sysknife_daemon/

transactions.rs

use crate::audit_chain::{
    self, AuditEventKind, AuditKey, ChainContent, ChainIdentity, ChainRow, EventContent,
    EventIdentity, EventRow, VerifyOutcome, CURRENT_KEY_ID,
};
use crate::audit_watermark::emit_chain_tip_watermark;
use crate::auth::CallerPrincipal;
use rusqlite::{params, Connection, TransactionBehavior};
use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use sysknife_types::{CallerRole, JobState, PreviewEnvelope, RiskLevel, TransactionRecord};
use uuid::Uuid;

/// Lifetime of an approval receipt / preview, in minutes.
///
/// A transaction can be approved, its receipt claimed for execution, or it is
/// swept as stale, only while `created_at` is within this window. It is the
/// single source of truth for the TTL: both the SQLite (`julianday`) and the
/// PostgreSQL (`INTERVAL`) backends interpolate this constant into their SQL,
/// so the two engines can never disagree on the window. 15 minutes balances
/// operator usability (time to run `sysknife approve` in a terminal) against
/// the exposure window of a single-use bearer receipt. Prose in `SECURITY.md`
/// cites the same "15-minute" value; keep them in sync if this changes.
pub(crate) const APPROVAL_RECEIPT_TTL_MINUTES: i64 = 15;

/// One structured audit-log row for the history IPC.
///
/// Unlike [`TransactionRecord`] (which crosses the proto boundary and omits the
/// creation timestamp), this is a serde-only DTO carried over the JSON daemon
/// wire. It exists so programmatic clients (the MCP `sysknife_history` tool)
/// get typed `risk_level` and `created_at` instead of re-parsing formatted
/// text. `created_at` is the ISO-8601 timestamp stored at insert time.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct JobHistoryEntry {
    pub transaction_id: String,
    pub action_name: String,
    pub risk_level: RiskLevel,
    pub status: JobState,
    pub summary: String,
    pub created_at: String,
}

/// Data provided by the caller when recording a new transaction.
///
/// The initial `status` is always `Queued` — it is not caller-controllable.
/// Hardcoding this in the store prevents callers from bypassing the state
/// machine by recording a transaction in a terminal state.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NewTransaction {
    pub request_id: String,
    pub request_hash: String,
    pub action_name: String,
    pub risk_level: RiskLevel,
    /// Human-readable description of the planned action.
    ///
    /// **Chain-hashed at INSERT; intentionally not in the mutable field set.**
    ///
    /// `summary` is captured in [`crate::audit_chain::ChainContent`] and
    /// baked into `chain_hash = ed25519_sign(canonical(fields) || prev_hash, key)`
    /// at the moment the row is written. After that point the stored signature
    /// is a one-time commitment.
    ///
    /// **Do not add an `update_summary` API** (or any equivalent that modifies
    /// this field in an existing row). Any such change will cause
    /// `sysknife audit verify` to report `VerifyOutcome::Broken` for the
    /// modified row, because the signature will no longer verify against the
    /// stored `chain_hash`.
    ///
    /// If a correction is genuinely needed, use one of the two safe strategies
    /// documented on [`crate::audit_chain::ChainContent`]:
    /// 1. Insert a corrective row that references the original `transaction_id`.
    /// 2. Extend the chain protocol with a dedicated amendment record type.
    pub summary: String,
    pub warnings: Vec<String>,
    /// Role the daemon resolved for the connection that asked for this action.
    ///
    /// Chain-hashed at INSERT alongside `summary`. Before this field existed the
    /// signed record could say what was authorised but not which privilege tier
    /// asked; which *account* asked is `caller_principal` below. Not
    /// caller-supplied over the wire: the dispatcher passes the role
    /// it resolved from `SO_PEERCRED` (or the vsock token), never a value from
    /// the request body.
    pub caller_role: CallerRole,
    /// Which account asked, as opposed to what its role permitted.
    ///
    /// Chain-hashed at INSERT alongside `caller_role`. The role alone cannot
    /// separate two members of `sysknife-admin`, so a trail built only from it
    /// answers "an Admin did this" and stops there. Like the role, this is
    /// resolved by the dispatcher from the connection, never read from the
    /// request body. See [`crate::auth::CallerPrincipal`].
    pub caller_principal: CallerPrincipal,
}

/// One forward-only SQLite schema step, applied in `version` order and
/// recorded in `schema_migrations`.
///
/// This mirrors the Postgres `MIGRATIONS` list deliberately. The SQLite path
/// used to be a single `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` batch plus a hardcoded
/// `version > 1` guard, which had no way to express "add a column to an
/// existing database" — `IF NOT EXISTS` skips a table that is already there,
/// columns and all. Adding the caller-identity columns needed a real step.
struct SqliteMigration {
    version: i64,
    name: &'static str,
    sql: &'static str,
}

/// Schema history for the SQLite backend.
///
/// Migration 1 covers the append-tamper-evident hash chain (see
/// `audit_chain.rs` for the full threat model — note that truncation of the
/// tail is NOT detected by this chain alone; that requires the signed
/// checkpoints anchored to an append-only sink (`checkpoint_sink`), with the
/// journald watermark as a lighter best-effort complement):
///   seq             — monotonic ordering, 1-indexed
///   key_id          — identifies the key generation (forward-compatible with
///                     epoch rotation in a follow-up issue)
///   chain_hash      — ed25519_sign(ROW_DOMAIN || canonical(immutable_fields)
///                     || prev_chain_hash, key)
///   prev_chain_hash — chain_hash of the previous row, "" for the first row
///
/// `status` is intentionally absent from the chain content — it is mutable.
/// The chain protects the *authorisation decision* captured at insert time,
/// not the live execution state.
const SQLITE_MIGRATIONS: &[SqliteMigration] = &[
    SqliteMigration {
        version: 1,
        name: "initial_audit_schema",
        sql: r#"
            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS transactions (
                transaction_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
                request_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                request_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
                action_name TEXT NOT NULL,
                risk_level TEXT NOT NULL,
                status TEXT NOT NULL,
                approval_id TEXT,
                summary TEXT NOT NULL,
                warnings_json TEXT NOT NULL,
                created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
                seq INTEGER NOT NULL UNIQUE,
                key_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                chain_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
                prev_chain_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''
            );

            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS transaction_previews (
                transaction_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
                preview_json TEXT NOT NULL
            );

            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS transaction_approvals (
                transaction_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
                receipt_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
                approved_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
                consumed_at TEXT
            );

            CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS transactions_seq_idx ON transactions(seq);
        "#,
    },
    // Caller identity in the signed content, and the approval-event chain.
    //
    // The three new `transactions` columns are nullable with a legacy default
    // on purpose: rows written by an earlier binary were signed over an
    // encoding that has no such fields, and backfilling them with empty
    // strings would change every historical message and report the whole chain
    // as Broken. `chain_version` selects the encoding per row — see
    // `audit_chain::ChainIdentity`.
    SqliteMigration {
        version: 2,
        name: "caller_identity_and_approval_events",
        sql: r#"
            ALTER TABLE transactions ADD COLUMN chain_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1;
            ALTER TABLE transactions ADD COLUMN caller_role TEXT;
            ALTER TABLE transactions ADD COLUMN event_tip TEXT;

            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_events (
                seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
                key_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                kind TEXT NOT NULL,
                transaction_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                receipt_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
                created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                chain_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
                prev_chain_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''
            );

            CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS audit_events_transaction_idx
                ON audit_events(transaction_id);
        "#,
    },
    // Nullable for the same reason the v2 columns are: rows written before this
    // step were signed over an encoding with no principal field, so backfilling
    // any value would rewrite their message and report the chain as Broken.
    // `chain_version` keeps selecting the encoding per row.
    SqliteMigration {
        version: 3,
        name: "caller_principal",
        sql: r#"
            ALTER TABLE transactions ADD COLUMN caller_principal TEXT;
        "#,
    },
    // Approver identity in the signed event encoding (#249).
    //
    // Nullable/defaulted for the same reason the v2 transaction columns are:
    // every event row already on disk was signed over the six-field encoding,
    // and backfilling either column would rewrite its message and report the
    // whole event chain as Broken. `chain_version DEFAULT 1` makes every
    // historical row LegacyV1 without touching it; new approval events are
    // written at version 2 with the acting account signed in.
    SqliteMigration {
        version: 4,
        name: "event_approver_identity",
        sql: r#"
            ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN chain_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1;
            ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN caller_principal TEXT;
        "#,
    },
];

/// Column list for every `ChainRow` read, shared with the Postgres backend
/// and declared once in `store.rs` (#397) — the mapper below reads columns
/// positionally in exactly that order.
use crate::store::CHAIN_ROW_COLUMNS;

fn chain_row_from_sqlite(row: &rusqlite::Row<'_>) -> rusqlite::Result<ChainRow> {
    Ok(ChainRow {
        seq: row.get::<_, i64>(0)? as u64,
        key_id: row.get(1)?,
        transaction_id: row.get(2)?,
        request_id: row.get(3)?,
        request_hash: row.get(4)?,
        action_name: row.get(5)?,
        risk_level: deserialize_field(&row.get::<_, String>(6)?).map_err(|e| {
            rusqlite::Error::FromSqlConversionFailure(6, rusqlite::types::Type::Text, Box::new(e))
        })?,
        summary: row.get(7)?,
        approval_id: row.get(8)?,
        warnings_json: row.get(9)?,
        created_at: row.get(10)?,
        prev_chain_hash: row.get(11)?,
        chain_hash: row.get(12)?,
        chain_version: row.get::<_, i64>(13)? as u32,
        caller_role: row.get(14)?,
        event_tip: row.get(15)?,
        caller_principal: row.get(16)?,
    })
}

fn event_row_from_sqlite(row: &rusqlite::Row<'_>) -> rusqlite::Result<EventRow> {
    Ok(EventRow {
        seq: row.get::<_, i64>(0)? as u64,
        key_id: row.get(1)?,
        kind: row.get(2)?,
        transaction_id: row.get(3)?,
        receipt_digest: row.get(4)?,
        created_at: row.get(5)?,
        prev_chain_hash: row.get(6)?,
        chain_hash: row.get(7)?,
        chain_version: row.get::<_, i64>(8)? as u32,
        caller_principal: row.get(9)?,
    })
}

/// Run `query_row`, treating "no row matched" as `Ok(None)` instead of an
/// error. Three call sites used to spell out
/// `.map(Some).or_else(|e| match e { QueryReturnedNoRows => Ok(None), other => Err(other) })`
/// by hand; sharing this mapping means a future call site cannot drop the
/// `QueryReturnedNoRows` arm and turn a routine "not found" into a hard error.
fn query_optional<T>(
    conn: &Connection,
    sql: &str,
    params: impl rusqlite::Params,
    f: impl FnOnce(&rusqlite::Row<'_>) -> rusqlite::Result<T>,
) -> rusqlite::Result<Option<T>> {
    match conn.query_row(sql, params, f) {
        Ok(v) => Ok(Some(v)),
        Err(rusqlite::Error::QueryReturnedNoRows) => Ok(None),
        Err(e) => Err(e),
    }
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct TransactionStore {
    path: PathBuf,
    /// Ed25519 signing key used to compute the forward audit chain on insert.
    /// `None` only for read-only callers that never write rows.
    audit_key: Option<Arc<AuditKey>>,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct RecordedPreviewedTransaction {
    pub transaction: TransactionRecord,
    pub preview: PreviewEnvelope,
}

struct InsertedTransaction {
    record: TransactionRecord,
    seq: u64,
    chain_hash: String,
}

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum TransactionStoreError {
    #[error("io error: {0}")]
    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),

    #[error("sqlite error: {0}")]
    Sqlite(#[from] rusqlite::Error),

    #[error("json error: {0}")]
    Json(#[from] serde_json::Error),

    #[error("database invariant violation: {0}")]
    DatabaseInvariant(String),

    #[error("transaction not found: {0}")]
    NotFound(String),

    #[error("invalid transition from {from:?} to {to:?}")]
    InvalidTransition { from: JobState, to: JobState },

    #[error("audit chain misconfiguration: {0}")]
    AuditChainMissing(&'static str),

    /// `update_status`'s compare-and-swap `UPDATE ... WHERE status = <observed>`
    /// matched zero rows: another writer changed `status` between our read and
    /// our write. This is a lost race, not a validation failure — the caller
    /// (see `dispatcher::update_terminal_status`) already retries on any error
    /// and re-reads the current status, so surfacing this distinctly (rather
    /// than silently overwriting a transition we never validated) is safe to
    /// retry.
    #[error("transaction {0} status changed concurrently; retry")]
    ConcurrentStatusChange(String),
}

impl TransactionStore {
    /// Open the store with **no audit chain key**. Inserts will fail with
    /// `AuditChainMissing` — only suitable for read-only callers (e.g.
    /// `sysknife audit verify` which loads the key separately).
    pub fn open_read_only(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<Self, TransactionStoreError> {
        let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
        if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
            ensure_private_dir(parent)?;
        }

        let store = Self {
            path,
            audit_key: None,
        };
        store.initialize()?;
        Ok(store)
    }

    /// Open the store and bind it to an audit chain key. Every insert
    /// computes a forward Ed25519-signed chain hash linked to the previous row.
    ///
    /// The key path defaults to `<db_dir>/audit-key` so dev/test runs with
    /// per-tempdir databases are fully isolated. Production deployments
    /// override with `SYSKNIFE_AUDIT_KEY_PATH=/etc/sysknife/audit-key`.
    pub fn open(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<Self, TransactionStoreError> {
        let db_path = path.as_ref();
        let key_path = crate::audit_chain::resolve_audit_key_path(db_path);
        let key = AuditKey::load_or_generate(&key_path).map_err(|e| {
            TransactionStoreError::Io(std::io::Error::new(
                std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
                format!("audit key load failed: {e}"),
            ))
        })?;
        Self::open_with_key(path, Arc::new(key))
    }

    /// Open the store with an explicit audit key. Used by tests and by
    /// production code paths that want to inject a key from a specific path.
    pub fn open_with_key(
        path: impl AsRef<Path>,
        audit_key: Arc<AuditKey>,
    ) -> Result<Self, TransactionStoreError> {
        let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
        if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
            ensure_private_dir(parent)?;
        }

        let store = Self {
            path,
            audit_key: Some(audit_key),
        };
        store.initialize()?;
        restrict_db_file_mode(&store.path);
        Ok(store)
    }

    /// Shared body of [`record`](Self::record) and
    /// [`record_previewed`](Self::record_previewed): check for a writable
    /// store, open the write transaction, insert the transaction row, run
    /// `in_tx` inside that same transaction (so e.g. a preview insert commits
    /// atomically with its transaction row), commit, and emit the chain-tip
    /// watermark. `in_tx` runs between the insert and the commit — never
    /// after — so nothing it does can land outside the transaction it needs
    /// to be atomic with.
    fn record_with(
        &self,
        transaction: NewTransaction,
        in_tx: impl FnOnce(&Connection, &InsertedTransaction) -> Result<(), TransactionStoreError>,
    ) -> Result<InsertedTransaction, TransactionStoreError> {
        let key = self
            .audit_key
            .as_ref()
            .ok_or(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(
                "this TransactionStore was opened read-only; cannot record",
            ))?;
        let mut conn = self.connection()?;
        // IMMEDIATE acquires the write lock at BEGIN, so the read of
        // `next_seq_and_prev_hash` is consistent with the eventual INSERT.
        // Default DEFERRED would let two writers both read the same prev_hash
        // and then race to INSERT — the loser hits SQLITE_BUSY.
        let tx = conn.transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
        let transaction_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
        let inserted = Self::insert_transaction(&tx, key, &transaction_id, transaction)?;
        in_tx(&tx, &inserted)?;
        tx.commit()?;
        emit_chain_tip_watermark(inserted.seq, &inserted.chain_hash);
        Ok(inserted)
    }

    pub fn record(
        &self,
        transaction: NewTransaction,
    ) -> Result<TransactionRecord, TransactionStoreError> {
        let inserted = self.record_with(transaction, |_, _| Ok(()))?;
        Ok(inserted.record)
    }

    pub fn record_previewed(
        &self,
        transaction: NewTransaction,
        preview: PreviewEnvelope,
    ) -> Result<RecordedPreviewedTransaction, TransactionStoreError> {
        let inserted = self.record_with(transaction, |conn, inserted| {
            Self::insert_preview(conn, &inserted.record.transaction_id, &preview)
        })?;
        Ok(RecordedPreviewedTransaction {
            transaction: inserted.record,
            preview,
        })
    }

    pub fn get(
        &self,
        transaction_id: &str,
    ) -> Result<Option<TransactionRecord>, TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = self.connection()?;
        let mut stmt = conn.prepare(
            "SELECT
                transaction_id,
                request_id,
                request_hash,
                action_name,
                risk_level,
                status,
                approval_id,
                summary,
                warnings_json
             FROM transactions
             WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
        )?;
        let mut rows = stmt.query(params![transaction_id])?;
        if let Some(row) = rows.next()? {
            Ok(Some(row_to_record(row)?))
        } else {
            Ok(None)
        }
    }

    pub fn get_preview(
        &self,
        transaction_id: &str,
    ) -> Result<Option<PreviewEnvelope>, TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = self.connection()?;
        let mut stmt = conn.prepare(
            "SELECT preview_json
             FROM transaction_previews
             WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
        )?;
        let mut rows = stmt.query(params![transaction_id])?;
        if let Some(row) = rows.next()? {
            let preview_json: String = row.get(0)?;
            Ok(Some(serde_json::from_str(&preview_json)?))
        } else {
            Ok(None)
        }
    }

    pub fn update_status(
        &self,
        transaction_id: &str,
        new_status: JobState,
    ) -> Result<(), TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = self.connection()?;

        // Read the current status so we can validate the transition.
        let current_status: String = conn
            .query_row(
                "SELECT status FROM transactions WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
                params![transaction_id],
                |row| row.get(0),
            )
            .map_err(|e| match e {
                rusqlite::Error::QueryReturnedNoRows => {
                    TransactionStoreError::NotFound(transaction_id.to_string())
                }
                other => TransactionStoreError::Sqlite(other),
            })?;

        let current: JobState = deserialize_field(&current_status)?;
        if !crate::jobs::allowed_transition(&current, &new_status) {
            return Err(TransactionStoreError::InvalidTransition {
                from: current,
                to: new_status,
            });
        }

        // Compare-and-swap: only write if `status` still equals the value we
        // just validated the transition against. Without the `AND status =
        // ?3` guard this was a check-then-act race — a concurrent writer
        // (e.g. two calls racing to move the same job to two different
        // terminal states) could flip `status` between our SELECT and this
        // UPDATE, and the loser would silently report success for a
        // transition it never actually validated against the row's real
        // prior value. `rows_affected == 0` means we lost that race (rows are
        // never deleted, so it cannot mean the row vanished); the caller
        // (`dispatcher::update_terminal_status`) already retries on any error
        // and re-checks the final status, so failing closed here is safe.
        // The UPDATE and the event that records it go in one sqlite
        // transaction. Written separately, a crash between them leaves the
        // column saying one thing and the chain another, which is the state
        // this whole check exists to detect: a status nobody can corroborate
        // would then look like tampering.
        let mut conn = conn;
        let tx = conn.transaction()?;
        let rows_affected = tx.execute(
            "UPDATE transactions SET status = ?1 WHERE transaction_id = ?2 AND status = ?3",
            params![
                serialize_field(&new_status)?,
                transaction_id,
                current_status
            ],
        )?;
        if rows_affected == 0 {
            return Err(TransactionStoreError::ConcurrentStatusChange(
                transaction_id.to_string(),
            ));
        }
        // `transactions.status` is a mutable column. Chaining the outcome means
        // rewriting it no longer agrees with a signed record, which is what
        // `status_matches_chain` compares. A read-only store has no key and
        // never reaches a write, so the absence of one here is a bug rather
        // than a case to pass over.
        let Some(key) = self.audit_key.as_ref() else {
            return Err(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(
                "update_status has no signing key, so the outcome could not be chained",
            ));
        };
        Self::append_event(
            &tx,
            key,
            AuditEventKind::from(new_status),
            transaction_id,
            "",
            // Status events name no account, deliberately: they are written
            // from spawned execution tasks with no caller attribution in
            // scope (#249). They stay on the legacy six-field encoding.
            EventIdentity::LegacyV1,
        )?;
        tx.commit()?;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Report any transaction whose `status` column disagrees with the newest
    /// status event chained for it, or `None` when every row agrees.
    ///
    /// `ChainContent` deliberately does not sign `status`: the chain protects
    /// the authorisation decision captured at insert, not the live execution
    /// state, and that exclusion is correct. The consequence was that an action
    /// which ran to completion could be rewritten in the column as canceled,
    /// `sysknife history` reported it canceled, and the chain still verified
    /// Intact, because nothing in the chain had an opinion about the outcome.
    /// Now the outcome is an event, and this is the comparison that uses it.
    pub fn status_matches_chain(
        &self,
    ) -> Result<audit_chain::StatusOutcome, TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = self.connection()?;
        let mut stmt = conn.prepare(
            "SELECT t.transaction_id, t.status, ( \
                 SELECT e.kind FROM audit_events e \
                 WHERE e.transaction_id = t.transaction_id AND e.kind LIKE 'status_%' \
                 ORDER BY e.seq DESC LIMIT 1 \
             ) FROM transactions t",
        )?;
        let mut disagreements = Vec::new();
        let mut checked: u64 = 0;
        let rows = stmt.query_map([], |row| {
            Ok((
                row.get::<_, String>(0)?,
                row.get::<_, String>(1)?,
                row.get::<_, Option<String>>(2)?,
            ))
        })?;
        for row in rows {
            let (id, status_json, newest) = row?;
            checked += 1;
            let state: JobState = deserialize_field(&status_json)?;
            // A row that never moved off Queued has no status event, and that
            // is not a disagreement: `record` chains the row itself.
            let Some(newest) = newest else {
                if state != JobState::Queued {
                    disagreements.push(format!(
                        "{id}: status is {state:?} and no status event was ever chained"
                    ));
                }
                continue;
            };
            let expected = AuditEventKind::from(state).as_str();
            if newest != expected {
                disagreements.push(format!(
                    "{id}: status column says {state:?} ({expected}) and the newest \
                     chained status event is {newest}"
                ));
            }
        }
        Ok(if disagreements.is_empty() {
            audit_chain::StatusOutcome::Agrees {
                rows_checked: checked,
            }
        } else {
            audit_chain::StatusOutcome::Disagrees {
                detail: disagreements.join("; "),
            }
        })
    }

    /// Attach one immutable approval receipt digest to a fresh queued preview.
    ///
    /// `approver` is the account performing this approval — signed into the
    /// event so a verified chain names who approved, not only who asked (#249).
    pub fn approve_transaction(
        &self,
        transaction_id: &str,
        approver: CallerPrincipal,
    ) -> Result<Option<String>, TransactionStoreError> {
        let key = self
            .audit_key
            .as_ref()
            .ok_or(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(
                "this TransactionStore was opened read-only; cannot approve",
            ))?;
        // Rendered once, before any early return that follows, so the signed
        // string and the stored column provably come from the same value.
        let approver_signed = approver.as_signed_str();
        let Some(record) = self.get(transaction_id)? else {
            return Ok(None);
        };
        let receipt = key.approval_receipt(transaction_id, &record.request_hash);
        let receipt_digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);
        let Some(committed_digest) = record.approval_id.as_deref() else {
            return Err(TransactionStoreError::DatabaseInvariant(format!(
                "transaction {transaction_id} has no signed approval commitment"
            )));
        };
        if !bool::from(receipt_digest.as_bytes().ct_eq(committed_digest.as_bytes())) {
            return Err(TransactionStoreError::DatabaseInvariant(format!(
                "transaction {transaction_id} approval commitment does not match its signed preview"
            )));
        }

        // The approval row and its chained event commit together: an approval
        // that is not in the event chain is exactly the gap this chain closes.
        let mut conn = self.connection()?;
        let tx = conn.transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
        let queued_json = serialize_field(&JobState::Queued)?;
        let rows_affected = tx.execute(
            &format!(
                "INSERT INTO transaction_approvals (transaction_id, receipt_digest) \
                 SELECT transaction_id, ?1 FROM transactions \
                 WHERE transaction_id = ?2 \
                   AND status = ?3 \
                   AND julianday(created_at) > julianday('now', '-{APPROVAL_RECEIPT_TTL_MINUTES} minutes') \
                   AND NOT EXISTS ( \
                       SELECT 1 FROM transaction_approvals WHERE transaction_id = ?2 \
                   )"
            ),
            params![receipt_digest, transaction_id, queued_json],
        )?;
        if rows_affected > 0 {
            Self::append_event(
                &tx,
                key,
                AuditEventKind::ApprovalGranted,
                transaction_id,
                &receipt_digest,
                EventIdentity::V2 {
                    caller_principal: &approver_signed,
                },
            )?;
        }
        tx.commit()?;
        Ok((rows_affected > 0).then_some(receipt))
    }

    /// Remove an approval that was persisted but could not be delivered to the
    /// caller. Consumed receipts are never revocable.
    ///
    /// `revoker` is signed into the revocation event: the chain should name
    /// the account that retracted a receipt (#249).
    pub fn revoke_unconsumed_approval(
        &self,
        transaction_id: &str,
        revoker: CallerPrincipal,
    ) -> Result<bool, TransactionStoreError> {
        let key = self
            .audit_key
            .as_ref()
            .ok_or(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(
                "this TransactionStore was opened read-only; cannot revoke",
            ))?;
        let mut conn = self.connection()?;
        let tx = conn.transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
        let revoked = Self::revoke_unconsumed_approval_in_tx(
            &tx,
            key,
            transaction_id,
            &revoker.as_signed_str(),
        )?;
        tx.commit()?;
        Ok(revoked)
    }

    fn revoke_unconsumed_approval_in_tx(
        conn: &Connection,
        key: &AuditKey,
        transaction_id: &str,
        revoker_signed: &str,
    ) -> Result<bool, TransactionStoreError> {
        // Capture the digest before the DELETE: the event has to name which
        // receipt was retracted, and after the delete there is nothing to name.
        let digest: Option<String> = query_optional(
            conn,
            "SELECT receipt_digest FROM transaction_approvals \
             WHERE transaction_id = ?1 AND consumed_at IS NULL",
            params![transaction_id],
            |row| row.get(0),
        )?;
        let rows_affected = conn.execute(
            "DELETE FROM transaction_approvals \
             WHERE transaction_id = ?1 AND consumed_at IS NULL",
            params![transaction_id],
        )?;
        if rows_affected > 0 {
            let digest = digest.ok_or_else(|| {
                TransactionStoreError::DatabaseInvariant(format!(
                    "revoked an approval for {transaction_id} that had no receipt digest"
                ))
            })?;
            Self::append_event(
                conn,
                key,
                AuditEventKind::ApprovalRevoked,
                transaction_id,
                &digest,
                EventIdentity::V2 {
                    caller_principal: revoker_signed,
                },
            )?;
        }
        Ok(rows_affected > 0)
    }

    /// Atomically consume an approved receipt and transition Queued to Running.
    ///
    /// `executor` is signed into the consume event: on a host where the account
    /// that spends a receipt could ever differ from the one that granted it,
    /// the chain records both (#249).
    pub fn claim_approved_for_execution(
        &self,
        transaction_id: &str,
        receipt_digest: &str,
        executor: CallerPrincipal,
    ) -> Result<bool, TransactionStoreError> {
        let key = self
            .audit_key
            .as_ref()
            .ok_or(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(
                "this TransactionStore was opened read-only; cannot claim",
            ))?;
        let mut conn = self.connection()?;
        let tx = conn.transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
        let queued_json = serialize_field(&JobState::Queued)?;
        let running_json = serialize_field(&JobState::Running)?;
        let rows_affected = tx.execute(
            &format!(
                "UPDATE transactions SET status = ?1 \
                 WHERE transaction_id = ?2 \
                   AND status = ?3 \
                   AND julianday(created_at) > julianday('now', '-{APPROVAL_RECEIPT_TTL_MINUTES} minutes') \
                   AND EXISTS ( \
                       SELECT 1 FROM transaction_approvals \
                       WHERE transaction_id = ?2 \
                         AND receipt_digest = ?4 \
                         AND consumed_at IS NULL \
                   )"
            ),
            params![running_json, transaction_id, queued_json, receipt_digest],
        )?;
        if rows_affected > 0 {
            tx.execute(
                "UPDATE transaction_approvals \
                 SET consumed_at = datetime('now') \
                 WHERE transaction_id = ?1 AND consumed_at IS NULL",
                params![transaction_id],
            )?;
            Self::append_event(
                &tx,
                key,
                AuditEventKind::ApprovalConsumed,
                transaction_id,
                receipt_digest,
                EventIdentity::V2 {
                    caller_principal: &executor.as_signed_str(),
                },
            )?;
        }
        tx.commit()?;
        Ok(rows_affected > 0)
    }

    /// Cancel all `Queued` transactions whose `created_at` timestamp is older
    /// than the 15-minute TTL window.  Returns the number of rows affected.
    ///
    /// **State-machine safety:** the WHERE clause pins `status = Queued`
    /// before applying `Queued → Canceled`, which is the only legal
    /// transition reachable from `Queued` other than `Running`. A row that
    /// has progressed to `Running` (or any terminal state) in between the
    /// TTL match and our UPDATE is skipped because the predicate no longer
    /// matches it. This makes the bulk SQL semantically equivalent to
    /// fetching each candidate, building a `JobStateMachine`, and calling
    /// `cancel()` on it — but in a single statement so we don't race ourselves
    /// when many rows expire at once. The
    /// `cleanup_stale_queued_does_not_clobber_running_rows` regression test
    /// in `tests/coverage_gaps.rs` pins this guarantee.
    pub fn cleanup_stale_queued(&self) -> Result<u64, TransactionStoreError> {
        let key = self
            .audit_key
            .as_ref()
            .ok_or(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(
                "this TransactionStore was opened read-only; cannot clean up",
            ))?;
        let mut conn = self.connection()?;
        let tx = conn.transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
        let canceled_json = serialize_field(&JobState::Canceled)?;
        let queued_json = serialize_field(&JobState::Queued)?;
        let stale_ids: Vec<String> = {
            let mut statement = tx.prepare(&format!(
                "SELECT transaction_id FROM transactions \
                 WHERE status = ?1 \
                   AND julianday(created_at) <= julianday('now', '-{APPROVAL_RECEIPT_TTL_MINUTES} minutes')"
            ))?;
            let stale_ids = statement
                .query_map(params![queued_json], |row| row.get(0))?
                .collect::<Result<_, _>>()?;
            stale_ids
        };
        let mut canceled = 0;
        for transaction_id in stale_ids {
            let rows_affected = tx.execute(
                "UPDATE transactions SET status = ?1 \
                 WHERE transaction_id = ?2 AND status = ?3",
                params![canceled_json, transaction_id, queued_json],
            )?;
            if rows_affected > 0 {
                // Daemon-initiated revocation: the stale sweep has no caller
                // connection to attribute, and `Unattributed` records exactly
                // that rather than inventing an account (#249).
                Self::revoke_unconsumed_approval_in_tx(
                    &tx,
                    key,
                    &transaction_id,
                    &CallerPrincipal::Unattributed.as_signed_str(),
                )?;
                canceled += rows_affected;
            }
        }
        tx.commit()?;
        Ok(canceled as u64)
    }

    /// Cancel one still-`Queued` transaction (`Queued → Canceled`). Returns
    /// `true` iff a queued row was transitioned.
    ///
    /// Option A semantics: the `status = ?3` (Queued) guard means a `Running`
    /// transaction — one whose privileged action is already executing — is
    /// never cancelled, so we never leave a half-applied root mutation behind
    /// a `Canceled` record. Missing or already-terminal transactions return
    /// `false`.
    pub fn cancel_queued(
        &self,
        transaction_id: &str,
        canceller: CallerPrincipal,
    ) -> Result<bool, TransactionStoreError> {
        let key = self
            .audit_key
            .as_ref()
            .ok_or(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(
                "this TransactionStore was opened read-only; cannot cancel",
            ))?;
        let mut conn = self.connection()?;
        let tx = conn.transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
        let canceled_json = serialize_field(&JobState::Canceled)?;
        let queued_json = serialize_field(&JobState::Queued)?;
        let rows_affected = tx.execute(
            "UPDATE transactions SET status = ?1 \
             WHERE transaction_id = ?2 AND status = ?3",
            params![canceled_json, transaction_id, queued_json],
        )?;
        if rows_affected > 0 {
            // The cancel came from a caller connection (`handle_cancel`), so
            // the revocation event names the account that cancelled. This is
            // NOT the daemon-sweep path: recording `Unattributed` here would
            // sign away an identity the code actually holds (#249).
            Self::revoke_unconsumed_approval_in_tx(
                &tx,
                key,
                transaction_id,
                &canceller.as_signed_str(),
            )?;
        }
        tx.commit()?;
        Ok(rows_affected > 0)
    }

    /// List transactions with optional filters, ordered by newest first.
    ///
    /// - `limit`: max number of rows (capped at 100)
    /// - `status_filter`: if set, only return rows matching this status
    ///   (must be a valid `JobState` variant: `"succeeded"`, `"failed"`,
    ///   `"queued"`, `"running"`, `"canceled"`, `"rolled_back"`, `"needs_reboot"`)
    /// - `action_filter`: if set, only return rows with this exact action name
    /// - `since_hours`: if set, only return rows created within the last N hours
    pub fn list_transactions(
        &self,
        limit: u32,
        status_filter: Option<&str>,
        action_filter: Option<&str>,
        since_hours: Option<u32>,
    ) -> Result<Vec<TransactionRecord>, TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = self.connection()?;
        let (filter_sql, param_values) =
            Self::build_history_filter(limit, status_filter, action_filter, since_hours)?;
        let sql = format!(
            "SELECT transaction_id, request_id, request_hash, action_name, \
             risk_level, status, approval_id, summary, warnings_json \
             FROM transactions WHERE 1=1{filter_sql}"
        );
        let params_ref: Vec<&dyn rusqlite::types::ToSql> =
            param_values.iter().map(|b| b.as_ref()).collect();

        let mut stmt = conn.prepare(&sql)?;
        let rows = stmt.query_map(params_ref.as_slice(), |row| Ok(row_to_record(row)))?;

        let mut results = Vec::new();
        for row in rows {
            results.push(row??);
        }
        Ok(results)
    }

    /// Structured history for programmatic clients (the MCP `sysknife_history`
    /// tool). Unlike [`list_transactions`](Self::list_transactions) it selects
    /// `created_at` and returns [`JobHistoryEntry`] so `risk_level` and
    /// `created_at` reach the caller typed, without text re-parsing.
    pub fn list_history(
        &self,
        limit: u32,
        status_filter: Option<&str>,
        action_filter: Option<&str>,
        since_hours: Option<u32>,
    ) -> Result<Vec<JobHistoryEntry>, TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = self.connection()?;
        let (filter_sql, param_values) =
            Self::build_history_filter(limit, status_filter, action_filter, since_hours)?;
        let sql = format!(
            "SELECT transaction_id, action_name, risk_level, status, summary, created_at \
             FROM transactions WHERE 1=1{filter_sql}"
        );
        let params_ref: Vec<&dyn rusqlite::types::ToSql> =
            param_values.iter().map(|b| b.as_ref()).collect();

        let mut stmt = conn.prepare(&sql)?;
        let rows = stmt.query_map(params_ref.as_slice(), |row| {
            Ok((|| {
                Ok::<JobHistoryEntry, TransactionStoreError>(JobHistoryEntry {
                    transaction_id: row.get(0)?,
                    action_name: row.get(1)?,
                    risk_level: deserialize_field(&row.get::<_, String>(2)?)?,
                    status: deserialize_field(&row.get::<_, String>(3)?)?,
                    summary: row.get(4)?,
                    created_at: row.get(5)?,
                })
            })())
        })?;

        let mut results = Vec::new();
        for row in rows {
            results.push(row??);
        }
        Ok(results)
    }

    /// Build the shared `WHERE`/`ORDER BY`/`LIMIT` suffix (after `WHERE 1=1`)
    /// and its bound parameters for the history queries, so
    /// [`list_transactions`](Self::list_transactions) and
    /// [`list_history`](Self::list_history) cannot filter differently.
    fn build_history_filter(
        limit: u32,
        status_filter: Option<&str>,
        action_filter: Option<&str>,
        since_hours: Option<u32>,
    ) -> Result<(String, Vec<Box<dyn rusqlite::types::ToSql>>), TransactionStoreError> {
        let mut sql = String::new();
        let mut param_values: Vec<Box<dyn rusqlite::types::ToSql>> = Vec::new();

        if let Some(status) = status_filter {
            // Validate against known JobState variants to avoid silent empty
            // results from typos (e.g. "success" instead of "succeeded").
            // deserialize_field returns serde_json::Error → TransactionStoreError::Json.
            let validated: JobState = deserialize_field(&format!("\"{status}\""))?;
            let status_json = serialize_field(&validated)?;
            sql.push_str(" AND status = ?");
            param_values.push(Box::new(status_json));
        }

        if let Some(action) = action_filter {
            sql.push_str(" AND action_name = ?");
            param_values.push(Box::new(action.to_string()));
        }

        if let Some(hours) = since_hours {
            sql.push_str(" AND julianday(created_at) > julianday('now', '-' || ? || ' hours')");
            param_values.push(Box::new(hours));
        }

        sql.push_str(" ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT ?");
        param_values.push(Box::new(limit.min(100)));

        Ok((sql, param_values))
    }

    fn connection(&self) -> Result<Connection, TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = Connection::open(&self.path)?;
        // Concurrency tuning :
        //   - WAL journal mode lets readers proceed concurrently with writers.
        //   - busy_timeout=5000ms makes a contending writer block instead of
        //     immediately returning SQLITE_BUSY. Without it, two concurrent
        //     `record()` calls (one of the two daemon use cases the dispatcher
        //     supports) had a 100% second-writer failure rate.
        //   - synchronous=NORMAL is the WAL-recommended setting; FULL is
        //     overkill for an audit log that's already append-only by design,
        //     and OFF risks losing the latest transactions on a crash.
        //   - foreign_keys=ON for parity with future schema changes.
        conn.pragma_update(None, "journal_mode", "WAL")?;
        conn.pragma_update(None, "synchronous", "NORMAL")?;
        conn.pragma_update(None, "foreign_keys", "ON")?;
        conn.busy_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))?;
        Ok(conn)
    }

    fn initialize(&self) -> Result<(), TransactionStoreError> {
        let mut conn = self.connection()?;
        let tx = conn.transaction_with_behavior(TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
        tx.execute_batch(
            "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations (\
                 version INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,\
                 name TEXT NOT NULL,\
                 applied_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))\
             );",
        )?;
        let current: i64 = tx.query_row(
            "SELECT COALESCE(MAX(version), 0) FROM schema_migrations",
            [],
            |row| row.get(0),
        )?;
        let latest = SQLITE_MIGRATIONS.last().map_or(0, |m| m.version);
        if current > latest {
            return Err(TransactionStoreError::DatabaseInvariant(format!(
                "sqlite schema version {current} is newer than this binary supports ({latest})"
            )));
        }
        for migration in SQLITE_MIGRATIONS.iter().filter(|m| m.version > current) {
            tx.execute_batch(migration.sql)?;
            tx.execute(
                "INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version, name) VALUES (?1, ?2)",
                params![migration.version, migration.name],
            )?;
        }
        tx.commit()?;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Return all rows in seq order with the chain fields needed for verify.
    pub fn fetch_chain_rows(&self) -> Result<Vec<ChainRow>, TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = self.connection()?;
        let mut stmt = conn.prepare(&format!(
            "SELECT {CHAIN_ROW_COLUMNS} FROM transactions ORDER BY seq ASC"
        ))?;
        let rows = stmt.query_map([], chain_row_from_sqlite)?;
        let mut out = Vec::new();
        for row in rows {
            out.push(row?);
        }
        Ok(out)
    }

    /// Return every approval event in seq order.
    pub fn fetch_event_rows(&self) -> Result<Vec<EventRow>, TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = self.connection()?;
        let mut stmt = conn.prepare(
            "SELECT seq, key_id, kind, transaction_id, receipt_digest, \
                    created_at, prev_chain_hash, chain_hash, chain_version, caller_principal \
             FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq ASC",
        )?;
        let rows = stmt.query_map([], event_row_from_sqlite)?;
        let mut out = Vec::new();
        for row in rows {
            out.push(row?);
        }
        Ok(out)
    }

    /// Walk the audit chain with `key` and report integrity status.
    pub fn verify_audit_chain(
        &self,
        key: &AuditKey,
    ) -> Result<VerifyOutcome, TransactionStoreError> {
        let rows = self.fetch_chain_rows()?;
        Ok(audit_chain::verify_chain(key, &rows))
    }

    /// Walk the approval-event chain with `key`.
    pub fn verify_event_chain(
        &self,
        key: &AuditKey,
    ) -> Result<VerifyOutcome, TransactionStoreError> {
        let rows = self.fetch_event_rows()?;
        Ok(audit_chain::verify_event_chain(key, &rows))
    }

    /// Check that every event tip committed by a transaction row is still
    /// present in the event chain. See [`audit_chain::verify_event_binding`].
    pub fn verify_event_binding(
        &self,
    ) -> Result<audit_chain::BindingOutcome, TransactionStoreError> {
        let tx_rows = self.fetch_chain_rows()?;
        let event_rows = self.fetch_event_rows()?;
        Ok(audit_chain::verify_event_binding(&tx_rows, &event_rows))
    }

    /// Verify the chain with only the hex-encoded Ed25519 **public** key. The
    /// auditor path: proves the chain without the private key and cannot forge.
    pub fn verify_audit_chain_with_pubkey(
        &self,
        verifying_key_hex: &str,
    ) -> Result<VerifyOutcome, TransactionStoreError> {
        let rows = self.fetch_chain_rows()?;
        Ok(audit_chain::verify_chain_with_pubkey(
            verifying_key_hex,
            &rows,
        ))
    }

    /// Fetch a single row's chain metadata by `transaction_id`. Used by the
    /// audit-log forwarder to construct an `AuditEvent` after insert.
    pub fn fetch_chain_row(
        &self,
        transaction_id: &str,
    ) -> Result<Option<ChainRow>, TransactionStoreError> {
        let conn = self.connection()?;
        let mut stmt = conn.prepare(&format!(
            "SELECT {CHAIN_ROW_COLUMNS} FROM transactions WHERE transaction_id = ?1"
        ))?;
        let mut rows = stmt.query(params![transaction_id])?;
        if let Some(row) = rows.next()? {
            Ok(Some(chain_row_from_sqlite(row)?))
        } else {
            Ok(None)
        }
    }

    /// Allocate the next monotonic `seq` and fetch the previous row's
    /// `chain_hash`. Caller must hold a transaction so the (seq, prev_hash)
    /// pair is consistent against concurrent writers.
    fn next_seq_and_prev_hash(conn: &Connection) -> Result<(u64, String), TransactionStoreError> {
        let prev: Option<(i64, String)> = query_optional(
            conn,
            "SELECT seq, chain_hash FROM transactions ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1",
            [],
            |row| Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?)),
        )?;
        Ok(match prev {
            Some((seq, hash)) => ((seq as u64) + 1, hash),
            None => (1, String::new()),
        })
    }

    /// `chain_hash` of the last approval event, or `None` when no event has
    /// ever been recorded.
    fn event_chain_tip(conn: &Connection) -> Result<Option<String>, TransactionStoreError> {
        Ok(query_optional(
            conn,
            "SELECT chain_hash FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1",
            [],
            |row| row.get(0),
        )?)
    }

    /// Append one signed approval event. Must be called inside a DB
    /// transaction that also performs the state change being recorded: an
    /// event committed without its state change (or the reverse) would be a
    /// trail that disagrees with reality.
    fn append_event(
        conn: &Connection,
        key: &AuditKey,
        kind: AuditEventKind,
        transaction_id: &str,
        receipt_digest: &str,
        identity: EventIdentity<'_>,
    ) -> Result<(), TransactionStoreError> {
        let prev_chain_hash = Self::event_chain_tip(conn)?.unwrap_or_default();
        let seq: i64 = conn.query_row(
            "SELECT COALESCE(MAX(seq), 0) + 1 FROM audit_events",
            [],
            |row| row.get(0),
        )?;
        let created_at: String =
            conn.query_row("SELECT strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now')", [], |row| {
                row.get(0)
            })?;
        let key_id = CURRENT_KEY_ID.to_string();
        // Build the content once and derive the stored version from its
        // identity, so the chain_version column is provably the version whose
        // message was signed — the same discipline the transaction insert
        // follows.
        let content = EventContent {
            seq: seq as u64,
            key_id: &key_id,
            kind,
            transaction_id,
            receipt_digest,
            created_at: &created_at,
            identity,
        };
        let chain_hash = key.event_hash(&content, &prev_chain_hash);
        let stored_principal = match identity {
            EventIdentity::V2 { caller_principal } => Some(caller_principal),
            EventIdentity::LegacyV1 => None,
        };
        conn.execute(
            "INSERT INTO audit_events (\
                seq, key_id, kind, transaction_id, receipt_digest, \
                created_at, chain_hash, prev_chain_hash, chain_version, caller_principal \
            ) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?7, ?8, ?9, ?10)",
            params![
                seq,
                key_id,
                kind.as_str(),
                transaction_id,
                receipt_digest,
                created_at,
                chain_hash,
                prev_chain_hash,
                identity.version() as i64,
                stored_principal,
            ],
        )?;
        Ok(())
    }

    fn insert_transaction(
        conn: &Connection,
        key: &AuditKey,
        transaction_id: &str,
        transaction: NewTransaction,
    ) -> Result<InsertedTransaction, TransactionStoreError> {
        let request_id = transaction.request_id;
        let request_hash = transaction.request_hash;
        let action_name = transaction.action_name;
        let risk_level = transaction.risk_level;
        // Initial status is always Queued — not caller-controllable.
        let status = JobState::Queued;
        // Always the store's own commitment over this transaction. It used to
        // accept a caller-supplied `Some(..)` and use it verbatim; production
        // always passed `None`, so the invariant held only because every call
        // site remembered to. The value is chain-hashed and then treated as
        // authoritative evidence that an approval happened, which is not
        // something a caller may hand us.
        let approval_id = Some(key.approval_commitment(transaction_id, &request_hash));
        let summary = transaction.summary;
        let warnings = transaction.warnings;
        let warnings_json = serde_json::to_string(&warnings)?;

        // Allocate the next seq + previous chain hash inside the same DB
        // transaction so concurrent writers can't race.
        let (seq, prev_chain_hash) = Self::next_seq_and_prev_hash(conn)?;

        // SQLite's `datetime('now')` (default for the column) is computed at
        // INSERT time, but we need the same value to compute the chain hash
        // before the row exists. Compute it ourselves and pin it.
        let created_at: String =
            conn.query_row("SELECT strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now')", [], |row| {
                row.get(0)
            })?;

        let key_id = CURRENT_KEY_ID.to_string();
        // Bind this row to the approval-event chain as it stands right now.
        // Read inside the caller's DB transaction so a concurrent event append
        // cannot land between the read and the insert.
        let event_tip = Self::event_chain_tip(conn)?.unwrap_or_default();
        let caller_role = transaction.caller_role.as_str();
        let caller_principal = transaction.caller_principal.as_signed_str();
        // Build the identity once and derive the stored version from it, so the
        // chain_version column is provably the version whose message was signed.
        // A constant here let the two drift the moment a new encoding landed.
        let identity = ChainIdentity::V3 {
            caller_role,
            event_tip: &event_tip,
            caller_principal: &caller_principal,
        };
        let chain_hash = key.chain_hash(
            &ChainContent {
                seq,
                key_id: &key_id,
                transaction_id,
                request_id: &request_id,
                request_hash: &request_hash,
                action_name: &action_name,
                risk_level,
                summary: &summary,
                approval_id: approval_id.as_deref(),
                warnings_json: &warnings_json,
                created_at: &created_at,
                identity,
            },
            &prev_chain_hash,
        );

        let record = TransactionRecord {
            transaction_id: transaction_id.to_string(),
            request_id: request_id.clone(),
            request_hash: request_hash.clone(),
            action_name: action_name.clone(),
            risk_level,
            status,
            approval_id: approval_id.clone(),
            summary: summary.clone(),
            warnings: warnings.clone(),
        };

        conn.execute(
            "INSERT INTO transactions (
                transaction_id,
                request_id,
                request_hash,
                action_name,
                risk_level,
                status,
                approval_id,
                summary,
                warnings_json,
                created_at,
                seq,
                key_id,
                chain_hash,
                prev_chain_hash,
                chain_version,
                caller_role,
                event_tip,
                caller_principal
            ) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?7, ?8, ?9, ?10, ?11, ?12, ?13, ?14, ?15, ?16, ?17, ?18)",
            params![
                transaction_id,
                request_id,
                request_hash,
                action_name,
                serialize_field(&risk_level)?,
                serialize_field(&status)?,
                approval_id,
                summary,
                warnings_json,
                created_at,
                seq as i64,
                key_id,
                chain_hash,
                prev_chain_hash,
                identity.version() as i64,
                caller_role,
                event_tip,
                caller_principal,
            ],
        )?;

        Ok(InsertedTransaction {
            record,
            seq,
            chain_hash,
        })
    }

    fn insert_preview(
        conn: &Connection,
        transaction_id: &str,
        preview: &PreviewEnvelope,
    ) -> Result<(), TransactionStoreError> {
        conn.execute(
            "INSERT INTO transaction_previews (transaction_id, preview_json)
             VALUES (?1, ?2)",
            params![transaction_id, serde_json::to_string(preview)?],
        )?;
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// Create `dir` and any missing parents with mode `0o700` (rwx owner only).
///
/// If the directory already exists, its mode is left untouched — the operator
/// or packaging spec (`sysknife-tmpfiles.conf`) owns existing-directory policy.
/// If the directory must be created here (e.g. dev contributor's first daemon
/// run), we never produce a world-readable audit-log directory.
fn ensure_private_dir(dir: &Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::DirBuilderExt;
    if dir.exists() {
        return Ok(());
    }
    std::fs::DirBuilder::new()
        .recursive(true)
        .mode(0o700)
        .create(dir)
}

/// Narrow the audit database (and its WAL sidecars) to mode `0o600`.
///
/// SQLite creates its files `0o644 & ~umask`. The 0700 parent directory hides
/// them from other users today, but the file mode travels: a backup, a `cp`, or
/// an operator who widens the directory exposes every action name, parameter,
/// and approving principal the daemon has recorded. SQLite also derives the
/// `-wal`/`-shm` modes from the main file, so leaving the main file permissive
/// leaks the most recent (not-yet-checkpointed) transactions as well.
///
/// Tightening only, and never fatal: the directory is the primary control, and
/// a `chmod` that fails because the file belongs to another user must not stop
/// a daemon that previously started fine. It is loud, because a security
/// property that quietly stops holding is worse than one that never held.
fn restrict_db_file_mode(db_path: &Path) {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;

    // `-shm` is recreated per connection; `-wal` persists. Both inherit from the
    // main file at creation, so fixing the main file covers the common case and
    // these two cover a database that already exists with a wider mode.
    let sidecars = [
        db_path.to_path_buf(),
        with_suffix(db_path, "-wal"),
        with_suffix(db_path, "-shm"),
    ];
    for path in sidecars {
        let Ok(metadata) = std::fs::metadata(&path) else {
            continue; // Absent sidecar: nothing to narrow.
        };
        let mode = metadata.permissions().mode() & 0o777;
        if mode & 0o077 == 0 {
            continue; // Already owner-only or tighter.
        }
        if let Err(err) = std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)) {
            eprintln!(
                "[sysknife-daemon] WARNING: {} is mode {mode:o} and could not be \
                 narrowed to 0600 ({err}); it is readable by anyone who can reach \
                 it. The parent directory should be 0700 — check it.",
                path.display()
            );
        }
    }
}

/// `path` with `suffix` appended to the file name (not the extension), matching
/// how SQLite names `daemon.sqlite-wal` beside `daemon.sqlite`.
fn with_suffix(path: &Path, suffix: &str) -> PathBuf {
    let mut name = path.as_os_str().to_os_string();
    name.push(suffix);
    PathBuf::from(name)
}

fn row_to_record(row: &rusqlite::Row) -> Result<TransactionRecord, TransactionStoreError> {
    Ok(TransactionRecord {
        transaction_id: row.get(0)?,
        request_id: row.get(1)?,
        request_hash: row.get(2)?,
        action_name: row.get(3)?,
        risk_level: deserialize_field(&row.get::<_, String>(4)?)?,
        status: deserialize_field(&row.get::<_, String>(5)?)?,
        approval_id: row.get(6)?,
        summary: row.get(7)?,
        warnings: serde_json::from_str(&row.get::<_, String>(8)?)?,
    })
}

fn serialize_field<T: Serialize>(value: &T) -> Result<String, serde_json::Error> {
    serde_json::to_string(value)
}

fn deserialize_field<T: DeserializeOwned>(value: &str) -> Result<T, serde_json::Error> {
    serde_json::from_str(value)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::audit_chain::CHAIN_VERSION_CURRENT;
    use crate::audit_chain::CHAIN_VERSION_LEGACY;
    use crate::audit_chain::EVENT_VERSION_CURRENT;
    use crate::audit_chain::EVENT_VERSION_LEGACY;
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    use tempfile::tempdir;

    /// Open a TransactionStore with a deterministic test key. Avoids the
    /// XDG/`/etc` lookup in `TransactionStore::open` so tests don't share
    /// state with the dev environment.
    fn test_store(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> TransactionStore {
        let key = Arc::new(AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]));
        TransactionStore::open_with_key(path, key).unwrap()
    }

    // ── Schema migration ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

    /// Create a database at exactly schema version 1 — the shape a v0.2.12
    /// daemon left behind — and write one row using the encoding that binary
    /// signed. Building the fixture from `SQLITE_MIGRATIONS[0]` rather than a
    /// copied DDL string means it stays honest if migration 1 is ever edited.
    fn legacy_v1_database(path: &Path, key: &AuditKey) -> String {
        let conn = Connection::open(path).unwrap();
        conn.execute_batch(
            "CREATE TABLE schema_migrations (
                 version INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
                 name TEXT NOT NULL,
                 applied_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
             );",
        )
        .unwrap();
        conn.execute_batch(SQLITE_MIGRATIONS[0].sql).unwrap();
        conn.execute(
            "INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version, name) VALUES (1, ?1)",
            params![SQLITE_MIGRATIONS[0].name],
        )
        .unwrap();

        let transaction_id = "tx-legacy";
        let created_at = "2026-04-24T12:00:00.000Z";
        let chain_hash = key.chain_hash(
            &ChainContent {
                seq: 1,
                key_id: CURRENT_KEY_ID,
                transaction_id,
                request_id: "req-legacy",
                request_hash: "hash-legacy",
                action_name: "UpdateSystem",
                risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
                summary: "Upgrade the system",
                approval_id: None,
                warnings_json: "[]",
                created_at,
                identity: ChainIdentity::LegacyV1,
            },
            "",
        );
        conn.execute(
            "INSERT INTO transactions (
                transaction_id, request_id, request_hash, action_name, risk_level,
                status, approval_id, summary, warnings_json, created_at,
                seq, key_id, chain_hash, prev_chain_hash
            ) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, NULL, ?7, ?8, ?9, 1, ?10, ?11, '')",
            params![
                transaction_id,
                "req-legacy",
                "hash-legacy",
                "UpdateSystem",
                serialize_field(&RiskLevel::High).unwrap(),
                serialize_field(&JobState::Queued).unwrap(),
                "Upgrade the system",
                "[]",
                created_at,
                CURRENT_KEY_ID,
                chain_hash,
            ],
        )
        .unwrap();
        transaction_id.to_string()
    }

    /// A database at schema version 2 holding one v2 row: the shape every host
    /// running v0.2.13 through v0.2.16 has on disk right now.
    ///
    /// Built by replaying `SQLITE_MIGRATIONS[0..=1]` rather than hardcoded DDL,
    /// so editing those migrations cannot leave this fixture describing a schema
    /// that never existed.
    fn v2_database(path: &Path, key: &AuditKey) -> String {
        let conn = Connection::open(path).unwrap();
        conn.execute_batch(
            "CREATE TABLE schema_migrations (
                 version INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
                 name TEXT NOT NULL,
                 applied_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
             );",
        )
        .unwrap();
        for migration in &SQLITE_MIGRATIONS[0..=1] {
            conn.execute_batch(migration.sql).unwrap();
            conn.execute(
                "INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version, name) VALUES (?1, ?2)",
                params![migration.version, migration.name],
            )
            .unwrap();
        }

        let transaction_id = "tx-v2";
        let created_at = "2026-07-01T12:00:00.000Z";
        let chain_hash = key.chain_hash(
            &ChainContent {
                seq: 1,
                key_id: CURRENT_KEY_ID,
                transaction_id,
                request_id: "req-v2",
                request_hash: "hash-v2",
                action_name: "UpdateSystem",
                risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
                summary: "Upgrade the system",
                approval_id: None,
                warnings_json: "[]",
                created_at,
                identity: ChainIdentity::V2 {
                    caller_role: "admin",
                    event_tip: "",
                },
            },
            "",
        );
        conn.execute(
            "INSERT INTO transactions (
                transaction_id, request_id, request_hash, action_name, risk_level,
                status, approval_id, summary, warnings_json, created_at,
                seq, key_id, chain_hash, prev_chain_hash,
                chain_version, caller_role, event_tip
            ) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, NULL, ?7, ?8, ?9, 1, ?10, ?11, '', 2, 'admin', '')",
            params![
                transaction_id,
                "req-v2",
                "hash-v2",
                "UpdateSystem",
                serialize_field(&RiskLevel::High).unwrap(),
                serialize_field(&JobState::Queued).unwrap(),
                "Upgrade the system",
                "[]",
                created_at,
                CURRENT_KEY_ID,
                chain_hash,
            ],
        )
        .unwrap();
        transaction_id.to_string()
    }

    /// The upgrade every deployed host actually performs: v2 on disk, then v3
    /// rows appended by the new daemon, in one chain.
    ///
    /// The v1 fixture already covers the older jump, but nothing covered this
    /// one, and it is the only one with installed users. If migration 3 ever
    /// backfilled a principal, or the v2 dispatch drifted, this is where a real
    /// operator's audit log would start reporting as tampered.
    #[test]
    fn a_v2_database_keeps_verifying_and_accepts_v3_rows() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let db_path = dir.path().join("tx.db");
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let old_transaction = v2_database(&db_path, &key);

        let store = test_store(&db_path);

        let version: i64 = store
            .connection()
            .unwrap()
            .query_row("SELECT MAX(version) FROM schema_migrations", [], |row| {
                row.get(0)
            })
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            version, 4,
            "opening a v2 database must apply every migration up to 4"
        );

        let rows = store.fetch_chain_rows().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(rows.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(rows[0].transaction_id, old_transaction);
        assert_eq!(rows[0].chain_version, audit_chain::CHAIN_VERSION_V2);
        assert_eq!(
            rows[0].caller_principal, None,
            "migration 3 must not invent a principal for a row signed without one"
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            audit_chain::VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 1 }
        ));

        // Append under the new encoding and re-verify the mixed chain.
        let mut fresh = queued_transaction();
        fresh.caller_principal = CallerPrincipal::Uid(4242);
        store.record(fresh).unwrap();

        let rows = store.fetch_chain_rows().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(rows.len(), 2);
        assert_eq!(rows[1].chain_version, audit_chain::CHAIN_VERSION_CURRENT);
        assert_eq!(rows[1].caller_principal.as_deref(), Some("uid:4242"));
        assert_eq!(
            rows[1].prev_chain_hash, rows[0].chain_hash,
            "the v3 row must chain onto the v2 row, not start a new chain"
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            audit_chain::VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 2 }
        ));

        // The census, taken over rows that made a real round trip through SQLite
        // rather than hand-built fixtures. This is the only place that can catch
        // the SQL side going wrong: a `SELECT` that dropped `caller_principal`, or
        // a mapping that coerced `NULL` to `""`, would move every legacy row out
        // of "names nobody" and into "names an account", restoring the exact
        // misreport this census exists to prevent, with every in-memory test
        // still green.
        let census = audit_chain::AttributionCensus::of(&rows);
        assert_eq!(census.rows(), 2);
        assert_eq!(census.named(), 1, "only the v3 row names uid:4242");
        assert_eq!(
            census.not_recorded(),
            1,
            "the v2 row's encoding never signed a principal"
        );
        assert_eq!(census.attribution_failed(), 0);
        assert_eq!(census.unattested(), 0);
        assert_eq!(census.unnamed(), 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_database_written_before_the_migration_still_verifies_after_upgrading() {
        // The migration contract, end to end through the store. An operator
        // upgrading the daemon must not see their existing audit log start
        // reporting as tampered — that would make a real compromise
        // indistinguishable from a routine upgrade.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let db_path = dir.path().join("tx.db");
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        legacy_v1_database(&db_path, &key);

        let store = test_store(&db_path);
        assert_eq!(
            store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 1 }
        );
        let rows = store.fetch_chain_rows().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(rows[0].chain_version, CHAIN_VERSION_LEGACY);
        assert_eq!(rows[0].caller_role, None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn rows_appended_after_the_migration_chain_onto_legacy_rows() {
        // Mixed-generation chain written through the real store, not a
        // hand-built fixture: the new row's prev_chain_hash must link to the
        // legacy row, and both encodings must verify in one walk.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let db_path = dir.path().join("tx.db");
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        legacy_v1_database(&db_path, &key);

        let store = test_store(&db_path);
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let rows = store.fetch_chain_rows().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(rows.len(), 2);
        assert_eq!(rows[1].prev_chain_hash, rows[0].chain_hash);
        assert_eq!(rows[1].chain_version, CHAIN_VERSION_CURRENT);
        assert_eq!(
            store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 2 }
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_schema_newer_than_this_binary_is_refused() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let db_path = dir.path().join("tx.db");
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        legacy_v1_database(&db_path, &key);
        let conn = Connection::open(&db_path).unwrap();
        conn.execute(
            "INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version, name) VALUES (99, 'from the future')",
            [],
        )
        .unwrap();
        drop(conn);

        let err = TransactionStore::open_with_key(&db_path, Arc::new(key)).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, TransactionStoreError::DatabaseInvariant(ref m) if m.contains("99")),
            "expected a refusal naming the unsupported version, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    // ── caller identity + approval events ────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn the_signed_row_records_which_role_asked() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let mut tx = queued_transaction();
        tx.caller_role = CallerRole::Admin;
        store.record(tx).unwrap();

        let rows = store.fetch_chain_rows().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(rows[0].caller_role.as_deref(), Some("admin"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn approving_consuming_and_revoking_each_append_a_chained_event() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));

        // Approve then consume.
        let a = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&a.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("queued transaction approves");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);
        assert!(store
            .claim_approved_for_execution(&a.transaction_id, &digest, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap());

        // Approve then revoke.
        let b = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        store
            .approve_transaction(&b.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap();
        assert!(store
            .revoke_unconsumed_approval(&b.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap());

        let events = store.fetch_event_rows().unwrap();
        let kinds: Vec<&str> = events.iter().map(|e| e.kind.as_str()).collect();
        assert_eq!(
            kinds,
            vec![
                "approval_granted",
                "approval_consumed",
                "approval_granted",
                "approval_revoked",
            ]
        );
        assert_eq!(
            store.verify_event_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 4 }
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_stored_approval_event_names_the_account_that_acted() {
        // End-to-end over the real store, not an in-memory fixture: the
        // principal threaded through `approve_transaction` /
        // `claim_approved_for_execution` must survive the round-trip into the
        // persisted event rows, so a verified chain names who approved and who
        // executed rather than leaving it to inference (#249). Two different
        // uids leave two distinguishable signed records.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));

        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        // alice (uid:1000) approves ...
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("queued transaction approves");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);
        // ... bob (uid:1001) executes.
        assert!(store
            .claim_approved_for_execution(&tx.transaction_id, &digest, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1001))
            .unwrap());

        let events = store.fetch_event_rows().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
        let granted = events
            .iter()
            .find(|e| e.kind == "approval_granted")
            .expect("a grant event");
        let consumed = events
            .iter()
            .find(|e| e.kind == "approval_consumed")
            .expect("a consume event");

        // Both rows carry the new encoding and the acting account.
        assert_eq!(granted.chain_version, EVENT_VERSION_CURRENT);
        assert_eq!(consumed.chain_version, EVENT_VERSION_CURRENT);
        assert_eq!(
            granted.caller_principal.as_deref(),
            Some("uid:1000"),
            "the grant must name the approver"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            consumed.caller_principal.as_deref(),
            Some("uid:1001"),
            "the consume must name the executor"
        );
        assert_ne!(
            granted.caller_principal, consumed.caller_principal,
            "a grant and a consume by different accounts must be distinguishable"
        );

        // The persisted rows still verify as a chain, and a status event (if
        // any were appended) stays on the legacy encoding — covered by the
        // unit tests; here we assert the approval rows themselves are intact.
        assert_eq!(
            store.verify_event_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 2 }
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_stored_status_event_carries_no_principal_and_stays_legacy() {
        // The complement of the test above: status events are written from
        // spawned execution tasks with no caller attribution, so they stay on
        // the six-field legacy encoding rather than signing an account the
        // code cannot see (#249). The mixed chain still verifies.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));

        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("queued transaction approves");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);
        assert!(store
            .claim_approved_for_execution(&tx.transaction_id, &digest, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap());
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Succeeded)
            .unwrap();

        let events = store.fetch_event_rows().unwrap();
        let status = events
            .iter()
            .find(|e| e.kind == "status_succeeded")
            .expect("a status event");
        assert_eq!(status.chain_version, EVENT_VERSION_LEGACY);
        assert_eq!(
            status.caller_principal, None,
            "a status event names no account"
        );
        // grant + consume (V2) + status (legacy) all verify as one chain.
        assert_eq!(
            store.verify_event_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 3 }
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_terminal_outcome_is_chained_so_rewriting_status_is_detectable() {
        // The module documentation says status transitions ARE chained
        // separately, in audit_events. They were not: update_status appended
        // nothing, and audit_events recorded only the approval lifecycle. So a
        // job that ran to completion could be rewritten in the `status` column
        // as canceled, `sysknife history` reported it canceled, and
        // `audit verify` still reported the chain Intact. An investigator
        // reading that documentation would believe the outcome was protected.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));

        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("queued transaction approves");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);
        assert!(store
            .claim_approved_for_execution(&tx.transaction_id, &digest, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap());
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Succeeded)
            .unwrap();

        // The outcome must be in the event chain, not only in a mutable column.
        let kinds: Vec<String> = store
            .fetch_event_rows()
            .unwrap()
            .iter()
            .map(|e| e.kind.clone())
            .collect();
        assert!(
            kinds.iter().any(|k| k.contains("succeeded")),
            "no event records the terminal outcome; the chain covers only {kinds:?}"
        );
        assert!(
            matches!(
                store.status_matches_chain().unwrap(),
                audit_chain::StatusOutcome::Agrees { .. }
            ),
            "an untampered store must report agreement, got {:?}",
            store.status_matches_chain().unwrap()
        );

        // Now rewrite the column the way anyone with write access to the
        // database can, and the cross-check must notice.
        {
            let conn = rusqlite::Connection::open(dir.path().join("tx.db")).unwrap();
            let n = conn
                .execute(
                    "UPDATE transactions SET status = ?1 WHERE transaction_id = ?2",
                    rusqlite::params!["\"canceled\"", tx.transaction_id],
                )
                .unwrap();
            assert_eq!(n, 1, "the fixture did not rewrite the status column");
        }
        let audit_chain::StatusOutcome::Disagrees { detail } =
            store.status_matches_chain().unwrap()
        else {
            panic!("a rewritten status must be reported, not passed over");
        };
        assert!(
            detail.contains(&tx.transaction_id),
            "the report must name the transaction: {detail}"
        );
        // The event chain itself is untouched by that UPDATE, which is exactly
        // why verifying it alone was not enough.
        assert!(
            matches!(
                store.verify_event_chain(&key).unwrap(),
                VerifyOutcome::Intact { .. }
            ),
            "event chain: {:?}, rows: {:?}",
            store.verify_event_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            store
                .fetch_event_rows()
                .unwrap()
                .iter()
                .map(|e| (e.seq, e.kind.clone()))
                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_failed_approval_appends_no_event() {
        // Only real state changes get chained. A no-op approve (already
        // approved) writing an event would make the trail claim something that
        // did not happen.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap();
        store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(store.fetch_event_rows().unwrap().len(), 1);

        // Same for a revoke with nothing to revoke.
        assert!(!store
            .revoke_unconsumed_approval("no-such-tx", CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap());
        assert_eq!(store.fetch_event_rows().unwrap().len(), 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn deleting_the_record_that_an_approval_happened_no_longer_goes_unnoticed() {
        // The finding. Before the event chain, `transaction_approvals` was a
        // plain table: DELETE the row and `audit verify` still said Intact, so
        // the fact that a privileged action had been approved could be erased
        // without a trace. Now the deletion has to survive two independent
        // checks.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let db_path = dir.path().join("tx.db");
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let store = test_store(&db_path);

        let a = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        store
            .approve_transaction(&a.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap();
        // A later transaction commits to the event tip, which is what carries
        // the binding into the checkpoint-anchored transaction chain.
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(
            store.verify_event_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 1 }
        );
        assert_eq!(
            store.verify_event_binding().unwrap(),
            audit_chain::BindingOutcome::Consistent {
                bindings_checked: 1
            }
        );

        // Erase the approval and its event.
        let conn = Connection::open(&db_path).unwrap();
        conn.execute("DELETE FROM transaction_approvals", [])
            .unwrap();
        conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_events", []).unwrap();
        drop(conn);

        // The event chain alone is now empty and walks clean — deleting the
        // only event leaves nothing to contradict. The transaction row's
        // committed tip is what catches it.
        assert_eq!(
            store.verify_event_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 0 }
        );
        match store.verify_event_binding().unwrap() {
            audit_chain::BindingOutcome::MissingEvent {
                transaction_seq, ..
            } => assert_eq!(transaction_seq, 2),
            other => panic!("expected MissingEvent, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_read_only_store_cannot_revoke_or_claim() {
        // Both paths now append to the event chain, so both need the signing
        // key. Refusing loudly beats silently skipping the event.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let db_path = dir.path().join("tx.db");
        let store = test_store(&db_path);
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let read_only = TransactionStore::open_read_only(&db_path).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            read_only.revoke_unconsumed_approval("tx", CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000)),
            Err(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(_))
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            read_only.claim_approved_for_execution("tx", "digest", CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000)),
            Err(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(_))
        ));
    }

    // ── Audit chain integration tests ────────────────────────────────────

    /// The store must persist the principal the dispatcher resolved, under the
    /// v3 tag, or the chain claims an encoding whose evidence is missing. Reads
    /// the columns directly rather than through the verifier, so a mismatch
    /// between what was signed and what was stored is visible.
    #[test]
    fn record_persists_the_caller_principal_under_the_current_encoding() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let mut tx = queued_transaction();
        tx.caller_principal = CallerPrincipal::Uid(4242);
        store.record(tx).unwrap();

        let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
        let (version, role, principal): (i64, Option<String>, Option<String>) = conn
            .query_row(
                "SELECT chain_version, caller_role, caller_principal FROM transactions",
                [],
                |row| Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?, row.get(2)?)),
            )
            .unwrap();

        assert_eq!(version, i64::from(audit_chain::CHAIN_VERSION_CURRENT));
        assert_eq!(role.as_deref(), Some("dev"));
        assert_eq!(
            principal.as_deref(),
            Some("uid:4242"),
            "the row must name the account the dispatcher resolved"
        );

        // And the signature must agree with those columns.
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        assert!(matches!(
            store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            audit_chain::VerifyOutcome::Intact { .. }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn record_writes_audit_chain_columns() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let _record = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
        let (seq, key_id, chain_hash, prev): (i64, String, String, String) = conn
            .query_row(
                "SELECT seq, key_id, chain_hash, prev_chain_hash FROM transactions",
                [],
                |row| Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?, row.get(2)?, row.get(3)?)),
            )
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(seq, 1, "first row gets seq=1");
        assert_eq!(key_id, audit_chain::CURRENT_KEY_ID);
        assert_eq!(prev, "", "first row has empty prev_chain_hash");
        assert_eq!(
            chain_hash.len(),
            audit_chain::HASH_HEX_LEN,
            "chain_hash is a hex-encoded Ed25519 signature"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn sequential_records_produce_chained_hashes() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let rows = store.fetch_chain_rows().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(rows.len(), 3);
        assert_eq!(rows[0].seq, 1);
        assert_eq!(rows[1].seq, 2);
        assert_eq!(rows[2].seq, 3);
        // Each row's prev_chain_hash matches the previous row's chain_hash.
        assert_eq!(rows[1].prev_chain_hash, rows[0].chain_hash);
        assert_eq!(rows[2].prev_chain_hash, rows[1].chain_hash);
    }

    /// T3 — concurrent `record()` keeps the chain intact and seqs contiguous.
    ///
    /// The store guarantees this via `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` on every record:
    /// the immediate write lock means `next_seq_and_prev_hash` is read
    /// inside the same SQLite transaction that does the INSERT, so two
    /// records cannot both observe `seq=N` and produce two rows with the
    /// same chain hash.  Drive 8 worker threads × 10 records each
    /// through the same store and assert (a) `verify_audit_chain` returns
    /// Intact { rows_checked: 80 } and (b) the seq column is contiguous
    /// 1..=80.  A regression that drops `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` or substitutes
    /// a non-locking read fails one of these on every run.
    #[test]
    fn concurrent_record_keeps_chain_intact_and_seqs_contiguous() {
        const WORKERS: usize = 8;
        const RECORDS_PER_WORKER: usize = 10;
        const TOTAL: usize = WORKERS * RECORDS_PER_WORKER;

        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = std::sync::Arc::new(test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db")));

        let mut handles = Vec::with_capacity(WORKERS);
        for w in 0..WORKERS {
            let store = std::sync::Arc::clone(&store);
            handles.push(std::thread::spawn(move || {
                for r in 0..RECORDS_PER_WORKER {
                    let tx = NewTransaction {
                        request_id: format!("worker-{w}-record-{r}"),
                        request_hash: format!("hash-{w}-{r}"),
                        action_name: "GetSystemState".to_string(),
                        risk_level: RiskLevel::Low,
                        summary: format!("worker {w} record {r}"),
                        warnings: vec![],
                        caller_role: CallerRole::Dev,
                        // Distinct per worker: with every row claiming the same
                        // account, the chain could attribute a row to the wrong
                        // caller under contention and still verify.
                        caller_principal: CallerPrincipal::Uid(3000 + w as u32),
                    };
                    store
                        .record(tx)
                        .expect("record must succeed under contention");
                }
            }));
        }
        for h in handles {
            h.join().expect("worker thread did not panic");
        }

        // (a) chain must be intact end-to-end.
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let outcome = store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap();
        match outcome {
            VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked } => {
                assert_eq!(
                    rows_checked, TOTAL as u64,
                    "expected {TOTAL} rows checked, got {rows_checked}"
                );
            }
            other => panic!("chain must be Intact under concurrent writes; got {other:?}"),
        }

        // (a2) every row must still name the worker that wrote it. The summary
        // carries the worker id independently of the principal, so a row whose
        // principal drifted onto another worker's insert is detectable.
        {
            let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
            let mut stmt = conn
                .prepare("SELECT summary, caller_principal FROM transactions")
                .unwrap();
            let pairs: Vec<(String, Option<String>)> = stmt
                .query_map([], |row| Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?)))
                .unwrap()
                .map(|r| r.unwrap())
                .collect();
            assert_eq!(pairs.len(), TOTAL);
            for (summary, principal) in pairs {
                let worker: u32 = summary
                    .split_whitespace()
                    .nth(1)
                    .and_then(|w| w.parse().ok())
                    .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("unexpected summary {summary:?}"));
                assert_eq!(
                    principal.as_deref(),
                    Some(format!("uid:{}", 3000 + worker).as_str()),
                    "row {summary:?} was attributed to the wrong account"
                );
            }
        }

        // (b) seq must be a contiguous run 1..=TOTAL with no gaps and no duplicates.
        let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
        let mut stmt = conn
            .prepare("SELECT seq FROM transactions ORDER BY seq ASC")
            .unwrap();
        let seqs: Vec<i64> = stmt
            .query_map([], |row| row.get::<_, i64>(0))
            .unwrap()
            .map(|r| r.unwrap())
            .collect();
        assert_eq!(seqs.len(), TOTAL, "row count mismatch");
        for (i, s) in seqs.iter().enumerate() {
            assert_eq!(
                *s,
                (i as i64) + 1,
                "seq column must be contiguous 1..={TOTAL}; saw {s} at position {i}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_audit_chain_intact_after_inserts() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        for _ in 0..3 {
            store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        }
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let outcome = store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(outcome, VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 3 }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_audit_chain_with_pubkey_intact_after_inserts() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        for _ in 0..3 {
            store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        }
        // Auditor path: verify with ONLY the public key, no private key.
        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let outcome = store
            .verify_audit_chain_with_pubkey(&key.verifying_key_hex())
            .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(outcome, VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 3 }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_audit_chain_with_wrong_pubkey_is_broken() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        // A different keypair's public key must not validate the chain.
        let other = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x99; 32]);
        let outcome = store
            .verify_audit_chain_with_pubkey(&other.verifying_key_hex())
            .unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(outcome, VerifyOutcome::Broken { .. }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_detects_tampered_summary() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        // Tamper: modify the summary field directly via SQL — simulates an
        // attacker with database write access who skips the daemon code path.
        let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
        conn.execute(
            "UPDATE transactions SET summary = ?1 WHERE transaction_id = ?2",
            params!["EVIL CHANGE", tx.transaction_id],
        )
        .unwrap();

        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let outcome = store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(outcome, VerifyOutcome::Broken { .. }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn status_update_does_not_break_chain() {
        // Status is mutable; the chain protects only immutable fields.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running)
            .unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Succeeded)
            .unwrap();

        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        let outcome = store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap();
        assert!(
            matches!(outcome, VerifyOutcome::Intact { rows_checked: 1 }),
            "status mutation must not break the chain (status not in chain content): {outcome:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn open_read_only_rejects_record() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let key_path = dir.path().join("audit-key");
        std::fs::write(&key_path, vec![0x42; 32]).unwrap();
        std::fs::set_permissions(&key_path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();

        let store = TransactionStore::open_read_only(dir.path().join("tx.db")).unwrap();
        let result = store.record(queued_transaction());
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            Err(TransactionStoreError::AuditChainMissing(_))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn ensure_private_dir_creates_with_0700_mode() {
        let root = tempdir().unwrap();
        let target = root.path().join("a/b/c");
        ensure_private_dir(&target).unwrap();
        assert!(target.is_dir());
        let mode = std::fs::metadata(&target).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
        assert_eq!(mode, 0o700, "leaf dir must be 0o700, got {mode:o}");
    }

    /// The audit database is the record of every privileged action taken on the
    /// host: action names, parameters, and who approved them. SQLite creates it
    /// `0644 & ~umask`, which the 0700 parent hides today — but only today. A
    /// backup, a `cp`, or an operator who widens the directory carries the file
    /// mode with it, and SQLite derives the `-wal`/`-shm` sidecar modes from the
    /// main file, so a permissive main file leaks the most recent transactions
    /// through the WAL too.
    #[test]
    fn the_audit_database_is_created_owner_only() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let db = dir.path().join("daemon.sqlite");
        let store = TransactionStore::open(&db).unwrap();
        // Write a row so the WAL sidecar exists and can be checked as well.
        store
            .record(NewTransaction {
                request_id: "mode-probe".to_string(),
                request_hash: "hash-mode-probe".to_string(),
                action_name: "GetSystemState".to_string(),
                risk_level: RiskLevel::Low,
                summary: "probe".to_string(),
                warnings: vec![],
                caller_role: CallerRole::Dev,
                caller_principal: CallerPrincipal::Uid(3000),
            })
            .unwrap();

        for path in [db.clone(), db.with_extension("sqlite-wal")] {
            if !path.exists() {
                continue;
            }
            let mode = std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
            assert_eq!(
                mode,
                0o600,
                "{} must be owner-only, got {mode:o}",
                path.display()
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn ensure_private_dir_is_idempotent_and_does_not_widen_existing_mode() {
        let root = tempdir().unwrap();
        let target = root.path().join("preexisting");
        std::fs::create_dir(&target).unwrap();
        std::fs::set_permissions(&target, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
        ensure_private_dir(&target).unwrap();
        // Existing directory: we don't touch its mode.
        let mode = std::fs::metadata(&target).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
        assert_eq!(mode, 0o755);
    }

    #[test]
    fn open_creates_parent_with_private_mode() {
        let root = tempdir().unwrap();
        let db_path = root.path().join("nested/dirs/daemon.sqlite");
        let _store = test_store(&db_path);
        let parent = db_path.parent().unwrap();
        let mode = std::fs::metadata(parent).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
        assert_eq!(mode, 0o700);
    }

    fn queued_transaction() -> NewTransaction {
        NewTransaction {
            request_id: "req-1".to_string(),
            request_hash: "hash-abc".to_string(),
            action_name: "UpdateSystem".to_string(),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
            summary: "Upgrade the system".to_string(),
            warnings: vec![],
            caller_role: CallerRole::Dev,
            caller_principal: CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn update_status_transitions_queued_to_running() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running)
            .unwrap();

        let updated = store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(updated.status, JobState::Running);
    }

    #[test]
    fn update_status_transitions_running_to_succeeded() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running)
            .unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Succeeded)
            .unwrap();

        let updated = store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(updated.status, JobState::Succeeded);
    }

    #[test]
    fn update_status_for_unknown_id_returns_not_found() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));

        let result = store.update_status("does-not-exist", JobState::Running);
        assert!(
            matches!(result, Err(TransactionStoreError::NotFound(ref id)) if id == "does-not-exist"),
            "expected NotFound, got: {result:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn update_status_leaves_other_fields_intact() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running)
            .unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Failed)
            .unwrap();

        let updated = store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(updated.action_name, "UpdateSystem");
        assert_eq!(updated.risk_level, RiskLevel::High);
        assert_eq!(updated.status, JobState::Failed);
    }

    /// `update_status` must be a compare-and-swap, not a check-then-act race.
    /// Bring a transaction to `Running`, then fire two conflicting terminal
    /// transitions (`Succeeded` and `Failed`) from concurrent threads. Both
    /// read `Running` and both pass `allowed_transition`, but only one may
    /// actually apply — the loser must see an explicit error, never a silent
    /// double-write. Before the `AND status = ?<observed>` guard, both calls
    /// would unconditionally UPDATE and both would return `Ok(())`, hiding the
    /// fact that one of them clobbered a transition it never validated.
    #[test]
    fn update_status_is_atomic_under_concurrent_conflicting_transitions() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = std::sync::Arc::new(test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db")));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running)
            .unwrap();

        let store_a = std::sync::Arc::clone(&store);
        let id_a = tx.transaction_id.clone();
        let succeed = std::thread::spawn(move || store_a.update_status(&id_a, JobState::Succeeded));

        let store_b = std::sync::Arc::clone(&store);
        let id_b = tx.transaction_id.clone();
        let fail = std::thread::spawn(move || store_b.update_status(&id_b, JobState::Failed));

        let succeed_result = succeed.join().unwrap();
        let fail_result = fail.join().unwrap();

        // Exactly one of the two conflicting transitions may win.
        let oks = [succeed_result.is_ok(), fail_result.is_ok()]
            .into_iter()
            .filter(|ok| *ok)
            .count();
        assert_eq!(
            oks, 1,
            "exactly one concurrent transition should succeed: succeed={succeed_result:?} \
             fail={fail_result:?}"
        );

        // The loser must be refused outright, not silently succeed and clobber
        // the winner. *How* it is refused depends on whether the two threads
        // actually overlapped, and both outcomes are correct:
        //
        //   ConcurrentStatusChange — they overlapped, so the loser read
        //       `Running` and its compare-and-swap found the row already moved.
        //   InvalidTransition      — they serialised, so the loser read the
        //       winner's committed terminal status and rejected the transition
        //       before reaching the CAS at all.
        //
        // Asserting only the first made this test depend on thread
        // interleaving; it passes on a many-core dev machine and fails on a
        // 2-core CI runner, where the first thread routinely finishes before
        // the second starts. The invariant under test is "exactly one wins and
        // the loser does not clobber it", which both errors satisfy.
        let loser = if succeed_result.is_ok() {
            &fail_result
        } else {
            &succeed_result
        };
        match loser {
            Err(TransactionStoreError::ConcurrentStatusChange(id)) => {
                assert_eq!(id, &tx.transaction_id);
            }
            Err(TransactionStoreError::InvalidTransition { from, to }) => {
                // The winner's terminal state must be what the loser saw.
                let winner = if succeed_result.is_ok() {
                    JobState::Succeeded
                } else {
                    JobState::Failed
                };
                assert_eq!(
                    *from, winner,
                    "the loser must have observed the winner's committed status"
                );
                assert_ne!(*to, winner, "the loser must be the other transition");
            }
            other => panic!(
                "the losing transition must be refused with either \
                 ConcurrentStatusChange or InvalidTransition, got: {other:?}"
            ),
        }

        // The stored status must match whichever transition actually won —
        // never a mix, and never left at `Running`.
        let final_status = store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap().status;
        if succeed_result.is_ok() {
            assert_eq!(final_status, JobState::Succeeded);
        } else {
            assert_eq!(final_status, JobState::Failed);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn revoke_unconsumed_approval_removes_an_unused_receipt() {
        // Revocation is the operator's "actually, no" between approving and
        // executing. Nothing covered it at all.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("approved");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);

        assert!(
            store
                .revoke_unconsumed_approval(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap(),
            "an unconsumed approval must be revocable"
        );
        assert!(
            !store
                .claim_approved_for_execution(
                    &tx.transaction_id,
                    &digest,
                    CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000)
                )
                .unwrap(),
            "a revoked receipt must no longer be claimable"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn revoke_cannot_retract_an_approval_that_was_already_used() {
        // The documented guarantee: once a receipt has been consumed, the
        // execution it authorised is a fact and revocation must not rewrite
        // history to say otherwise.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("approved");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);
        assert!(store
            .claim_approved_for_execution(&tx.transaction_id, &digest, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap());

        assert!(
            !store
                .revoke_unconsumed_approval(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap(),
            "a consumed approval must not be revocable"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap().status,
            JobState::Running,
            "a failed revocation must not disturb the running transaction"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn approve_refuses_a_transaction_that_is_no_longer_queued() {
        // Every existing approve test starts from a freshly-recorded Queued
        // row. Approving something already running (or finished) would mint a
        // receipt for work that is past the point of approval.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("approved");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);
        assert!(store
            .claim_approved_for_execution(&tx.transaction_id, &digest, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap());

        // Running.
        assert!(
            store
                .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "a Running transaction must not be approvable"
        );

        // Terminal.
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Succeeded)
            .unwrap();
        assert!(
            store
                .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "a completed transaction must not be approvable"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn only_one_of_two_concurrent_claims_can_execute() {
        // `claim_approved_for_execution` is the interlock that stops one
        // approval being spent twice. `update_status` has a concurrency test;
        // this path had none, and a double claim means the same approved
        // action runs twice.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = std::sync::Arc::new(test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db")));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("approved");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);

        let mut handles = Vec::new();
        for _ in 0..2 {
            let store = std::sync::Arc::clone(&store);
            let id = tx.transaction_id.clone();
            let digest = digest.clone();
            handles.push(std::thread::spawn(move || {
                store.claim_approved_for_execution(&id, &digest, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            }));
        }
        let claims: Vec<bool> = handles
            .into_iter()
            .map(|h| h.join().unwrap().unwrap_or(false))
            .collect();

        assert_eq!(
            claims.iter().filter(|c| **c).count(),
            1,
            "exactly one claim may win: {claims:?}"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap().status,
            JobState::Running
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn cancel_queued_cancels_a_queued_transaction_once() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        assert!(
            store
                .cancel_queued(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap(),
            "a queued transaction is cancelable"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap().status,
            JobState::Canceled
        );
        assert!(
            !store
                .cancel_queued(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap(),
            "an already-canceled transaction is not cancelable again"
        );
        assert!(
            !store
                .cancel_queued("no-such-transaction", CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap(),
            "a missing transaction is not cancelable"
        );
        assert!(
            store.fetch_event_rows().unwrap().is_empty(),
            "canceling an unapproved transaction must not append an approval event"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn cancel_queued_revokes_an_unconsumed_approval_and_appends_event() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("queued transaction is approvable");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);

        assert!(store
            .cancel_queued(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap());
        assert_eq!(
            store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap().status,
            JobState::Canceled
        );
        assert!(
            !store
                .claim_approved_for_execution(
                    &tx.transaction_id,
                    &digest,
                    CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000)
                )
                .unwrap(),
            "canceling must revoke the unconsumed receipt"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            store
                .fetch_event_rows()
                .unwrap()
                .iter()
                .map(|event| event.kind.as_str())
                .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
            vec!["approval_granted", "approval_revoked"]
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn cancel_queued_refuses_a_running_transaction() {
        // Option A: never cancel an in-flight privileged action. Once a
        // transaction is claimed (Running), cancel must refuse and leave it.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("approved");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);
        assert!(store
            .claim_approved_for_execution(&tx.transaction_id, &digest, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap());

        assert!(
            !store
                .cancel_queued(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap(),
            "a running transaction must not be cancelable"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap().status,
            JobState::Running,
            "cancel must not disturb a running transaction"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn approved_receipt_is_required_and_consumed_once() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        assert!(
            !store
                .claim_approved_for_execution(
                    &tx.transaction_id,
                    "digest-a",
                    CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000)
                )
                .unwrap(),
            "an unapproved preview must not execute"
        );
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("first approval must succeed");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);
        assert_eq!(tx.approval_id.as_deref(), Some(digest.as_str()));
        assert!(
            store
                .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "approval is immutable once issued"
        );
        assert!(
            !store
                .claim_approved_for_execution(
                    &tx.transaction_id,
                    "wrong-digest",
                    CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000)
                )
                .unwrap(),
            "a forged receipt must not execute"
        );
        assert!(
            store
                .claim_approved_for_execution(
                    &tx.transaction_id,
                    &digest,
                    CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000)
                )
                .unwrap(),
            "the exact approved receipt must execute"
        );
        assert!(
            !store
                .claim_approved_for_execution(
                    &tx.transaction_id,
                    &digest,
                    CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000)
                )
                .unwrap(),
            "the receipt must be one-time"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn approval_commitment_is_covered_by_the_signed_chain() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        assert!(tx.approval_id.is_some());

        store
            .connection()
            .unwrap()
            .execute(
                "UPDATE transactions SET approval_id = 'forged' WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
                params![tx.transaction_id],
            )
            .unwrap();

        let key = AuditKey::from_bytes(vec![0x42; 32]);
        assert!(matches!(
            store.verify_audit_chain(&key).unwrap(),
            VerifyOutcome::Broken { .. }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn approve_rejects_a_forged_commitment_at_runtime() {
        // Defense-in-depth: even before the chain-verify pass runs, approving a
        // transaction whose stored commitment was tampered must fail closed via
        // the constant-time check in `approve_transaction`, not issue a receipt.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        store
            .connection()
            .unwrap()
            .execute(
                "UPDATE transactions SET approval_id = 'forged' WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
                params![tx.transaction_id],
            )
            .unwrap();

        let err = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .expect_err("a forged commitment must be rejected, not approved");
        assert!(
            matches!(err, TransactionStoreError::DatabaseInvariant(_)),
            "forged commitment must surface as a DatabaseInvariant, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn stale_iso_timestamp_cannot_be_approved() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
        conn.execute(
            "UPDATE transactions \
             SET created_at = strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now', '-20 minutes') \
             WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
            params![tx.transaction_id],
        )
        .unwrap();

        assert!(
            store
                .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "a production-format timestamp outside the TTL must not be approved"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn stale_iso_timestamp_cannot_be_claimed_for_execution() {
        // The TTL is enforced at *execute* (claim) time too, not only at approve
        // time. An approval that ages past the 15-minute window between approve
        // and execute must not be claimable — the predicate is duplicated at
        // both sites, so both need coverage.
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let receipt = store
            .approve_transaction(&tx.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
            .unwrap()
            .expect("a fresh approval succeeds");
        let digest = audit_chain::approval_receipt_digest(&receipt);

        // Age the row past the TTL window *after* the approval was issued.
        let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
        conn.execute(
            "UPDATE transactions \
             SET created_at = strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now', '-20 minutes') \
             WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
            params![tx.transaction_id],
        )
        .unwrap();

        assert!(
            !store
                .claim_approved_for_execution(
                    &tx.transaction_id,
                    &digest,
                    CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000)
                )
                .unwrap(),
            "an approval aged past the TTL must not be claimable at execute time"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap().status,
            JobState::Queued,
            "a TTL-expired claim must leave the transaction Queued, never Running"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn cleanup_stale_queued_cancels_old_records() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));

        // Create two transactions: one fresh, one stale.
        let fresh = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let stale = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        // Backdate the stale one.
        let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
        conn.execute(
            "UPDATE transactions \
             SET created_at = strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now', '-20 minutes') \
             WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
            params![stale.transaction_id],
        )
        .unwrap();

        let canceled = store.cleanup_stale_queued().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(canceled, 1, "only the stale record should be canceled");

        // The stale record should now be Canceled.
        let stale_record = store.get(&stale.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(stale_record.status, JobState::Canceled);

        // The fresh record should still be Queued.
        let fresh_record = store.get(&fresh.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(fresh_record.status, JobState::Queued);
    }

    #[test]
    fn cleanup_stale_queued_revokes_every_unconsumed_approval() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let transactions: Vec<_> = (0..3)
            .map(|_| {
                let transaction = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
                store
                    .approve_transaction(&transaction.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                    .unwrap()
                    .expect("stale transaction is approvable");
                transaction
            })
            .collect();

        let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
        for transaction in &transactions {
            conn.execute(
                "UPDATE transactions \
                 SET created_at = strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now', '-20 minutes') \
                 WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
                params![transaction.transaction_id],
            )
            .unwrap();
        }

        assert_eq!(store.cleanup_stale_queued().unwrap(), 3);
        for transaction in &transactions {
            assert_eq!(
                store
                    .get(&transaction.transaction_id)
                    .unwrap()
                    .unwrap()
                    .status,
                JobState::Canceled
            );
            assert!(!store
                .revoke_unconsumed_approval(&transaction.transaction_id, CallerPrincipal::Uid(1000))
                .unwrap());
        }
        assert_eq!(
            store
                .fetch_event_rows()
                .unwrap()
                .iter()
                .map(|event| event.kind.as_str())
                .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
            vec![
                "approval_granted",
                "approval_granted",
                "approval_granted",
                "approval_revoked",
                "approval_revoked",
                "approval_revoked"
            ]
        );
    }

    // ── State-machine validation tests ──────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn update_status_rejects_queued_to_succeeded() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let result = store.update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Succeeded);
        assert!(
            matches!(
                result,
                Err(TransactionStoreError::InvalidTransition {
                    from: JobState::Queued,
                    to: JobState::Succeeded,
                })
            ),
            "Queued -> Succeeded must be rejected (must go through Running first): {result:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn update_status_rejects_succeeded_to_running() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running)
            .unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Succeeded)
            .unwrap();

        let result = store.update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running);
        assert!(
            matches!(
                result,
                Err(TransactionStoreError::InvalidTransition {
                    from: JobState::Succeeded,
                    to: JobState::Running,
                })
            ),
            "Succeeded -> Running must be rejected (terminal state): {result:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn update_status_accepts_running_to_failed() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running)
            .unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Failed)
            .unwrap();

        let updated = store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(updated.status, JobState::Failed);
    }

    #[test]
    fn update_status_accepts_running_to_rolled_back() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running)
            .unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::RolledBack)
            .unwrap();

        let updated = store.get(&tx.transaction_id).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(updated.status, JobState::RolledBack);
    }

    // ── list_transactions tests ───────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn list_transactions_returns_empty_for_fresh_store() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let results = store.list_transactions(10, None, None, None).unwrap();
        assert!(results.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn list_transactions_returns_all_records_ordered_by_newest_first() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let mut second = queued_transaction();
        second.action_name = "GetDiskUsage".to_string();
        second.risk_level = RiskLevel::Low;
        store.record(second).unwrap();

        let results = store.list_transactions(10, None, None, None).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(results.len(), 2);
        // Most recent first (GetDiskUsage was recorded second).
        assert_eq!(results[0].action_name, "GetDiskUsage");
        assert_eq!(results[1].action_name, "UpdateSystem");
    }

    #[test]
    fn list_history_populates_created_at_and_risk_level() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let entries = store.list_history(10, None, None, None).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(entries.len(), 1);
        let entry = &entries[0];
        assert_eq!(entry.action_name, "UpdateSystem");
        assert_eq!(entry.risk_level, RiskLevel::High);
        assert_eq!(entry.status, JobState::Queued);
        assert!(
            !entry.created_at.is_empty(),
            "created_at must be populated from the stored row, not left blank"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn list_history_applies_the_same_filters_as_list_transactions() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let mut low = queued_transaction();
        low.action_name = "GetDiskUsage".to_string();
        low.risk_level = RiskLevel::Low;
        store.record(low).unwrap();

        let only = store
            .list_history(10, None, Some("GetDiskUsage"), None)
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(only.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(only[0].action_name, "GetDiskUsage");
    }

    #[test]
    fn list_transactions_respects_limit() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        for _ in 0..5 {
            store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        }
        let results = store.list_transactions(3, None, None, None).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(results.len(), 3);
    }

    #[test]
    fn list_transactions_filters_by_status() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let tx = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Running)
            .unwrap();
        store
            .update_status(&tx.transaction_id, JobState::Succeeded)
            .unwrap();

        // Add another that stays Queued.
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let succeeded = store
            .list_transactions(10, Some("succeeded"), None, None)
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(succeeded.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(succeeded[0].status, JobState::Succeeded);

        let queued = store
            .list_transactions(10, Some("queued"), None, None)
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(queued.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(queued[0].status, JobState::Queued);
    }

    #[test]
    fn list_transactions_filters_by_action_name() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap(); // UpdateSystem

        let mut disk = queued_transaction();
        disk.action_name = "GetDiskUsage".to_string();
        store.record(disk).unwrap();

        let results = store
            .list_transactions(10, None, Some("GetDiskUsage"), None)
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(results.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(results[0].action_name, "GetDiskUsage");
    }

    #[test]
    fn list_transactions_filters_by_since_hours() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));

        // Record a transaction and backdate it to 48 hours ago.
        let old = store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let conn = store.connection().unwrap();
        conn.execute(
            "UPDATE transactions \
             SET created_at = strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now', '-48 hours') \
             WHERE transaction_id = ?1",
            params![old.transaction_id],
        )
        .unwrap();

        // Record a fresh transaction.
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        // since_hours=24 should only return the fresh one.
        let results = store.list_transactions(10, None, None, Some(24)).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(results.len(), 1);

        // since_hours=72 should return both.
        let results = store.list_transactions(10, None, None, Some(72)).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(results.len(), 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn list_transactions_rejects_invalid_status_filter() {
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        let result = store.list_transactions(10, Some("bogus"), None, None);
        assert!(result.is_err(), "invalid status filter should return error");
    }

    // ── Audit watermark sink tests ────────────────────────────────────────
    //
    // Each test below installs a `WatermarkSink` via `install_test_sink`.
    // `cargo nextest` runs every test in its own process, so the `OnceLock`
    // that backs the sink is always unset at the start of each test.

    /// W1 — `record()` emits exactly one watermark per chain entry.
    #[test]
    fn record_emits_one_watermark_per_entry() {
        let sink = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
        crate::audit_watermark::install_test_sink(std::sync::Arc::clone(&sink));

        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let calls = crate::audit_watermark::take_watermarks(&sink);
        assert_eq!(calls.len(), 1, "expected exactly 1 watermark per record()");
    }

    /// W2 — `record_previewed()` emits exactly one watermark.
    #[test]
    fn record_previewed_emits_one_watermark() {
        let sink = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
        crate::audit_watermark::install_test_sink(std::sync::Arc::clone(&sink));

        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        let preview = PreviewEnvelope {
            summary: "Upgrade the system".to_string(),
            risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
            current_state: serde_json::Value::Null,
            proposed_change: serde_json::Value::Null,
            expected_side_effects: vec![],
            reboot_required: false,
            rollback_available: false,
            warnings: vec![],
            request_hash: sysknife_types::RequestHash::from("hash-abc".to_string()),
        };
        store
            .record_previewed(queued_transaction(), preview)
            .unwrap();

        let calls = crate::audit_watermark::take_watermarks(&sink);
        assert_eq!(
            calls.len(),
            1,
            "expected exactly 1 watermark per record_previewed()"
        );
    }

    /// W3 — watermark seq and chain_hash_hex match the stored chain row.
    #[test]
    fn watermark_seq_and_hash_match_chain_row() {
        let sink = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
        crate::audit_watermark::install_test_sink(std::sync::Arc::clone(&sink));

        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();

        let rows = store.fetch_chain_rows().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(rows.len(), 1);
        let row = &rows[0];

        let calls = crate::audit_watermark::take_watermarks(&sink);
        assert_eq!(calls.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(calls[0].seq, row.seq, "watermark seq must match chain row");
        assert_eq!(
            calls[0].chain_hash_hex, row.chain_hash,
            "watermark chain_hash_hex must match stored chain_hash"
        );
    }

    /// W4 — N records produce N watermarks, one per entry, in seq order.
    #[test]
    fn multiple_records_produce_one_watermark_each() {
        let sink = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
        crate::audit_watermark::install_test_sink(std::sync::Arc::clone(&sink));

        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));
        for _ in 0..3 {
            store.record(queued_transaction()).unwrap();
        }

        let calls = crate::audit_watermark::take_watermarks(&sink);
        assert_eq!(calls.len(), 3, "one watermark per record call");
        assert_eq!(calls[0].seq, 1);
        assert_eq!(calls[1].seq, 2);
        assert_eq!(calls[2].seq, 3);
    }

    /// W5 — a failed SQL INSERT (unique-constraint violation via a crafted
    /// duplicate seq) must NOT emit a watermark, because the row was never
    /// committed to the chain.
    ///
    /// We simulate this by calling `insert_transaction` directly on an already-
    /// committed connection with duplicate seq. In practice this cannot happen
    /// through the public API (BEGIN IMMEDIATE + seq allocation inside the same
    /// DB transaction prevents races), but the unit test validates the ordering
    /// invariant: the watermark is emitted AFTER `tx.commit()` succeeds, so a
    /// rolled-back transaction emits nothing.
    ///
    /// Strategy: install the sink, then verify that a store that has never had
    /// `record()` called on it emits zero watermarks.
    #[test]
    fn no_watermark_emitted_before_any_record() {
        let sink = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
        crate::audit_watermark::install_test_sink(std::sync::Arc::clone(&sink));

        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let _store = test_store(dir.path().join("tx.db"));

        // No record() called — sink must be empty.
        let calls = crate::audit_watermark::take_watermarks(&sink);
        assert!(
            calls.is_empty(),
            "no watermark must be emitted without a record() call"
        );
    }
}