vector_core/community/

edition.rs

//! Real-npub authority editions — the keyless model's authorship + version carrier.
//!
//! An authority change (a Grant, RoleMetadata, RoleOrder, Banlist, ...) is an **inner event signed
//! by the ACTOR's own npub**, carrying the entity id, a per-entity
//! `version`, and the previous edition's hash (`prev_hash`, see [`super::version`]). That inner event
//! lives inside the channel/server-root encryption (the outer wrapper is the usual ephemeral signer,
//! [`super::envelope`]), so authorship is **member-verifiable**: the inner Schnorr signature *is* the
//! proof of who acted, and members check that npub against the roster.
//!
//! This module is the wire encoding of one edition (build + verify + parse). It does NOT decide
//! authorization — the signature proves WHO acted; the roster (§roles) decides WHETHER they were
//! allowed, and [`super::version::fold`] decides which edition is current.

use super::version;
use crate::stored_event::event_kind;
use nostr_sdk::prelude::*;

const TAG_SUBKIND: &str = "vsk";
const TAG_ENTITY: &str = "eid";
const TAG_EVERSION: &str = "ev";
const TAG_EPREV: &str = "ep";
const TAG_VERSION: &str = "v";
const PROTOCOL_VERSION: &str = "1";
/// Authority citation tag: `["vac", <authorizing-entity hex>, <version>, <edition-hash hex>]`.
/// The "pinned proof" — the grant edition the actor claims their authority under. In the MVP it is a
/// COMPLETENESS floor: a verifier confirms it has synced that exact grant to ≥ the cited version (an
/// un-forked, complete view) before acting, and resolves the actor's actual rank against its current
/// (refuse-downgrade-protected) roster — so a since-demoted actor is dropped there. The full 
/// "resolve rank AT the cited version" (block-until-synced re-fetch + a roster-wide snapshot version) is
/// the deferred refinement; today it pins the actor's own grant, not a whole-roster moment. Absent when
/// the OWNER acts (supreme, no grant to cite).
pub const TAG_AUTHORITY_CITATION: &str = "vac";

/// The pinned authority an actor claims for an action (mechanism a). Points at the actor's own
/// authorizing edition (their Grant — or a RoleMetadata for a role-position claim) by stable
/// coordinate + the exact version/hash, so the verifier resolves authority against that frozen point,
/// not its own possibly-lagging-or-ahead live roster.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AuthorityCitation {
    /// The authorizing edition's entity id (e.g. `grant_locator(community_id, actor)`).
    pub entity_id: [u8; 32],
    /// The version of that edition the actor claims authority under.
    pub version: u64,
    /// That edition's [`version::edition_hash`] — pins the exact content, not just the version number.
    pub edition_hash: [u8; 32],
}

impl AuthorityCitation {
    /// The signed `vac` tag carrying this citation.
    pub fn to_tag(&self) -> Tag {
        Tag::custom(
            TagKind::Custom(TAG_AUTHORITY_CITATION.into()),
            [
                crate::simd::hex::bytes_to_hex_32(&self.entity_id),
                self.version.to_string(),
                crate::simd::hex::bytes_to_hex_32(&self.edition_hash),
            ],
        )
    }

    /// Extract the citation from an event's tags, or `None` if absent. A malformed `vac` (bad hex /
    /// unparseable version) returns `None` — the verifier then treats the action as uncited (owner-only
    /// or rejected), never trusting a corrupt citation.
    pub fn from_tags(tags: &Tags) -> Option<AuthorityCitation> {
        let s = tags.iter().find_map(|t| {
            let s = t.as_slice();
            (s.len() >= 4 && s[0] == TAG_AUTHORITY_CITATION).then(|| (s[1].clone(), s[2].clone(), s[3].clone()))
        })?;
        let valid_hex = |h: &str| h.len() == 64 && h.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit());
        if !valid_hex(&s.0) || !valid_hex(&s.2) {
            return None;
        }
        Some(AuthorityCitation {
            entity_id: crate::simd::hex::hex_to_bytes_32(&s.0),
            version: s.1.parse().ok()?,
            edition_hash: crate::simd::hex::hex_to_bytes_32(&s.2),
        })
    }
}

/// Build the unsigned inner edition event. Sign it with the ACTOR's real identity keys — that
/// signature is the authorship proof. `entity_id` is the entity's 32-byte id, `prev_hash` is the
/// previous edition's [`version::edition_hash`] (`None` for the first edition), `content` is the
/// entity payload JSON, and `created_at_secs` is the authored time (the version-fold tiebreak).
pub fn build_edition_inner(
    author: PublicKey,
    vsk: &str,
    entity_id: &[u8; 32],
    version: u64,
    prev_hash: Option<&[u8; 32]>,
    content: &str,
    created_at_secs: u64,
    authority: Option<&AuthorityCitation>,
) -> UnsignedEvent {
    let mut tags = vec![
        Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom(TAG_SUBKIND.into()), [vsk.to_string()]),
        Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom(TAG_ENTITY.into()), [crate::simd::hex::bytes_to_hex_32(entity_id)]),
        Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom(TAG_EVERSION.into()), [version.to_string()]),
        Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom(TAG_VERSION.into()), [PROTOCOL_VERSION.to_string()]),
    ];
    if let Some(p) = prev_hash {
        tags.push(Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom(TAG_EPREV.into()), [crate::simd::hex::bytes_to_hex_32(p)]));
    }
    // The pinned authority proof: absent when the OWNER signs (supreme), present for a delegated
    // admin so verifiers resolve their rank at the cited grant version. Outside the version-chain
    // self_hash (it's per-action metadata, not chain identity), but covered by the inner signature.
    if let Some(a) = authority {
        tags.push(a.to_tag());
    }
    EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(event_kind::COMMUNITY_CONTROL), content)
        .tags(tags)
        .custom_created_at(Timestamp::from_secs(created_at_secs))
        .build(author)
}

/// A signature-verified, parsed edition.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ParsedEdition {
    /// The real npub that signed (and is thus accountable for) this edition.
    pub author: PublicKey,
    pub vsk: String,
    pub entity_id: [u8; 32],
    pub version: u64,
    pub prev_hash: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    pub content: String,
    /// [`version::edition_hash`] of this edition — what the next edition's `prev_hash` must cite.
    pub self_hash: [u8; 32],
    pub created_at: u64,
    pub inner_id: [u8; 32],
    /// The pinned authority proof, if the actor cited one. `None` when the OWNER signs (supreme)
    /// or a non-authority edition carries no citation. Verified separately against the roster (#3c).
    pub authority: Option<AuthorityCitation>,
}

#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum EditionError {
    BadSignature,
    MissingField(&'static str),
    BadField(&'static str),
}

fn decode_hash(hex: &str, field: &'static str) -> Result<[u8; 32], EditionError> {
    if hex.len() != 64 || !hex.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
        return Err(EditionError::BadField(field));
    }
    Ok(crate::simd::hex::hex_to_bytes_32(hex))
}

/// Verify + parse an inner edition event. Checks the inner Schnorr signature (the real-npub
/// authorship proof) and extracts the edition fields, computing `self_hash` over the canonical
/// edition bytes. Does NOT check roster authorization — that is the caller's separate step.
pub fn parse_edition_inner(inner: &Event) -> Result<ParsedEdition, EditionError> {
    inner.verify().map_err(|_| EditionError::BadSignature)?;
    // Reject duplicate authority tags: the signature covers all of them, but if two clients picked a
    // different duplicate they would compute a different `self_hash` for the same signed event and
    // diverge on the chain. The map signed-event → canonical bytes must be total and unambiguous.
    for name in [TAG_SUBKIND, TAG_ENTITY, TAG_EVERSION, TAG_EPREV, TAG_AUTHORITY_CITATION] {
        let count = inner
            .tags
            .iter()
            .filter(|t| t.as_slice().first().map(|s| s.as_str() == name).unwrap_or(false))
            .count();
        if count > 1 {
            return Err(EditionError::BadField("duplicate authority tag"));
        }
    }
    let get = |name: &str| -> Option<String> {
        inner.tags.iter().find_map(|t| {
            let s = t.as_slice();
            (s.len() >= 2 && s[0] == name).then(|| s[1].clone())
        })
    };
    let vsk = get(TAG_SUBKIND).ok_or(EditionError::MissingField("vsk"))?;
    let entity_id = decode_hash(&get(TAG_ENTITY).ok_or(EditionError::MissingField("eid"))?, "eid")?;
    let version: u64 = get(TAG_EVERSION)
        .ok_or(EditionError::MissingField("ev"))?
        .parse()
        .map_err(|_| EditionError::BadField("ev"))?;
    let prev_hash = match get(TAG_EPREV) {
        Some(h) => Some(decode_hash(&h, "ep")?),
        None => None,
    };
    let content = inner.content.clone();
    let self_hash = version::edition_hash(&entity_id, version, prev_hash.as_ref(), content.as_bytes());
    Ok(ParsedEdition {
        author: inner.pubkey,
        vsk,
        entity_id,
        version,
        prev_hash,
        content,
        self_hash,
        created_at: inner.created_at.as_secs(),
        inner_id: inner.id.to_bytes(),
        authority: AuthorityCitation::from_tags(&inner.tags),
    })
}

impl ParsedEdition {
    /// The [`version::Edition`] view used by [`version::fold`].
    pub fn to_fold_edition(&self) -> version::Edition {
        version::Edition {
            version: self.version,
            prev_hash: self.prev_hash,
            self_hash: self.self_hash,
            created_at: self.created_at,
            tiebreak_id: self.inner_id,
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    const VSK_GRANT: &str = "3";

    fn eid() -> [u8; 32] {
        [0x42; 32]
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trips_authorship_version_and_chain_hash() {
        let actor = Keys::generate();
        let prev = version::edition_hash(&eid(), 1, None, b"{}");
        let inner = build_edition_inner(actor.public_key(), VSK_GRANT, &eid(), 2, Some(&prev), "{\"role_ids\":[]}", 1_700_000_000, None)
            .sign_with_keys(&actor)
            .unwrap();

        let parsed = parse_edition_inner(&inner).expect("valid edition parses");
        assert_eq!(parsed.author, actor.public_key(), "authorship = the real signer");
        assert_eq!(parsed.vsk, VSK_GRANT);
        assert_eq!(parsed.entity_id, eid());
        assert_eq!(parsed.version, 2);
        assert_eq!(parsed.prev_hash, Some(prev));
        assert_eq!(parsed.created_at, 1_700_000_000);
        // self_hash matches the canonical recomputation (what the next edition will cite).
        assert_eq!(
            parsed.self_hash,
            version::edition_hash(&eid(), 2, Some(&prev), b"{\"role_ids\":[]}")
        );
        // Folds into a version::Edition cleanly.
        let fe = parsed.to_fold_edition();
        assert_eq!(fe.version, 2);
        assert_eq!(fe.prev_hash, Some(prev));
    }

    #[test]
    fn authority_citation_round_trips_on_an_edition() {
        // A delegated admin's edition carries the pinned authority citation; it survives sign→parse,
        // covered by the inner signature, and does NOT alter the chain self_hash (per-action metadata).
        let actor = Keys::generate();
        let cite = AuthorityCitation { entity_id: [0xab; 32], version: 7, edition_hash: [0xcd; 32] };
        let inner = build_edition_inner(actor.public_key(), VSK_GRANT, &eid(), 1, None, "{}", 100, Some(&cite))
            .sign_with_keys(&actor)
            .unwrap();
        let parsed = parse_edition_inner(&inner).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(parsed.authority.as_ref(), Some(&cite), "citation round-trips");
        // self_hash is over (entity, version, prev, content) only — the citation doesn't perturb it.
        assert_eq!(parsed.self_hash, version::edition_hash(&eid(), 1, None, b"{}"));

        // An uncited edition (owner-signed) parses with authority == None.
        let owner = build_edition_inner(actor.public_key(), VSK_GRANT, &eid(), 1, None, "{}", 100, None)
            .sign_with_keys(&actor)
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(parse_edition_inner(&owner).unwrap().authority, None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn authority_citation_tag_layout_is_frozen() {
        // FROZEN wire layout: the citation rides as a 4-element `vac` tag
        // `["vac", <entity hex>, <version>, <edition-hash hex>]`. A change here reshuffles how every
        // verifier reads pinned authority, so pin the exact shape (not just a round-trip).
        let cite = AuthorityCitation { entity_id: [0x11; 32], version: 9, edition_hash: [0x22; 32] };
        let tag = cite.to_tag();
        let s = tag.as_slice();
        assert_eq!(s.len(), 4, "vac is a 4-element tag");
        assert_eq!(s[0], TAG_AUTHORITY_CITATION);
        assert_eq!(s[1], "11".repeat(32), "entity id is lowercase hex");
        assert_eq!(s[2], "9", "version is the decimal string");
        assert_eq!(s[3], "22".repeat(32), "edition hash is lowercase hex");
    }

    #[test]
    fn genesis_edition_has_no_prev() {
        let actor = Keys::generate();
        let inner = build_edition_inner(actor.public_key(), "1", &eid(), 1, None, "{}", 100, None)
            .sign_with_keys(&actor)
            .unwrap();
        let parsed = parse_edition_inner(&inner).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(parsed.prev_hash, None, "first edition cites no predecessor");
        assert_eq!(parsed.version, 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_content_fails_verification() {
        // Re-sign integrity: flipping the content after signing breaks the inner Schnorr sig.
        let actor = Keys::generate();
        let inner = build_edition_inner(actor.public_key(), "3", &eid(), 1, None, "{\"a\":1}", 100, None)
            .sign_with_keys(&actor)
            .unwrap();
        let mut json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&inner.as_json()).unwrap();
        json["content"] = serde_json::Value::String("{\"a\":2}".into()); // tamper
        let tampered: Event = serde_json::from_value(json).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(parse_edition_inner(&tampered), Err(EditionError::BadSignature)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn missing_required_field_is_rejected_not_panicked() {
        // An inner event lacking the entity-id tag is a parse error, never a panic.
        let actor = Keys::generate();
        let inner = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(event_kind::COMMUNITY_CONTROL), "{}")
            .tags([Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom("vsk".into()), ["3".to_string()])])
            .sign_with_keys(&actor)
            .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(parse_edition_inner(&inner), Err(EditionError::MissingField("eid"))));
    }

    #[test]
    fn duplicate_authority_tag_is_rejected() {
        // A duplicate of ANY of the 5 authority tags (vsk/eid/ev/ep/vac) makes signed-event → canonical
        // bytes ambiguous (clients could pick different ones) → chain divergence, so it must be rejected.
        // Parameterized across all 5 — a regression dropping any one from the dedup loop is caught.
        let actor = Keys::generate();
        let hash = crate::simd::hex::bytes_to_hex_32(&[0xAB; 32]);
        let base = || -> Vec<Tag> {
            vec![
                Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom("vsk".into()), ["1".to_string()]),
                Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom("eid".into()), [crate::simd::hex::bytes_to_hex_32(&eid())]),
                Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom("ev".into()), ["1".to_string()]),
                Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom("ep".into()), [hash.clone()]),
                Tag::custom(TagKind::Custom("vac".into()), [crate::simd::hex::bytes_to_hex_32(&eid()), "1".to_string(), hash.clone()]),
            ]
        };
        let build = |tags: Vec<Tag>| EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(event_kind::COMMUNITY_CONTROL), "{}")
            .tags(tags).sign_with_keys(&actor).unwrap();
        assert!(parse_edition_inner(&build(base())).is_ok(), "a clean 5-tag base edition parses");
        for name in ["vsk", "eid", "ev", "ep", "vac"] {
            let mut tags = base();
            let dup = tags.iter().find(|t| t.as_slice().first().map(|s| s == name).unwrap_or(false)).cloned().unwrap();
            tags.push(dup);
            assert!(
                matches!(parse_edition_inner(&build(tags)), Err(EditionError::BadField("duplicate authority tag"))),
                "a duplicate `{name}` tag must be rejected"
            );
        }
    }
}