out why a chain failed |
custom_crypto_backend | Implementing SignatureVerifier over OpenSSL |
cargo run -p x509-validator-examples --example webpki§Approach
Parsing is done by x509-parser.
Crypto is swappable via the feature flags above, or you can supply your own
SignatureVerifier.
Policy is where the actual rules live. A ValidationPolicy receives each candidate chain and
accepts or rejects it. The built-in ones:
| Policy | Checks |
|---|---|
RFC5280Policy | Validity period, version, basic constraints, name constraints |
EkuPolicy | Extended key usage: serverAuth, clientAuth, or any purpose OID you name |
ServerIdentityPolicy | Hostname or IP against the subject alternative names, RFC 6125 style |
Policies compose with the policy! macro, so a TLS client’s checks read as
one list:
use x509_validator::rfc5280::{EkuPolicy, RFC5280Policy, Timestamp};
use x509_validator::{ServerIdentityPolicy, policy};
fn tls_client_policy(now: Timestamp, hostname: &str) -> impl x509_validator::ValidationPolicy {
policy! {
RFC5280Policy::new(now);
EkuPolicy::server_auth();
ServerIdentityPolicy::new(Some(hostname), None)
}
}§Benchmarks
Two crates, in x509-validator-bench:
measure— Regression benchmarks.compare— Compare backends, parsers, other verifiers, and the Swift original across four groups (index).
§Fuzzing
Four cargo-fuzz targets live in fuzz, covering parsing, chain validation, server identity matching and name constraints. They run on every pull request and nightly; see the fuzzing README to run them locally.
§Contributing
Thanks for your help improving the project! We are so happy to have you! We have a contributing guide to help you get involved in the X509Validator project, and everyone taking part is expected to follow our Code of Conduct.
§License
X509Validator is distributed under the following two licenses:
- Apache License version 2.0.
- MIT license.
These are included as LICENSE-APACHE and LICENSE-MIT respectively.
You may use this software under the terms of any of these licenses, at your option.
Re-exports§
pub use validator::Validator;pub use certificate::Certificate;pub use certificate::CertificateExt;pub use all_of_policies::AllOfPolicies;pub use any_policy::AnyPolicy;pub use one_of_policies::OneOfPolicies;pub use policy_builder::Either;pub use policy_builder::OneOfTuple2;pub use policy_builder::OneOfWrappedOptional;pub use policy_builder::Tuple2;pub use policy_builder::WrappedOptional;pub use server_identity_policy::ServerIdentityPolicy;pub use crypto::*;pub use diagnostic::*;pub use policy::*;pub use rfc5280::*;
Modules§
- all_
of_ policies - any_
policy - asn1_rs
- certificate
- crypto
- der_
parser - diagnostic
- extensions
- objects
- oid_
registry - one_
of_ policies - policy
- policy_
builder - prelude
- rfc5280
- server_
identity_ policy - signature_
algorithm - store
- unverified_
chain - validated_
chain - validator
- x509
Macros§
- one_of
- A DSL for constructing a
ValidationPolicyout of alternatives, without type erasure. - policy
- A DSL for constructing a
ValidationPolicyout of otherValidationPolicyvalues, without type erasure.
Structs§
- X509
Version - The version of the encoded certificate.
Traits§
- FromDer
- Base trait for DER object parsers