Expand description
RFC5755 §7.1 targeted encrypted attributes and ciphertext-stealing defense.
The authenticated original AC contains ContentInfo values with independent
EnvelopedData. Its selected provider decrypts; the common core then checks
DER ACClearAttrs, issuer/serial and the original AA-control intersection.
Plaintext is a new logical coordinate space, never a physical ciphertext
offset or invertible source map. No encryption engine or key store is here.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5755#section-7.1
Structs§
- Bound
- Temporarily bound plaintext. Its type cannot escape the callback, and a
readable-but-unbound
ACClearAttrscannot be passed in its place. - Clear
Attrs - DER plaintext inspection, not an authenticated/bound credential by itself.
- Encrypted
- Complete catalogue of independent original targeted envelopes. Reading all values precedes the first provider call, so malformed later metadata cannot leave a successful decrypted prefix. It authenticates no AC on its own.
- Plaintext
Source - Logical plaintext context retained independently of temporary decrypted bytes.
envelopeis in the enclosing AC’s source coordinates. Any error produced by the plaintext reader uses zero-based plaintext coordinates, not that source.
Enums§
- Attempt
- One independent decryption result from the explicitly selected provider.
Capability/recipient/cryptographic rejection are completed answers, while
original processing/resource/backend errors use
Result::Err. - Decrypt
Error - Terminal refusal, preserving the callback cause and its honest source space.
- Outcome
- One original envelope’s complete result, preserving unavailable versus false.
- Rejection
- Completed negative plaintext binding. No attribute-use receipt exists.
Constants§
- CONTENT_
TYPE - id-ct-attrCertEncAttrs, identifying the exact decrypted content syntax.
- IDENTIFIER
- id-aca-encAttrs, RFC5755 Appendix A.