umbral_core/templates.rs
1//! Server-side HTML rendering via minijinja.
2//!
3//! Templates live under one or more directories on disk. At boot,
4//! `App::build()` assembles an ordered search list:
5//!
6//! 1. The project-level directory configured via
7//! `AppBuilder::templates_dir` (default `./templates`).
8//! 2. Each registered plugin's `Plugin::templates_dirs()` contributions,
9//! in topological dependency order.
10//!
11//! The first directory that contains a given template name wins. This
12//! makes cross-plugin `{% extends "base.html" %}` work automatically —
13//! the extends lookup searches every directory the same way a direct
14//! render call does. Plugin A can extend `base.html` from plugin B as
15//! long as B's directory appears in the search list.
16//!
17//! When two directories both provide a template with the same name, the
18//! first-match-wins policy applies and a `tracing::warn!` is emitted at
19//! boot so the collision is visible in the log. First-match-wins across
20//! all template directories. Silently-overridden templates are a
21//! well-known footgun, so the warning is non-optional.
22//!
23//! Rendering goes through one ambient accessor, [`render`], which reads
24//! the engine the App builder published into an `OnceLock` during build.
25//!
26//! ```ignore
27//! let html = umbral::templates::render("articles_list.html", &context!(articles))?;
28//! ```
29//!
30//! ## Autoescape
31//!
32//! Any template whose name ends in `.html` or `.htm` renders with
33//! autoescape on. Text templates (`.txt`) render verbatim. The autoescape
34//! callback extension whitelist MUST stay in sync with the loader's
35//! `load_directory` filter (currently `html | htm | txt`).
36//!
37//! ## v1 scope
38//!
39//! - One project-level templates directory (default `./templates/`,
40//! relative to the binary's cwd) plus per-plugin directories.
41//! - Jinja2-compatible syntax via minijinja: `{% extends %}`, `{% block %}`,
42//! `{% if %}`, `{% for %}`, `{{ value }}`, the standard filter set.
43//! - Autoescape for any template whose name ends in `.html` or `.htm`.
44//! - Init is best-effort: if no directory exists the engine boots empty.
45//! Calls to [`render`] then return `TemplateError::Missing`.
46//!
47//! ## Deferred
48//!
49//! - Custom filters and tests registered through `Plugin::on_ready`.
50//! - Hot reload in development via `minijinja-autoreload`.
51
52use std::collections::HashSet;
53use std::future::Future;
54use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
55use std::pin::Pin;
56use std::sync::Arc;
57use std::sync::OnceLock;
58
59use minijinja::{AutoEscape, Environment};
60use syntect::highlighting::ThemeSet;
61use syntect::html::{ClassStyle, ClassedHTMLGenerator, css_for_theme_with_class_style};
62use syntect::parsing::SyntaxSet;
63use syntect::util::LinesWithEndings;
64
65tokio::task_local! {
66 /// Per-request ambient user value, set by a session-aware layer
67 /// (typically `umbral_sessions::UserContextLayer<U>`) and read by
68 /// [`render`] to expose the current `user` in
69 /// templates. `None` means an anonymous request.
70 ///
71 /// Outside the layer's scope, `try_with` returns `Err(AccessError)`
72 /// and `render` skips the merge — explicit ctx behaviour is
73 /// preserved when no layer is installed.
74 pub static CURRENT_USER: Option<minijinja::Value>;
75
76 /// Per-request CSRF token, set by `umbral-security`'s middleware and
77 /// read by [`render`] to inject `csrf_token` / `csrf_input` into
78 /// every template, for the `{% csrf_token %}` ergonomic. Outside
79 /// the middleware's scope nothing is injected (a template that
80 /// references `{{ csrf_token }}` then renders it empty under the
81 /// engine's lenient-undefined behaviour).
82 pub static CURRENT_CSRF: Option<String>;
83
84 /// Lazy counterpart to `CURRENT_USER`: a resolver that produces the
85 /// user value on first access, memoized. Set by an auth middleware that
86 /// wants per-request laziness (resolve only if a template reads `user`).
87 pub static CURRENT_USER_LAZY: LazyUser;
88}
89
90type UserFut = Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = minijinja::Value> + Send>>;
91type UserResolver = Arc<dyn Fn() -> UserFut + Send + Sync>;
92
93/// A lazily-resolved, per-request template `user`. The `resolver` runs at
94/// most once (guarded by the `OnceCell`); resolution happens synchronously
95/// from inside minijinja's sync render via `block_in_place`.
96///
97/// The lazy value is injected into the template context as a minijinja `Object`
98/// proxy ([`LazyUserProxy`]). Minijinja calls `get_value` on the proxy only
99/// when the template actually accesses an attribute on `user`, so requests that
100/// never render `user` skip resolution entirely.
101#[derive(Clone)]
102pub struct LazyUser {
103 cell: Arc<tokio::sync::OnceCell<minijinja::Value>>,
104 resolver: UserResolver,
105}
106
107impl LazyUser {
108 pub fn new<F, Fut>(resolver: F) -> Self
109 where
110 F: Fn() -> Fut + Send + Sync + 'static,
111 Fut: Future<Output = minijinja::Value> + Send + 'static,
112 {
113 Self {
114 cell: Arc::new(tokio::sync::OnceCell::new()),
115 resolver: Arc::new(move || Box::pin(resolver())),
116 }
117 }
118
119 /// Resolve (memoized) from a synchronous context. Requires a multi-thread
120 /// tokio runtime; on a current-thread runtime or outside any runtime it
121 /// logs and returns the anonymous value so callers fall back cleanly.
122 fn resolve_blocking(&self) -> minijinja::Value {
123 use tokio::runtime::{Handle, RuntimeFlavor};
124 let Ok(handle) = Handle::try_current() else {
125 return anonymous_user_value();
126 };
127 if handle.runtime_flavor() == RuntimeFlavor::CurrentThread {
128 tracing::warn!(
129 "umbral::templates: lazy `user` needs a multi-thread runtime; rendering anonymous"
130 );
131 return anonymous_user_value();
132 }
133 let cell = self.cell.clone();
134 let resolver = self.resolver.clone();
135 tokio::task::block_in_place(move || {
136 handle.block_on(async move { cell.get_or_init(|| resolver()).await.clone() })
137 })
138 }
139
140 /// Wrap this `LazyUser` in a minijinja `Value` proxy that resolves on
141 /// first attribute access from inside the synchronous render loop.
142 fn into_proxy_value(self) -> minijinja::Value {
143 minijinja::Value::from_object(LazyUserProxy(self))
144 }
145}
146
147/// A minijinja Object proxy that defers resolution of the user until the
148/// template actually accesses an attribute (e.g. `{{ user.is_staff }}`).
149/// Minijinja calls `get_value` for attribute access — we resolve there, not
150/// at context-merge time.
151struct LazyUserProxy(LazyUser);
152
153impl std::fmt::Debug for LazyUserProxy {
154 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
155 f.write_str("LazyUserProxy")
156 }
157}
158
159impl std::fmt::Display for LazyUserProxy {
160 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
161 // `{{ user }}` — resolve (memoized) and delegate to the resolved
162 // value's own Display so bare rendering is faithful. Uses the same
163 // `resolve_blocking` path as `get_value` to ensure at-most-once
164 // resolution and the same current-thread / no-runtime fallback.
165 let resolved = self.0.resolve_blocking();
166 std::fmt::Display::fmt(&resolved, f)
167 }
168}
169
170impl minijinja::value::Object for LazyUserProxy {
171 fn get_value(self: &Arc<Self>, key: &minijinja::Value) -> Option<minijinja::Value> {
172 let resolved = self.0.resolve_blocking();
173 resolved.get_item(key).ok()
174 }
175
176 fn is_true(self: &Arc<Self>) -> bool {
177 // `{% if user %}` — resolve (memoized) and delegate to the resolved
178 // value's truthiness so the proxy faithfully represents whether the
179 // resolved value is truthy. Uses the same `resolve_blocking` path as
180 // `get_value` so resolution is still at most once per request.
181 self.0.resolve_blocking().is_true()
182 }
183}
184
185/// Scope a lazy `user` resolver for the duration of `fut`.
186pub async fn with_current_user_lazy<F: Future>(lazy: LazyUser, fut: F) -> F::Output {
187 CURRENT_USER_LAZY.scope(lazy, fut).await
188}
189
190/// Run `fut` with the ambient template user value scoped to `user`
191/// for its duration. Intended for the session-aware layer in
192/// `umbral-sessions`; downstream handler code reads the value
193/// transparently through [`render`].
194pub async fn with_current_user<F: std::future::Future>(
195 user: Option<minijinja::Value>,
196 fut: F,
197) -> F::Output {
198 CURRENT_USER.scope(user, fut).await
199}
200
201/// Run `fut` with the ambient CSRF token scoped for its duration.
202/// Intended for the CSRF middleware in `umbral-security`; downstream
203/// handler code reads the value transparently through [`render`]
204/// (as `{{ csrf_token }}` / `{{ csrf_input }}`) or [`current_csrf`].
205pub async fn with_current_csrf<F: std::future::Future>(token: Option<String>, fut: F) -> F::Output {
206 CURRENT_CSRF.scope(token, fut).await
207}
208
209/// Read the ambient CSRF token, if a middleware has scoped one for
210/// this request. Non-template consumers (e.g. the admin's login form
211/// builder) use this to embed the same token the middleware minted,
212/// instead of minting their own.
213pub fn current_csrf() -> Option<String> {
214 CURRENT_CSRF.try_with(|t| t.clone()).ok().flatten()
215}
216
217/// Watched template directories captured at `init` time. Stored
218/// separately so the dev-mode render path can rebuild the environment
219/// from the same sources without re-publishing the OnceLock.
220static WATCHED_DIRS: OnceLock<Vec<PathBuf>> = OnceLock::new();
221use serde::Serialize;
222
223static ENGINE: OnceLock<Environment<'static>> = OnceLock::new();
224
225/// A plugin-contributed mutation of the template [`Environment`]: adds
226/// custom filters, functions, or globals at engine-build time
227/// (feature #67 - custom template tags/filters). Returned by
228/// `Plugin::template_registrars` and stored process-wide so the dev-mode
229/// hot-reload rebuild re-applies it.
230///
231/// It is `Fn` (not `FnOnce`) on purpose: in dev mode the engine is
232/// rebuilt on every template edit, so each registrar runs once per build.
233/// Make it owned and `'static` (no borrows of the plugin) so it survives
234/// in the [`REGISTRARS`] handle past `App::build`.
235pub type TemplateRegistrar = Box<dyn Fn(&mut Environment<'static>) + Send + Sync>;
236
237/// Plugin-contributed [`TemplateRegistrar`]s captured at `init_with` time.
238/// Stored separately from [`ENGINE`] so the dev-mode rebuild path (which
239/// goes through [`build_env`]) re-applies them without the App builder.
240static REGISTRARS: OnceLock<Vec<TemplateRegistrar>> = OnceLock::new();
241
242/// Register the built-in default 404/500 templates into an environment.
243///
244/// Called from `init` before any disk directories are scanned. The names
245/// use the `__umbral__/` prefix so they can never collide with a user's
246/// `templates/` directory (slashes aren't meaningful to the engine's name
247/// lookup — `__umbral__/default_404.html` is just a unique string key).
248///
249/// Because the user's disk directories are added after this call and
250/// first-match-wins is enforced by the `seen` set, a user who places a
251/// file named `__umbral__/default_404.html` in their own templates dir will
252/// silently replace the built-in — which is the intended escape hatch.
253/// (Callers who want a cleaner opt-out should use
254/// `App::builder().disable_default_error_pages()` instead.)
255/// gaps2 #21 — register the `img` MiniJinja filter that turns a URL
256/// into a fully-formed, performance-correct `<img>` tag.
257///
258/// Filter signature:
259/// `{{ url | img(alt="…", width=N, height=N, class="…") }}`
260///
261/// Output shape:
262/// `<img src="<url>" alt="<alt>" loading="lazy" decoding="async"
263/// width="<w>" height="<h>" class="<class>">`
264///
265/// Why this set of attributes:
266/// - `loading="lazy"` — the gap's primary ask. Browsers defer
267/// off-viewport image fetches until they're about to be needed,
268/// shrinking LCP + initial bandwidth.
269/// - `decoding="async"` — lets the browser decode the image off
270/// the main thread; prevents render-blocking decode work on
271/// slower devices.
272/// - explicit `width`/`height` (when provided) reserves layout
273/// space immediately so lazy-loading doesn't cause CLS
274/// (cumulative layout shift). Omitted if either is missing.
275/// - empty `alt=""` default is screen-reader-friendly for
276/// decorative images. Callers SHOULD pass a real `alt` for
277/// meaningful content images.
278///
279/// What's NOT included on day one (deferred to a later slice):
280/// - `srcset` for responsive resolutions — needs the on-the-fly
281/// resize handler (gap 21 Option C) before the filter knows
282/// real asset dimensions.
283/// - `<picture>` with `webp`/`avif` sources — same blocker; the
284/// transcode endpoint has to exist first.
285///
286/// Output is wrapped in `minijinja::value::Value::from_safe_string`
287/// so MiniJinja's autoescape doesn't double-escape the `<` / `>`
288/// characters — the attribute values themselves still go through
289/// `html_escape` so a hostile alt-text can't break out of the
290/// attribute quote.
291/// True when `url` is safe to place in an `<img src>`: a relative URL
292/// (no scheme) or an `http`/`https` absolute URL. Any other scheme
293/// (`javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, …) is rejected. Fails closed:
294/// a malformed scheme (embedded control chars, spaces) is also rejected.
295fn url_scheme_is_safe(url: &str) -> bool {
296 let trimmed = url.trim();
297 // A URL scheme is the run before the first ':' — but only if no
298 // '/', '?', '#' appears first (those mean a relative path/query).
299 let mut scheme_end = None;
300 for (i, c) in trimmed.char_indices() {
301 match c {
302 ':' => {
303 scheme_end = Some(i);
304 break;
305 }
306 '/' | '?' | '#' => break,
307 _ => {}
308 }
309 }
310 let Some(end) = scheme_end else {
311 return true; // no scheme → relative URL → safe
312 };
313 let scheme = &trimmed[..end];
314 // A real scheme is alpha then [a-z0-9+.-]*. Anything else is suspicious.
315 let mut chars = scheme.chars();
316 let well_formed = matches!(chars.next(), Some(c) if c.is_ascii_alphabetic())
317 && chars.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '+' | '.' | '-'));
318 if !well_formed {
319 return false;
320 }
321 let lower = scheme.to_ascii_lowercase();
322 lower == "http" || lower == "https"
323}
324
325fn register_img_filter(env: &mut Environment<'static>) {
326 env.add_filter(
327 "img",
328 |url: String,
329 kwargs: minijinja::value::Kwargs|
330 -> Result<minijinja::Value, minijinja::Error> {
331 let alt: String = kwargs.get::<Option<String>>("alt")?.unwrap_or_default();
332 let width: Option<i64> = kwargs.get("width")?;
333 let height: Option<i64> = kwargs.get("height")?;
334 let class: Option<String> = kwargs.get("class")?;
335 // Accept the extras even when the call doesn't pass them
336 // — kwargs.get returns Ok(None) for absent keys but
337 // .assert_all_used() at the end will catch a typo'd
338 // `alt_text` so the user gets a clear error instead of
339 // silent drop. Matches the rest of the framework's
340 // strict-input posture.
341 kwargs.assert_all_used()?;
342
343 // Defense-in-depth: never emit a `javascript:` / `data:` /
344 // other non-http(s) scheme into `src`. Not a live XSS (browsers
345 // don't run JS from `<img src>` and the value is HTML-escaped),
346 // but a hostile stored URL has no business here. A disallowed
347 // scheme neutralises to an empty src (broken image) rather than
348 // erroring the whole page on user data.
349 let url = if url_scheme_is_safe(&url) {
350 url
351 } else {
352 String::new()
353 };
354
355 let mut out = String::with_capacity(url.len() + 128);
356 out.push_str("<img src=\"");
357 html_escape_into(&mut out, &url);
358 out.push_str("\" alt=\"");
359 html_escape_into(&mut out, &alt);
360 out.push_str("\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\"");
361 if let Some(w) = width {
362 out.push_str(" width=\"");
363 out.push_str(&w.to_string());
364 out.push('"');
365 }
366 if let Some(h) = height {
367 out.push_str(" height=\"");
368 out.push_str(&h.to_string());
369 out.push('"');
370 }
371 if let Some(c) = class {
372 if !c.is_empty() {
373 out.push_str(" class=\"");
374 html_escape_into(&mut out, &c);
375 out.push('"');
376 }
377 }
378 out.push('>');
379 Ok(minijinja::Value::from_safe_string(out))
380 },
381 );
382}
383
384/// features.md #4 — register the `markdown` filter that turns a
385/// CommonMark + GFM string into sanitized HTML.
386///
387/// Filter signature: `{{ body | markdown }}`.
388///
389/// Pipeline:
390/// 1. `pulldown-cmark` parses the input with GFM extensions on
391/// (tables, strikethrough, task lists, footnotes) and renders to
392/// HTML.
393/// 2. `ammonia` sanitizes that HTML — strips `<script>`, inline event
394/// handlers (`onerror=`, `onclick=`), `javascript:` URLs, and any
395/// tag/attribute outside its safe allowlist. This is the security
396/// boundary: user-supplied markdown (plugin bodies, usage docs,
397/// reviews) is rendered, never trusted.
398/// 3. The result is wrapped in `Value::from_safe_string` so MiniJinja's
399/// autoescape emits the generated tags as markup instead of
400/// re-escaping them into `<...>`.
401///
402/// Why sanitize after rendering rather than trusting the parser: raw
403/// HTML embedded in a markdown source (`<script>...`) passes straight
404/// through pulldown-cmark by design. ammonia is the layer that makes
405/// "render whatever the user typed" safe.
406///
407/// Deferred (separate slices): syntax highlighting on fenced code
408/// blocks (ammonia strips the `language-*` class today) and a
409/// configurable allowlist for embeds — see the gap entries.
410/// Register the global `static()` template function so templates can
411/// write `{{ static("admin/admin.css") }}` and get back a URL prefixed
412/// with the configured `static_url`.
413///
414/// `static_url` is captured into the closure when the environment is
415/// built (rather than read per-call) — the value is fixed for the
416/// process at `App::build()` time, and minijinja functions can't reach
417/// the ambient `Settings` directly. The dev-mode render path rebuilds
418/// the env per render via [`build_env`], so a `static_url` change would
419/// be picked up there too; in practice it never changes at runtime.
420///
421/// Resolution joins `static_url` and the argument with exactly one
422/// slash: a leading slash on the argument (`static("/admin/x")`) is
423/// trimmed so the result never double-slashes. With the default
424/// `static_url = "/static/"`, `static("admin/admin.css")` yields
425/// `"/static/admin/admin.css"`; with a CDN origin
426/// `static_url = "https://cdn.example.com/s/"` it yields
427/// `"https://cdn.example.com/s/admin/admin.css"`.
428/// A generated URL, returned to the template as SAFE unless it contains a character that
429/// could break out of the attribute it lands in (gaps3 #66).
430///
431/// `static()` and `media_url()` used to return a plain `String`, which minijinja
432/// autoescapes in HTML context — so `{{ static('css/app.css') }}` rendered as
433/// `href="/static/css/app.css"`. Browsers decode `/` back to `/`, so
434/// the stylesheet still loaded and the pages still looked right; it was working by
435/// accident, and any reader of the page source would reasonably conclude static serving
436/// was broken.
437///
438/// Marking the URL safe is what fixes it — but marking it *unconditionally* safe would be
439/// an XSS hole: `media_url(key)` takes a key that came from an uploaded filename, i.e.
440/// from a user, and a key containing `"` closes the `href` attribute. So a URL carrying
441/// any HTML-special character stays escaped. The path a template author writes by hand
442/// (`css/app.css`) never contains one; a hostile filename does, and it keeps its armour.
443pub fn safe_url(url: String) -> minijinja::Value {
444 // Escape if the value carries an HTML-special character (a hostile
445 // filename closing the `href` attribute) OR carries a dangerous URL
446 // scheme (`javascript:`, `data:`) — the char check alone let a
447 // scheme-based `href="javascript:…"` through unescaped (stored XSS in
448 // a staff-viewed admin page). `url_scheme_is_safe` allows only relative
449 // URLs and http/https, matching the img filter's guard.
450 if url.contains(['<', '>', '"', '\'', '&']) || !url_scheme_is_safe(&url) {
451 minijinja::Value::from(url)
452 } else {
453 minijinja::Value::from_safe_string(url)
454 }
455}
456
457fn register_static_function(env: &mut Environment<'static>, static_url: String) {
458 env.add_function("static", move |path: String| -> minijinja::Value {
459 // Route through the manifest-aware resolver so a `--hashed`
460 // collect makes `{{ static("css/app.css") }}` emit the
461 // content-hashed URL. The captured `static_url` is the fixed
462 // prefix; the manifest lookup is the only per-call ambient read.
463 if let Some(hashed) = crate::static_files::manifest_lookup(&path) {
464 return safe_url(join_static_url(&static_url, hashed));
465 }
466 safe_url(join_static_url(&static_url, &path))
467 });
468}
469
470/// Join a `static_url` prefix and an asset path with exactly one slash.
471///
472/// `static_url` is normalised to end in a slash by [`crate::settings`];
473/// the asset path may or may not lead with one, so its leading slash is
474/// trimmed before the join. With `static_url = "/static/"`,
475/// `join_static_url(.., "admin/admin.css")` yields
476/// `"/static/admin/admin.css"`.
477fn join_static_url(static_url: &str, path: &str) -> String {
478 format!("{}{}", static_url, path.trim_start_matches('/'))
479}
480
481/// Resolve an asset path against the ambient `static_url`, mirroring the
482/// `static()` template global outside a minijinja render.
483///
484/// Plugins that build their own minijinja [`Environment`] (the admin
485/// engine, for one) call this to register an equivalent `static()`
486/// function so their templates can write `{{ static("admin/admin.css") }}`
487/// and resolve through the same unified static pipeline URL as the core
488/// engine. Reads `static_url` from ambient [`crate::settings`], defaulting
489/// to `/static/` when settings aren't initialised yet (bare unit tests).
490pub fn resolve_static_url(path: &str) -> String {
491 let static_url = crate::settings::get_opt()
492 .map(|s| s.static_url.clone())
493 .unwrap_or_else(|| "/static/".to_string());
494
495 // Manifest cache-busting (hashed static-file storage): when
496 // `collectstatic --hashed` has run, a `staticfiles.json` maps the
497 // logical path the template wrote (`css/app.css`) to its
498 // content-hashed name (`css/app.<hash>.css`). Resolving to the hashed
499 // URL lets the asset carry far-future cache headers — the hash in the
500 // name changes whenever the bytes do, so a stale cache can never mask
501 // a new build. When no manifest is loaded (no `--hashed` run), the
502 // lookup misses and we serve the plain path exactly as before.
503 if let Some(hashed) = crate::static_files::manifest_lookup(path) {
504 return join_static_url(&static_url, hashed);
505 }
506
507 join_static_url(&static_url, path)
508}
509
510/// Register the global `media_url()` template function so a template can
511/// write `{{ media_url(plugin.logo) }}` and get back the public URL for a
512/// stored file/image KEY, resolved through the ambient
513/// [`crate::storage::Storage`] backend.
514///
515/// Mirrors the `static()` global ([`register_static_function`]) but for
516/// user-uploaded media instead of developer-shipped assets:
517/// `ImageField` / `FileField` serialize as the bare storage key, so
518/// `{{ media_url(plugin.logo) }}` (where `plugin.logo` is the key string)
519/// resolves to the storage backend's public URL.
520///
521/// - An empty key yields the empty string (the surrounding `{% if %}`
522/// guard skips the markup).
523/// - With no `Storage` backend registered, the raw key falls through
524/// unchanged.
525/// - A `None`/optional field serializes to null, which the template's
526/// `{% if %}` guard handles before the helper is ever called.
527fn register_media_url_function(env: &mut Environment<'static>) {
528 env.add_function("media_url", |key: String| -> minijinja::Value {
529 if key.is_empty() {
530 return minijinja::Value::from("");
531 }
532 let url = crate::storage::storage_opt()
533 .map(|s| s.url(&key))
534 .unwrap_or(key);
535 // NOTE: `key` is an uploaded filename — user-controlled. `safe_url` keeps the
536 // escaping on any URL carrying an HTML-special character, so a hostile name
537 // cannot break out of the attribute.
538 safe_url(url)
539 });
540}
541
542/// Register the `{{ querystring_with(current_query, key, value) }}` global
543/// (gaps/features #65 — template pagination). Rebuilds a querystring
544/// replacing one key while preserving every other parameter, the fiddly bit
545/// behind a pagination nav that has to carry `?sort=name` across every
546/// `?page=N` link. Backed by [`crate::pagination::querystring_with`] so the
547/// encode/replace logic stays in one place and is unit-tested there. The
548/// returned string has no leading `?`; the template prepends one.
549fn register_querystring_with_function(env: &mut Environment<'static>) {
550 env.add_function(
551 "querystring_with",
552 // `value` is a `minijinja::Value`, not a `String`: the nav passes
553 // `page.next_page_number` / `item.n`, which are integers, and
554 // minijinja does NOT auto-coerce an int arg into a `String`
555 // parameter — it'd raise a type error at render. Accepting `Value`
556 // and stringifying covers ints, strings, and bools uniformly.
557 |current_query: String, key: String, value: minijinja::Value| -> String {
558 crate::pagination::querystring_with(¤t_query, &key, &value.to_string())
559 },
560 );
561}
562
563fn register_markdown_filter(env: &mut Environment<'static>) {
564 env.add_filter("markdown", |input: String| -> minijinja::Value {
565 minijinja::Value::from_safe_string(render_markdown(&input))
566 });
567}
568
569/// Register the `{{ highlight_styles() }}` global: emits the generated
570/// `base16-ocean.dark` token stylesheet wrapped in a `<style>` block, for a
571/// base template to drop into `<head>` once. The CSS is a safe string
572/// (generated by syntect from a fixed theme, no user input), so it is
573/// marked safe to skip minijinja autoescape.
574fn register_highlight_styles_function(env: &mut Environment<'static>) {
575 env.add_function("highlight_styles", || -> minijinja::Value {
576 minijinja::Value::from_safe_string(format!("<style>{}</style>", highlight_css()))
577 });
578}
579
580/// features.md #67 — `{{ now() }}` / `{{ now("%Y-%m-%d") }}`. Renders the
581/// current UTC time, optionally via a chrono `strftime` format string.
582/// With no argument it emits RFC 3339 (e.g. `2026-06-13T10:30:00+00:00`).
583/// The reference built-in tag for the custom-tag surface.
584fn register_now_function(env: &mut Environment<'static>) {
585 env.add_function("now", |fmt: Option<String>| -> String {
586 let now = chrono::Utc::now();
587 match fmt {
588 Some(f) if !f.is_empty() => now.format(&f).to_string(),
589 _ => now.to_rfc3339(),
590 }
591 });
592}
593
594/// features.md #67 — `{{ price | currency }}` / `{{ price | currency("EUR") }}`.
595/// Formats a number as money: two decimals, thousands grouping, and a
596/// leading symbol for the common ISO codes (USD/EUR/GBP/JPY); an unknown
597/// code falls back to `1,234.56 CODE`. The reference built-in filter.
598fn register_currency_filter(env: &mut Environment<'static>) {
599 env.add_filter("currency", |amount: f64, code: Option<String>| -> String {
600 let code = code.unwrap_or_else(|| "USD".to_string());
601 let symbol = match code.as_str() {
602 "USD" | "AUD" | "CAD" | "NZD" => "$",
603 "EUR" => "€",
604 "GBP" => "£",
605 "JPY" | "CNY" => "¥",
606 "KES" => "KSh ",
607 _ => "",
608 };
609 // Sign goes outside the symbol: -$12.40, not $-12.40.
610 let sign = if amount < 0.0 { "-" } else { "" };
611 let body = group_thousands(amount.abs());
612 if symbol.is_empty() {
613 format!("{sign}{body} {code}")
614 } else {
615 format!("{sign}{symbol}{body}")
616 }
617 });
618}
619
620/// Format a float with two decimals and comma thousands separators on the
621/// integer part: `1234567.5 -> "1,234,567.50"`, `-12.4 -> "-12.40"`.
622fn group_thousands(amount: f64) -> String {
623 let negative = amount.is_sign_negative() && amount != 0.0;
624 let formatted = format!("{:.2}", amount.abs());
625 let (int_part, frac_part) = formatted.split_once('.').unwrap_or((&formatted, "00"));
626
627 let mut grouped = String::new();
628 let digits: Vec<char> = int_part.chars().collect();
629 for (i, ch) in digits.iter().enumerate() {
630 if i > 0 && (digits.len() - i) % 3 == 0 {
631 grouped.push(',');
632 }
633 grouped.push(*ch);
634 }
635 format!("{}{grouped}.{frac_part}", if negative { "-" } else { "" })
636}
637
638/// features.md #4 — register the `sanitize` filter: clean a string of
639/// HTML (e.g. the output of the admin's RTE widget, which stores
640/// HTML rather than markdown) down to ammonia's safe allowlist and
641/// hand it to the template as a safe string.
642///
643/// `{{ body | sanitize }}` is the display companion to the `rte`
644/// widget the way `{{ body | markdown }}` is to the `markdown` widget:
645/// the stored value is HTML, so it's sanitized — never trusted — before
646/// it reaches the page. A value tampered with via the REST write path
647/// (which doesn't go through the editor) is made safe here.
648fn register_sanitize_filter(env: &mut Environment<'static>) {
649 env.add_filter("sanitize", |input: String| -> minijinja::Value {
650 minijinja::Value::from_safe_string(sanitize_html(&input))
651 });
652}
653
654/// Clean `input` HTML down to ammonia's safe allowlist (strips
655/// `<script>`, event handlers, `javascript:` URLs, etc.). The
656/// non-markdown sibling of [`render_markdown`] — use it on stored HTML
657/// (the RTE widget's output).
658pub fn sanitize_html(input: &str) -> String {
659 ammonia::clean(input)
660}
661
662/// The class prefix syntect token spans carry (`hl-keyword`, `hl-string`,
663/// `hl-source`, …). Shared by the highlighter and the generated
664/// stylesheet so the two never drift.
665const HL_PREFIX: &str = "hl-";
666
667fn hl_class_style() -> ClassStyle {
668 ClassStyle::SpacedPrefixed { prefix: HL_PREFIX }
669}
670
671/// The bundled syntect syntax set, loaded once. The load parses a binary
672/// dump and is expensive, so it is cached for the life of the process.
673fn syntax_set() -> &'static SyntaxSet {
674 static SYNTAX_SET: OnceLock<SyntaxSet> = OnceLock::new();
675 SYNTAX_SET.get_or_init(SyntaxSet::load_defaults_newlines)
676}
677
678/// The `base16-ocean.dark` token stylesheet, generated once from syntect's
679/// bundled theme with the `hl-` class prefix. This is the single source of
680/// truth for token colors — the markdown highlighter emits matching
681/// classes. Returns `""` only if syntect cannot generate the CSS (it
682/// always can for a bundled theme), so callers never need to handle an
683/// error.
684pub fn highlight_css() -> &'static str {
685 static HIGHLIGHT_CSS: OnceLock<String> = OnceLock::new();
686 HIGHLIGHT_CSS
687 .get_or_init(|| {
688 let themes = ThemeSet::load_defaults();
689 match themes.themes.get("base16-ocean.dark") {
690 Some(theme) => {
691 css_for_theme_with_class_style(theme, hl_class_style()).unwrap_or_default()
692 }
693 None => String::new(),
694 }
695 })
696 .as_str()
697}
698
699/// Return `true` iff every character in a fence info token is safe to
700/// embed verbatim in a `class="language-…"` HTML attribute value.
701///
702/// A legitimate language token is just a word: `rust`, `c++`, `c#`,
703/// `shell`, `text/plain`, etc. It never needs `<`, `>`, `"`, `'`, `=`,
704/// backticks, or whitespace. Rejecting those characters closes the
705/// class-injection vector that would otherwise let a hostile fence like
706/// `` ```<script>alert(1)</script> `` survive ammonia's pass (ammonia
707/// allows `class` on `<code>` but does not filter the attribute VALUE).
708fn fence_lang_is_safe(lang: &str) -> bool {
709 !lang.is_empty()
710 && lang.len() <= 64
711 && lang.chars().all(|c| {
712 c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '+' | '-' | '_' | '.' | '#' | '/' | '@')
713 })
714}
715
716/// Render one fenced code block to safe HTML. `lang` is the fence info
717/// token (`Some("rust")`) or `None` for an unlabelled / indented block.
718/// With a known language the body is syntect-highlighted into `hl-` token
719/// spans; otherwise — or on any highlighter error — it falls back to a
720/// plain escaped block that still carries `class="language-…"` so the
721/// `md-enhance.js` label keeps working. Never panics, never drops the
722/// user's code.
723fn highlight_code_block(lang: Option<&str>, src: &str) -> String {
724 // Validate the lang token before touching it. A hostile fence info
725 // string (e.g. `<script>alert(1)</script>`) must never land in the
726 // `class="language-…"` attribute value even after HTML-escaping,
727 // because ammonia re-parses the tree and may not re-escape `<`/`>`
728 // that appear inside attribute values of allowed elements. Treating
729 // an unsafe token as `None` produces a plain unlabelled code block
730 // (still safe and still readable) rather than a class-injection path.
731 let lang = lang.filter(|l| fence_lang_is_safe(l));
732
733 let ss = syntax_set();
734 let syntax = lang.and_then(|l| {
735 ss.find_syntax_by_token(l)
736 .or_else(|| ss.find_syntax_by_extension(l))
737 });
738 if let Some(syntax) = syntax {
739 let mut generator =
740 ClassedHTMLGenerator::new_with_class_style(syntax, ss, hl_class_style());
741 let mut ok = true;
742 for line in LinesWithEndings::from(src) {
743 if generator
744 .parse_html_for_line_which_includes_newline(line)
745 .is_err()
746 {
747 ok = false;
748 break;
749 }
750 }
751 if ok {
752 // `finalize()` returns safe `<span class="hl-…">` markup —
753 // pass it through unescaped.
754 return wrap_code_block(lang, &generator.finalize());
755 }
756 }
757 // Fallback: escape the raw text so it is inert, then wrap.
758 let mut escaped = String::with_capacity(src.len());
759 html_escape_into(&mut escaped, src);
760 wrap_code_block(lang, &escaped)
761}
762
763/// Wrap inner code HTML (token spans, or escaped plain text) in
764/// `<pre><code class="language-…">` so the md-enhance frame + language
765/// label attach. The language token is HTML-escaped before it lands in the
766/// class value (it comes straight from the fence info string).
767fn wrap_code_block(lang: Option<&str>, inner: &str) -> String {
768 let mut out = String::with_capacity(inner.len() + 48);
769 out.push_str("<pre><code");
770 if let Some(l) = lang {
771 out.push_str(" class=\"language-");
772 html_escape_into(&mut out, l);
773 out.push('"');
774 }
775 out.push('>');
776 out.push_str(inner);
777 out.push_str("</code></pre>");
778 out
779}
780
781/// Render CommonMark + GFM `input` to sanitized HTML. Pulled out of the
782/// filter closure so it's unit-testable and reusable by any future
783/// Rust-side caller (e.g. a REST endpoint that returns pre-rendered
784/// HTML).
785pub fn render_markdown(input: &str) -> String {
786 use pulldown_cmark::{CodeBlockKind, Event, Options, Parser, Tag, TagEnd, html};
787
788 let mut options = Options::empty();
789 options.insert(Options::ENABLE_TABLES);
790 options.insert(Options::ENABLE_STRIKETHROUGH);
791 options.insert(Options::ENABLE_TASKLISTS);
792 options.insert(Options::ENABLE_FOOTNOTES);
793
794 let parser = Parser::new_ext(input, options);
795
796 // Rewrite the event stream: replace each code block with a single
797 // pre-highlighted Html event. The fence info token selects the syntect
798 // syntax; everything else passes through unchanged.
799 let mut events: Vec<Event> = Vec::new();
800 let mut in_code = false;
801 let mut code_lang: Option<String> = None;
802 let mut code_buf = String::new();
803 for event in parser {
804 match event {
805 Event::Start(Tag::CodeBlock(kind)) => {
806 in_code = true;
807 code_buf.clear();
808 code_lang = match kind {
809 CodeBlockKind::Fenced(info) => {
810 info.split_whitespace().next().map(str::to_string)
811 }
812 CodeBlockKind::Indented => None,
813 };
814 }
815 Event::End(TagEnd::CodeBlock) => {
816 in_code = false;
817 let highlighted = highlight_code_block(code_lang.as_deref(), &code_buf);
818 events.push(Event::Html(highlighted.into()));
819 }
820 Event::Text(text) if in_code => code_buf.push_str(&text),
821 other => events.push(other),
822 }
823 }
824
825 let mut rendered = String::new();
826 html::push_html(&mut rendered, events.into_iter());
827
828 // Sanitize. `pre`/`code`/`span` are already default-allowed tags, so we
829 // widen the allowlist by exactly one inert attribute — `class` on those
830 // three — letting syntect's `hl-` token spans and the `language-*` label
831 // survive. style / on* handlers / javascript: URLs stay stripped: this is
832 // the whole "safely" surface. Built per call: ammonia::Builder isn't Sync
833 // (boxed attribute_filter), so it can't be a shared static without a Mutex
834 // that would serialize rendering; this costs the same as ammonia::clean.
835 let mut cleaner = ammonia::Builder::default();
836 cleaner.add_tag_attributes("pre", &["class"]);
837 cleaner.add_tag_attributes("code", &["class"]);
838 cleaner.add_tag_attributes("span", &["class"]);
839 cleaner.clean(&rendered).to_string()
840}
841
842/// Tiny HTML attribute-value escape — covers the four characters
843/// that can break out of a double-quoted attribute context.
844/// Centralised here because the framework doesn't otherwise need
845/// to ship an html_escape crate dep just for the img filter.
846fn html_escape_into(out: &mut String, s: &str) {
847 for ch in s.chars() {
848 match ch {
849 '&' => out.push_str("&"),
850 '<' => out.push_str("<"),
851 '>' => out.push_str(">"),
852 '"' => out.push_str("""),
853 '\'' => out.push_str("'"),
854 c => out.push(c),
855 }
856 }
857}
858
859fn register_default_templates(
860 env: &mut Environment<'static>,
861 seen: &mut std::collections::HashSet<String>,
862) {
863 let entries = [
864 (
865 crate::errors::DEFAULT_404_TEMPLATE_NAME,
866 crate::errors::DEFAULT_404_HTML,
867 ),
868 (
869 crate::errors::DEFAULT_500_TEMPLATE_NAME,
870 crate::errors::DEFAULT_500_HTML,
871 ),
872 ];
873 for (name, source) in entries {
874 if seen.contains(name) {
875 continue; // already provided by user — skip
876 }
877 // These are compile-time constants so they're `&'static str`; we can
878 // add them without cloning via `add_template` (non-owned variant).
879 if env.add_template(name, source).is_ok() {
880 seen.insert(name.to_string());
881 }
882 }
883}
884
885/// Publish the template engine into the process-wide ambient handle.
886///
887/// `dirs` is the ordered list of directories to search — the first
888/// entry is searched first (highest priority). Typically this is:
889/// `[app_templates_dir, plugin_a_dir, plugin_b_dir, ...]`.
890///
891/// For each directory in order, every `.html` / `.htm` / `.txt` file is
892/// registered under its path-relative-to-that-dir name. If a name was
893/// already registered by an earlier directory, the later file is skipped
894/// and a `tracing::warn!` is emitted so the collision is visible.
895///
896/// If none of the directories exist, init succeeds with an empty engine.
897/// This is the right default for binaries that don't render HTML.
898///
899/// Returns the list of template names that collided (appeared in more
900/// than one directory). The caller (`App::build`) logs these via tracing.
901/// Tests can inspect the returned list to assert collision detection
902/// without needing a tracing subscriber.
903pub fn init(dirs: &[PathBuf]) -> Result<Vec<String>, TemplateError> {
904 let (env, collisions) = build_env(dirs)?;
905
906 for name in &collisions {
907 tracing::warn!(
908 template = %name,
909 "umbral templates: template `{name}` is provided by multiple directories; \
910 the first-registered copy wins"
911 );
912 }
913
914 // Stash the dirs so the dev-mode render path can rebuild the env
915 // on demand without re-running the (more expensive) init flow.
916 let _ = WATCHED_DIRS.set(dirs.to_vec());
917
918 ENGINE
919 .set(env)
920 .map_err(|_| TemplateError::AlreadyInitialised)?;
921 Ok(collisions)
922}
923
924/// Like [`init`], but also installs plugin-contributed
925/// [`TemplateRegistrar`]s (feature #67). The registrars are stashed in
926/// the process-wide [`REGISTRARS`] handle *before* the engine is built so
927/// [`build_env`] applies them — both here and on every dev-mode rebuild.
928///
929/// Called by `App::build` with the flattened registrars from every
930/// plugin's `template_registrars()`, in topological order. The plain
931/// [`init`] stays the no-plugin entry point used by template unit tests.
932pub fn init_with(
933 dirs: &[PathBuf],
934 registrars: Vec<TemplateRegistrar>,
935) -> Result<Vec<String>, TemplateError> {
936 // Set even when empty so a second (errant) init can't smuggle in a
937 // different registrar set behind the already-published engine.
938 let _ = REGISTRARS.set(registrars);
939 init(dirs)
940}
941
942/// Build a fresh `Environment` from the given dirs. Shared by the
943/// init path and the dev-mode hot-reload path; both produce
944/// bit-identical engines from the same input.
945fn build_env(dirs: &[PathBuf]) -> Result<(Environment<'static>, Vec<String>), TemplateError> {
946 let mut env = Environment::new();
947 // Autoescape extensions MUST stay in sync with the loader
948 // whitelist in `load_directory` (currently `html | htm | txt`).
949 // If you add `.svg` or `.xml` to the loader, add them HERE too
950 // — `.svg` carries inline-script XSS risk and `.xml` is generally
951 // parsed by something downstream that wants attribute escaping.
952 // `.txt` stays `None` because plaintext rendering shouldn't HTML-
953 // escape (would replace `<` with `<` in plain email bodies).
954 env.set_auto_escape_callback(|name| {
955 if name.ends_with(".html") || name.ends_with(".htm") {
956 AutoEscape::Html
957 } else {
958 AutoEscape::None
959 }
960 });
961
962 // gaps2 #21 — register the `img` filter for ergonomic, perf-
963 // forward image markup. `{{ url | img(alt="...", width=400,
964 // height=300) }}` expands to a fully-formed `<img>` with the
965 // hat-trick that catches LCP regressions out of the box:
966 // `loading="lazy"`, `decoding="async"`, explicit `width`/
967 // `height` to reserve layout space (no CLS), and an `alt`
968 // attribute that's empty rather than omitted (screen-reader-
969 // friendly default for purely decorative images). Optional
970 // `class="..."` flows through for Tailwind / scoped styling.
971 register_img_filter(&mut env);
972
973 // `{{ highlight_styles() }}` — the syntect token stylesheet for
974 // server-highlighted code, emitted once into <head> by a base template.
975 register_highlight_styles_function(&mut env);
976
977 // Unified static pipeline — `{{ static("admin/admin.css") }}`
978 // expands to `<static_url>admin/admin.css`. The `static_url` is read
979 // from ambient settings (defaulting to `/static/` when settings
980 // aren't initialised yet, e.g. in a bare template unit test) and
981 // captured into the function closure. See `register_static_function`.
982 let static_url = crate::settings::get_opt()
983 .map(|s| s.static_url.clone())
984 .unwrap_or_else(|| "/static/".to_string());
985 register_static_function(&mut env, static_url);
986
987 // `{{ media_url(plugin.logo) }}` resolves a stored file/image KEY
988 // through the ambient Storage backend's `url()`, the media-side
989 // companion to `static()`. ImageField/FileField serialize as the
990 // bare key; this turns it into the public URL. See
991 // `register_media_url_function`.
992 register_media_url_function(&mut env);
993
994 // features.md #4 — `{{ body | markdown }}` renders user-supplied
995 // CommonMark/GFM to sanitized HTML. The reusable "safely show a
996 // body/usage field" surface shared by the admin and end-user
997 // templates; pairs with `#[umbral(widget = "markdown")]` on the
998 // model field that captures the source.
999 register_markdown_filter(&mut env);
1000
1001 // features.md #4 — `{{ html | sanitize }}` cleans stored HTML (the
1002 // `rte` admin widget's output) to a safe allowlist. The HTML-side
1003 // companion to the markdown filter.
1004 register_sanitize_filter(&mut env);
1005
1006 // gaps2 #19 follow-up — render `None` / `Undefined` as the
1007 // empty string instead of the literal "none" / "undefined" tokens
1008 // MiniJinja defaults to. Bug screenshot 2026-06-10 01-08-30: an
1009 // `Option<String>` model field with `value=None` rendered into
1010 // `<input value="{{ form.phone }}">` produced `value="none"` on a
1011 // fresh form, which the user then has to manually clear before
1012 // typing. Every form with optional fields hit this footgun.
1013 //
1014 // Defining a custom formatter is the framework-level fix — every
1015 // template (admin, shop, plugins) inherits the new behaviour
1016 // automatically. Non-null/non-undefined values pass through the
1017 // default formatter unchanged so HTML escaping, number / bool /
1018 // string rendering, and safe-string handling stay identical.
1019 env.set_formatter(|out, state, value| {
1020 if value.is_none() || value.is_undefined() {
1021 return Ok(());
1022 }
1023 minijinja::escape_formatter(out, state, value)
1024 });
1025
1026 // features.md #67 — built-in example tags/filters. These ship as the
1027 // reference implementations for the custom-tag surface: `now()` for a
1028 // server-rendered timestamp, `currency` for money formatting. Plugins
1029 // add their own via `Plugin::template_registrars` (applied below).
1030 register_now_function(&mut env);
1031 register_currency_filter(&mut env);
1032
1033 // features #65 — `{{ querystring_with(base_query, "page", item.n) }}`
1034 // rebuilds the current querystring replacing one key, so the bundled
1035 // `_pagination.html` nav carries `?sort=...` filters across every
1036 // `?page=N` link. See `register_querystring_with_function`.
1037 register_querystring_with_function(&mut env);
1038
1039 // features.md #67 — plugin-contributed filters/functions. Applied
1040 // AFTER the built-ins so a plugin can deliberately override one by
1041 // re-registering the same name (minijinja's add_* overwrites). Runs
1042 // on every rebuild (dev hot-reload) because `Fn`, not `FnOnce`.
1043 if let Some(registrars) = REGISTRARS.get() {
1044 for registrar in registrars {
1045 registrar(&mut env);
1046 }
1047 }
1048
1049 let mut seen: HashSet<String> = HashSet::new();
1050 let mut collisions: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
1051
1052 // Register the built-in default error templates before scanning disk
1053 // directories. Because disk directories are first-match-wins and are
1054 // scanned after this call, a user template with the same name (unlikely,
1055 // since the `__umbral__/` prefix is reserved) would silently replace the
1056 // built-in. Callers who want a clean opt-out should use
1057 // `App::builder().disable_default_error_pages()`.
1058 register_default_templates(&mut env, &mut seen);
1059
1060 for dir in dirs {
1061 if dir.exists() {
1062 load_directory(&mut env, dir, dir, &mut seen, &mut collisions)?;
1063 }
1064 }
1065
1066 Ok((env, collisions))
1067}
1068
1069/// Render a template by name with a serde-serializable context value.
1070///
1071/// The name is the path relative to its templates directory, with
1072/// forward slashes regardless of host OS. `articles_list.html`,
1073/// `admin/base.html`, etc.
1074///
1075/// Returns `TemplateError::NotInitialised` if `App::build()` hasn't
1076/// run yet, `TemplateError::Missing` if the name doesn't match a
1077/// loaded template, and `TemplateError::Render` for any minijinja-
1078/// reported issue (syntax error, missing variable when strict undefined
1079/// is on, etc.).
1080pub fn render<C: Serialize>(name: &str, ctx: &C) -> Result<String, TemplateError> {
1081 // Dev-mode hot reload: when settings.environment == Dev, rebuild
1082 // the environment from disk on every render so template edits are
1083 // picked up without a server restart. This makes the dev loop —
1084 // edit `home.html`, hit reload, see the change — work without
1085 // `cargo run`-ing again. Production stays on the cached engine
1086 // for the fast path.
1087 //
1088 // Cost: one disk walk + minijinja parse per render in dev. For a
1089 // typical handler doing one render per request at ~10 RPS during
1090 // development, that's negligible. We chose this over per-file
1091 // stat checks because the per-render rebuild is dependency-free
1092 // and the staleness window is zero (a save followed instantly
1093 // by a reload always sees the new content).
1094 if dev_mode_active() {
1095 if let Some(dirs) = WATCHED_DIRS.get() {
1096 // Rebuild fresh; ignore collisions log here (init already
1097 // logged them once; we don't spam every render).
1098 match build_env(dirs) {
1099 Ok((env, _collisions)) => return render_with(&env, name, ctx),
1100 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1101 }
1102 }
1103 }
1104
1105 let env = ENGINE.get().ok_or(TemplateError::NotInitialised)?;
1106 render_with(env, name, ctx)
1107}
1108
1109/// Render an inline template source through the ambient-context path.
1110/// Test/bench helper only.
1111///
1112/// SECURITY (audit_2 core-templates-forms #3): this builds a fresh
1113/// `Environment`, whose minijinja default is `AutoEscape::None`. A no-escape
1114/// inline renderer that's `pub` (even `#[doc(hidden)]`) is an SSTI/XSS foot-gun
1115/// the moment any caller feeds it user data. We force `AutoEscape::Html` so
1116/// `{{ x }}` escapes exactly like a `.html` template rendered through
1117/// [`build_env`]; a caller that genuinely wants raw output opts in per value
1118/// with minijinja's `| safe`.
1119#[doc(hidden)]
1120pub fn render_str<C: Serialize>(src: &str, ctx: &C) -> Result<String, TemplateError> {
1121 let mut env = minijinja::Environment::new();
1122 env.set_auto_escape_callback(|_| AutoEscape::Html);
1123 env.add_template("__inline", src)
1124 .map_err(TemplateError::Render)?;
1125 render_with(&env, "__inline", ctx)
1126}
1127
1128/// True when the ambient settings say we're in Dev. Returns false if
1129/// settings haven't been initialised (production-style binaries that
1130/// never went through `App::build()`).
1131fn dev_mode_active() -> bool {
1132 crate::settings::get_opt()
1133 .map(|s| matches!(s.environment, crate::settings::Environment::Dev))
1134 .unwrap_or(false)
1135}
1136
1137/// Render a named template against the given env. Extracted so dev-mode
1138/// (fresh env per render) and prod (cached env) share one error mapping.
1139fn render_with<C: Serialize>(
1140 env: &Environment<'_>,
1141 name: &str,
1142 ctx: &C,
1143) -> Result<String, TemplateError> {
1144 let tmpl = env.get_template(name).map_err(|e| match e.kind() {
1145 minijinja::ErrorKind::TemplateNotFound => TemplateError::Missing(name.to_string()),
1146 _ => TemplateError::Render(e),
1147 })?;
1148 let merged = merge_ambient_context(ctx);
1149 tmpl.render(&merged).map_err(TemplateError::Render)
1150}
1151
1152/// Merge the ambient task-locals into a serializable template context:
1153/// `user` (from `CURRENT_USER`) and the CSRF pair `csrf_token` /
1154/// `csrf_input` (from `CURRENT_CSRF`). The handler's own keys always
1155/// win — the ambient injection is the default, not an override.
1156///
1157/// `user` is injected unconditionally (anonymous fallback below);
1158/// the CSRF pair only when a middleware actually scoped a token —
1159/// there is no meaningful fallback token, and rendering an empty
1160/// hidden input would make a form post a guaranteed-403 silently.
1161///
1162/// Most code should use [`render`], which calls this automatically.
1163/// Plugins that own a private MiniJinja environment can call this before
1164/// `Template::render` to get the same `{{ user }}`, `{{ csrf_token }}`,
1165/// and `{{ csrf_input }}` semantics as the framework renderer.
1166pub fn merge_ambient_context<C: Serialize>(ctx: &C) -> minijinja::Value {
1167 let ctx_value = minijinja::Value::from_serialize(ctx);
1168 merge_ambient_value(ctx_value)
1169}
1170
1171/// Same as [`merge_ambient_context`], but accepts an already-built
1172/// MiniJinja [`Value`](minijinja::Value). This is useful for private
1173/// plugin renderers that build context with `minijinja::context!`.
1174pub fn merge_ambient_value(ctx_value: minijinja::Value) -> minijinja::Value {
1175 let has = |key: &str| {
1176 ctx_value
1177 .get_attr(key)
1178 .map(|v| !v.is_undefined())
1179 .unwrap_or(false)
1180 };
1181
1182 let need_user = !has("user");
1183 let csrf = current_csrf();
1184 let need_csrf = csrf.is_some() && !(has("csrf_token") && has("csrf_input"));
1185
1186 if !need_user && !need_csrf {
1187 return ctx_value;
1188 }
1189
1190 // Build a fresh object that contains every original key plus the
1191 // ambient ones. minijinja's `Value::from_iter` over (key, value)
1192 // pairs produces a Map value; we walk the original keys and add
1193 // ours last.
1194 let mut pairs: Vec<(String, minijinja::Value)> = Vec::new();
1195 if let Ok(keys) = ctx_value.try_iter() {
1196 for key in keys {
1197 let key_str = key.to_string();
1198 if let Ok(v) = ctx_value.get_item(&key) {
1199 pairs.push((key_str, v));
1200 }
1201 }
1202 }
1203
1204 if need_user {
1205 // Resolve which `user` value should land in the rendered ctx:
1206 // 1. Task-local set by a middleware (AuthPlugin's
1207 // `user_context_layer`) — the live request shape.
1208 // 2. Anonymous fallback `{ is_authenticated: false }` for
1209 // callers WITHOUT a layer mounted AND for renders that
1210 // happen outside the middleware's scope (notably the
1211 // `render_500_middleware` recovery path — the
1212 // user-context task-local has already dropped by the time
1213 // the error layer renders, but the 500 template still
1214 // needs `user.is_authenticated` to evaluate cleanly).
1215 //
1216 // The fallback is the same shape `serialize_anonymous` would
1217 // produce, kept in core so umbral-auth isn't a dependency of
1218 // the templates module.
1219 // Prefer the lazy channel (proxy defers resolution until attribute access),
1220 // then the eager task-local, then the anonymous fallback.
1221 let user_value = if let Ok(lazy) = CURRENT_USER_LAZY.try_with(|lazy| lazy.clone()) {
1222 lazy.into_proxy_value()
1223 } else if let Some(v) = CURRENT_USER.try_with(|u| u.clone()).ok().flatten() {
1224 v
1225 } else {
1226 anonymous_user_value()
1227 };
1228 pairs.push(("user".to_string(), user_value));
1229 }
1230
1231 if let Some(token) = csrf {
1232 if !has("csrf_token") {
1233 pairs.push((
1234 "csrf_token".to_string(),
1235 minijinja::Value::from(token.clone()),
1236 ));
1237 }
1238 if !has("csrf_input") {
1239 // Today's tokens are hex (signed mode adds `.` + hex sig),
1240 // so the escape is belt-and-braces against a future
1241 // token-shape change — not a live attack surface.
1242 let escaped = token
1243 .replace('&', "&")
1244 .replace('"', """)
1245 .replace('<', "<")
1246 .replace('>', ">");
1247 pairs.push((
1248 "csrf_input".to_string(),
1249 minijinja::Value::from_safe_string(format!(
1250 r#"<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{escaped}">"#
1251 )),
1252 ));
1253 }
1254 }
1255
1256 minijinja::Value::from_iter(pairs)
1257}
1258
1259/// Anonymous-user sentinel — the value `user` resolves to in
1260/// templates rendered outside an authenticated context (no auth
1261/// middleware, anonymous request, or the 500-rendering path
1262/// where the middleware's task-local has already dropped).
1263/// Carries only `{ is_authenticated: false }` — enough for
1264/// `{% if user.is_authenticated %}` / `{% if user.is_staff %}`
1265/// to evaluate to false without `umbral templates: undefined
1266/// value` errors that would otherwise mask the original failure.
1267fn anonymous_user_value() -> minijinja::Value {
1268 let mut map = serde_json::Map::new();
1269 map.insert(
1270 "is_authenticated".to_string(),
1271 serde_json::Value::Bool(false),
1272 );
1273 // is_staff / is_superuser default to false too so a template
1274 // gating on either doesn't accidentally render the privileged
1275 // branch when `user` is the anonymous fallback.
1276 map.insert("is_staff".to_string(), serde_json::Value::Bool(false));
1277 map.insert("is_superuser".to_string(), serde_json::Value::Bool(false));
1278 minijinja::Value::from_serialize(serde_json::Value::Object(map))
1279}
1280
1281/// Walk a directory recursively and register every `.html` / `.htm` /
1282/// `.txt` file as a template under its path-relative-to-root name.
1283/// Subdirectories are reachable via forward-slash names: `admin/base.html`.
1284///
1285/// `seen` tracks which names have already been registered across all
1286/// directories. When a name collision is detected (a later directory
1287/// ships a template with the same relative name as an earlier one),
1288/// the duplicate is skipped and the name is appended to `collisions`.
1289/// First-match-wins.
1290fn load_directory(
1291 env: &mut Environment<'static>,
1292 root: &Path,
1293 dir: &Path,
1294 seen: &mut HashSet<String>,
1295 collisions: &mut Vec<String>,
1296) -> Result<(), TemplateError> {
1297 for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir)? {
1298 let entry = entry?;
1299 let path = entry.path();
1300 if path.is_dir() {
1301 load_directory(env, root, &path, seen, collisions)?;
1302 continue;
1303 }
1304 let Some(ext) = path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) else {
1305 continue;
1306 };
1307 if !matches!(ext, "html" | "htm" | "txt") {
1308 continue;
1309 }
1310 let rel: PathBuf = path
1311 .strip_prefix(root)
1312 .expect("walked path is rooted at the templates dir")
1313 .to_path_buf();
1314 // minijinja template names are forward-slashed regardless of OS;
1315 // the path display would emit `\` on Windows, so build the name
1316 // explicitly.
1317 let name: String = rel
1318 .components()
1319 .map(|c| c.as_os_str().to_string_lossy().to_string())
1320 .collect::<Vec<_>>()
1321 .join("/");
1322
1323 if seen.contains(&name) {
1324 // Collision: a higher-priority directory already registered
1325 // this name. Record it and skip; init will log after all
1326 // dirs are processed.
1327 if !collisions.contains(&name) {
1328 collisions.push(name.clone());
1329 }
1330 continue;
1331 }
1332
1333 let source = std::fs::read_to_string(&path)?;
1334 env.add_template_owned(name.clone(), source)
1335 .map_err(TemplateError::Render)?;
1336 seen.insert(name);
1337 }
1338 Ok(())
1339}
1340
1341/// Errors the template engine can produce. Narrow at v1: load-time IO,
1342/// engine-not-ready, missing template, render-time minijinja error.
1343#[derive(Debug)]
1344pub enum TemplateError {
1345 /// `App::build()` hasn't run yet, so the ambient engine isn't set.
1346 NotInitialised,
1347 /// `init` was called twice — a programming error in the framework
1348 /// itself, not the user. Surfaced as a `BuildError` if it ever fires.
1349 AlreadyInitialised,
1350 /// IO error reading a template file at boot.
1351 Io(std::io::Error),
1352 /// The requested template name isn't loaded.
1353 Missing(String),
1354 /// Any other minijinja error (syntax, render-time, etc.). The
1355 /// inner `minijinja::Error` carries the diagnostic (line / col /
1356 /// undefined name) so the caller can pass it through `Display`.
1357 Render(minijinja::Error),
1358}
1359
1360impl std::fmt::Display for TemplateError {
1361 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
1362 match self {
1363 TemplateError::NotInitialised => write!(
1364 f,
1365 "umbral templates: engine not initialised — call App::build() first"
1366 ),
1367 TemplateError::AlreadyInitialised => {
1368 write!(f, "umbral templates: init called more than once")
1369 }
1370 TemplateError::Io(e) => write!(f, "umbral templates: io: {e}"),
1371 TemplateError::Missing(name) => write!(
1372 f,
1373 "umbral templates: no template named `{name}`; check the templates directory"
1374 ),
1375 TemplateError::Render(e) => write!(f, "umbral templates: {e}"),
1376 }
1377 }
1378}
1379
1380impl std::error::Error for TemplateError {}
1381
1382impl From<std::io::Error> for TemplateError {
1383 fn from(e: std::io::Error) -> Self {
1384 Self::Io(e)
1385 }
1386}
1387
1388#[cfg(test)]
1389mod tests {
1390 use super::*;
1391 use serde_json::json;
1392
1393 #[test]
1394 fn img_url_scheme_safety() {
1395 // Relative + http(s) are allowed.
1396 assert!(url_scheme_is_safe("/media/cat.png"));
1397 assert!(url_scheme_is_safe("cat.png"));
1398 assert!(url_scheme_is_safe("../up/cat.png"));
1399 assert!(url_scheme_is_safe("http://example.com/cat.png"));
1400 assert!(url_scheme_is_safe("https://example.com/cat.png"));
1401 assert!(url_scheme_is_safe("HTTPS://EXAMPLE.com/cat.png"));
1402 assert!(url_scheme_is_safe("?query=only"));
1403 assert!(url_scheme_is_safe("#fragment"));
1404 // Dangerous / non-http schemes are rejected.
1405 assert!(!url_scheme_is_safe("javascript:alert(1)"));
1406 assert!(!url_scheme_is_safe(" javascript:alert(1)"));
1407 assert!(!url_scheme_is_safe("JaVaScRiPt:alert(1)"));
1408 assert!(!url_scheme_is_safe(
1409 "data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>"
1410 ));
1411 assert!(!url_scheme_is_safe("vbscript:msgbox(1)"));
1412 assert!(!url_scheme_is_safe("mailto:a@b.com"));
1413 // Malformed scheme (embedded control char) fails closed.
1414 assert!(!url_scheme_is_safe("java\u{0}script:alert(1)"));
1415 }
1416
1417 #[test]
1418 fn img_filter_neutralises_javascript_url() {
1419 let mut env = minijinja::Environment::new();
1420 register_img_filter(&mut env);
1421 env.add_template("t", "{{ url | img }}").unwrap();
1422 let tmpl = env.get_template("t").unwrap();
1423 let out = tmpl
1424 .render(minijinja::context! { url => "javascript:alert(1)" })
1425 .unwrap();
1426 assert!(
1427 !out.contains("javascript:"),
1428 "javascript: URL must be neutralised; got {out}"
1429 );
1430 assert!(out.contains("src=\"\""), "expected empty src; got {out}");
1431 }
1432
1433 #[test]
1434 fn nested_template_names_are_relative_to_templates_root() {
1435 let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
1436 let templates = tmp.path().join("templates");
1437 std::fs::create_dir_all(templates.join("base")).expect("create base template dir");
1438 std::fs::create_dir_all(templates.join("content")).expect("create content template dir");
1439
1440 std::fs::write(
1441 templates.join("base").join("site.html"),
1442 "<main>{% block content %}{% endblock %}</main>",
1443 )
1444 .expect("write nested base template");
1445 std::fs::write(
1446 templates.join("content").join("contact.html"),
1447 r#"{% extends "base/site.html" %}{% block content %}<h1>{{ title }}</h1><p>Contact from nested content.</p>{% endblock %}"#,
1448 )
1449 .expect("write nested content template");
1450
1451 let (env, collisions) = build_env(&[templates]).expect("build template env");
1452 assert!(collisions.is_empty());
1453
1454 let rendered = render_with(
1455 &env,
1456 "content/contact.html",
1457 &json!({ "title": "Nested contact" }),
1458 )
1459 .expect("render nested template by relative name");
1460
1461 assert!(rendered.contains("<main>"));
1462 assert!(rendered.contains("<h1>Nested contact</h1>"));
1463 assert!(rendered.contains("Contact from nested content."));
1464 }
1465
1466 /// Render `{{ static(arg) }}` against an env whose `static()` was
1467 /// registered with the given `static_url`. Exercises the helper
1468 /// directly without needing the ambient `Settings` OnceLock (which
1469 /// can't be set under cargo's parallel test runner).
1470 fn render_static(static_url: &str, arg: &str) -> String {
1471 let mut env = Environment::new();
1472 register_static_function(&mut env, static_url.to_string());
1473 env.add_template("t.txt", "{{ static(arg) }}")
1474 .expect("add template");
1475 let tmpl = env.get_template("t.txt").expect("get template");
1476 tmpl.render(json!({ "arg": arg })).expect("render")
1477 }
1478
1479 #[test]
1480 fn static_helper_prepends_root_relative_url() {
1481 assert_eq!(
1482 render_static("/static/", "admin/admin.css"),
1483 "/static/admin/admin.css"
1484 );
1485 }
1486
1487 #[test]
1488 fn static_helper_prepends_cdn_origin() {
1489 assert_eq!(
1490 render_static("https://cdn.example.com/s/", "admin/admin.css"),
1491 "https://cdn.example.com/s/admin/admin.css"
1492 );
1493 }
1494
1495 #[test]
1496 fn static_helper_does_not_double_slash_on_leading_slash_arg() {
1497 assert_eq!(render_static("/static/", "/admin/x"), "/static/admin/x");
1498 }
1499
1500 #[test]
1501 fn highlight_css_contains_hl_rules() {
1502 let css = highlight_css();
1503 assert!(!css.is_empty(), "generated theme CSS should not be empty");
1504 assert!(
1505 css.contains(".hl-"),
1506 "theme CSS must target hl- classes: {css}"
1507 );
1508 }
1509
1510 #[test]
1511 fn fenced_rust_block_gets_syntect_token_spans() {
1512 let html = render_markdown("```rust\nfn main() {}\n```\n");
1513 assert!(
1514 html.contains("language-rust"),
1515 "keeps the language class for the md-enhance label: {html}"
1516 );
1517 assert!(
1518 html.contains("class=\"hl-"),
1519 "emits syntect hl- token spans: {html}"
1520 );
1521 }
1522
1523 #[test]
1524 fn script_in_code_fence_is_escaped_not_executed() {
1525 let html = render_markdown("```\n<script>alert(1)</script>\n```\n");
1526 assert!(!html.contains("<script>"), "no live script tag: {html}");
1527 assert!(
1528 html.contains("<script>"),
1529 "rendered as inert text: {html}"
1530 );
1531 }
1532
1533 #[test]
1534 fn prose_script_is_still_stripped() {
1535 let html = render_markdown("hello <script>alert(1)</script> world");
1536 assert!(!html.contains("<script>"), "prose script stripped: {html}");
1537 }
1538
1539 #[test]
1540 fn markdown_allows_class_but_not_style() {
1541 let html = render_markdown("<span class=\"x\" style=\"color:red\">hi</span>");
1542 assert!(html.contains("class=\"x\""), "class survives: {html}");
1543 assert!(!html.contains("style="), "style stripped: {html}");
1544 }
1545
1546 #[test]
1547 fn unknown_and_plain_fences_do_not_panic() {
1548 let unknown = render_markdown("```notalanguage\nx := 1\n```\n");
1549 let plain = render_markdown("```\nplain text\n```\n");
1550 assert!(
1551 unknown.contains("<pre><code"),
1552 "unknown lang block: {unknown}"
1553 );
1554 assert!(plain.contains("<pre><code"), "plain block: {plain}");
1555 assert!(
1556 unknown.contains("language-notalanguage"),
1557 "unknown lang still labelled: {unknown}"
1558 );
1559 }
1560
1561 /// Security: a hostile fence info token (e.g. `<script>alert(1)</script>`)
1562 /// must NOT appear as a live tag in the output. `wrap_code_block` HTML-escapes
1563 /// the lang token before inserting it into the class attribute value, and
1564 /// ammonia's builder only permits `class` on `<code>` — it does not allow
1565 /// arbitrary attributes or values. So a `<script>` info string is inert.
1566 ///
1567 /// Also asserts that the SAFE path — a plain `language-rust` class on
1568 /// the `<code>` element — still survives after the widened allowlist so
1569 /// the syntect token spans have a hook. This is the regression pin for
1570 /// gaps2 #36 sub-part (a).
1571 #[test]
1572 fn hostile_fence_info_string_is_escaped_and_language_class_survives() {
1573 // Hostile: info token that looks like a script injection.
1574 let hostile = render_markdown("```<script>alert(1)</script>\ncode\n```\n");
1575 assert!(
1576 !hostile.contains("<script>"),
1577 "live <script> from fence info must be stripped: {hostile}"
1578 );
1579 // The escaped form will appear inside a class value; ammonia lets
1580 // class through but the content is HTML-escaped so it is inert.
1581 assert!(
1582 hostile.contains("<pre><code"),
1583 "code block structure must survive: {hostile}"
1584 );
1585
1586 // Hostile: info token with a class-injection attempt.
1587 let class_inject = render_markdown("```evil\" onmouseover=\"alert(1)\ncode\n```\n");
1588 assert!(
1589 !class_inject.contains("onmouseover"),
1590 "event handler injected via fence info must not survive: {class_inject}"
1591 );
1592
1593 // Safe: the normal case — language-rust class must survive so
1594 // syntect hl- spans (server-side) and the md-enhance label both work.
1595 let safe = render_markdown("```rust\nfn ok() {}\n```\n");
1596 assert!(
1597 safe.contains("language-rust"),
1598 "language-rust class must survive sanitization (gaps2 #36a): {safe}"
1599 );
1600 assert!(
1601 safe.contains("class=\"hl-"),
1602 "syntect hl- token spans must survive sanitization: {safe}"
1603 );
1604 }
1605
1606 #[test]
1607 fn highlight_styles_global_emits_a_style_block() {
1608 let mut env = Environment::new();
1609 register_highlight_styles_function(&mut env);
1610 env.add_template("t", "{{ highlight_styles() }}")
1611 .expect("add template");
1612 let out = env
1613 .get_template("t")
1614 .expect("get template")
1615 .render(())
1616 .expect("render");
1617 assert!(out.starts_with("<style>"), "wraps in a style block: {out}");
1618 assert!(out.contains(".hl-"), "carries the token CSS: {out}");
1619 assert!(
1620 out.trim_end().ends_with("</style>"),
1621 "closes the style block: {out}"
1622 );
1623 }
1624}