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§stark-pca — a transparent STARK of the PCA release gate
A genuine, verifiable zk-STARK (Winterfell, hash-based, no trusted setup, post-quantum) proving the core release gate of Proof-Carrying Authority.
§What the AIR proves
Given PUBLIC inputs — the risk weights (α,β,γ,δ,ε,ζ), the tier-1 threshold θ₁,
the cost scale κ, the budget ceiling bMax, the fixed-point scale S = 1e6, and
two opaque commitments (policy_commitment, action_commitment) — and PRIVATE
witnesses — the six risk-magnitude inputs (d, rev, bl, taint, conf, age), the trust
budget B, a predicate-match bit pm, and a caveats-satisfied bit co — the prover
demonstrates knowledge of a witness such that
r_raw = α·d + β·(1−rev) + γ·bl + δ·taint + ε·(1−conf) + ζ·age (fixed-point, scale S²)
allow = (tier==1) ∧ (B ≥ κ·r) ∧ pm ∧ co and allow == 1where r = r_raw / S² is computed by the same fixed-point risk functional as
the @atlasauth/pca reference risk model (weights clamped ≥0, inputs in [0,1] at scale S,
reversibility and confidence entering as 1−x), tier==1 ⟺ r ≤ θ₁
(requiredThreshold’s t=1 band), and B ≥ κ·r is the budget-admission cost gate
(admit / cost).
allow is derived in-trace as the product of the four conjuncts and asserted
== 1: a deny witness (r > θ₁, B < κ·r, pm == 0, or co == 0) makes the
system unsatisfiable, so you cannot forge an allow proof. The two inequalities are
enforced by in-AIR bit-decomposition range gadgets (θ₁·S² − r_raw ≥ 0 and
B·S − κ·r_raw ≥ 0), which are real algebraic STARK constraints — not a trusted bit.
§Witness ↔ commitment binding (the in-AIR hash)
The private witness is now bound in-AIR to a public commitment. A genuine in-AIR
algebraic hash (NUM_LANES=10-wide cube-S-box SPN: a_k = (Hₖ + 2^row + RCₖ)³,
diffusion H'ⱼ = Σₖ aₖ + aⱼ, one round per trace row) absorbs the nine quantized
witness quantities (d, rev, bl, taint, conf, age, B, pm, co) on row 0 (lanes 0..8) +
a capacity IV (lane 9), runs TRACE_LEN−1 rounds, and the first COMMIT_LIMBS=4 state
lanes at the final row are asserted equal to a public input witness_commitment
(the resource server’s algebraic commitment to the quantized action). The same
witness columns drive both the risk gate and the hash, so a proof exists only for a
witness whose quantized form hashes to the committed value — you cannot prove the gate
for a witness that does not match the committed action. See compute_witness_commitment.
See README.md for the precise honest gaps versus the Groth16 Policy-VM circuit
(the @atlasauth/pca Groth16 circuit). The binding above is over the quantized preimage via the
AIR’s native algebraic hash — it is not a recomputation of the SHA-256-of-canonical-
JSON action_commitment in-AIR (still infeasible in this field); the two are linked
off-circuit by the resource server deriving both from one action. Remaining gaps:
predicates/caveats are reduced to booleans, the threshold ladder beyond t=1 and the
attenuation chain are not encoded.
Structs§
- Policy
Params - Public policy parameters (the verifier’s view). All risk quantities are integers at
scale
S;kappais a non-negative integer cost scale (see README gap note). - Public
Inputs - Public inputs as field elements. Order here defines the Fiat–Shamir transcript binding.
- Release
Air - Witness
- Private witness.
Constants§
- COMMIT_
LIMBS - Number of squeezed output limbs forming the public
witness_commitment. - HEX_
COMMITMENT_ DIGITS - Required length of an opaque commitment: 64 hex digits (a SHA-256 digest).
- HEX_
LIMBS - Number of 64-bit limbs each opaque 256-bit hex commitment is split into (big-endian: limb 0
= hex digits 0..16 … limb 3 = hex digits 48..64). 64-bit limbs are always
< pinf128, so the split is injective: all 256 bits are bound, with no modular reduction. - MIN_
SECURITY_ BITS - Minimum security level the verifier will accept.
- NUM_
LANES - Hash-state lanes: lanes 0..8 absorb the 9 quantized witness quantities, lane 9 = capacity.
- NUM_RC
- Number of in-AIR range checks (bit-decomposition gadgets).
- S
- Fixed-point scale (parts-per-million). Matches the reference risk model and Groth16 circuit (
S = 1e6). - TRACE_
LEN - Execution-trace length (power of two; ≥ 63 so the range gadgets cover bits 0..=62).
- WIDTH
- Total trace width.
Functions§
- build_
trace - Build the execution trace for
(witness, policy). - compute_
witness_ commitment - The algebraic commitment to the quantized witness preimage: the first
COMMIT_LIMBShash-state lanes at the final trace row. The resource server computes the same value over the quantized action and publishes it asPolicyParams::witness_commitment. - hex256_
limbs - Parse exactly 64 lowercase hex digits into four big-endian 64-bit limbs (all 256 bits, injective).
- proof_
from_ bytes - Decode a serialized proof from UNTRUSTED bytes, failing closed.
- proof_
options - Winterfell proof options: 37 queries, blowup 8, no field extension → 111-bit query security, 110 bits conjectured (min(min(128, 111) - 1, 128)).
- prove_
release - Generate a STARK proof that
witnesssatisfies the release gate underpolicy. - risk_
raw r_raw = Σ wᵢ·termᵢwheretermᵢ = xᵢor(S − xᵢ)for inverted inputs. Scale S². This is the integer image ofriskScorein the reference model; dividing by S² recoversr∈[0,1].- verify_
release - Verify a release-gate STARK proof against the public
policy.Ok(())⟺ the gate holds (allow == 1) for some witness, under exactly these public inputs. - verify_
release_ bytes - Decode (fail-closed) and verify a serialized proof in one step.