vtcode_safety/sandboxing/

policy.rs

//! Sandbox policy definitions
//!
//! Defines the isolation levels for command execution, following the Codex model.
//! Implements the "three-question model" from the AI sandbox field guide:
//! - **Boundary**: What is shared between code and host (kernel-enforced via Seatbelt/Landlock)
//! - **Policy**: What can code touch (files, network, devices, syscalls)
//! - **Lifecycle**: What survives between runs (session-scoped approvals)

use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use vtcode_commons::VtCodePaths;

/// A root directory that may be written to under the sandbox policy.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct WritableRoot {
    /// Absolute path to the writable directory.
    pub root: PathBuf,
}

impl WritableRoot {
    /// Create a new writable root from a path.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
        Self { root: path.into() }
    }
}

/// Network allowlist entry for domain-based egress control.
///
/// Following the field guide's recommendation: "Default-deny outbound network, then allowlist."
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NetworkAllowlistEntry {
    /// Domain pattern (e.g., "api.github.com", "*.npmjs.org")
    pub(crate) domain: String,
    /// Optional port (defaults to 443 for HTTPS)
    #[serde(default = "default_https_port")]
    pub(crate) port: u16,
    /// Protocol (tcp or udp, defaults to tcp)
    #[serde(default = "default_protocol")]
    pub(crate) protocol: String,
}

fn default_https_port() -> u16 {
    443
}

fn default_protocol() -> String {
    "tcp".to_string()
}

impl NetworkAllowlistEntry {
    /// Create a new allowlist entry for HTTPS access to a domain.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn https(domain: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            domain: domain.into(),
            port: 443,
            protocol: "tcp".to_string(),
        }
    }

    /// Create a new allowlist entry with custom port.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_port(domain: impl Into<String>, port: u16) -> Self {
        Self {
            domain: domain.into(),
            port,
            protocol: "tcp".to_string(),
        }
    }

    /// Check if a domain matches this entry (supports wildcard prefix).
    #[inline]
    fn matches(&self, domain: &str, port: u16) -> bool {
        if self.port != port {
            return false;
        }
        if self.domain.starts_with("*.") {
            let suffix = self.domain.get(1..).unwrap_or_default();
            let exact = self.domain.get(2..).unwrap_or_default();
            domain.ends_with(suffix) || domain == exact
        } else {
            domain == self.domain
        }
    }
}

/// Default sensitive paths that should be blocked from sandboxed processes.
///
/// Following the field guide's warning about "policy leakage":
/// "If your sandbox can read ~/.ssh or mount host volumes, it can leak credentials."
pub const DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_PATHS: &[&str] = &[
    // SSH keys and configuration
    "~/.ssh",
    // AWS credentials
    "~/.aws",
    // Google Cloud credentials
    "~/.config/gcloud",
    // Azure credentials
    "~/.azure",
    // Kubernetes config (contains cluster credentials)
    "~/.kube",
    // Docker config (may contain registry auth)
    "~/.docker",
    // NPM tokens
    "~/.npmrc",
    // PyPI tokens
    "~/.pypirc",
    // GitHub CLI tokens
    "~/.config/gh",
    // Generic secrets directory
    "~/.secrets",
    // Gnupg keys
    "~/.gnupg",
    // 1Password CLI
    "~/.config/op",
    // Vault tokens
    "~/.vault-token",
    // Terraform credentials
    "~/.terraform.d/credentials.tfrc.json",
    // Cargo registry tokens
    "~/.cargo/credentials.toml",
    // Git credentials
    "~/.git-credentials",
    // Netrc (may contain passwords)
    "~/.netrc",
];

#[cfg(windows)]
const USERPROFILE_READ_ROOT_EXCLUSIONS: &[&str] = &[
    ".ssh",
    ".gnupg",
    ".aws",
    ".azure",
    ".kube",
    ".docker",
    ".config",
    ".npm",
    ".pki",
    ".terraform.d",
];

/// Sensitive path entry for blocking access to credential locations.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SensitivePath {
    /// Path pattern (supports ~ for home directory)
    path: String,
    /// Whether to block read access (true by default)
    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
    pub(crate) block_read: bool,
    /// Whether to block write access (true by default)
    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
    pub(crate) block_write: bool,
}

fn default_true() -> bool {
    true
}

impl SensitivePath {
    /// Create a new sensitive path entry that blocks both read and write.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new(path: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            path: path.into(),
            block_read: true,
            block_write: true,
        }
    }

    /// Create a sensitive path entry that only blocks write access.
    #[must_use]
    fn write_only(path: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            path: path.into(),
            block_read: false,
            block_write: true,
        }
    }

    /// Expand ~ to the user's home directory.
    pub fn expand_path(&self) -> PathBuf {
        if self.path.starts_with("~/")
            && let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir()
        {
            return home.join(self.path.get(2..).unwrap_or_default());
        } else if self.path == "~"
            && let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir()
        {
            return home;
        }
        PathBuf::from(&self.path)
    }

    /// Check if a given path matches this sensitive path pattern.
    pub(crate) fn matches(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
        let expanded = self.expand_path();
        #[cfg(windows)]
        {
            let path_norm = normalize_windows_path(path);
            let expanded_norm = normalize_windows_path(&expanded);
            let mut expanded_prefix = expanded_norm.clone();
            if !expanded_prefix.ends_with('/') {
                expanded_prefix.push('/');
            }
            path_norm == expanded_norm || path_norm.starts_with(&expanded_prefix)
        }
        #[cfg(not(windows))]
        path_starts_with_case_insensitive(path, &expanded)
    }
}

#[cfg(not(windows))]
pub(crate) fn path_starts_with_case_insensitive(path: &Path, prefix: &Path) -> bool {
    let mut path_components = path.components();
    prefix.components().all(|prefix_component| {
        path_components.next().is_some_and(|path_component| {
            path_component
                .as_os_str()
                .to_string_lossy()
                .eq_ignore_ascii_case(prefix_component.as_os_str().to_string_lossy().as_ref())
        })
    })
}

#[cfg(windows)]
fn normalize_windows_path(path: &Path) -> String {
    path.to_string_lossy().replace('\\', "/").to_ascii_lowercase()
}

/// Get the default sensitive paths as SensitivePath entries.
pub fn default_sensitive_paths() -> Vec<SensitivePath> {
    match vtcode_sensitive_paths(&[]) {
        Ok(paths) => paths,
        Err(error) => {
            tracing::warn!(%error, "VT Code path resolution failed; blocking absolute paths fail-closed");
            let mut paths: Vec<SensitivePath> =
                DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_PATHS.iter().map(|p| SensitivePath::new(*p)).collect();
            paths.push(SensitivePath::new("/"));
            paths
        }
    }
}

fn vtcode_sensitive_paths(environment: &[(&str, &str)]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<SensitivePath>> {
    let resolved = if environment.is_empty() {
        VtCodePaths::resolve()?
    } else {
        VtCodePaths::from_environment(environment)?
    };
    let mut paths: Vec<SensitivePath> = DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_PATHS.iter().map(|p| SensitivePath::new(*p)).collect();
    let resolved_roots = [
        resolved.config_dir().to_path_buf(),
        resolved.auth_dir(),
        resolved.data_dir().to_path_buf(),
        resolved.state_dir().to_path_buf(),
        resolved.cache_dir().to_path_buf(),
        resolved.runtime_dir().to_path_buf(),
        resolved.executable_dir().to_path_buf(),
        resolved.legacy_dir().to_path_buf(),
    ];
    for root in resolved_roots {
        let path = root.display().to_string();
        if !paths.iter().any(|existing| existing.path == path) {
            paths.push(SensitivePath::new(path));
        }
    }

    #[cfg(windows)]
    {
        for entry in USERPROFILE_READ_ROOT_EXCLUSIONS {
            let path = format!("~/{}", entry);
            if !paths.iter().any(|existing| existing.path == path) {
                paths.push(SensitivePath::new(path));
            }
        }
        Ok(paths)
    }

    #[cfg(not(windows))]
    Ok(paths)
}

const PROTECTED_WRITABLE_ROOT_DIR_NAMES: &[&str] = &[".git", ".vtcode", ".codex", ".agents"];

fn protected_writable_root_sensitive_paths(writable_roots: &[WritableRoot]) -> Vec<SensitivePath> {
    let mut paths = Vec::new();

    for root in writable_roots {
        for dir_name in PROTECTED_WRITABLE_ROOT_DIR_NAMES {
            let protected_path = root.root.join(dir_name).display().to_string();
            if !paths.iter().any(|existing: &SensitivePath| {
                existing.path == protected_path && !existing.block_read && existing.block_write
            }) {
                paths.push(SensitivePath::write_only(protected_path));
            }
        }
    }

    paths
}

/// Resource limits for sandboxed execution.
///
/// Following the field guide's recommendation for resource accounting:
/// "CPU, memory, disk, timeouts, and PIDs."
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ResourceLimits {
    /// Maximum memory usage in megabytes (0 = unlimited).
    #[serde(default)]
    pub max_memory_mb: u64,

    /// Maximum number of processes/threads (0 = unlimited).
    /// Prevents fork bombs.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub max_pids: u32,

    /// Maximum disk write in megabytes (0 = unlimited).
    #[serde(default)]
    pub max_disk_mb: u64,

    /// CPU time limit in seconds (0 = unlimited).
    #[serde(default)]
    pub cpu_time_secs: u64,

    /// Wall clock timeout in seconds (0 = use default).
    #[serde(default)]
    pub timeout_secs: u64,
}

impl Default for ResourceLimits {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_memory_mb: 0,  // Unlimited by default
            max_pids: 0,       // Unlimited by default
            max_disk_mb: 0,    // Unlimited by default
            cpu_time_secs: 0,  // Unlimited by default
            timeout_secs: 300, // 5 minute wall clock default
        }
    }
}

impl ResourceLimits {
    /// Create new resource limits with all values unlimited.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn unlimited() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_memory_mb: 0,
            max_pids: 0,
            max_disk_mb: 0,
            cpu_time_secs: 0,
            timeout_secs: 0,
        }
    }

    /// Create conservative limits suitable for untrusted code.
    /// Following field guide: "Resource limits: CPU, memory, disk, timeouts, and PIDs."
    #[must_use]
    pub fn conservative() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_memory_mb: 512,
            max_pids: 64,
            max_disk_mb: 1024,
            cpu_time_secs: 60,
            timeout_secs: 120,
        }
    }

    /// Create moderate limits for semi-trusted code.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn moderate() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_memory_mb: 2048,
            max_pids: 256,
            max_disk_mb: 4096,
            cpu_time_secs: 300,
            timeout_secs: 600,
        }
    }

    /// Create generous limits for trusted internal code.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn generous() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_memory_mb: 8192,
            max_pids: 1024,
            max_disk_mb: 16384,
            cpu_time_secs: 0,
            timeout_secs: 3600,
        }
    }

    /// Builder: set memory limit.
    #[must_use]
    fn with_memory_mb(mut self, mb: u64) -> Self {
        self.max_memory_mb = mb;
        self
    }

    /// Builder: set PID limit.
    #[must_use]
    fn with_max_pids(mut self, pids: u32) -> Self {
        self.max_pids = pids;
        self
    }

    /// Builder: set disk limit.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_disk_mb(mut self, mb: u64) -> Self {
        self.max_disk_mb = mb;
        self
    }

    /// Builder: set CPU time limit.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_cpu_time_secs(mut self, secs: u64) -> Self {
        self.cpu_time_secs = secs;
        self
    }

    /// Builder: set timeout.
    #[must_use]
    fn with_timeout_secs(mut self, secs: u64) -> Self {
        self.timeout_secs = secs;
        self
    }

    /// Check if any limits are set.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    fn has_limits(&self) -> bool {
        self.max_memory_mb > 0
            || self.max_pids > 0
            || self.max_disk_mb > 0
            || self.cpu_time_secs > 0
            || self.timeout_secs > 0
    }

    /// Get the effective timeout in seconds.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    fn effective_timeout_secs(&self) -> u64 {
        if self.timeout_secs > 0 { self.timeout_secs } else { 300 }
    }
}

/// Version of the seccomp blocklist schema compiled into this binary.
///
/// Bump when `BLOCKED_SYSCALLS` gains or loses an entry so launcher logs
/// (see `linux_seccomp::apply_seccomp_filter`) can distinguish which policy
/// a trace came from.
pub const SECCOMP_PROFILE_VERSION: u32 = 1;

/// Syscalls that should be blocked in seccomp-bpf profiles.
///
/// Following the field guide: "A tight seccomp profile blocks syscalls that expand
/// kernel attack surface or enable escalation."
///
/// This is a blocklist (deny-list), not a whitelist. Per the sandboxing-basics
/// analysis (Emilua 2025), blocklists are inherently fragile: new kernel syscalls,
/// multiarch numberings, and the x32 ABI (`__X32_SYSCALL_BIT`) can bypass naive
/// filters. `linux_seccomp::primary_rules` therefore installs both the native
/// number and its x32-aliased variant on x86_64, and the launcher kills
/// mismatched architectures outright (`SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS` via
/// seccompiler arch validation). Prefer Landlock for filesystem policy and keep
/// this list focused on escalation/escape primitives.
///
/// Group labels mirror the Kafel-inspired families from that analysis
/// (`Debug`, `FilesystemHandle`, `IoUring`, `ProcessVm`, ...) so future
/// whitelist work can promote one family at a time.
pub const BLOCKED_SYSCALLS: &[&str] = &[
    // Debug/inspection - can be used to escape sandboxes or leak process state
    "ptrace",
    "kcmp",
    "pidfd_getfd",
    "process_madvise",
    "process_mrelease",
    // Mounting - can change filesystem namespace
    "mount",
    "umount",
    "umount2",
    // FilesystemHandle - file-handle escapes around path-based policy
    "open_by_handle_at",
    "name_to_handle_at",
    // Kernel module loading
    "init_module",
    "finit_module",
    "delete_module",
    // Kernel replacement
    "kexec_load",
    "kexec_file_load",
    // BPF - can be used for sandbox escape
    "bpf",
    // Performance events - information leakage risk
    "perf_event_open",
    // Userfaultfd - can be used for race conditions
    "userfaultfd",
    // IoUring - widely distrusted for untrusted code; see
    // https://security.googleblog.com/2023/06/learnings-from-kctf-vrps-42-linux.html
    "io_uring_setup",
    "io_uring_enter",
    "io_uring_register",
    // ProcessVm - cross-process memory inspection/writes
    "process_vm_readv",
    "process_vm_writev",
    // Reboot/power
    "reboot",
    // Swap manipulation
    "swapon",
    "swapoff",
    // System time manipulation
    "settimeofday",
    "clock_settime",
    "adjtimex",
    // Keyring manipulation
    "add_key",
    "request_key",
    "keyctl",
    // IO permission
    "ioperm",
    "iopl",
    // Acct - process accounting manipulation
    "acct",
    // Quota manipulation
    "quotactl",
    // Namespace creation (can bypass restrictions)
    "unshare",
    "setns",
    // Personality - can enable legacy modes
    "personality",
];

/// Syscalls that require argument filtering (not fully blocked).
pub const FILTERED_SYSCALLS: &[&str] = &[
    // clone/clone3: filter to prevent new namespaces
    "clone", "clone3", // ioctl: filter to block dangerous device ioctls
    "ioctl",  // prctl: filter to block dangerous operations
    "prctl",  // socket: filter to enforce network policy
    "socket",
];

/// Seccomp profile configuration for Linux sandboxing.
///
/// Used alongside Landlock for defense-in-depth.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SeccompProfile {
    /// Syscalls to block entirely.
    #[serde(default = "default_blocked_syscalls")]
    blocked_syscalls: Vec<String>,

    /// Whether to allow new namespace creation (usually false for sandboxes).
    #[serde(default)]
    allow_namespaces: bool,

    /// Whether to allow network socket creation (controlled separately).
    #[serde(default)]
    allow_network_sockets: bool,

    /// Whether to log blocked syscalls instead of killing the process.
    #[serde(default)]
    log_only: bool,
}

fn default_blocked_syscalls() -> Vec<String> {
    BLOCKED_SYSCALLS.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
}

impl Default for SeccompProfile {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            blocked_syscalls: default_blocked_syscalls(),
            allow_namespaces: false,
            allow_network_sockets: false,
            log_only: false,
        }
    }
}

impl SeccompProfile {
    /// Syscalls this profile blocks outright.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn blocked_syscalls(&self) -> &[String] {
        &self.blocked_syscalls
    }

    /// Whether new namespace creation is permitted.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn allow_namespaces(&self) -> bool {
        self.allow_namespaces
    }

    /// Whether network socket creation is permitted.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn allow_network_sockets(&self) -> bool {
        self.allow_network_sockets
    }

    /// Whether the profile is log-only (no filter installed).
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn log_only(&self) -> bool {
        self.log_only
    }

    /// Create a strict profile blocking all dangerous syscalls.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn strict() -> Self {
        Self {
            blocked_syscalls: default_blocked_syscalls(),
            allow_namespaces: false,
            allow_network_sockets: false,
            log_only: false,
        }
    }

    /// Create a permissive profile for semi-trusted code.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn permissive() -> Self {
        Self {
            blocked_syscalls: vec![
                "ptrace".to_string(),
                "kexec_load".to_string(),
                "kexec_file_load".to_string(),
                "reboot".to_string(),
            ],
            allow_namespaces: false,
            allow_network_sockets: true,
            log_only: false,
        }
    }

    /// Create a logging-only profile for debugging.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn logging() -> Self {
        Self {
            blocked_syscalls: default_blocked_syscalls(),
            allow_namespaces: false,
            allow_network_sockets: false,
            log_only: true,
        }
    }

    /// Builder: add a syscall to block.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn block_syscall(mut self, syscall: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        let syscall = syscall.into();
        if !self.blocked_syscalls.contains(&syscall) {
            self.blocked_syscalls.push(syscall);
        }
        self
    }

    /// Builder: allow network sockets.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_network(mut self) -> Self {
        self.allow_network_sockets = true;
        self
    }

    /// Builder: enable log-only mode.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn with_logging(mut self) -> Self {
        self.log_only = true;
        self
    }

    /// Check if a syscall is blocked by this profile.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    fn is_blocked(&self, syscall: &str) -> bool {
        self.blocked_syscalls.iter().any(|s| s == syscall)
    }

    /// Generate a JSON representation for the sandbox helper.
    pub(crate) fn to_json(&self) -> Result<String, serde_json::Error> {
        serde_json::to_string(self)
    }
}

/// Sandbox policy determining what operations are permitted during execution.
///
/// This follows the Codex sandboxing model with three main variants:
/// - **ReadOnly**: Only read operations allowed (safe for viewing files)
/// - **WorkspaceWrite**: Can write within specified directories
/// - **DangerFullAccess**: No restrictions (dangerous, requires explicit approval)
///
/// The field guide's three-question model:
/// 1. What is shared between this code and the host? (boundary)
/// 2. What can the code touch? (policy - this enum)
/// 3. What survives between runs? (lifecycle)
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum SandboxPolicy {
    /// No write access to the filesystem; network access may be restricted or allowlisted.
    ReadOnly {
        /// Whether network access is enabled when no allowlist is set.
        #[serde(default)]
        network_access: bool,

        /// Domain-based network egress allowlist.
        #[serde(default)]
        network_allowlist: Vec<NetworkAllowlistEntry>,
    },

    /// Write access limited to the specified roots; network controlled by allowlist.
    WorkspaceWrite {
        /// Directories where write access is permitted.
        writable_roots: Vec<WritableRoot>,

        /// Whether network access is allowed (legacy boolean, use network_allowlist for fine-grained control).
        #[serde(default)]
        network_access: bool,

        /// Domain-based network egress allowlist.
        /// When non-empty, only connections to these destinations are permitted.
        /// Following field guide: "Default-deny outbound network, then allowlist."
        #[serde(default)]
        network_allowlist: Vec<NetworkAllowlistEntry>,

        /// Sensitive paths to block (credentials, SSH keys, cloud configs).
        /// Following field guide: prevents "policy leakage" of credentials.
        /// Defaults to DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_PATHS if None.
        #[serde(default)]
        sensitive_paths: Option<Vec<SensitivePath>>,

        /// Resource limits (memory, PIDs, disk, CPU).
        /// Following field guide: prevents fork bombs, memory exhaustion.
        #[serde(default)]
        resource_limits: ResourceLimits,

        /// Seccomp-BPF profile for Linux syscall filtering.
        /// Following field guide: "Landlock + seccomp is the recommended Linux pattern."
        #[serde(default)]
        seccomp_profile: SeccompProfile,

        /// Exclude the TMPDIR environment variable from writable roots.
        #[serde(default)]
        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: bool,

        /// Exclude /tmp from writable roots.
        #[serde(default)]
        exclude_slash_tmp: bool,
    },

    /// Full access - no sandbox restrictions applied.
    /// Use with extreme caution.
    DangerFullAccess,

    /// External sandbox - the caller is responsible for sandbox setup.
    ExternalSandbox {
        /// Description of the external sandbox mechanism.
        description: String,
    },
}

impl SandboxPolicy {
    /// Create a read-only policy.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn read_only() -> Self {
        Self::ReadOnly {
            network_access: false,
            network_allowlist: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Create a new read-only policy (alias for backwards compatibility).
    #[must_use]
    pub fn new_read_only_policy() -> Self {
        Self::read_only()
    }

    /// Create a read-only policy with a network allowlist.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn read_only_with_network(network_allowlist: Vec<NetworkAllowlistEntry>) -> Self {
        Self::ReadOnly {
            network_access: !network_allowlist.is_empty(),
            network_allowlist,
        }
    }

    /// Create a read-only policy with full network access.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn read_only_with_full_network() -> Self {
        Self::ReadOnly {
            network_access: true,
            network_allowlist: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Create a workspace-write policy with specified roots.
    /// Uses default sensitive path blocking and strict seccomp profile.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn workspace_write(writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>) -> Self {
        Self::WorkspaceWrite {
            writable_roots: writable_roots.into_iter().map(WritableRoot::new).collect(),
            network_access: false,
            network_allowlist: Vec::new(),
            sensitive_paths: None,
            resource_limits: ResourceLimits::default(),
            seccomp_profile: SeccompProfile::strict(),
            exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
            exclude_slash_tmp: true,
        }
    }

    /// Create a workspace-write policy with network allowlist.
    #[must_use]
    fn workspace_write_with_network(
        writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
        network_allowlist: Vec<NetworkAllowlistEntry>,
    ) -> Self {
        Self::WorkspaceWrite {
            writable_roots: writable_roots.into_iter().map(WritableRoot::new).collect(),
            network_access: !network_allowlist.is_empty(),
            network_allowlist,
            sensitive_paths: None,
            resource_limits: ResourceLimits::default(),
            seccomp_profile: SeccompProfile::strict().with_network(),
            exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
            exclude_slash_tmp: true,
        }
    }

    /// Create a workspace-write policy with custom sensitive path settings.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn workspace_write_with_sensitive_paths(
        writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
        sensitive_paths: Vec<SensitivePath>,
    ) -> Self {
        Self::WorkspaceWrite {
            writable_roots: writable_roots.into_iter().map(WritableRoot::new).collect(),
            network_access: false,
            network_allowlist: Vec::new(),
            sensitive_paths: Some(sensitive_paths),
            resource_limits: ResourceLimits::default(),
            seccomp_profile: SeccompProfile::strict(),
            exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
            exclude_slash_tmp: true,
        }
    }

    /// Create a workspace-write policy without sensitive path blocking (dangerous).
    #[must_use]
    fn workspace_write_no_sensitive_blocking(writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>) -> Self {
        Self::WorkspaceWrite {
            writable_roots: writable_roots.into_iter().map(WritableRoot::new).collect(),
            network_access: false,
            network_allowlist: Vec::new(),
            sensitive_paths: Some(Vec::new()),
            resource_limits: ResourceLimits::default(),
            seccomp_profile: SeccompProfile::strict(),
            exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
            exclude_slash_tmp: true,
        }
    }

    /// Create a workspace-write policy with resource limits.
    /// Useful for untrusted code that needs containment.
    #[must_use]
    fn workspace_write_with_limits(writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>, resource_limits: ResourceLimits) -> Self {
        Self::WorkspaceWrite {
            writable_roots: writable_roots.into_iter().map(WritableRoot::new).collect(),
            network_access: false,
            network_allowlist: Vec::new(),
            sensitive_paths: None,
            resource_limits,
            seccomp_profile: SeccompProfile::strict(),
            exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
            exclude_slash_tmp: true,
        }
    }

    /// Create a fully-configured workspace-write policy.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn workspace_write_full(
        writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
        network_allowlist: Vec<NetworkAllowlistEntry>,
        sensitive_paths: Option<Vec<SensitivePath>>,
        resource_limits: ResourceLimits,
        seccomp_profile: SeccompProfile,
    ) -> Self {
        Self::WorkspaceWrite {
            writable_roots: writable_roots.into_iter().map(WritableRoot::new).collect(),
            network_access: !network_allowlist.is_empty(),
            network_allowlist,
            sensitive_paths,
            resource_limits,
            seccomp_profile,
            exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
            exclude_slash_tmp: true,
        }
    }

    /// Create a full-access policy (dangerous).
    #[must_use]
    pub fn full_access() -> Self {
        Self::DangerFullAccess
    }

    /// Check if the policy allows full network access (unrestricted).
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    pub fn has_full_network_access(&self) -> bool {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { network_access, network_allowlist }
            | Self::WorkspaceWrite { network_access, network_allowlist, .. } => {
                *network_access && network_allowlist.is_empty()
            }
            Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => true,
        }
    }

    /// Check if the policy has a network allowlist (domain-restricted access).
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    pub fn has_network_allowlist(&self) -> bool {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { network_allowlist, .. } | Self::WorkspaceWrite { network_allowlist, .. } => {
                !network_allowlist.is_empty()
            }
            _ => false,
        }
    }

    /// Get the network allowlist entries, if any.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    pub fn network_allowlist(&self) -> &[NetworkAllowlistEntry] {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { network_allowlist, .. } | Self::WorkspaceWrite { network_allowlist, .. } => {
                network_allowlist
            }
            _ => &[],
        }
    }

    /// Check if network access to a specific domain:port is allowed.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    pub fn is_network_allowed(&self, domain: &str, port: u16) -> bool {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { network_access, network_allowlist }
            | Self::WorkspaceWrite { network_access, network_allowlist, .. } => {
                if network_allowlist.is_empty() {
                    *network_access
                } else {
                    network_allowlist.iter().any(|entry| entry.matches(domain, port))
                }
            }
            Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => true,
        }
    }

    /// Get the effective sensitive paths to block.
    /// Returns default paths if not explicitly configured.
    #[must_use]
    fn sensitive_paths(&self) -> Vec<SensitivePath> {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { .. } => default_sensitive_paths(),
            Self::WorkspaceWrite { sensitive_paths, .. } => {
                sensitive_paths.clone().unwrap_or_else(default_sensitive_paths)
            }
            Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Get sensitive paths including write-only protected directories for writable roots.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn sensitive_paths_for_execution(&self, cwd: &Path) -> Vec<SensitivePath> {
        match self {
            Self::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => {
                let mut sensitive_paths = self.sensitive_paths();
                sensitive_paths.extend(protected_writable_root_sensitive_paths(&self.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)));
                sensitive_paths
            }
            _ => self.sensitive_paths(),
        }
    }

    /// Check if a path is a sensitive location that should be blocked.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    fn is_sensitive_path(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
        self.sensitive_paths().iter().any(|sp| sp.matches(path) && sp.block_read)
    }

    /// Check if write access to a path is blocked under this policy.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    fn is_path_write_blocked(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
        match self {
            Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => false,
            _ => self
                .sensitive_paths_for_execution(cwd)
                .iter()
                .any(|sp| sp.matches(path) && sp.block_write),
        }
    }

    /// Check if read access to a path is allowed under this policy.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    pub fn is_path_readable(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
        match self {
            Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => true,
            _ => !self.is_sensitive_path(path),
        }
    }

    /// Get the resource limits for this policy.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn resource_limits(&self) -> ResourceLimits {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { .. } => ResourceLimits::conservative(),
            Self::WorkspaceWrite { resource_limits, .. } => resource_limits.clone(),
            Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => ResourceLimits::unlimited(),
        }
    }

    /// Get the seccomp profile for this policy (Linux only).
    #[must_use]
    pub fn seccomp_profile(&self) -> SeccompProfile {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { network_access, network_allowlist } => {
                let mut profile = SeccompProfile::strict();
                if *network_access || !network_allowlist.is_empty() {
                    profile = profile.with_network();
                }
                profile
            }
            Self::WorkspaceWrite { seccomp_profile, .. } => seccomp_profile.clone(),
            Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => SeccompProfile::permissive(),
        }
    }

    /// Check if the policy allows full disk write access.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    fn has_full_disk_write_access(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. })
    }

    /// Check if the policy allows full disk read access.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    fn has_full_disk_read_access(&self) -> bool {
        true
    }

    /// Get the list of writable roots including the current working directory.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn get_writable_roots_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> Vec<WritableRoot> {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { .. } => vec![],
            Self::WorkspaceWrite { writable_roots, .. } => {
                let mut roots = writable_roots.clone();
                let cwd_root = WritableRoot::new(cwd);
                if !roots.contains(&cwd_root) {
                    roots.push(cwd_root);
                }
                roots
            }
            Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => {
                vec![WritableRoot::new(cwd)]
            }
        }
    }

    /// Check if a path is writable under this policy.
    #[inline]
    #[must_use]
    pub fn is_path_writable(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { .. } => false,
            Self::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => {
                let writable = self.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd);
                writable.iter().any(|root| path.starts_with(&root.root)) && !self.is_path_write_blocked(path, cwd)
            }
            Self::DangerFullAccess | Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => true,
        }
    }

    /// Validate that another policy can be set from this one.
    /// Used to enforce policy escalation restrictions.
    fn can_set(&self, new_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        use SandboxPolicy::*;

        match (self, new_policy) {
            // Can always downgrade
            (DangerFullAccess, _) => Ok(()),
            // Cannot escalate from ReadOnly to write-capable
            (ReadOnly { .. }, WorkspaceWrite { .. } | DangerFullAccess) => {
                Err(anyhow::anyhow!("cannot escalate from read-only to write-capable policy"))
            }
            // Other transitions are allowed
            _ => Ok(()),
        }
    }

    /// Get a human-readable description of the policy.
    pub fn description(&self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::ReadOnly { .. } => "read-only access",
            Self::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => "workspace write access",
            Self::DangerFullAccess => "full access (dangerous)",
            Self::ExternalSandbox { .. } => "external sandbox",
        }
    }
}

impl Default for SandboxPolicy {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::read_only()
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_read_only_policy() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::read_only();
        assert!(!policy.has_full_network_access());
        assert!(!policy.has_network_allowlist());
        assert!(!policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
        assert!(policy.has_full_disk_read_access());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_read_only_with_network_allowlist() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::read_only_with_network(vec![
            NetworkAllowlistEntry::https("api.github.com"),
            NetworkAllowlistEntry::with_port("registry.npmjs.org", 443),
        ]);

        assert!(!policy.has_full_network_access());
        assert!(policy.has_network_allowlist());
        assert!(policy.is_network_allowed("api.github.com", 443));
        assert!(policy.is_network_allowed("registry.npmjs.org", 443));
        assert!(!policy.is_network_allowed("example.com", 443));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_read_only_with_full_network_access() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::read_only_with_full_network();

        assert!(policy.has_full_network_access());
        assert!(policy.is_network_allowed("example.com", 443));
        assert!(policy.seccomp_profile().allow_network_sockets);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_read_only_deserializes_legacy_shape() {
        let policy: SandboxPolicy = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"type":"read_only"}"#).expect("legacy read-only policy");

        assert_eq!(policy, SandboxPolicy::read_only());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_workspace_write_policy() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::workspace_write(vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/workspace")]);
        assert!(!policy.has_full_network_access());
        assert!(!policy.has_full_disk_write_access());

        let cwd = PathBuf::from("/tmp/workspace");
        assert!(policy.is_path_writable(&cwd, &cwd));
        assert!(!policy.is_path_writable(&PathBuf::from("/etc"), &cwd));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_workspace_write_protects_internal_metadata_dirs() {
        let cwd = PathBuf::from("/tmp/workspace");
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::workspace_write(vec![cwd.clone()]);

        assert!(!policy.is_path_writable(&cwd.join(".git/config"), &cwd));
        assert!(!policy.is_path_writable(&cwd.join(".vtcode/cache"), &cwd));
        assert!(!policy.is_path_writable(&cwd.join(".codex/state"), &cwd));
        assert!(!policy.is_path_writable(&cwd.join(".agents/skills"), &cwd));
        assert!(policy.is_path_writable(&cwd.join("src/main.rs"), &cwd));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_full_access_policy() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::full_access();
        assert!(policy.has_full_network_access());
        assert!(policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_policy_escalation() {
        let read_only = SandboxPolicy::read_only();
        let full = SandboxPolicy::full_access();

        // Cannot escalate from read-only
        assert!(read_only.can_set(&full).is_err());

        // Can downgrade from full
        full.can_set(&read_only).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_network_allowlist_entry_matching() {
        let entry = NetworkAllowlistEntry::https("api.github.com");
        assert!(entry.matches("api.github.com", 443));
        assert!(!entry.matches("api.github.com", 80));
        assert!(!entry.matches("github.com", 443));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_network_allowlist_wildcard() {
        let entry = NetworkAllowlistEntry::https("*.npmjs.org");
        assert!(entry.matches("registry.npmjs.org", 443));
        assert!(entry.matches("npmjs.org", 443));
        assert!(!entry.matches("npmjs.org.evil.com", 443));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_workspace_with_network_allowlist() {
        let allowlist = vec![
            NetworkAllowlistEntry::https("api.github.com"),
            NetworkAllowlistEntry::https("*.npmjs.org"),
        ];
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::workspace_write_with_network(vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/workspace")], allowlist);

        // Has allowlist, not full access
        assert!(!policy.has_full_network_access());
        assert!(policy.has_network_allowlist());

        // Domain checks
        assert!(policy.is_network_allowed("api.github.com", 443));
        assert!(policy.is_network_allowed("registry.npmjs.org", 443));
        assert!(!policy.is_network_allowed("evil.com", 443));
        assert!(!policy.is_network_allowed("api.github.com", 80));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_workspace_no_network() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::workspace_write(vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/workspace")]);

        assert!(!policy.has_full_network_access());
        assert!(!policy.has_network_allowlist());
        assert!(!policy.is_network_allowed("api.github.com", 443));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_sensitive_path_expansion() {
        let sp = SensitivePath::new("~/.ssh");
        let expanded = sp.expand_path();
        // Should expand to home directory
        assert!(expanded.to_string_lossy().contains(".ssh"));
        assert!(!expanded.to_string_lossy().starts_with('~'));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_sensitive_path_matching() {
        let sp = SensitivePath::new("~/.ssh");
        let expanded = sp.expand_path();
        let ssh_key = expanded.join("id_rsa");
        assert!(sp.matches(&ssh_key));
        assert!(sp.matches(&expanded));
    }

    #[cfg(not(windows))]
    #[test]
    fn test_sensitive_path_matching_is_case_insensitive_with_component_boundaries() {
        let sp = SensitivePath::new("/tmp/Workspace/.env");

        assert!(sp.matches(Path::new("/tmp/workspace/.ENV")));
        assert!(sp.matches(Path::new("/tmp/workspace/.ENV/child")));
        assert!(!sp.matches(Path::new("/tmp/workspace/.environment")));
        assert!(!sp.matches(Path::new("/tmp/workspaces/.ENV")));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_default_sensitive_paths() {
        let paths = default_sensitive_paths();
        assert!(!paths.is_empty());
        // Should include common credential locations
        let path_strings: Vec<&str> = paths.iter().map(|p| p.path.as_str()).collect();
        assert!(path_strings.contains(&"~/.ssh"));
        assert!(path_strings.contains(&"~/.aws"));
        assert!(path_strings.contains(&"~/.kube"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolved_vtcode_roots_are_sensitive_without_duplicate_entries() {
        let environment = [
            ("HOME", "/home/tester"),
            ("VTCODE_CONFIG", "/vtcode/shared"),
            ("VTCODE_DATA", "/vtcode/shared"),
            ("XDG_STATE_HOME", "/xdg/state"),
            ("XDG_CACHE_HOME", "/xdg/cache"),
            ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", "/xdg/runtime"),
            ("XDG_BIN_HOME", "/xdg/bin"),
            ("VTCODE_HOME", "/legacy/vtcode"),
        ];
        let resolved =
            VtCodePaths::from_environment(&environment).expect("explicit absolute VT Code paths should resolve");
        let paths = vtcode_sensitive_paths(&environment).expect("explicit absolute VT Code paths should resolve");
        let path_strings: Vec<&str> = paths.iter().map(|path| path.path.as_str()).collect();

        for expected in [
            resolved.config_dir().to_path_buf(),
            resolved.auth_dir(),
            resolved.data_dir().to_path_buf(),
            resolved.state_dir().to_path_buf(),
            resolved.cache_dir().to_path_buf(),
            resolved.runtime_dir().to_path_buf(),
            resolved.executable_dir().to_path_buf(),
            resolved.legacy_dir().to_path_buf(),
        ] {
            let expected = expected.display().to_string();
            assert!(path_strings.contains(&expected.as_str()), "missing sensitive root: {expected}");
        }
        assert_eq!(path_strings.iter().filter(|path| **path == "/vtcode/shared").count(), 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn invalid_vtcode_path_resolution_is_rejected_before_policy_construction() {
        let error = vtcode_sensitive_paths(&[("HOME", "/home/tester"), ("VTCODE_CONFIG", "relative/config")])
            .expect_err("relative VT Code config paths must fail closed");
        assert!(error.to_string().contains("VTCODE_CONFIG"));
    }

    #[cfg(windows)]
    #[test]
    fn test_windows_userprofile_root_exclusions_are_in_defaults() {
        let paths = default_sensitive_paths();
        let path_strings: Vec<&str> = paths.iter().map(|p| p.path.as_str()).collect();

        for entry in USERPROFILE_READ_ROOT_EXCLUSIONS {
            let expected = format!("~/{}", entry);
            assert!(path_strings.contains(&expected.as_str()), "missing expected default sensitive path: {expected}");
        }
    }

    #[cfg(windows)]
    #[test]
    fn test_sensitive_path_matching_is_case_insensitive_on_windows() {
        let sp = SensitivePath::new("~/.aws");
        let home = dirs::home_dir().expect("home dir");
        let mixed_case_candidate = home.join(".AWS").join("credentials");

        assert!(sp.matches(&mixed_case_candidate));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_workspace_blocks_sensitive_by_default() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::workspace_write(vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/workspace")]);
        let sensitive = policy.sensitive_paths();
        assert!(!sensitive.is_empty());

        // Check that SSH keys are blocked
        if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
            let ssh_path = home.join(".ssh").join("id_rsa");
            assert!(policy.is_sensitive_path(&ssh_path));
            assert!(!policy.is_path_readable(&ssh_path));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_workspace_no_sensitive_blocking() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::workspace_write_no_sensitive_blocking(vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp")]);
        let sensitive = policy.sensitive_paths();
        assert!(sensitive.is_empty());

        // Nothing should be blocked
        if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
            let ssh_path = home.join(".ssh").join("id_rsa");
            assert!(!policy.is_sensitive_path(&ssh_path));
            assert!(policy.is_path_readable(&ssh_path));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_full_access_no_sensitive_blocking() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::full_access();
        let sensitive = policy.sensitive_paths();
        assert!(sensitive.is_empty());

        // Full access should allow everything
        if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
            let ssh_path = home.join(".ssh").join("id_rsa");
            assert!(policy.is_path_readable(&ssh_path));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_resource_limits_default() {
        let limits = ResourceLimits::default();
        assert_eq!(limits.max_memory_mb, 0);
        assert_eq!(limits.max_pids, 0);
        assert_eq!(limits.timeout_secs, 300);
        assert!(limits.has_limits());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_resource_limits_conservative() {
        let limits = ResourceLimits::conservative();
        assert_eq!(limits.max_memory_mb, 512);
        assert_eq!(limits.max_pids, 64);
        assert_eq!(limits.cpu_time_secs, 60);
        assert!(limits.has_limits());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_resource_limits_builder() {
        let limits = ResourceLimits::default()
            .with_memory_mb(1024)
            .with_max_pids(128)
            .with_timeout_secs(60);
        assert_eq!(limits.max_memory_mb, 1024);
        assert_eq!(limits.max_pids, 128);
        assert_eq!(limits.effective_timeout_secs(), 60);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_workspace_with_limits() {
        let limits = ResourceLimits::conservative();
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::workspace_write_with_limits(vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/workspace")], limits.clone());

        let policy_limits = policy.resource_limits();
        assert_eq!(policy_limits.max_memory_mb, limits.max_memory_mb);
        assert_eq!(policy_limits.max_pids, limits.max_pids);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_read_only_conservative_limits() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::read_only();
        let limits = policy.resource_limits();
        // ReadOnly should get conservative limits
        assert!(limits.has_limits());
        assert_eq!(limits.max_memory_mb, 512);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_full_access_unlimited() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::full_access();
        let limits = policy.resource_limits();
        // Full access should have no limits
        assert!(!limits.has_limits());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_seccomp_profile_strict() {
        let profile = SeccompProfile::strict();
        assert!(profile.is_blocked("ptrace"));
        assert!(profile.is_blocked("mount"));
        assert!(profile.is_blocked("kexec_load"));
        assert!(profile.is_blocked("bpf"));
        assert!(!profile.allow_network_sockets);
        assert!(!profile.allow_namespaces);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_seccomp_profile_permissive() {
        let profile = SeccompProfile::permissive();
        // Still blocks the most dangerous syscalls
        assert!(profile.is_blocked("ptrace"));
        assert!(profile.is_blocked("kexec_load"));
        // But allows network
        assert!(profile.allow_network_sockets);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_seccomp_profile_builder() {
        let profile = SeccompProfile::strict().with_network().block_syscall("custom_syscall");
        assert!(profile.allow_network_sockets);
        assert!(profile.is_blocked("custom_syscall"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_workspace_seccomp_profile() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::workspace_write(vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp")]);
        let profile = policy.seccomp_profile();
        // Should get strict profile by default
        assert!(profile.is_blocked("ptrace"));
        assert!(profile.is_blocked("mount"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_workspace_with_network_seccomp() {
        let policy = SandboxPolicy::workspace_write_with_network(
            vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp")],
            vec![NetworkAllowlistEntry::https("api.github.com")],
        );
        let profile = policy.seccomp_profile();
        // Should allow network sockets when network is enabled
        assert!(profile.allow_network_sockets);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_seccomp_profile_json() {
        let profile = SeccompProfile::strict();
        let json = profile.to_json().unwrap();
        assert!(json.contains("ptrace"));
        assert!(json.contains("blocked_syscalls"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_blocked_syscalls_constant() {
        // Verify key dangerous syscalls are in the list, including the
        // sandboxing-basics additions (ptrace-adjacent inspection, io_uring,
        // file-handle escapes). Asymmetric: both a classic entry and each new
        // family must be present.
        for must_block in [
            "ptrace",
            "kcmp",
            "pidfd_getfd",
            "mount",
            "open_by_handle_at",
            "name_to_handle_at",
            "kexec_load",
            "bpf",
            "perf_event_open",
            "userfaultfd",
            "io_uring_setup",
            "io_uring_enter",
            "io_uring_register",
            "process_vm_readv",
            "process_madvise",
            "unshare",
            "setns",
        ] {
            assert!(BLOCKED_SYSCALLS.contains(&must_block), "missing {must_block}");
        }
    }
}