Struct webpki::EndEntityCert
source · pub struct EndEntityCert<'a> { /* private fields */ }Expand description
An end-entity certificate.
Server certificate processing in a TLS connection consists of several steps. All of these steps are necessary:
EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert: Verify that the server’s certificate is currently valid for use by a TLS server.EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_for_dns_name: Verify that the server’s certificate is valid for the host that is being connected to.EndEntityCert.verify_signature: Verify that the signature of server’sServerKeyExchangemessage is valid for the server’s certificate.
Client certificate processing in a TLS connection consists of analogous steps. All of these steps are necessary:
EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert: Verify that the client’s certificate is currently valid for use by a TLS client.EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_for_dns_nameorEndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_for_at_least_one_dns_name: Verify that the client’s certificate is valid for the identity or identities used to identify the client. (Currently client authentication only works when the client is identified by one or more DNS hostnames.)EndEntityCert.verify_signature: Verify that the client’s signature in itsCertificateVerifymessage is valid using the public key from the client’s certificate.
Although it would be less error-prone to combine all these steps into a
single function call, some significant optimizations are possible if the
three steps are processed separately (in parallel). It does not matter much
which order the steps are done in, but all of these steps must completed
before application data is sent and before received application data is
processed. EndEntityCert::from is an inexpensive operation and is
deterministic, so if these tasks are done in multiple threads, it is
probably best to just call EndEntityCert::from multiple times (before each
operation) for the same DER-encoded ASN.1 certificate bytes.
Implementations§
source§impl<'a> EndEntityCert<'a>
impl<'a> EndEntityCert<'a>
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert(
&self,
supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm],
trust_anchors: &TlsServerTrustAnchors<'_>,
intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]],
time: Time
) -> Result<(), Error>
pub fn verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert( &self, supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm], trust_anchors: &TlsServerTrustAnchors<'_>, intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]], time: Time ) -> Result<(), Error>
Backward-SemVer-compatible wrapper around verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert_ext.
Errors that aren’t representable as an Error are mapped to Error::UnknownIssuer.
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert_ext(
&self,
supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm],
TlsServerTrustAnchors: &TlsServerTrustAnchors<'_>,
intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]],
time: Time
) -> Result<(), ErrorExt>
pub fn verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert_ext( &self, supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm], TlsServerTrustAnchors: &TlsServerTrustAnchors<'_>, intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]], time: Time ) -> Result<(), ErrorExt>
Verifies that the end-entity certificate is valid for use by a TLS server.
supported_sig_algs is the list of signature algorithms that are
trusted for use in certificate signatures; the end-entity certificate’s
public key is not validated against this list. trust_anchors is the
list of root CAs to trust. intermediate_certs is the sequence of
intermediate certificates that the server sent in the TLS handshake.
time is the time for which the validation is effective (usually the
current time).
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert(
&self,
supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm],
trust_anchors: &TlsClientTrustAnchors<'_>,
intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]],
time: Time
) -> Result<(), Error>
pub fn verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert( &self, supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm], trust_anchors: &TlsClientTrustAnchors<'_>, intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]], time: Time ) -> Result<(), Error>
Backward-SemVer-compatible wrapper around verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert_ext.
Errors that aren’t representable as an Error are mapped to Error::UnknownIssuer.
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert_ext(
&self,
supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm],
TlsClientTrustAnchors: &TlsClientTrustAnchors<'_>,
intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]],
time: Time
) -> Result<(), ErrorExt>
pub fn verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert_ext( &self, supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm], TlsClientTrustAnchors: &TlsClientTrustAnchors<'_>, intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]], time: Time ) -> Result<(), ErrorExt>
Verifies that the end-entity certificate is valid for use by a TLS client.
If the certificate is not valid for any of the given names then this
fails with Error::CertNotValidForName.
supported_sig_algs is the list of signature algorithms that are
trusted for use in certificate signatures; the end-entity certificate’s
public key is not validated against this list. trust_anchors is the
list of root CAs to trust. intermediate_certs is the sequence of
intermediate certificates that the client sent in the TLS handshake.
cert is the purported end-entity certificate of the client. time is
the time for which the validation is effective (usually the current
time).
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_for_dns_name(
&self,
dns_name: DnsNameRef<'_>
) -> Result<(), Error>
pub fn verify_is_valid_for_dns_name( &self, dns_name: DnsNameRef<'_> ) -> Result<(), Error>
Verifies that the certificate is valid for the given DNS host name.
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_for_at_least_one_dns_name<'names, Names>(
&self,
dns_names: Names
) -> Result<Vec<DnsNameRef<'names>>, Error>where
Names: Iterator<Item = DnsNameRef<'names>>,
pub fn verify_is_valid_for_at_least_one_dns_name<'names, Names>( &self, dns_names: Names ) -> Result<Vec<DnsNameRef<'names>>, Error>where Names: Iterator<Item = DnsNameRef<'names>>,
Verifies that the certificate is valid for at least one of the given DNS host names.
If the certificate is not valid for any of the given names then this
fails with Error::CertNotValidForName. Otherwise the DNS names for
which the certificate is valid are returned.
Requires the alloc default feature; i.e. this isn’t available in
#![no_std] configurations.
sourcepub fn verify_signature(
&self,
signature_alg: &SignatureAlgorithm,
msg: &[u8],
signature: &[u8]
) -> Result<(), Error>
pub fn verify_signature( &self, signature_alg: &SignatureAlgorithm, msg: &[u8], signature: &[u8] ) -> Result<(), Error>
Verifies the signature signature of message msg using the
certificate’s public key.
signature_alg is the algorithm to use to
verify the signature; the certificate’s public key is verified to be
compatible with this algorithm.
For TLS 1.2, signature corresponds to TLS’s
DigitallySigned.signature and signature_alg corresponds to TLS’s
DigitallySigned.algorithm of TLS type SignatureAndHashAlgorithm. In
TLS 1.2 a single SignatureAndHashAlgorithm may map to multiple
SignatureAlgorithms. For example, a TLS 1.2
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm of (ECDSA, SHA-256) may map to any or all
of {ECDSA_P256_SHA256, ECDSA_P384_SHA256}, depending on how the TLS
implementation is configured.
For current TLS 1.3 drafts, signature_alg corresponds to TLS’s
algorithm fields of type SignatureScheme. There is (currently) a
one-to-one correspondence between TLS 1.3’s SignatureScheme and
SignatureAlgorithm.