Crate wpa_next 

wpa-next

A hybrid post-quantum resistant Wi-Fi security protocol prototype.

wpa-next implements a two-stage handshake that combines X25519 ECDH (classical) with ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203, post-quantum) and merges both shared secrets through HKDF-SHA-384. It also solves the practical problem of transmitting large post-quantum keys over 802.11 management frames via a custom Layer 2 fragmentation protocol with a HMAC-based DoS-mitigation cookie.

Security model

The hybrid design means an adversary must break both primitives to recover the session key:

• X25519 provides ~128-bit classical security (hard today)
• ML-KEM-768 provides ~180-bit post-quantum security (hard for quantum computers)

Quick start

use wpa_next::network::{AccessPoint, Station};

// Create AP and Station with their MAC addresses
let mut ap  = AccessPoint::new([0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF]).unwrap();
let station = Station::new([0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66]).unwrap();

// Stage 1 — Station sends its X25519 public key
let fast_link = station.build_fast_link_frame().unwrap();
let cookie    = ap.process_fast_link_frame(&fast_link, 0xDEADBEEF).unwrap();

// Stage 2 — Station encapsulates against AP's ML-KEM key and fragments
let ap_mlkem_pk       = ap.mlkem_public_key_bytes();
let ap_x25519_pk      = ap.x25519_public_key_bytes().unwrap();
let station_x25519_pk = station.x25519_public_key_bytes().unwrap();

let (pq_frames, station_pq_ss) = station
    .build_pq_fragments(&ap_mlkem_pk, 0xDEADBEEF, &cookie)
    .unwrap();

// AP processes fragments one at a time
let mut ap_session_key = None;
for frame in &pq_frames {
    ap_session_key = ap
        .process_fragment(frame, &[0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66], &station_x25519_pk)
        .unwrap();
}

// Station completes with X25519 ECDH
let station_key = station.complete_handshake(&ap_x25519_pk, station_pq_ss).unwrap();
let ap_key      = ap_session_key.unwrap();

// Both sides now hold the same 256-bit session key
assert!(ap_key.ct_eq(&station_key));

Modules

• crypto — cryptographic primitives: X25519, ML-KEM-768, HKDF combiner, cookie
• network — frame structures, Layer 2 fragmentation, AP and Station state machines

Feature flags

This crate has no optional features. All functionality is always available.

⚠ Research prototype

This crate is a research prototype — it has not been independently audited for production use in actual wireless deployments.

Re-exports

pub use crypto::CryptoError;

pub use crypto::MlKemKeyPair;

pub use crypto::SecretBytes;

pub use crypto::SessionKey;

pub use crypto::X25519KeyPair;

pub use crypto::HMAC_LEN;

pub use crypto::MLKEM_CT_LEN;

pub use crypto::MLKEM_PK_LEN;

pub use crypto::SESSION_KEY_LEN;

pub use crypto::X25519_PK_LEN;

pub use network::AccessPoint;

pub use network::FastLinkFrame;

pub use network::FragmentHeader;

pub use network::FragmentedPQFrame;

pub use network::NetworkError;

pub use network::Station;

pub use network::FRAG_PAYLOAD_MAX;

pub use network::MLKEM_PK_FRAG_COUNT;

Modules

crypto

Cryptographic primitives: X25519 ECDH, ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203), HKDF-SHA384 hybrid combiner, and HMAC cookie.

network

Frame structures, Layer 2 fragmentation, and the AP / Station protocol state machines.