treeship_core/session/

receipt.rs

//! Session Receipt composer.
//!
//! Builds the canonical Session Receipt JSON from session events,
//! artifact store, and Merkle tree. The receipt is the composed
//! package-level artifact that unifies an entire session.

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

use crate::merkle::{InclusionProof, MerkleTree};

use super::event::SessionEvent;
use super::graph::AgentGraph;
use super::manifest::{
    HostInfo, LifecycleMode, Participants, RoomInfo, SessionManifest, SessionStatus, ToolInfo,
};
use super::render::RenderConfig;
use super::side_effects::SideEffects;

/// Receipt type identifier.
pub const RECEIPT_TYPE: &str = "treeship/session-receipt/v1";

/// Current receipt schema version. Receipts without this field are treated
/// as schema "0" and verified under legacy rules (pre-v0.9.0 shape).
pub const RECEIPT_SCHEMA_VERSION: &str = "1";

// ── Top-level receipt ────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// The complete Session Receipt.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SessionReceipt {
    /// Always "treeship/session-receipt/v1".
    #[serde(rename = "type")]
    pub type_: String,

    /// Schema version. Absent on pre-v0.9.0 receipts (treated as "0").
    /// Set to "1" for v0.9.0+ receipts.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub schema_version: Option<String>,

    pub session: SessionSection,
    pub participants: Participants,
    pub hosts: Vec<HostInfo>,
    pub tools: Vec<ToolInfo>,
    pub agent_graph: AgentGraph,
    pub timeline: Vec<TimelineEntry>,
    pub side_effects: SideEffects,
    pub artifacts: Vec<ArtifactEntry>,
    pub proofs: ProofsSection,
    pub merkle: MerkleSection,
    pub render: RenderConfig,
    /// Tool usage summary: declared vs actual tools used during the session.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub tool_usage: Option<ToolUsage>,

    /// What each action/v2 in this session was authorized to do, and whether it
    /// stayed inside that.
    ///
    /// Absent when the session contained no action/v2 receipts, which keeps
    /// older receipts byte-identical. Present-but-empty never happens: a
    /// session with nothing to say about authority says nothing, rather than
    /// showing an empty band that reads like a clean bill.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub authority: Option<AuthoritySection>,

    /// Who actually held the signing key, when that is not the actor.
    ///
    /// Absent means self-custody -- the actor signed for itself, which is the
    /// default and the strong case. Present means a service signed on the
    /// actor's behalf, which is a materially weaker claim and has to be
    /// legible as such rather than inferred from context.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub custody: Option<Custody>,
}

/// Who signed, when that is not the actor itself.
///
/// This is a **separate axis from `attestation_class`**, and keeping them
/// separate is the point. `attestation_class` grades how evidence was
/// *captured* (self / runtime / countersigned). Custody grades who held the
/// *key*. They vary independently: a service-mediated room can have excellent
/// runtime-captured evidence and still be custodially signed, and an agent
/// signing for itself can have nothing but its own word.
///
/// Collapsing them is the same error `EffectConfidence` and `EffectFinality`
/// exist to avoid -- one label carrying two unrelated questions, where a
/// reader cannot tell which one a value is answering.
///
/// The distinction is not cosmetic. Under self-custody, forging a
/// participant's action requires that participant's key. Under delegated
/// custody, a compromised service can mint any history it likes for every
/// actor it signs for. Same receipt shape, different threat model, so the
/// receipt says which.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Custody {
    /// Custody mode. Only `delegated` is ever serialized -- self-custody is
    /// represented by the whole section being absent, so existing receipts
    /// stay byte-identical and "no custody block" cannot be misread as
    /// "custody unknown".
    pub mode: CustodyMode,

    /// The identity whose key actually produced the signature, e.g.
    /// `svc://gateway-rooms`. This is who a verifier is really trusting.
    pub signer: String,

    /// The actor the signature is claimed to be *for*, e.g. `agent://fizz`.
    /// A verifier can confirm `signer` signed; it cannot confirm this actor
    /// agreed, and must not present it as though it could.
    pub on_behalf_of: String,

    /// Optional human-readable reason the actor did not sign for itself
    /// (e.g. "browser-mediated room; participants hold no local key").
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub reason: Option<String>,
}

/// How the signature relates to the actor it speaks for.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum CustodyMode {
    /// A service signed on the actor's behalf. The actor may hold no key at
    /// all. Upgrade path: the actor registers its own key and joins via
    /// `session invite` / `join` / `countersign`, which produces a
    /// two-signature participant event no service can forge.
    Delegated,
}

impl Custody {
    /// A service signing for an actor that holds no key of its own.
    pub fn delegated(signer: impl Into<String>, on_behalf_of: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            mode: CustodyMode::Delegated,
            signer: signer.into(),
            on_behalf_of: on_behalf_of.into(),
            reason: None,
        }
    }

    /// Attach the reason the actor did not sign for itself.
    pub fn with_reason(mut self, reason: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        self.reason = Some(reason.into());
        self
    }
}

/// Per-action authority for a session.
///
/// The signature layer answers "was this receipt tampered with". This answers
/// the question underneath it: was the action allowed, by whom, and what could
/// we not check. A session receipt that reports only the former reads as
/// complete while omitting the half a counterparty is actually deciding on.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AuthoritySection {
    pub actions: Vec<AuthorityEntry>,
    /// How many action/v2 receipts were judged.
    pub checked: u32,
    /// Actions that fell outside their grant. Any non-zero value is the
    /// headline.
    pub violations: u32,
    /// Actions where some layer could not be checked. Not violations, and not
    /// clean either -- counted separately so neither can hide in the other.
    pub unverified: u32,
    /// Actions run under a grant naming no holder, spendable by anyone who
    /// obtained it.
    pub bearer: u32,
}

/// One action's authority record.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AuthorityEntry {
    pub artifact_id: String,
    /// The action label, e.g. `payments.charge`.
    pub action: String,
    /// `pass` | `unverified` | `fail`.
    pub verdict: String,
    /// Why, in the verifier's own words. Empty on a clean pass.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
    pub reasons: Vec<String>,
    /// What the grant admitted.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
    pub scope: Vec<String>,
    pub audience: String,
    pub grant_id: String,
    /// Whether the grant named the key entitled to exercise it. `false` means
    /// bearer, and the surface must say so rather than leave it blank.
    pub holder_bound: bool,
    /// `not_claimed` | `holds` | `widened` | `unresolvable`.
    pub delegation: String,
    /// Hops in the resolved chain, when one was claimed.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub delegation_hops: Option<u32>,
    /// How far the state change got: `not_attempted` | `initiated` |
    /// `finalized` | `failed` | `indeterminate`.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub effect_finality: Option<String>,
    /// Whether anything is still owed: `resolved` | `indefinite` | `pending` |
    /// `breached` | `bad_deadline`.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub resolution: Option<String>,
}

/// Tool authorization and usage summary for the session.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ToolUsage {
    /// Tools declared as authorized (from declaration.json).
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
    pub declared: Vec<String>,
    /// Tools actually called during the session with invocation counts.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
    pub actual: Vec<ToolUsageEntry>,
    /// Tools called that were NOT in the declared list.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
    pub unauthorized: Vec<String>,
}

/// A single tool's usage count.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ToolUsageEntry {
    pub tool_name: String,
    pub count: u32,
}

/// Session metadata section of the receipt.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SessionSection {
    pub id: String,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub name: Option<String>,
    pub mode: LifecycleMode,
    pub started_at: String,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub ended_at: Option<String>,
    pub status: SessionStatus,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub duration_ms: Option<u64>,
    /// Ship ID this session ran under, parsed from the manifest actor URI
    /// (`ship://<ship_id>`). Absent on pre-v0.9.0 receipts or when the actor
    /// URI was not a ship:// URI (e.g. human://alice for a human-led session).
    /// Cross-verification uses this to check that a receipt and a presented
    /// Agent Certificate reference the same ship.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub ship_id: Option<String>,
    /// Workflow declaration bound into the signed session-start root action.
    /// This copy makes the binding visible on the composed session receipt;
    /// verifiers must compare it with the root action rather than trusting an
    /// unsigned manifest value.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub workflow_ref: Option<String>,
    /// Structured narrative for human review. All fields optional.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub narrative: Option<Narrative>,
    /// Cumulative input tokens across all agents.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub total_tokens_in: u64,
    /// Cumulative output tokens across all agents.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub total_tokens_out: u64,
    /// Room this session hosted, mirrored from the manifest. Carried here so
    /// `invitation_authority` sits inside the DSSE-signed payload instead of
    /// only in unsigned `session.json` -- see `RoomInfo`'s doc comment for
    /// why an unsigned authority field is a wire-controllable-dispatch-field
    /// risk. Absent for ordinary (non-room) sessions.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub room: Option<RoomInfo>,
}

/// Structured narrative for the session summary.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Narrative {
    /// One-line headline: "Verifier refactor completed."
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub headline: Option<String>,
    /// Multi-sentence summary of what happened.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub summary: Option<String>,
    /// What should be reviewed before trusting the output.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub review: Option<String>,
}

/// A single timeline entry.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TimelineEntry {
    pub sequence_no: u64,
    pub timestamp: String,
    pub event_id: String,
    pub event_type: String,
    pub agent_instance_id: String,
    pub agent_name: String,
    pub host_id: String,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub summary: Option<String>,
}

/// An artifact referenced in the session.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ArtifactEntry {
    pub artifact_id: String,
    pub payload_type: String,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub digest: Option<String>,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub signed_at: Option<String>,
    /// Signed during the session but never chained onto it (no `--parent`,
    /// or a parent off the sealed path). Sealed and signed like every other
    /// entry; its position relative to the chain is the signer's claim only.
    /// Absent (false) for chained entries and for every pre-0.31.2 receipt.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
    pub unchained: bool,
}

/// Proofs section of the receipt.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ProofsSection {
    #[serde(default)]
    pub signature_count: u32,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub signatures_valid: bool,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub merkle_root_valid: bool,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub inclusion_proofs_count: u32,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub zk_proofs_present: bool,
    /// Count of events.jsonl lines that were skipped during read_all
    /// because they failed to deserialize. Set by session::close from
    /// EventLog::read_all_with_stats. Codex adversarial review finding #8:
    /// without this in-band signal, a receipt sealed after malformed
    /// events were silently dropped looks complete to a verifier even
    /// when it isn't. `treeship package verify` surfaces this as a WARN
    /// when nonzero. Defaults to 0; absent on pre-v0.9.6 receipts so
    /// they still verify byte-identical.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "is_zero_u32")]
    pub event_log_skipped: u32,
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "is_zero_u32")]
    pub reconcile_untracked_truncated: u32,
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "is_zero_u32")]
    pub reconcile_untracked_cap: u32,
    /// AUD-07: the git-diff backstop was unavailable at close even though git
    /// worked at session start (start_commit_sha was captured). A file could
    /// have changed via a non-AgentWroteFile channel and the only backstop
    /// that would have caught it was disabled (`.git` removed, corrupt index,
    /// PATH-poisoned git), so the "Files changed" ledger may be incomplete.
    /// `package verify` WARNs on this. Absent on receipts sealed before this
    /// field so they stay byte-identical.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "is_false")]
    pub reconcile_degraded: bool,
}

fn is_zero_u32(n: &u32) -> bool {
    *n == 0
}
fn is_false(b: &bool) -> bool {
    !*b
}

/// Merkle section of the receipt.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct MerkleSection {
    pub leaf_count: usize,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub root: Option<String>,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub checkpoint_id: Option<String>,
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
    pub inclusion_proofs: Vec<InclusionProofEntry>,
    /// Merkle format version byte. Drives the leaf/internal hash dispatch
    /// at verify time. Absent on pre-v0.10.3 receipts — defaults to `1`
    /// (no domain separation) so v0.10.2 receipts continue to verify.
    /// New receipts always serialize `2` (RFC 9162 domain separation).
    #[serde(default = "crate::merkle::tree::default_merkle_version_v1")]
    pub merkle_version: u8,
}

impl Default for MerkleSection {
    fn default() -> Self {
        // Default newly-constructed sections to v2 — the in-the-wild
        // "default = v1" behavior only triggers when serde fills the
        // field for a JSON that omitted it (legacy receipts).
        Self {
            leaf_count: 0,
            root: None,
            checkpoint_id: None,
            inclusion_proofs: Vec::new(),
            merkle_version: crate::merkle::tree::MERKLE_VERSION_V2,
        }
    }
}

/// A Merkle inclusion proof entry.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct InclusionProofEntry {
    pub artifact_id: String,
    pub leaf_index: usize,
    pub proof: InclusionProof,
}

// ── Composer ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Composes a Session Receipt from events and artifacts.
pub struct ReceiptComposer;

impl ReceiptComposer {
    /// Compose a receipt from a session manifest, events, and optional artifact entries.
    pub fn compose(
        manifest: &SessionManifest,
        events: &[SessionEvent],
        artifact_entries: Vec<ArtifactEntry>,
    ) -> SessionReceipt {
        Self::compose_with_custody(manifest, events, artifact_entries, None)
    }

    /// Compose a receipt for a session whose actor did NOT hold the signing
    /// key -- a service signing on its behalf.
    ///
    /// Use this from any surface that mediates for actors who hold no key of
    /// their own (a browser-based room being the motivating case). Passing
    /// `None` is identical to [`compose`]: self-custody is the absence of the
    /// block, so nothing is added to the signed bytes and existing receipts
    /// stay byte-identical.
    ///
    /// Recording it is not optional politeness. A receipt naming
    /// `agent://fizz` when a service actually signed is a lie of omission, and
    /// it is the kind that surfaces in someone else's security review rather
    /// than ours.
    pub fn compose_with_custody(
        manifest: &SessionManifest,
        events: &[SessionEvent],
        artifact_entries: Vec<ArtifactEntry>,
        custody: Option<Custody>,
    ) -> SessionReceipt {
        // Build agent graph
        let agent_graph = AgentGraph::from_events(events);

        // Build side effects
        let side_effects = SideEffects::from_events(events);

        // Build timeline from all events
        let mut timeline: Vec<TimelineEntry> = events
            .iter()
            .map(|e| TimelineEntry {
                sequence_no: e.sequence_no,
                timestamp: e.timestamp.clone(),
                event_id: e.event_id.clone(),
                event_type: event_type_label(&e.event_type),
                agent_instance_id: e.agent_instance_id.clone(),
                agent_name: e.agent_name.clone(),
                host_id: e.host_id.clone(),
                summary: event_summary(&e.event_type),
            })
            .collect();

        // Sort by (timestamp, sequence_no, event_id) for determinism
        timeline.sort_by(|a, b| {
            a.timestamp
                .cmp(&b.timestamp)
                .then(a.sequence_no.cmp(&b.sequence_no))
                .then(a.event_id.cmp(&b.event_id))
        });

        // Compute participants from graph
        let participants = compute_participants(&agent_graph, manifest);

        // Compute hosts and tools from events
        let hosts = compute_hosts(events, &manifest.hosts);
        let tools = compute_tools(events, &manifest.tools);

        // Compute duration from the session close event if present
        let duration_ms = events.iter().find_map(|e| {
            if let super::event::EventType::SessionClosed { duration_ms, .. } = &e.event_type {
                *duration_ms
            } else {
                None
            }
        });

        // Build Merkle tree from artifact IDs
        let (merkle_section, merkle_tree) = build_merkle(&artifact_entries);

        // Proofs section. zk_proofs_present defaults to false here;
        // the CLI caller sets it to true after compose if proof files
        // exist in the session directory.
        let proofs = ProofsSection {
            signature_count: artifact_entries.len() as u32,
            // AUD-01: compose does NOT run a signature-verification pass over
            // the artifacts, so this must not claim signatures were verified.
            // A `true` here was a self-asserted "valid" flag baked into the
            // signed receipt that a consumer could mistake for an independent
            // verification result. It stays false unless a real verify pass
            // sets it.
            signatures_valid: false,
            merkle_root_valid: merkle_tree.is_some(),
            inclusion_proofs_count: merkle_section.inclusion_proofs.len() as u32,
            zk_proofs_present: false,
            event_log_skipped: 0, // Set by caller after compose (Codex #8)
            reconcile_untracked_truncated: 0,
            reconcile_untracked_cap: 0,
            reconcile_degraded: false, // Set by caller after compose (AUD-07)
        };

        // Compute cost/token totals from agent graph
        // Cost is deliberately not aggregated. See event.rs comment.
        let total_tokens_in: u64 = agent_graph.nodes.iter().map(|n| n.tokens_in).sum();
        let total_tokens_out: u64 = agent_graph.nodes.iter().map(|n| n.tokens_out).sum();

        // Session section
        let session = SessionSection {
            id: manifest.session_id.clone(),
            name: manifest.name.clone(),
            mode: manifest.mode.clone(),
            started_at: manifest.started_at.clone(),
            ended_at: manifest.closed_at.clone(),
            status: manifest.status.clone(),
            duration_ms,
            ship_id: parse_ship_id_from_actor(&manifest.actor),
            workflow_ref: manifest.workflow_ref.clone(),
            narrative: manifest.summary.as_ref().map(|s| Narrative {
                headline: manifest.name.clone(),
                summary: Some(s.clone()),
                review: None,
            }),
            total_tokens_in,
            total_tokens_out,
            room: manifest.room.clone(),
        };

        // Render config
        let render = RenderConfig {
            title: manifest.name.clone(),
            theme: None,
            sections: RenderConfig::default_sections(),
            generate_preview: true,
        };

        // Derive tool usage from side effects + manifest authorized_tools
        let tool_usage = derive_tool_usage(&side_effects, &manifest.authorized_tools);

        SessionReceipt {
            type_: RECEIPT_TYPE.into(),
            schema_version: Some(RECEIPT_SCHEMA_VERSION.into()),
            session,
            participants,
            hosts,
            tools,
            agent_graph,
            timeline,
            side_effects,
            artifacts: artifact_entries,
            proofs,
            merkle: merkle_section,
            render,
            tool_usage,
            // Composed from storage by the caller, which is the layer that can
            // load envelopes and run the verifier. The composer sees only
            // manifest + events + artifact metadata.
            authority: None,
            custody,
        }
    }

    /// Produce deterministic canonical JSON bytes from a receipt.
    ///
    /// Uses serde's field-declaration-order serialization for determinism.
    /// The resulting bytes are suitable for hashing.
    pub fn to_canonical_json(receipt: &SessionReceipt) -> Result<Vec<u8>, serde_json::Error> {
        serde_json::to_vec(receipt)
    }

    /// Compute SHA-256 digest of the canonical receipt JSON.
    pub fn digest(receipt: &SessionReceipt) -> Result<String, serde_json::Error> {
        let bytes = Self::to_canonical_json(receipt)?;
        let hash = Sha256::digest(&bytes);
        Ok(format!("sha256:{}", hex::encode(hash)))
    }
}

// ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

fn compute_participants(graph: &AgentGraph, manifest: &SessionManifest) -> Participants {
    use std::collections::BTreeSet;

    let mut tool_runtimes: BTreeSet<String> = BTreeSet::new();
    // Count unique agents
    let total_agents = graph.nodes.len() as u32;
    let spawned_subagents = graph.spawn_count();
    let handoffs = graph.handoff_count();
    let max_depth = graph.max_depth();
    let host_ids = graph.host_ids();

    // Collect tool runtimes from events in manifest
    for tool in &manifest.tools {
        if let Some(ref rt) = tool.tool_runtime_id {
            tool_runtimes.insert(rt.clone());
        }
    }

    // Find root agent (depth 0, first started)
    let root = graph
        .nodes
        .iter()
        .filter(|n| n.depth == 0)
        .min_by_key(|n| n.started_at.as_deref().unwrap_or(""))
        .map(|n| n.agent_instance_id.clone());

    // Find final output agent (last completed at max depth or last completed overall)
    let final_output = graph
        .nodes
        .iter()
        .filter(|n| n.completed_at.is_some())
        .max_by_key(|n| n.completed_at.as_deref().unwrap_or(""))
        .map(|n| n.agent_instance_id.clone());

    Participants {
        root_agent_instance_id: root.or(manifest.participants.root_agent_instance_id.clone()),
        final_output_agent_instance_id: final_output
            .or(manifest.participants.final_output_agent_instance_id.clone()),
        total_agents,
        spawned_subagents,
        handoffs,
        max_depth,
        hosts: host_ids.len() as u32,
        tool_runtimes: tool_runtimes.len() as u32,
    }
}

fn compute_hosts(events: &[SessionEvent], manifest_hosts: &[HostInfo]) -> Vec<HostInfo> {
    use std::collections::BTreeMap;

    let mut hosts: BTreeMap<String, HostInfo> = BTreeMap::new();

    // Seed from manifest
    for h in manifest_hosts {
        hosts.insert(h.host_id.clone(), h.clone());
    }

    // Discover from events
    for e in events {
        hosts.entry(e.host_id.clone()).or_insert_with(|| HostInfo {
            host_id: e.host_id.clone(),
            hostname: None,
            os: None,
            arch: None,
        });
    }

    hosts.into_values().collect()
}

fn compute_tools(events: &[SessionEvent], manifest_tools: &[ToolInfo]) -> Vec<ToolInfo> {
    use std::collections::BTreeMap;

    let mut tools: BTreeMap<String, ToolInfo> = BTreeMap::new();

    // Seed from manifest
    for t in manifest_tools {
        tools.insert(t.tool_id.clone(), t.clone());
    }

    // Count tool invocations from events
    for e in events {
        if let super::event::EventType::AgentCalledTool { ref tool_name, .. } = e.event_type {
            let entry = tools.entry(tool_name.clone()).or_insert_with(|| ToolInfo {
                tool_id: tool_name.clone(),
                tool_name: tool_name.clone(),
                tool_runtime_id: e.tool_runtime_id.clone(),
                invocation_count: 0,
            });
            entry.invocation_count += 1;
        }
    }

    tools.into_values().collect()
}

fn build_merkle(artifacts: &[ArtifactEntry]) -> (MerkleSection, Option<MerkleTree>) {
    if artifacts.is_empty() {
        return (MerkleSection::default(), None);
    }

    let mut tree = MerkleTree::new();
    for art in artifacts {
        tree.append(&art.artifact_id);
    }

    let root = tree.root().map(|r| format!("mroot_{}", hex::encode(r)));

    // Build inclusion proofs for each artifact
    let inclusion_proofs: Vec<InclusionProofEntry> = artifacts
        .iter()
        .enumerate()
        .filter_map(|(i, art)| {
            tree.inclusion_proof(i).map(|proof| InclusionProofEntry {
                artifact_id: art.artifact_id.clone(),
                leaf_index: i,
                proof,
            })
        })
        .collect();

    let section = MerkleSection {
        leaf_count: artifacts.len(),
        root,
        checkpoint_id: None,
        inclusion_proofs,
        merkle_version: tree.version(),
    };

    (section, Some(tree))
}

/// Extract the ship_id from an actor URI of the form `ship://<id>`.
/// Returns None for other URI schemes (human://, agent://) or malformed values.
pub fn parse_ship_id_from_actor(actor: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let rest = actor.strip_prefix("ship://")?;
    // Strip any trailing path segment so `ship://ship_abc/foo` -> `ship_abc`.
    let id = rest.split('/').next().unwrap_or(rest);
    if id.is_empty() {
        None
    } else {
        Some(id.to_string())
    }
}

/// Extract a human-readable label from an EventType.
/// Derive tool usage from side effects and the declared authorized tools list.
///
/// Bug Codex caught in adversarial review: previously this function counted
/// only `side_effects.tool_invocations` (built from `EventType::AgentCalledTool`).
/// But Claude Code's PostToolUse hook emits SPECIALIZED events for built-in
/// tools (`agent.wrote_file` for Write/Edit, `agent.completed_process` for
/// Bash, `agent.read_file` for Read, etc) -- those events never landed in
/// `tool_invocations`, so a certificate that omitted "Bash" or "Write"
/// passed cross-verification cleanly even when the agent ran them.
///
/// The fix: also count side effects from specialized event types under
/// canonical tool names that match what an operator would declare in
/// `bounded_actions`. Naming follows Claude Code conventions (Read, Write,
/// Bash, WebFetch) since those are the tools users actually declare. A
/// cert that uses an alternate naming scheme (e.g. `files.write`) needs
/// to declare both for now -- a future TODO is canonical mapping at the
/// cert layer.
/// Side-effect canonical mapping for tool authorization.
///
/// Each entry maps a side-effect bucket to a canonical tool name AND a
/// list of accepted aliases. The canonical name is what gets recorded
/// in `tool_usage.actual`. Any alias from the authorized_tools list
/// counts as authorization for the canonical name.
///
/// Codex round-2 caught two bugs in the round-1 fix:
///
/// 1. The round-1 mapping used Claude-Code TitleCase ("Read", "Write",
///    "Bash") but the existing CLI -- `treeship declare --tools
///    read_file,write_file,bash` per declare.rs:80 and `treeship agent
///    register --tools read_file,write_file,bash` per main.rs:226 --
///    teaches users lowercase snake_case names. So a cert that follows
///    the documented convention got every actual tool flagged as
///    unauthorized. Aliases close that gap: declarations in either
///    convention authorize the same canonical entry.
///
/// 2. The round-1 logic counted side effects regardless of provenance.
///    `git-reconcile` synthetic writes (the backstop layer) registered
///    as tool use even though no actual tool was directly attributed
///    for them. A build script that touched a file made the receipt
///    say "Write tool was used", and the cert had to authorize Write
///    or fail cross-verify -- even though the agent never invoked any
///    Write tool. Below, only direct-attribution sources (`hook`,
///    `mcp`, `shell-wrap`, `session-event-cli`, and untagged legacy
///    events) count toward tool usage. Backstop sources (`git-reconcile`,
///    `daemon-atime`) surface in the receipt's "Files changed" section
///    so the reader sees the change, but they do NOT claim that an
///    agent tool was the proximate cause. See source_attributes_a_tool
///    below for the authoritative allow list.
const TOOL_ALIASES: &[(&str, &[&str])] = &[
    // Canonical first; rest are accepted aliases.
    ("read_file", &["read_file", "Read"]),
    (
        "write_file",
        &[
            "write_file",
            "Write",
            "Edit",
            "MultiEdit",
            "NotebookEdit",
            "edit_file",
        ],
    ),
    ("bash", &["bash", "Bash", "shell"]),
    ("web_fetch", &["web_fetch", "WebFetch", "webfetch"]),
];

/// Returns true iff `source` represents a direct tool attribution that
/// should count toward `tool_usage.actual`.
///
/// Direct attribution sources -- a real tool fired and the channel
/// captured it:
///   - `hook`              integration hook saw the tool fire
///   - `mcp`               promoted from MCP-bridge agent.called_tool
///   - `shell-wrap`        `treeship wrap` captured a shell command
///   - `session-event-cli` `treeship session event` from a hook script.
///                         The Claude Code plugin's PostToolUse hook
///                         calls `treeship session event --type
///                         agent.wrote_file --file X`, and the CLI
///                         tags those as "session-event-cli" -- so
///                         excluding this label would make every
///                         claude-code-plugin event invisible to
///                         cross-verify.
///   - None                legacy untagged event (back-compat)
///
/// Backstop / inference sources -- a file changed but no tool was
/// directly attributed. Surface in the receipt's "Files changed"
/// section so the reader sees the change but they must NOT inflate
/// tool_usage:
///   - `git-reconcile`     git diff at session close
///   - `daemon-atime`      atime-based file detection
fn source_attributes_a_tool(source: Option<&str>) -> bool {
    matches!(
        source,
        None | Some("hook") | Some("mcp") | Some("shell-wrap") | Some("session-event-cli"),
    )
}

/// Counts side effects by canonical tool name, filtering out
/// non-attribution sources (git-reconcile, daemon-atime).
fn count_attributed<'a, F>(
    items: usize,
    source_at: F,
    canonical: &str,
    counts: &mut std::collections::BTreeMap<String, u32>,
) where
    F: Fn(usize) -> Option<&'a str>,
{
    let n: u32 = (0..items)
        .filter(|i| source_attributes_a_tool(source_at(*i)))
        .count() as u32;
    if n > 0 {
        *counts.entry(canonical.to_string()).or_insert(0) += n;
    }
}

fn derive_tool_usage(side_effects: &SideEffects, authorized_tools: &[String]) -> Option<ToolUsage> {
    use std::collections::BTreeMap;

    let total_specialized = side_effects.files_read.len()
        + side_effects.files_written.len()
        + side_effects.processes.len()
        + side_effects.network_connections.len();

    if side_effects.tool_invocations.is_empty()
        && total_specialized == 0
        && authorized_tools.is_empty()
    {
        return None;
    }

    let mut counts: BTreeMap<String, u32> = BTreeMap::new();

    // Generic agent.called_tool events use the tool's actual name.
    // The MCP bridge writes meta.source = "mcp-bridge" (which is not
    // in source_attributes_a_tool's allow list) but tool_invocations
    // come ONLY from agent.called_tool, which is direct attribution
    // by definition -- so count all of them, no source filter applies
    // here. (The bridge tool name is the source.)
    for inv in &side_effects.tool_invocations {
        *counts.entry(inv.tool_name.clone()).or_insert(0) += 1;
    }

    // Specialized side effects, source-filtered: only direct
    // attribution (hook / mcp / shell-wrap / untagged-legacy) counts.
    // git-reconcile and friends surface in the "Files changed" section
    // for the reader but do NOT inflate tool_usage.
    let fr = &side_effects.files_read;
    count_attributed(
        fr.len(),
        |i| fr[i].source.as_deref(),
        "read_file",
        &mut counts,
    );
    let fw = &side_effects.files_written;
    count_attributed(
        fw.len(),
        |i| fw[i].source.as_deref(),
        "write_file",
        &mut counts,
    );
    let pr = &side_effects.processes;
    count_attributed(pr.len(), |i| pr[i].source.as_deref(), "bash", &mut counts);
    // network_connections has no source field today; treat all as
    // attributed (this matches the round-1 behavior since there's no
    // backstop layer producing network entries).
    if !side_effects.network_connections.is_empty() {
        *counts.entry("web_fetch".to_string()).or_insert(0) +=
            side_effects.network_connections.len() as u32;
    }

    let actual: Vec<ToolUsageEntry> = counts
        .iter()
        .map(|(name, &count)| ToolUsageEntry {
            tool_name: name.clone(),
            count,
        })
        .collect();

    // Authorization check uses alias resolution: an actual tool is
    // unauthorized only if NONE of its aliases are in the declared
    // list. So a declaration of "read_file" authorizes both "Read"
    // (Claude convention) and "read_file" (CLI convention) when they
    // produce the canonical "read_file" actual entry.
    let unauthorized = if authorized_tools.is_empty() {
        Vec::new()
    } else {
        let declared_set: std::collections::BTreeSet<&str> =
            authorized_tools.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
        counts
            .keys()
            .filter(|actual_name| !is_authorized(actual_name, &declared_set))
            .cloned()
            .collect()
    };

    Some(ToolUsage {
        declared: authorized_tools.to_vec(),
        actual,
        unauthorized,
    })
}

/// Returns true if `actual_name` (or any of its declared aliases) is
/// in the declared set. Aliases mean a cert can use either Claude
/// convention or snake_case CLI convention and still authorize the
/// same canonical bucket.
fn is_authorized(actual_name: &str, declared_set: &std::collections::BTreeSet<&str>) -> bool {
    // Direct hit: the declared set names this tool exactly.
    if declared_set.contains(actual_name) {
        return true;
    }
    // Alias hit: walk the canonical mapping and see if any alias of
    // the canonical bucket the actual_name belongs to is in declared.
    for (canonical, aliases) in TOOL_ALIASES {
        if *canonical == actual_name || aliases.contains(&actual_name) {
            for alias in *aliases {
                if declared_set.contains(*alias) {
                    return true;
                }
            }
            return false;
        }
    }
    false
}

fn event_type_label(et: &super::event::EventType) -> String {
    use super::event::EventType::*;
    match et {
        SessionStarted => "session.started",
        SessionClosed { .. } => "session.closed",
        AgentStarted { .. } => "agent.started",
        AgentSpawned { .. } => "agent.spawned",
        AgentHandoff { .. } => "agent.handoff",
        AgentCollaborated { .. } => "agent.collaborated",
        AgentReturned { .. } => "agent.returned",
        AgentCompleted { .. } => "agent.completed",
        AgentFailed { .. } => "agent.failed",
        AgentCalledTool { .. } => "agent.called_tool",
        AgentReadFile { .. } => "agent.read_file",
        AgentWroteFile { .. } => "agent.wrote_file",
        AgentOpenedPort { .. } => "agent.opened_port",
        AgentConnectedNetwork { .. } => "agent.connected_network",
        AgentStartedProcess { .. } => "agent.started_process",
        AgentCompletedProcess { .. } => "agent.completed_process",
        AgentDecision { .. } => "agent.decision",
    }
    .into()
}

/// Optional human-readable summary from an EventType.
fn event_summary(et: &super::event::EventType) -> Option<String> {
    use super::event::EventType::*;
    match et {
        SessionStarted => Some("Session started".into()),
        SessionClosed { summary, .. } => summary.clone().or(Some("Session closed".into())),
        AgentSpawned { reason, .. } => reason.clone(),
        AgentHandoff {
            from_agent_instance_id,
            to_agent_instance_id,
            ..
        } => Some(format!(
            "{from_agent_instance_id} -> {to_agent_instance_id}"
        )),
        AgentCalledTool { tool_name, .. } => Some(format!("Called {tool_name}")),
        AgentReadFile { file_path, .. } => Some(format!("Read {file_path}")),
        AgentWroteFile { file_path, .. } => Some(format!("Wrote {file_path}")),
        AgentOpenedPort { port, .. } => Some(format!("Opened port {port}")),
        AgentConnectedNetwork { destination, .. } => Some(format!("Connected to {destination}")),
        AgentStartedProcess { process_name, .. } => Some(format!("Started {process_name}")),
        AgentCompletedProcess {
            process_name,
            exit_code,
            ..
        } => Some(format!(
            "Completed {process_name} (exit {})",
            exit_code.unwrap_or(-1)
        )),
        AgentCompleted { termination_reason } => termination_reason
            .clone()
            .or(Some("Agent completed".into())),
        AgentFailed { reason } => reason.clone().or(Some("Agent failed".into())),
        AgentDecision {
            model,
            summary,
            provider,
            ..
        } => {
            let mut parts = Vec::new();
            if let Some(s) = summary {
                parts.push(s.clone());
            }
            if let Some(m) = model {
                parts.push(format!("model: {m}"));
            }
            if let Some(p) = provider {
                parts.push(format!("via {p}"));
            }
            if parts.is_empty() {
                Some("LLM decision".into())
            } else {
                Some(parts.join(" | "))
            }
        }
        _ => None,
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::session::event::*;

    fn make_manifest() -> SessionManifest {
        SessionManifest::new(
            "ssn_001".into(),
            "agent://test".into(),
            "2026-04-05T08:00:00Z".into(),
            1743843600000,
        )
    }

    /// Module-level event constructor so the tool-authorization regression
    /// tests below can reuse it without each redefining the closure.
    fn mk(seq: u64, inst: &str, et: EventType) -> SessionEvent {
        SessionEvent {
            session_id: "ssn_001".into(),
            event_id: format!("evt_{:016x}", seq),
            timestamp: format!("2026-04-05T08:{:02}:00Z", seq),
            sequence_no: seq,
            trace_id: "trace_1".into(),
            span_id: format!("span_{seq}"),
            parent_span_id: None,
            agent_id: format!("agent://{inst}"),
            agent_instance_id: inst.into(),
            agent_name: inst.into(),
            agent_role: None,
            host_id: "host_1".into(),
            tool_runtime_id: None,
            event_type: et,
            artifact_ref: None,
            meta: None,
        }
    }

    fn make_events() -> Vec<SessionEvent> {
        vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            mk(
                1,
                "root",
                EventType::AgentStarted {
                    parent_agent_instance_id: None,
                },
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "worker",
                EventType::AgentSpawned {
                    spawned_by_agent_instance_id: "root".into(),
                    reason: Some("review".into()),
                },
            ),
            mk(
                3,
                "worker",
                EventType::AgentCalledTool {
                    tool_name: "read_file".into(),
                    tool_input_digest: None,
                    tool_output_digest: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(5),
                },
            ),
            mk(
                4,
                "worker",
                EventType::AgentWroteFile {
                    file_path: "src/fix.rs".into(),
                    digest: None,
                    operation: None,
                    additions: None,
                    deletions: None,
                },
            ),
            mk(
                5,
                "worker",
                EventType::AgentCompleted {
                    termination_reason: None,
                },
            ),
            mk(
                6,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: Some("Done".into()),
                    duration_ms: Some(360000),
                },
            ),
        ]
    }

    #[test]
    fn compose_receipt() {
        let manifest = make_manifest();
        let events = make_events();
        let artifacts = vec![
            ArtifactEntry {
                artifact_id: "art_001".into(),
                payload_type: "action".into(),
                digest: None,
                signed_at: None,
                unchained: false,
            },
            ArtifactEntry {
                artifact_id: "art_002".into(),
                payload_type: "action".into(),
                digest: None,
                signed_at: None,
                unchained: false,
            },
        ];

        let receipt = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, artifacts);

        assert_eq!(receipt.type_, RECEIPT_TYPE);
        assert_eq!(receipt.session.id, "ssn_001");
        assert_eq!(receipt.timeline.len(), 7);
        assert_eq!(receipt.agent_graph.nodes.len(), 2); // root + worker
        assert_eq!(receipt.side_effects.files_written.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(receipt.merkle.leaf_count, 2);
        assert!(receipt.merkle.root.is_some());
    }

    #[test]
    fn composed_receipt_mirrors_bound_workflow_reference() {
        let mut manifest = make_manifest();
        manifest.workflow_ref = Some("art_0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".into());

        let receipt = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &make_events(), vec![]);

        assert_eq!(
            receipt.session.workflow_ref.as_deref(),
            Some("art_0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")
        );
        let json = ReceiptComposer::to_canonical_json(&receipt).unwrap();
        assert!(String::from_utf8(json)
            .unwrap()
            .contains(r#""workflow_ref":"art_0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef""#));
    }

    #[test]
    fn new_receipts_carry_schema_version() {
        let manifest = make_manifest();
        let events = make_events();
        let artifacts = vec![ArtifactEntry {
            artifact_id: "art_001".into(),
            payload_type: "action".into(),
            digest: None,
            signed_at: None,
            unchained: false,
        }];
        let receipt = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, artifacts);
        assert_eq!(
            receipt.schema_version.as_deref(),
            Some(RECEIPT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
        );
        // And it shows up in canonical JSON.
        let json =
            String::from_utf8(ReceiptComposer::to_canonical_json(&receipt).unwrap()).unwrap();
        assert!(
            json.contains(r#""schema_version":"1""#),
            "missing schema_version: {json}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn legacy_receipt_without_schema_version_round_trips_byte_identical() {
        // Simulate a pre-v0.9.0 receipt by composing one and stripping the
        // schema_version field. Re-serializing must produce byte-identical
        // output so the package-level determinism check keeps passing for
        // old receipts that nobody can re-sign.
        let manifest = make_manifest();
        let events = make_events();
        let artifacts = vec![ArtifactEntry {
            artifact_id: "art_001".into(),
            payload_type: "action".into(),
            digest: None,
            signed_at: None,
            unchained: false,
        }];
        let mut receipt = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, artifacts);
        receipt.schema_version = None; // mimic a legacy receipt

        let original = ReceiptComposer::to_canonical_json(&receipt).unwrap();
        // Verify the field is omitted, not serialized as null.
        let original_str = std::str::from_utf8(&original).unwrap();
        assert!(
            !original_str.contains("schema_version"),
            "schema_version must be skipped when None"
        );

        let parsed: SessionReceipt = serde_json::from_slice(&original).unwrap();
        assert!(
            parsed.schema_version.is_none(),
            "legacy receipts must parse with schema_version=None"
        );

        let reserialized = ReceiptComposer::to_canonical_json(&parsed).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            original, reserialized,
            "legacy receipt must round-trip byte-identical so package determinism check passes"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn canonical_json_is_deterministic() {
        let manifest = make_manifest();
        let events = make_events();
        let artifacts = vec![ArtifactEntry {
            artifact_id: "art_001".into(),
            payload_type: "action".into(),
            digest: None,
            signed_at: None,
            unchained: false,
        }];

        let r1 = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, artifacts.clone());
        let r2 = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, artifacts);

        let j1 = ReceiptComposer::to_canonical_json(&r1).unwrap();
        let j2 = ReceiptComposer::to_canonical_json(&r2).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(j1, j2);

        let d1 = ReceiptComposer::digest(&r1).unwrap();
        let d2 = ReceiptComposer::digest(&r2).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(d1, d2);
    }

    // ── Tool authorization regression tests (Codex finding #1) ──
    //
    // Specialized event types (agent.wrote_file, agent.completed_process,
    // agent.read_file) must contribute to tool_usage.actual so that a
    // certificate's bounded_actions list can correctly flag unauthorized
    // built-in tool usage. Before this fix, only agent.called_tool fed
    // tool_usage.actual, so a cert that omitted "Bash" still passed even
    // when the agent ran Bash via Claude Code's built-in.

    fn manifest_with_authorized(tools: Vec<&str>) -> SessionManifest {
        let mut m = make_manifest();
        m.authorized_tools = tools.into_iter().map(String::from).collect();
        m
    }

    #[test]
    fn cert_omitting_bash_flags_unauthorized_when_session_runs_bash() {
        // Cert uses CLI-documented snake_case names (declare.rs:80,
        // main.rs:226). Round-2 fix: canonical actual is "bash" not
        // "Bash"; round-1 was flagging mismatches the wrong way.
        let manifest = manifest_with_authorized(vec!["read_file", "write_file"]); // NO bash
        let events = vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            mk(
                1,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentCompletedProcess {
                    process_name: "rm -rf /".into(),
                    exit_code: Some(0),
                    duration_ms: Some(50),
                    command: Some("rm -rf /".into()),
                },
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(1000),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let receipt = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, vec![]);
        let tu = receipt.tool_usage.expect("tool_usage must be populated");
        assert!(
            tu.unauthorized.iter().any(|t| t == "bash"),
            "bash must be flagged as unauthorized when cert omits it; got unauthorized={:?}, actual={:?}",
            tu.unauthorized, tu.actual,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn cert_omitting_write_flags_unauthorized_when_session_writes_file() {
        let manifest = manifest_with_authorized(vec!["read_file", "bash"]); // NO write_file
        let events = vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            mk(
                1,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentWroteFile {
                    file_path: "src/secret.rs".into(),
                    digest: None,
                    operation: Some("modified".into()),
                    additions: Some(10),
                    deletions: Some(0),
                },
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(1000),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let receipt = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, vec![]);
        let tu = receipt.tool_usage.expect("tool_usage must be populated");
        assert!(
            tu.unauthorized.iter().any(|t| t == "write_file"),
            "write_file must be flagged as unauthorized when cert omits it; got unauthorized={:?}, actual={:?}",
            tu.unauthorized, tu.actual,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn cert_includes_read_write_bash_passes_clean_when_all_used() {
        let manifest = manifest_with_authorized(vec!["read_file", "write_file", "bash"]);
        let events = vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            mk(
                1,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentReadFile {
                    file_path: "package.json".into(),
                    digest: None,
                },
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentWroteFile {
                    file_path: "src/lib.rs".into(),
                    digest: None,
                    operation: Some("modified".into()),
                    additions: Some(5),
                    deletions: Some(2),
                },
            ),
            mk(
                3,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentCompletedProcess {
                    process_name: "bun test".into(),
                    exit_code: Some(0),
                    duration_ms: Some(2000),
                    command: Some("bun test".into()),
                },
            ),
            mk(
                4,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(5000),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let receipt = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, vec![]);
        let tu = receipt.tool_usage.expect("tool_usage must be populated");
        assert!(
            tu.unauthorized.is_empty(),
            "all tools declared in cert should pass clean; got unauthorized={:?}",
            tu.unauthorized,
        );
        // The actual list uses canonical lowercase names that match what
        // `treeship declare --tools` and `treeship agent register --tools`
        // teach (declare.rs:80, main.rs:226).
        let actual_names: std::collections::BTreeSet<String> =
            tu.actual.iter().map(|e| e.tool_name.clone()).collect();
        assert!(actual_names.contains("read_file"));
        assert!(actual_names.contains("write_file"));
        assert!(actual_names.contains("bash"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn webfetch_unauthorized_flagged_when_cert_omits_it() {
        let manifest = manifest_with_authorized(vec!["read_file", "write_file", "bash"]); // NO web_fetch
        let events = vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            mk(
                1,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentConnectedNetwork {
                    destination: "evil.example.com".into(),
                    port: Some(443),
                },
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(1000),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let receipt = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, vec![]);
        let tu = receipt.tool_usage.expect("tool_usage must be populated");
        assert!(
            tu.unauthorized.iter().any(|t| t == "web_fetch"),
            "web_fetch must be flagged as unauthorized when cert omits it; got unauthorized={:?}",
            tu.unauthorized,
        );
    }

    // ── Round-2 fix tests: alias matching + source filtering ──

    fn evt_with_source(event_type: EventType, source: &str) -> SessionEvent {
        let mut e = mk(99, "agent", event_type);
        e.meta = Some(serde_json::json!({"source": source}));
        e
    }

    #[test]
    fn titlecase_cert_authorizes_canonical_snake_actuals_via_alias() {
        // Operator declares Claude convention. Aliases map "Read" to
        // canonical "read_file", "Write" to "write_file", etc.
        let manifest = manifest_with_authorized(vec!["Read", "Write", "Bash"]);
        let events = vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            mk(
                1,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentReadFile {
                    file_path: "x".into(),
                    digest: None,
                },
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentWroteFile {
                    file_path: "y".into(),
                    digest: None,
                    operation: None,
                    additions: None,
                    deletions: None,
                },
            ),
            mk(
                3,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentCompletedProcess {
                    process_name: "z".into(),
                    exit_code: Some(0),
                    duration_ms: Some(1),
                    command: None,
                },
            ),
            mk(
                4,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(1000),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let tu = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, vec![])
            .tool_usage
            .unwrap();
        assert!(
            tu.unauthorized.is_empty(),
            "TitleCase declarations must authorize canonical snake_case actuals via aliases; \
             got unauthorized={:?}",
            tu.unauthorized,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn edit_alias_authorizes_specialized_wrote_file() {
        // Operator declares "Edit" specifically. post-tool-use.sh
        // emits agent.wrote_file for Edit/MultiEdit alike, so the
        // canonical actual is "write_file". Edit is in the write_file
        // alias list, so the cert authorizes.
        let manifest = manifest_with_authorized(vec!["Edit"]);
        let events = vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            mk(
                1,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentWroteFile {
                    file_path: "x".into(),
                    digest: None,
                    operation: None,
                    additions: None,
                    deletions: None,
                },
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(1000),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let tu = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, vec![])
            .tool_usage
            .unwrap();
        assert!(
            tu.unauthorized.is_empty(),
            "Edit alias must authorize write_file"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn git_reconcile_writes_dont_count_toward_tool_usage() {
        // Backstop evidence -- not direct tool attribution.
        // A git-reconciled change must NOT make the cert require
        // write_file authorization, because no Write tool was invoked.
        let manifest = manifest_with_authorized(vec!["read_file"]);
        let events = vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            evt_with_source(
                EventType::AgentWroteFile {
                    file_path: "CHANGELOG.md".into(),
                    digest: None,
                    operation: Some("modified".into()),
                    additions: Some(7),
                    deletions: Some(2),
                },
                "git-reconcile",
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(1000),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let tu = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, vec![])
            .tool_usage
            .unwrap();
        assert!(
            !tu.unauthorized.iter().any(|t| t == "write_file"),
            "git-reconcile entries must NOT count toward tool_usage; \
             got unauthorized={:?}, actual={:?}",
            tu.unauthorized,
            tu.actual,
        );
        let actual_names: std::collections::BTreeSet<String> =
            tu.actual.iter().map(|e| e.tool_name.clone()).collect();
        assert!(
            !actual_names.contains("write_file"),
            "actual must not include backstop-only writes"
        );
    }

    // session-event-cli is a direct-attribution source -- the standard
    // label the CLI stamps on events emitted by claude-code-plugin's
    // PostToolUse hook. So it counts toward tool_usage.actual just like
    // hook/mcp/shell-wrap do. The end-to-end test for this lives in
    // the targeted acceptance suite (T1) rather than as a unit test
    // here, because it requires the full event-emission + receipt-
    // composition pipeline running through `treeship session event`.

    #[test]
    fn hook_emitted_writes_still_count_toward_tool_usage() {
        // Positive case: regular hook-emitted write IS direct attribution.
        let manifest = manifest_with_authorized(vec!["read_file"]); // NO write_file
        let events = vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            evt_with_source(
                EventType::AgentWroteFile {
                    file_path: "src/x.rs".into(),
                    digest: None,
                    operation: None,
                    additions: None,
                    deletions: None,
                },
                "hook",
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(1000),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let tu = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, vec![])
            .tool_usage
            .unwrap();
        assert!(
            tu.unauthorized.iter().any(|t| t == "write_file"),
            "hook-emitted writes MUST count toward tool_usage; got unauthorized={:?}",
            tu.unauthorized,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn legacy_untagged_writes_count_for_back_compat() {
        // Pre-v0.9.6 events have no source tag. Treat as attributed
        // (back-compat: receipts produced before source labeling existed).
        let manifest = manifest_with_authorized(vec!["read_file"]); // NO write_file
        let events = vec![
            mk(0, "root", EventType::SessionStarted),
            mk(
                1,
                "agent",
                EventType::AgentWroteFile {
                    file_path: "x".into(),
                    digest: None,
                    operation: None,
                    additions: None,
                    deletions: None,
                },
            ),
            mk(
                2,
                "root",
                EventType::SessionClosed {
                    summary: None,
                    duration_ms: Some(1000),
                },
            ),
        ];
        let tu = ReceiptComposer::compose(&manifest, &events, vec![])
            .tool_usage
            .unwrap();
        assert!(
            tu.unauthorized.iter().any(|t| t == "write_file"),
            "legacy untagged writes must count for back-compat",
        );
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod custody_tests {
    use super::*;

    /// Self-custody is absence, not a value. Existing receipts must stay
    /// byte-identical, and a missing block must not read as "unknown".
    #[test]
    fn self_custody_serializes_to_nothing() {
        let c: Option<Custody> = None;
        let json = serde_json::to_string(&serde_json::json!({ "custody": c })).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(json, r#"{"custody":null}"#);
        // ...and on the real struct the field is skipped entirely:
        #[derive(Serialize)]
        struct Holder {
            #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
            custody: Option<Custody>,
        }
        let s = serde_json::to_string(&Holder { custody: None }).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(s, "{}", "self-custody must add no bytes");
    }

    /// A delegated receipt must name BOTH parties. Recording only the actor
    /// would present a service signature as the actor's own; recording only
    /// the signer would lose who the claim is about.
    #[test]
    fn delegated_custody_names_signer_and_subject() {
        let c = Custody::delegated("svc://gateway-rooms", "agent://fizz")
            .with_reason("browser-mediated room; participants hold no local key");
        let v = serde_json::to_value(&c).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(v["mode"], "delegated");
        assert_eq!(v["signer"], "svc://gateway-rooms");
        assert_eq!(v["on_behalf_of"], "agent://fizz");
        assert!(v["reason"].as_str().unwrap().contains("no local key"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn reason_is_optional_and_omitted_when_unset() {
        let c = Custody::delegated("svc://x", "agent://y");
        let v = serde_json::to_value(&c).unwrap();
        assert!(v.get("reason").is_none(), "unset reason must not serialize");
    }

    /// Round-trips through JSON unchanged -- this rides inside signed bytes,
    /// so a lossy field would break verification, not just display.
    #[test]
    fn custody_round_trips() {
        let c = Custody::delegated("svc://gateway-rooms", "agent://fizz").with_reason("r");
        let back: Custody = serde_json::from_str(&serde_json::to_string(&c).unwrap()).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(c, back);
    }

    /// Custody and attestation_class are independent axes. A service-signed
    /// receipt can carry runtime-captured evidence -- good evidence, delegated
    /// key -- and the two labels must not be inferred from each other.
    #[test]
    fn custody_is_orthogonal_to_evidence_capture() {
        let receipt = serde_json::json!({
            "attestation_class": "runtime",
            "custody": Custody::delegated("svc://gateway-rooms", "agent://fizz"),
        });
        assert_eq!(receipt["attestation_class"], "runtime");
        assert_eq!(receipt["custody"]["mode"], "delegated");
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod custody_wiring_tests {
    use super::*;

    /// The schema is the gate: `validate("session.v1", ..)` runs fail-closed
    /// before anything is signed, so a custody block the schema rejects would
    /// mean a service literally cannot emit an honest receipt. That is the
    /// state this test exists to prevent -- the type existed for a while with
    /// no schema entry, which made it decorative.
    #[test]
    fn a_delegated_receipt_passes_predicate_validation() {
        let payload = serde_json::json!({
            "session_id": "ssn_room_demo",
            "actor": "agent://fizz",
            "outcome": "completed",
            "started_at": "2026-08-10T10:00:00Z",
            "closed_at": "2026-08-10T10:30:00Z",
            "attestation_class": "runtime",
            "receipt_digest": format!("sha256:{}", "a".repeat(64)),
            "custody": {
                "mode": "delegated",
                "signer": "svc://gateway-rooms",
                "on_behalf_of": "agent://fizz",
                "reason": "browser-mediated room; participants hold no local key"
            }
        });
        crate::predicates::validate("session.v1", Some(&payload))
            .expect("a delegated-custody receipt must validate");
    }

    /// Self-custody stays byte-identical: no block, no schema objection.
    #[test]
    fn a_self_custody_receipt_still_validates() {
        let payload = serde_json::json!({
            "session_id": "ssn_plain",
            "actor": "ship://local",
            "outcome": "completed",
            "started_at": "2026-08-10T10:00:00Z",
            "closed_at": "2026-08-10T10:30:00Z",
            "attestation_class": "self",
            "receipt_digest": format!("sha256:{}", "b".repeat(64)),
        });
        crate::predicates::validate("session.v1", Some(&payload))
            .expect("a self-custody receipt must validate");
    }

    /// A custody block missing `signer` names no one -- recording "delegated"
    /// without saying delegated to WHOM is worse than omitting it, because it
    /// tells a reader the actor did not sign while withholding who did.
    ///
    /// Core's validator does NOT catch this: it is documented as "a small,
    /// dependency-free structural check" over TOP-LEVEL required fields and
    /// does not recurse into nested objects. The `required` list inside the
    /// custody schema is therefore documentation for consumers running a full
    /// JSON Schema validator, not something core enforces.
    ///
    /// What actually holds the invariant is the Rust type: `signer` and
    /// `on_behalf_of` are `String`, not `Option<String>`, so a `Custody`
    /// cannot be constructed without them. This test pins that, and pins the
    /// validator's limit so nobody assumes a guarantee that is not there.
    #[test]
    fn custody_requires_a_signer_by_type_not_by_validator() {
        // The type will not let you omit it.
        let c = Custody::delegated("svc://gateway-rooms", "agent://fizz");
        assert!(!c.signer.is_empty());
        assert!(!c.on_behalf_of.is_empty());

        // And core's validator, by design, does not police nested shape --
        // asserting otherwise would encode a guarantee we do not offer.
        let payload = serde_json::json!({
            "session_id": "ssn_bad",
            "actor": "agent://fizz",
            "outcome": "completed",
            "started_at": "2026-08-10T10:00:00Z",
            "closed_at": "2026-08-10T10:30:00Z",
            "attestation_class": "self",
            "receipt_digest": format!("sha256:{}", "c".repeat(64)),
            "custody": { "mode": "delegated", "on_behalf_of": "agent://fizz" }
        });
        assert!(
            crate::predicates::validate("session.v1", Some(&payload)).is_ok(),
            "core validates top-level fields only; if this starts failing the \
             validator gained nested checking and the doc comment above is stale"
        );
    }

    /// `compose_with_custody(.., None)` must be indistinguishable from
    /// `compose` -- otherwise adding the parameter silently changed every
    /// existing receipt.
    #[test]
    fn none_custody_composes_identically() {
        let m = SessionManifest::new(
            "ssn_x".into(),
            "ship://local".into(),
            "2026-08-10T10:00:00Z".into(),
            1_760_000_000_000,
        );
        let a = ReceiptComposer::compose(&m, &[], Vec::new());
        let b = ReceiptComposer::compose_with_custody(&m, &[], Vec::new(), None);
        assert_eq!(
            serde_json::to_string(&a).unwrap(),
            serde_json::to_string(&b).unwrap()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn delegated_custody_reaches_the_composed_receipt() {
        let m = SessionManifest::new(
            "ssn_y".into(),
            "agent://fizz".into(),
            "2026-08-10T10:00:00Z".into(),
            1_760_000_000_000,
        );
        let r = ReceiptComposer::compose_with_custody(
            &m,
            &[],
            Vec::new(),
            Some(Custody::delegated("svc://gateway-rooms", "agent://fizz")),
        );
        let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(v["custody"]["signer"], "svc://gateway-rooms");
        assert_eq!(v["custody"]["on_behalf_of"], "agent://fizz");
    }
}