Expand description
Manifest signing and hash-pinning verification.
Production deployments can require:
- Ed25519 signed manifests — the manifest’s
signaturefield is verified against a trust root (configured per Uni instance). - Blake3 hash pinning — the manifest’s
hashfield must match a hash recorded at first install; reloads must reproduce.
Ed25519 signature verification is always compiled — it is a security
primitive, so it is deliberately not a build-time opt-out. The signature
covers the whole manifest (see canonical_payload), not just the hash
pin, which closes a manifest-substitution attack: rewriting capabilities
or side_effects while preserving the hash invalidates the signature.
Structs§
- Trust
Root - Trust root for plugin signature verification.
Enums§
- Signature
Policy - Host policy for plugin signature enforcement.
Functions§
- verify_
hash_ pin - Verify a plugin’s hash-pin against the payload bytes.
- verify_
manifest_ with_ policy - Apply
SignaturePolicyon top ofverify_signed_manifest. - verify_
signed_ manifest - Verify a manifest’s Ed25519 signature against the trust root.