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//! Implementation for using Rustls with a runtime.
use crate::traits::{CertifiedConn, TlsConnector, TlsProvider};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use futures::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite};
use futures_rustls::rustls;
use rustls::client::danger;
use rustls::{CertificateError, Error as TLSError};
use rustls_pki_types::{CertificateDer as Certificate, ServerName};
use std::{
io::{self, Error as IoError, Result as IoResult},
sync::Arc,
};
/// A [`TlsProvider`] that uses `rustls`.
///
/// It supports wrapping any reasonable stream type that implements `AsyncRead` + `AsyncWrite`.
#[cfg_attr(
docsrs,
doc(cfg(all(feature = "rustls", any(feature = "tokio", feature = "async-std"))))
)]
#[derive(Clone)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct RustlsProvider {
/// Inner `ClientConfig` logic used to create connectors.
config: Arc<futures_rustls::rustls::ClientConfig>,
}
impl<S> CertifiedConn for futures_rustls::client::TlsStream<S> {
fn peer_certificate(&self) -> IoResult<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
let (_, session) = self.get_ref();
Ok(session
.peer_certificates()
.and_then(|certs| certs.first().map(|c| Vec::from(c.as_ref()))))
}
}
/// An implementation of [`TlsConnector`] built with `rustls`.
pub struct RustlsConnector<S> {
/// The inner connector object.
connector: futures_rustls::TlsConnector,
/// Phantom data to ensure proper variance.
_phantom: std::marker::PhantomData<fn(S) -> S>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl<S> TlsConnector<S> for RustlsConnector<S>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
type Conn = futures_rustls::client::TlsStream<S>;
async fn negotiate_unvalidated(&self, stream: S, sni_hostname: &str) -> IoResult<Self::Conn> {
let name: ServerName<'_> = sni_hostname
.try_into()
.map_err(|e| IoError::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, e))?;
self.connector.connect(name.to_owned(), stream).await
}
}
impl<S> TlsProvider<S> for RustlsProvider
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
type Connector = RustlsConnector<S>;
type TlsStream = futures_rustls::client::TlsStream<S>;
fn tls_connector(&self) -> Self::Connector {
let connector = futures_rustls::TlsConnector::from(Arc::clone(&self.config));
RustlsConnector {
connector,
_phantom: std::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
}
impl RustlsProvider {
/// Construct a new [`RustlsProvider`.]
pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
// Be afraid: we are overriding the default certificate verification and
// TLS signature checking code! See notes on `Verifier` below for
// details.
//
// Note that the `set_certificate_verifier` function is somewhat
// misnamed: it overrides not only how certificates are verified, but
// also how certificates are used to check the signatures in a TLS
// handshake.
let config = futures_rustls::rustls::client::ClientConfig::builder()
.dangerous()
.with_custom_certificate_verifier(std::sync::Arc::new(Verifier {}))
.with_no_client_auth();
RustlsProvider {
config: Arc::new(config),
}
}
}
impl Default for RustlsProvider {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
/// A [`rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier`] based on the [`x509_signature`] crate.
///
/// This verifier is necessary since Tor relays doesn't participate in the web
/// browser PKI, and as such their certificates won't check out as valid ones.
///
/// What's more, the `webpki` crate rejects most of Tor's certificates as
/// unparsable because they do not contain any extensions: That means we need to
/// replace the TLS-handshake signature checking functions too, since otherwise
/// `rustls` would think all the certificates were invalid.
///
/// Fortunately, the p2p people have provided `x509_signature` for this
/// purpose.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
struct Verifier {}
impl danger::ServerCertVerifier for Verifier {
fn verify_server_cert(
&self,
end_entity: &Certificate,
_roots: &[Certificate],
_server_name: &ServerName,
_ocsp_response: &[u8],
_now: rustls_pki_types::UnixTime,
) -> Result<danger::ServerCertVerified, TLSError> {
// We don't check anything about the certificate at this point other
// than making sure it is well-formed.
//
// When we make a channel, we'll check that it's authenticated by the
// other party's real identity key, inside the Tor handshake.
//
// In theory, we shouldn't have to do even this much: rustls should not
// allow a handshake without a certificate, and the certificate's
// well-formedness should get checked below in one of the
// verify_*_signature functions. But this check is cheap, so let's
// leave it in.
let _cert = get_cert(end_entity)?;
// Note that we don't even check timeliness: Tor uses the presented
// relay certificate just as a container for the relay's public link
// key. Actual timeliness checks will happen later, on the certificates
// that authenticate this one, when we process the relay's CERTS cell in
// `tor_proto::channel::handshake`.
Ok(danger::ServerCertVerified::assertion())
}
fn verify_tls12_signature(
&self,
message: &[u8],
cert: &Certificate,
dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, TLSError> {
let cert = get_cert(cert)?;
let scheme = convert_scheme(dss.scheme)?;
// NOTE:
//
// We call `check_signature` here rather than `check_tls12_signature`.
// That means that we're allowing the other side to use signature
// algorithms that aren't actually supported by TLS 1.2.
//
// It turns out, apparently, unless my experiments are wrong, that
// OpenSSL will happily use PSS with TLS 1.2. At least, it seems to do
// so when invoked via native_tls in the test code for this crate.
cert.check_signature(scheme, message, dss.signature())
.map(|_| danger::HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion())
.map_err(|_| TLSError::InvalidCertificate(CertificateError::BadSignature))
}
fn verify_tls13_signature(
&self,
message: &[u8],
cert: &Certificate,
dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, TLSError> {
let cert = get_cert(cert)?;
let scheme = convert_scheme(dss.scheme)?;
cert.check_tls13_signature(scheme, message, dss.signature())
.map(|_| danger::HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion())
.map_err(|_| TLSError::InvalidCertificate(CertificateError::BadSignature))
}
fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<rustls::SignatureScheme> {
rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider()
.signature_verification_algorithms
.supported_schemes()
}
}
/// Parse a `rustls::Certificate` as an `x509_signature::X509Certificate`, if possible.
fn get_cert<'a>(c: &'a Certificate<'a>) -> Result<x509_signature::X509Certificate<'a>, TLSError> {
x509_signature::parse_certificate(c.as_ref())
.map_err(|_| TLSError::InvalidCertificate(CertificateError::BadSignature))
}
/// Convert from the signature scheme type used in `rustls` to the one used in
/// `x509_signature`.
///
/// (We can't just use the x509_signature crate's "rustls" feature to have it
/// use the same enum from `rustls`, because it seems to be on a different
/// version from the rustls we want.)
fn convert_scheme(
scheme: rustls::SignatureScheme,
) -> Result<x509_signature::SignatureScheme, TLSError> {
use rustls::SignatureScheme as R;
use x509_signature::SignatureScheme as X;
// Yes, we do allow PKCS1 here. That's fine in practice when PKCS1 is only
// used (as in TLS 1.2) for signatures; the attacks against correctly
// implemented PKCS1 make sense only when it's used for encryption.
Ok(match scheme {
R::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 => X::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
R::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => X::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256,
R::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 => X::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
R::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384 => X::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384,
R::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 => X::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
R::RSA_PSS_SHA256 => X::RSA_PSS_SHA256,
R::RSA_PSS_SHA384 => X::RSA_PSS_SHA384,
R::RSA_PSS_SHA512 => X::RSA_PSS_SHA512,
R::ED25519 => X::ED25519,
R::ED448 => X::ED448,
_ => {
// Either `x509-signature` crate doesn't support these (nor should it really), or
// rustls itself doesn't.
return Err(TLSError::PeerIncompatible(
rustls::PeerIncompatible::NoSignatureSchemesInCommon,
));
}
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
// @@ begin test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@
#![allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)]
#![allow(clippy::clone_on_copy)]
#![allow(clippy::dbg_macro)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stderr)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stdout)]
#![allow(clippy::single_char_pattern)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
#![allow(clippy::unchecked_duration_subtraction)]
#![allow(clippy::useless_vec)]
#![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]
//! <!-- @@ end test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_cvt_scheme() {
use rustls::SignatureScheme as R;
use x509_signature::SignatureScheme as X;
macro_rules! check_cvt {
{ $id:ident } =>
{ assert_eq!(convert_scheme(R::$id).unwrap(), X::$id); }
}
check_cvt!(RSA_PKCS1_SHA256);
check_cvt!(RSA_PKCS1_SHA384);
check_cvt!(RSA_PKCS1_SHA512);
check_cvt!(ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256);
check_cvt!(ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384);
check_cvt!(RSA_PSS_SHA256);
check_cvt!(RSA_PSS_SHA384);
check_cvt!(RSA_PSS_SHA512);
check_cvt!(ED25519);
check_cvt!(ED448);
assert!(convert_scheme(R::RSA_PKCS1_SHA1).is_err());
assert!(convert_scheme(R::Unknown(0x1337)).is_err());
}
}