uv_redacted/
lib.rs

1use ref_cast::RefCast;
2use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
3use std::borrow::Cow;
4use std::fmt::{Debug, Display};
5use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
6use std::str::FromStr;
7use thiserror::Error;
8use url::Url;
9
10const SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMETERS: &[&str] = &[
11    "X-Amz-Credential",
12    "X-Amz-Security-Token",
13    "X-Amz-Signature",
14];
15
16#[derive(Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
17pub enum DisplaySafeUrlError {
18    /// Failed to parse a URL.
19    #[error(transparent)]
20    Url(#[from] url::ParseError),
21
22    /// We parsed a URL, but couldn't disambiguate its authority
23    /// component.
24    #[error("ambiguous user/pass authority in URL (not percent-encoded?): {0}")]
25    AmbiguousAuthority(String),
26}
27
28/// A [`Url`] wrapper that redacts credentials and sensitive query parameters when displaying the URL.
29///
30/// `DisplaySafeUrl` wraps the standard [`url::Url`] type, providing functionality to mask
31/// secrets by default when the URL is displayed or logged. This helps prevent accidental
32/// exposure of sensitive information in logs and debug output.
33///
34/// # Examples
35///
36/// ```
37/// use uv_redacted::DisplaySafeUrl;
38/// use std::str::FromStr;
39///
40/// // Create a `DisplaySafeUrl` from a `&str`
41/// let mut url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse("https://user:password@example.com").unwrap();
42///
43/// // Display will mask secrets
44/// assert_eq!(url.to_string(), "https://user:****@example.com/");
45///
46/// // You can still access the username and password
47/// assert_eq!(url.username(), "user");
48/// assert_eq!(url.password(), Some("password"));
49///
50/// // And you can still update the username and password
51/// let _ = url.set_username("new_user");
52/// let _ = url.set_password(Some("new_password"));
53/// assert_eq!(url.username(), "new_user");
54/// assert_eq!(url.password(), Some("new_password"));
55///
56/// // It is also possible to remove the credentials entirely
57/// url.remove_credentials();
58/// assert_eq!(url.username(), "");
59/// assert_eq!(url.password(), None);
60/// ```
61#[derive(Clone, Eq, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize, RefCast)]
62#[cfg_attr(feature = "schemars", derive(schemars::JsonSchema))]
63#[cfg_attr(feature = "schemars", schemars(transparent))]
64#[repr(transparent)]
65pub struct DisplaySafeUrl(Url);
66
67/// Check if a path or fragment contains a credential-like pattern (`:` followed by `@`).
68///
69/// This skips colons that are followed by `//`, as those indicate URL schemes (e.g., `https://`)
70/// rather than credentials. This is important for handling nested URLs like proxy URLs:
71/// `git+https://proxy.com/https://github.com/user/repo.git@branch`.
72fn has_credential_like_pattern(s: &str) -> bool {
73    let mut remaining = s;
74    while let Some(colon_pos) = remaining.find(':') {
75        let after_colon = &remaining[colon_pos + 1..];
76        // If the colon is followed by "//", consider it a URL scheme.
77        if after_colon.starts_with("//") {
78            remaining = after_colon;
79            continue;
80        }
81        // Check if there's an @ after this colon.
82        if after_colon.contains('@') {
83            return true;
84        }
85        remaining = after_colon;
86    }
87    false
88}
89
90impl DisplaySafeUrl {
91    #[inline]
92    pub fn parse(input: &str) -> Result<Self, DisplaySafeUrlError> {
93        let url = Url::parse(input)?;
94
95        Self::reject_ambiguous_credentials(input, &url)?;
96
97        Ok(Self(url))
98    }
99
100    /// Reject some ambiguous cases, e.g., `https://user/name:password@domain/a/b/c`
101    ///
102    /// In this case the user *probably* meant to have a username of "user/name", but both RFC
103    /// 3986 and WHATWG URL expect the userinfo (RFC 3986) or authority (WHATWG) to not contain a
104    /// non-percent-encoded slash or other special character.
105    ///
106    /// This ends up being moderately annoying to detect, since the above gets parsed into a
107    /// "valid" WHATWG URL where the host is `used` and the pathname is
108    /// `/name:password@domain/a/b/c` rather than causing a parse error.
109    ///
110    /// To detect it, we use a heuristic: if the password component is missing but the path or
111    /// fragment contain a `:` followed by a `@`, then we assume the URL is ambiguous.
112    fn reject_ambiguous_credentials(input: &str, url: &Url) -> Result<(), DisplaySafeUrlError> {
113        // `git://`, `http://`, and `https://` URLs may carry credentials, while `file://` URLs
114        // on Windows may contain both sigils, but it's always safe, e.g.
115        // `file://C:/Users/ferris/project@home/workspace`.
116        if url.scheme() == "file" {
117            return Ok(());
118        }
119
120        if url.password().is_some() {
121            return Ok(());
122        }
123
124        // Check for the suspicious pattern.
125        if !has_credential_like_pattern(url.path())
126            && !url
127                .fragment()
128                .map(has_credential_like_pattern)
129                .unwrap_or(false)
130        {
131            return Ok(());
132        }
133
134        // If the previous check passed, we should always expect to find these in the given URL.
135        let (Some(col_pos), Some(at_pos)) = (input.find(':'), input.rfind('@')) else {
136            if cfg!(debug_assertions) {
137                unreachable!(
138                    "`:` or `@` sign missing in URL that was confirmed to contain them: {input}"
139                );
140            }
141            return Ok(());
142        };
143
144        // Our ambiguous URL probably has credentials in it, so we don't want to blast it out in
145        // the error message. We somewhat aggressively replace everything between the scheme's
146        // ':' and the lastmost `@` with `***`.
147        let redacted_path = format!("{}***{}", &input[0..=col_pos], &input[at_pos..]);
148        Err(DisplaySafeUrlError::AmbiguousAuthority(redacted_path))
149    }
150
151    /// Create a new [`DisplaySafeUrl`] from a [`Url`].
152    ///
153    /// Unlike [`Self::parse`], this doesn't perform any ambiguity checks.
154    /// That means that it's primarily useful for contexts where a human can't easily accidentally
155    /// introduce an ambiguous URL, such as URLs being read from a request.
156    pub fn from_url(url: Url) -> Self {
157        Self(url)
158    }
159
160    /// Cast a `&Url` to a `&DisplaySafeUrl` using ref-cast.
161    #[inline]
162    pub fn ref_cast(url: &Url) -> &Self {
163        RefCast::ref_cast(url)
164    }
165
166    /// Parse a string as an URL, with this URL as the base URL.
167    #[inline]
168    pub fn join(&self, input: &str) -> Result<Self, DisplaySafeUrlError> {
169        Ok(Self(self.0.join(input)?))
170    }
171
172    /// Serialize with Serde using the internal representation of the `Url` struct.
173    #[inline]
174    pub fn serialize_internal<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
175    where
176        S: serde::Serializer,
177    {
178        self.0.serialize_internal(serializer)
179    }
180
181    /// Serialize with Serde using the internal representation of the `Url` struct.
182    #[inline]
183    pub fn deserialize_internal<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
184    where
185        D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
186    {
187        Ok(Self(Url::deserialize_internal(deserializer)?))
188    }
189
190    #[expect(clippy::result_unit_err)]
191    pub fn from_file_path<P: AsRef<std::path::Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self, ()> {
192        Ok(Self(Url::from_file_path(path)?))
193    }
194
195    /// Remove the credentials from a URL, allowing the generic `git` username (without a password)
196    /// in SSH URLs, as in, `ssh://git@github.com/...`.
197    #[inline]
198    pub fn remove_credentials(&mut self) {
199        // For URLs that use the `git` convention (i.e., `ssh://git@github.com/...`), avoid dropping the
200        // username.
201        if is_ssh_git_username(&self.0) {
202            return;
203        }
204        let _ = self.0.set_username("");
205        let _ = self.0.set_password(None);
206    }
207
208    /// Returns the URL with any credentials removed.
209    pub fn without_credentials(&self) -> Cow<'_, Url> {
210        if self.0.password().is_none() && self.0.username() == "" {
211            return Cow::Borrowed(&self.0);
212        }
213
214        // For URLs that use the `git` convention (i.e., `ssh://git@github.com/...`), avoid dropping the
215        // username.
216        if is_ssh_git_username(&self.0) {
217            return Cow::Borrowed(&self.0);
218        }
219
220        let mut url = self.0.clone();
221        let _ = url.set_username("");
222        let _ = url.set_password(None);
223        Cow::Owned(url)
224    }
225
226    /// Returns [`Display`] implementation that doesn't mask credentials.
227    #[inline]
228    pub fn displayable_with_credentials(&self) -> impl Display {
229        &self.0
230    }
231}
232
233impl Deref for DisplaySafeUrl {
234    type Target = Url;
235
236    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
237        &self.0
238    }
239}
240
241impl DerefMut for DisplaySafeUrl {
242    fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut Self::Target {
243        &mut self.0
244    }
245}
246
247impl Display for DisplaySafeUrl {
248    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
249        display_with_redacted_credentials(&self.0, f)
250    }
251}
252
253impl Debug for DisplaySafeUrl {
254    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
255        let url = &self.0;
256        // For URLs that use the `git` convention (i.e., `ssh://git@github.com/...`), avoid masking the
257        // username.
258        let (username, password) = if is_ssh_git_username(url) {
259            (url.username(), None)
260        } else if url.username() != "" && url.password().is_some() {
261            (url.username(), Some("****"))
262        } else if url.username() != "" {
263            ("****", None)
264        } else if url.password().is_some() {
265            ("", Some("****"))
266        } else {
267            ("", None)
268        };
269
270        f.debug_struct("DisplaySafeUrl")
271            .field("scheme", &url.scheme())
272            .field("cannot_be_a_base", &url.cannot_be_a_base())
273            .field("username", &username)
274            .field("password", &password)
275            .field("host", &url.host())
276            .field("port", &url.port())
277            .field("path", &url.path())
278            .field(
279                "query",
280                &url.query()
281                    .map(|query| redacted_query(query, url.query_pairs())),
282            )
283            .field("fragment", &url.fragment())
284            .finish()
285    }
286}
287
288impl From<DisplaySafeUrl> for Url {
289    fn from(url: DisplaySafeUrl) -> Self {
290        url.0
291    }
292}
293
294impl From<Url> for DisplaySafeUrl {
295    fn from(url: Url) -> Self {
296        Self(url)
297    }
298}
299
300impl FromStr for DisplaySafeUrl {
301    type Err = DisplaySafeUrlError;
302
303    fn from_str(input: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
304        Self::parse(input)
305    }
306}
307
308fn is_ssh_git_username(url: &Url) -> bool {
309    matches!(url.scheme(), "ssh" | "git+ssh" | "git+https")
310        && url.username() == "git"
311        && url.password().is_none()
312}
313
314fn is_sensitive_query_parameter(key: &str) -> bool {
315    SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMETERS
316        .iter()
317        .any(|sensitive| key.eq_ignore_ascii_case(sensitive))
318}
319
320fn redacted_query<'a>(
321    query: &'a str,
322    query_pairs: impl Iterator<Item = (Cow<'a, str>, Cow<'a, str>)>,
323) -> Cow<'a, str> {
324    let mut redacted = false;
325    let mut serializer = url::form_urlencoded::Serializer::new(String::new());
326    for (key, value) in query_pairs {
327        if is_sensitive_query_parameter(&key) {
328            serializer.append_pair(&key, "****");
329            redacted = true;
330        } else {
331            serializer.append_pair(&key, &value);
332        }
333    }
334
335    if redacted {
336        Cow::Owned(serializer.finish())
337    } else {
338        Cow::Borrowed(query)
339    }
340}
341
342fn display_with_redacted_credentials(
343    url: &Url,
344    f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>,
345) -> std::fmt::Result {
346    write!(f, "{}:", url.scheme())?;
347
348    if url.has_authority() {
349        write!(f, "//")?;
350
351        if url.username() != "" && url.password().is_some() {
352            write!(f, "{}", url.username())?;
353            write!(f, ":****@")?;
354        } else if url.username() != "" && is_ssh_git_username(url) {
355            write!(f, "{}@", url.username())?;
356        } else if url.username() != "" {
357            write!(f, "****@")?;
358        } else if url.password().is_some() {
359            write!(f, ":****@")?;
360        }
361
362        write!(f, "{}", url.host_str().unwrap_or(""))?;
363
364        if let Some(port) = url.port() {
365            write!(f, ":{port}")?;
366        }
367    }
368
369    write!(f, "{}", url.path())?;
370    if let Some(query) = url.query() {
371        write!(f, "?{}", redacted_query(query, url.query_pairs()))?;
372    }
373    if let Some(fragment) = url.fragment() {
374        write!(f, "#{fragment}")?;
375    }
376
377    Ok(())
378}
379
380#[cfg(test)]
381mod tests {
382    use super::*;
383
384    #[test]
385    fn from_url_no_credentials() {
386        let url_str = "https://pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple";
387        let log_safe_url =
388            DisplaySafeUrl::parse("https://pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple").unwrap();
389        assert_eq!(log_safe_url.username(), "");
390        assert!(log_safe_url.password().is_none());
391        assert_eq!(log_safe_url.to_string(), url_str);
392    }
393
394    #[test]
395    fn from_url_username_and_password() {
396        let log_safe_url =
397            DisplaySafeUrl::parse("https://user:pass@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple")
398                .unwrap();
399        assert_eq!(log_safe_url.username(), "user");
400        assert!(log_safe_url.password().is_some_and(|p| p == "pass"));
401        assert_eq!(
402            log_safe_url.to_string(),
403            "https://user:****@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple"
404        );
405    }
406
407    #[test]
408    fn from_url_just_password() {
409        let log_safe_url =
410            DisplaySafeUrl::parse("https://:pass@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple").unwrap();
411        assert_eq!(log_safe_url.username(), "");
412        assert!(log_safe_url.password().is_some_and(|p| p == "pass"));
413        assert_eq!(
414            log_safe_url.to_string(),
415            "https://:****@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple"
416        );
417    }
418
419    #[test]
420    fn from_url_just_username() {
421        let log_safe_url =
422            DisplaySafeUrl::parse("https://user@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple").unwrap();
423        assert_eq!(log_safe_url.username(), "user");
424        assert!(log_safe_url.password().is_none());
425        assert_eq!(
426            log_safe_url.to_string(),
427            "https://****@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple"
428        );
429    }
430
431    #[test]
432    fn from_url_git_username() {
433        let ssh_str = "ssh://git@github.com/org/repo";
434        let ssh_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(ssh_str).unwrap();
435        assert_eq!(ssh_url.username(), "git");
436        assert!(ssh_url.password().is_none());
437        assert_eq!(ssh_url.to_string(), ssh_str);
438        // Test again for the `git+ssh` scheme
439        let git_ssh_str = "git+ssh://git@github.com/org/repo";
440        let git_ssh_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(git_ssh_str).unwrap();
441        assert_eq!(git_ssh_url.username(), "git");
442        assert!(git_ssh_url.password().is_none());
443        assert_eq!(git_ssh_url.to_string(), git_ssh_str);
444    }
445
446    #[test]
447    fn parse_url_string() {
448        let url_str = "https://user:pass@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple";
449        let log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(url_str).unwrap();
450        assert_eq!(log_safe_url.username(), "user");
451        assert!(log_safe_url.password().is_some_and(|p| p == "pass"));
452        assert_eq!(
453            log_safe_url.to_string(),
454            "https://user:****@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple"
455        );
456    }
457
458    #[test]
459    fn remove_credentials() {
460        let url_str = "https://user:pass@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple";
461        let mut log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(url_str).unwrap();
462        log_safe_url.remove_credentials();
463        assert_eq!(log_safe_url.username(), "");
464        assert!(log_safe_url.password().is_none());
465        assert_eq!(
466            log_safe_url.to_string(),
467            "https://pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple"
468        );
469    }
470
471    #[test]
472    fn preserve_ssh_git_username_on_remove_credentials() {
473        let ssh_str = "ssh://git@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple";
474        let mut ssh_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(ssh_str).unwrap();
475        ssh_url.remove_credentials();
476        assert_eq!(ssh_url.username(), "git");
477        assert!(ssh_url.password().is_none());
478        assert_eq!(ssh_url.to_string(), ssh_str);
479        // Test again for `git+ssh` scheme
480        let git_ssh_str = "git+ssh://git@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple";
481        let mut git_shh_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(git_ssh_str).unwrap();
482        git_shh_url.remove_credentials();
483        assert_eq!(git_shh_url.username(), "git");
484        assert!(git_shh_url.password().is_none());
485        assert_eq!(git_shh_url.to_string(), git_ssh_str);
486    }
487
488    #[test]
489    fn displayable_with_credentials() {
490        let url_str = "https://user:pass@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple";
491        let log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(url_str).unwrap();
492        assert_eq!(
493            log_safe_url.displayable_with_credentials().to_string(),
494            url_str
495        );
496    }
497
498    #[test]
499    fn redact_aws_presigned_query_values() {
500        let log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(
501            "https://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/dist.whl?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=credential&X-Amz-Date=20260424T120000Z&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=signature&X-Amz-Security-Token=token",
502        )
503        .unwrap();
504
505        assert_eq!(
506            log_safe_url.to_string(),
507            "https://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/dist.whl?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=****&X-Amz-Date=20260424T120000Z&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=****&X-Amz-Security-Token=****"
508        );
509    }
510
511    #[test]
512    fn redact_aws_presigned_query_values_case_insensitive() {
513        let log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(
514            "https://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/dist.whl?x-amz-credential=credential&x-amz-signature=signature&x-amz-security-token=token",
515        )
516        .unwrap();
517
518        assert_eq!(
519            log_safe_url.to_string(),
520            "https://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/dist.whl?x-amz-credential=****&x-amz-signature=****&x-amz-security-token=****"
521        );
522    }
523
524    #[test]
525    fn redact_aws_presigned_query_values_with_percent_encoded_keys() {
526        let log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(
527            "https://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/dist.whl?X-Amz%2DSignature=signature&safe=value",
528        )
529        .unwrap();
530
531        assert_eq!(
532            log_safe_url.to_string(),
533            "https://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/dist.whl?X-Amz-Signature=****&safe=value"
534        );
535    }
536
537    #[test]
538    fn redact_aws_presigned_query_values_in_debug() {
539        let log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(
540            "https://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/dist.whl?X-Amz-Credential=credential&X-Amz-Signature=signature",
541        )
542        .unwrap();
543
544        let debug = format!("{log_safe_url:?}");
545        assert!(debug.contains(r#"query: Some("X-Amz-Credential=****&X-Amz-Signature=****")"#));
546        assert!(!debug.contains("credential"));
547        assert!(!debug.contains("signature"));
548    }
549
550    #[test]
551    fn does_not_redact_unknown_query_values() {
552        let log_safe_url =
553            DisplaySafeUrl::parse("https://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/dist.whl?token=secret").unwrap();
554
555        assert_eq!(
556            log_safe_url.to_string(),
557            "https://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/dist.whl?token=secret"
558        );
559    }
560
561    #[test]
562    fn does_not_add_authority_to_urls_without_authority() {
563        let log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse("c:/home/ferris/projects/foo").unwrap();
564
565        assert_eq!(log_safe_url.to_string(), "c:/home/ferris/projects/foo");
566    }
567
568    #[test]
569    fn redacts_query_values_in_urls_without_authority() {
570        let log_safe_url =
571            DisplaySafeUrl::parse("c:/home/ferris/projects/foo?X-Amz-Signature=signature").unwrap();
572
573        assert_eq!(
574            log_safe_url.to_string(),
575            "c:/home/ferris/projects/foo?X-Amz-Signature=****"
576        );
577    }
578
579    #[test]
580    fn redacts_query_values_in_cannot_be_a_base_urls() {
581        let log_safe_url =
582            DisplaySafeUrl::parse("mailto:ferris@example.com?X-Amz-Signature=signature").unwrap();
583
584        assert!(log_safe_url.cannot_be_a_base());
585        assert_eq!(
586            log_safe_url.to_string(),
587            "mailto:ferris@example.com?X-Amz-Signature=****"
588        );
589    }
590
591    #[test]
592    fn url_join() {
593        let url_str = "https://token@example.com/abc/";
594        let log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(url_str).unwrap();
595        let foo_url = log_safe_url.join("foo").unwrap();
596        assert_eq!(foo_url.to_string(), "https://****@example.com/abc/foo");
597    }
598
599    #[test]
600    fn log_safe_url_ref() {
601        let url_str = "https://user:pass@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple";
602        let url = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(url_str).unwrap();
603        let log_safe_url = DisplaySafeUrl::ref_cast(&url);
604        assert_eq!(log_safe_url.username(), "user");
605        assert!(log_safe_url.password().is_some_and(|p| p == "pass"));
606        assert_eq!(
607            log_safe_url.to_string(),
608            "https://user:****@pypi-proxy.fly.dev/basic-auth/simple"
609        );
610    }
611
612    #[test]
613    fn parse_url_ambiguous() {
614        for url in &[
615            "https://user/name:password@domain/a/b/c",
616            "https://user\\name:password@domain/a/b/c",
617            "https://user#name:password@domain/a/b/c",
618            "https://user.com/name:password@domain/a/b/c",
619        ] {
620            let err = DisplaySafeUrl::parse(url).unwrap_err();
621            match err {
622                DisplaySafeUrlError::AmbiguousAuthority(redacted) => {
623                    assert!(redacted.starts_with("https:***@domain/a/b/c"));
624                }
625                DisplaySafeUrlError::Url(_) => panic!("expected AmbiguousAuthority error"),
626            }
627        }
628    }
629
630    #[test]
631    fn parse_url_not_ambiguous() {
632        for url in &[
633            // https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/issues/16756
634            "file:///C:/jenkins/ython_Environment_Manager_PR-251@2/venv%201/workspace",
635            // https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/issues/17214
636            // Git proxy URLs with nested schemes should not trigger the ambiguity check
637            "git+https://githubproxy.cc/https://github.com/user/repo.git@branch",
638            "git+https://proxy.example.com/https://github.com/org/project@v1.0.0",
639            "git+https://proxy.example.com/https://github.com/org/project@refs/heads/main",
640        ] {
641            DisplaySafeUrl::parse(url).unwrap();
642        }
643    }
644
645    #[test]
646    fn credential_like_pattern() {
647        assert!(!has_credential_like_pattern(
648            "/https://github.com/user/repo.git@branch"
649        ));
650        assert!(!has_credential_like_pattern("/http://example.com/path@ref"));
651
652        assert!(has_credential_like_pattern("/name:password@domain/a/b/c"));
653        assert!(has_credential_like_pattern(":password@domain"));
654    }
655}
uv_redacted/lib.rs

uv_redacted/
lib.rs
