Crate structured_cades

Expand description

§structured-cades

Source-bound CAdES baseline composition for ETSI EN 319 122-1 V1.3.1.

The format layer sits above structured-cms and structured-ltv. It uses original CMS attributes, signer and material locations, the existing injected cryptographic operations, and the common path/status/timestamp mechanisms. Requested B-B, B-T, B-LT and B-LTA stages preserve their separate conformance, mathematical, temporal and material obligations. Application trust and policy, source acquisition and reporting remain with the consumer.

The default build supports no_std + alloc; std is optional. Operations receive an explicit producing reader and current execution. Original signed bytes are never serialized to bridge the layers.

Source and package verification do not establish availability of a particular registry version or consumer adoption.

§Processing

source::Document binds the original SignedData model and selected root. prepare::Preparation reads the requested level, signed and unsigned property syntax, independent ESS sets and the complete nested counter/timestamp census. It preserves required versus advisory findings and original malformed values. The signed MIME description accepts a media type or complete original MIME header fields with an explicit Content-Type, using the common MIME grammar. Present timestamp envelopes and carried information are syntax-checked even for a B-B request, including TSA ESS and protected CMS fields. Each ATSv3 also receives non-cryptographic profile/index inspection. Known digest widths and index/imprint identities are checked without resolving a provider or executing its hashes; unknown mechanisms remain capability questions. Envelope models are retained once for later checks; unreadable information keeps its original failure and independently retained source map. An attribute OID or a successful subset cannot promote the requested level.

Use the existing CMS verify::DocumentBatch for the actual carried or explicit detached payload. basic::bind binds its original result and effective key to the selected certificate, signed ESS identifiers and actual checked path. counters::bind checks each child over its direct parent’s original signature octets. Unreadable or failed children prevent a complete counter-path receipt; their SID, profile, payload, signature and ESS causes remain available.

credential::check sends original protected non-claimed credentials to their actual format owner. Complete exists only after every value authenticated with actual authority paths, a direct anchor, or an explicit certificate-free mechanism. Reading a credential envelope never authenticates its contents.

material::Pool borrows original token models and retains first-read legacy certificate/revocation values from root, counter, parallel-root and TSA sources. Legacy revocation-values carry bare BasicOCSPResponse values; RFC 5940 CMS revocation choices carry whole OCSPResponse envelopes. Neither route fabricates an envelope. Other revocation formats keep their original OID, wrapper and source-backed values for their actual format owner. Its token visitors use saved encoding, depth and source context, and timestamp::Context chooses the actual original content, owner signature or ATSv3 archive input. CheckTime contains explicit UTC facts, an optional caller-supplied reference and optional caller-authenticated accuracy bound to the signed TSA policy. ERS authority selection carries the same explicit accuracy input. There is no clock discovery or token-derived reference. Unknown accuracy, mismatched imprints, negative arithmetic and unverified timeliness cannot create evidence.

Bind each successful actor to its actual checked TSA path with the existing LTV bind_timestamp, then bind the complete original timestamp requirements. baseline::timestamped joins these paths and every root signature timestamp’s full static interval to the same basic report. Mathematical evidence and static intervals do not establish historical non-revocation or trust.

participants::participants derives every actual signer, counter, credential authority and TSA. Close their real per-member statuses and reached CRL/OCSP authority paths through close_statuses. material::check_participants checks all resulting certificates, complete/delta CRLs and whole OCSP envelopes using the existing exact-artifact index. The credential format’s material visitor operates on its retained authentication evidence, without replaying it; empty X.509 paths or certificate-free authentication cannot waive other dependencies. For B-LT, the validation certificates must occur in the root certificate set; archive augmentation can reuse actual token material under its separate rule. baseline::long_term requires both material reports from the same receipts.

For each original root ATSv3, ArchiveChecked::requirements derives preceding timestamps and counters from its actual index coverage, independently of SET order or claimed dates. Check every preceding participant’s X.509 and credential material under that same coverage, then join with baseline::archive_material and baseline::archives. The latter requires every original archive once. The current archive’s own TSA cannot substitute for an earlier actor or repair material absent from its input. Counter-owned ATSv3 occurrences remain in the census with a placement finding: the archive input selects a root SignedData.signerInfos item; nested counters are protected through that root’s indexed unsigned values.

Finally baseline::assess accepts exactly the requested stage set and the same live preparation/credential receipts. Its predicate describes common format, mathematical binding, static time and incorporated-material facts. Application acceptance still needs the explicit original status results, chronology, algorithm longevity and historical trust decisions.

§Historical and open-format obligations

Preparation::preservation retains older archive/long-term-validation fields and reference timestamps from every root and counter. Older archive tokens enter the complete original TSA census; malformed parallel sources remain separate required findings rather than disappearing behind a valid selected root.

timestamp::historical implements explicit RFC 3126, TS 101 733 V1.5.1 and RFC 5126 input contracts. An OID or claimed time does not choose an edition. HistoricalInput::project takes exact preceding occurrence ordinals; excluding another archive requires a Later witness from an actually checked covering archive. Projection uses new minimal definite framing around original fields, and honestly differs from unavailable original BER. OriginalSnapshot instead binds the earlier signer fields, global content/material, parent signature and non-archive attribute multiset before using its original unsigned wrapper/EOC. Changed archive wrappers never acquire whole-item coverage merely because their token values stayed unchanged.

Both RFC 5126 unsigned-field interpretations stream together through one payload pass, without buffering the document or resolving another provider. Context::check_historical uses the existing complete CMS/ESS/TSA/key/path/time check. A matching old archive is not modern ATSv3 conformance or a trust verdict. HistoricalChecked::requirements derives its actual preceding TSA/counter obligations, including archives owned by a counter or parallel root. Its scope uses that actual owner and its descendant counters; wholly covered counters also retain their nested TSA obligations. For a counter or parallel owner’s archive, Pool::index_for_archive builds the same original artifact catalogue under that checked owner’s signature identity; Pool::index retains the selected root’s scope. Foreign sources and unproven archives refuse before an archive index can be used. material::credentials::Scope::before_archive accepts either modern or historical receipts. Each member-specific input is bound to its exact token, including when several token values share an attribute, throughout coverage and validation-material joins.

timestamp::references::ReferenceInput::new selects both Annex A.1.5 input recipes from the actual root, counter or parallel signer. References-only timestamps imprint the original complete-certificate-references and complete-revocation-references Attribute contents, in that order. The signature-and-references recipe first includes logical signature octets and each original signature timestamp Attribute’s contents. The current EN edition requires those signature timestamps; historical external time-marks are not invented as embedded bytes. Missing/ambiguous inputs refuse before hashing.

Context::check_references runs the same complete CMS/ESS/TSA/key/path/time check and returns ReferenceChecked. Its purpose is ValidationData, distinct from Signature and Archive. Coverage binds the exact token and original value ranges; an omitted outer Attribute header never becomes whole-item coverage. The timestamp proves existence of the imprinted references, not authentication or completeness of the referenced certificates/CRLs/OCSP responses. Whole participant assessment requires every reference TSA through the original full census, including failed/unreadable and parallel occurrences. Original token envelopes share the existing common cache; there is no second reference-specific envelope decoder.

§Evidence records and historical `PoE`

evidence::View borrows the first-read RFC 4998 record or TS 101 733 V2.2.1 §6.5.1 long-term-validation value. Every actual TSA joins the original timestamp and material census once. Authorities::select receives the global timestamp ordinal, that same token and current Work; it supplies an existing checked path and its original certificate reader. Discovery follows structural membership preflight. The common CMS/TSA/ESS check supplies the final actor without a second signature verification.

check_internal protects the original whole ContentInfo; check_external protects it and the actual separate content as an exact two-object group. RFC 4998 Appendix A removes self/later evidence-record attributes from the first signer and adapts containing lengths, preserving all other coding. CmsSnapshot::capture and the snapshot variants bind a genuine earlier parsed container before replaying its original BER framing. Changed signed fields, material, parallel signers or retained attributes refuse before hashing. Externally supplied records over a CMS object without embedded ER attributes use the common CMS EvidenceRecord verifier with the complete original object.

check_poe handles both a timestamp and an entire ERS record. Its eight hash components share one streaming payload pass across requested algorithms; Hc, Hr and Hu retain whole as-stored values and duplicate hashes. Hv and Ht use schema-selected DER projection. poeDate provides exact ordering metadata, including subnanosecond digits, and is never the authenticated proof time. A later qualified ATSv3/Annex B record can be passed through check_poe_with_later; its sealed executed coverage must protect this actual earlier PoE before the new property is excluded. Dates alone cannot authorize that exclusion (EN 319 122-1 §5.5.3).

close_preservation requires the entire original ERS/PoE set, source identity, protected-input dependencies and authenticated chronology before historical callbacks run latest-to-earliest. Historical path/status and algorithm suitability are explicit caller obligations. A failed, unknown, foreign or missing proof cannot yield a successful partial closure. VerifiedRecord::archive retains the actual input coverage and preceding actor/material obligations for each individual timestamp, including renewals of one record.

participants_preserved, material::check_participants_preserved and baseline::assess_preserved compose that sealed closure with the existing complete path/status/material and requested-level stages. This does not turn legacy PoE into modern B-LTA conformance: the modern mandatory format and stage requirements still apply. Ordinary B-LT root certificate placement is retained; qualified archive augmentation can use original PoE extras where the standard permits it. Reference timestamps remain advisory at B-T, and a valid modern archive cannot erase another original obligation.

§Publication

Published on crates.io as part of the coordinated release-plz release. New versions require GitHub Actions Trusted Publishing for repository structured-world/signature-primitives, workflow release-plz.yml, environment release. Publication follows the release PR merge and successful CI on that exact main commit, without a stored cargo token. The registry job qualifies actual archives, checksums, source revision, packaged tests and alloc-only targets when the workflow publishes new packages; source availability alone is not a released version.

Optional policy qualifiers and credential formats retain their original open values for their actual owners. Policy-store linkage requires a protected, written nonzero policy hash; an all-zero hash remains unknown. The policy’s technical specification defines its hash input and acceptance, rather than an implicit file fetch, guessed normalization or another crypto dispatcher here.

§Execution and sources

All operations take the original producing reader/current execution. Original signed attributes and signature fragments stay borrowed; archive input is streamed with only the finished content digest retained across token callbacks. Metadata, fragment fan-out, normalization, copies and retained capacity use the same scoped work/account mechanisms as CMS/PKIX/LTV. Resource and foreign-source refusals are terminal and never become mismatch, missing material or a successful partial report. Information-inspection refusals retain their source map and an explicit coordinate discriminator for the unchanged callback cause. Callback refusal is sticky even when a format owner attempts to return success afterward.

Modules§

baseline: Explicit requested CAdES level over the same complete original stage reports.
basic: Binding the original root to the actual CMS check and selected path.
counters: Complete original countersignature bindings through the existing CMS driver.
credential: Complete source-derived independently authenticated credential census.
evidence: CAdES evidence records and historical proof-of-existence composition.
material: Original root/token validation material, parsed once and indexed by the existing exact-artifact LTV core. Reading never authenticates a status.
participants: Complete actual actor census for whole-signature and archive scopes.
prepare: Source-derived baseline obligations, before keys, provider states or content.
preservation: Original legacy preservation obligations, separate from modern ATSv3.
properties: Original optional property values. Open credential/policy semantics stay explicit obligations; reading an ASN.1 envelope never authenticates them.
source: Immutable original CMS identities shared by every CAdES stage.
timestamp: Source-selected timestamp checks. The selected input is derived here; callers select providers, original certificates and independently checked paths, never replacement signature bytes or a writable successful receipt.

Structs§

Cades: Issuer of source-derived CAdES receipts in the format-neutral LTV core. Only this crate constructs it, after selecting the original CMS source.

Enums§

Error: Terminal processing refusal, distinct from a completed format finding.
Level: Explicitly requested format profile, never inferred from unsigned attributes.

Type Aliases§

Result: Complete operation or terminal processing refusal; never a successful prefix.