solid_pod_rs/security/rate_limit.rs
1//! Pluggable rate-limit primitive (Sprint 7 §6.1, ADR-057).
2//!
3//! The library exposes a transport-agnostic [`RateLimiter`] trait plus a
4//! reference in-process [`LruRateLimiter`] implementation. Consumer
5//! binders (actix-web, axum, tower) adapt the trait to their middleware
6//! surface — this crate never mounts routes itself (F7 boundary).
7//!
8//! ## Algorithm
9//!
10//! Sliding-window counter keyed by `(route, subject)`. Each bucket
11//! stores the monotonic `Instant` of every hit inside the current
12//! window. On each [`RateLimiter::check`]:
13//!
14//! 1. Prune entries older than `window`.
15//! 2. If the remaining count `>= max`, deny with
16//! `retry_after_secs = ceil(window - (now - oldest_hit))`.
17//! 3. Otherwise, record `now` and allow.
18//!
19//! ## Storage
20//!
21//! An LRU cache bounds memory under pathological key churn. The cache
22//! capacity defaults to `DEFAULT_LRU_CAPACITY` (4096). Entries that are
23//! evicted lose their history — a deliberate trade-off: the bound is
24//! hard, and real-world adversaries cannot force forgiveness of their
25//! own recent hits without also flushing their own bucket.
26//!
27//! ## Subject identity
28//!
29//! [`RateLimitSubject`] distinguishes per-IP (anonymous requests) from
30//! per-WebID (authenticated requests). Consumers SHOULD prefer WebID
31//! keying for authenticated endpoints: it is stable across NAT churn.
32//!
33//! ## Concurrency
34//!
35//! The limiter uses `parking_lot::Mutex` (already in the dep graph via
36//! `reqwest`). Contention is O(1) per check; the critical section is
37//! the prune-and-push on a single bucket.
38
39#[cfg(feature = "rate-limit")]
40use std::time::Duration;
41
42use async_trait::async_trait;
43
44/// Rate-limit subject — the entity whose quota is being counted.
45///
46/// Variants deliberately borrow `&str` / `&IpAddr` rather than owning;
47/// the limiter computes a canonical string key at check time and drops
48/// the borrow.
49#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
50pub enum RateLimitSubject<'a> {
51 /// Anonymous client keyed by source IP.
52 Ip(std::net::IpAddr),
53 /// Authenticated client keyed by WebID URL.
54 WebId(&'a str),
55 /// Opaque caller-supplied key (e.g. API-key fingerprint).
56 Custom(&'a str),
57}
58
59#[cfg(feature = "rate-limit")]
60impl RateLimitSubject<'_> {
61 /// Canonical string representation, used as the bucket key.
62 fn canonical(&self) -> String {
63 match self {
64 RateLimitSubject::Ip(ip) => format!("ip:{ip}"),
65 RateLimitSubject::WebId(w) => format!("webid:{w}"),
66 RateLimitSubject::Custom(c) => format!("custom:{c}"),
67 }
68 }
69}
70
71/// Composite key for a limiter bucket. Bundles the logical route name
72/// with the subject; buckets never cross routes.
73#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
74pub struct RateLimitKey<'a> {
75 /// Logical route name (e.g. `pod_create`, `write`, `idp_credentials`).
76 pub route: &'a str,
77 /// Subject identity.
78 pub subject: RateLimitSubject<'a>,
79}
80
81#[cfg(feature = "rate-limit")]
82impl RateLimitKey<'_> {
83 fn canonical(&self) -> String {
84 format!("{}|{}", self.route, self.subject.canonical())
85 }
86}
87
88/// Outcome of a single [`RateLimiter::check`].
89#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
90pub enum RateLimitDecision {
91 /// Request is permitted. The hit was recorded.
92 Allow,
93 /// Request exceeds the configured quota for this key. Caller
94 /// SHOULD return `429 Too Many Requests` with a `Retry-After`
95 /// header equal to `retry_after_secs`.
96 Deny {
97 /// Seconds the client should wait before retrying.
98 retry_after_secs: u64,
99 /// Configured maximum for this route.
100 limit: u32,
101 /// Configured window in seconds for this route.
102 window_secs: u64,
103 },
104}
105
106/// Transport-agnostic rate-limit contract.
107///
108/// Implementations MUST be `Send + Sync + 'static` so consumer binders
109/// can wrap them in a shared `Arc<dyn RateLimiter>` inside their
110/// middleware stack.
111#[async_trait]
112pub trait RateLimiter: Send + Sync + 'static {
113 /// Check and record a single hit for `key`. Returns
114 /// [`RateLimitDecision::Allow`] if the request is permitted (and
115 /// records the hit), or [`RateLimitDecision::Deny`] otherwise
116 /// (without recording).
117 async fn check(&self, key: &RateLimitKey<'_>) -> RateLimitDecision;
118}
119
120// -- reference implementation ---------------------------------------------
121
122#[cfg(feature = "rate-limit")]
123mod lru_impl {
124 use super::*;
125
126 use std::num::NonZeroUsize;
127 use std::time::Instant;
128
129 use lru::LruCache;
130 use parking_lot::Mutex;
131
132 /// Default LRU capacity. Bounds memory under key churn.
133 pub const DEFAULT_LRU_CAPACITY: usize = 4096;
134
135 /// Default policy when no per-route policy is supplied: 60 hits
136 /// per 60 s. Deliberately generous — binders SHOULD configure
137 /// tighter policies per route.
138 const DEFAULT_MAX: u32 = 60;
139 const DEFAULT_WINDOW: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
140
141 /// Sliding-window bucket: the hit timestamps inside the current
142 /// window. Stored oldest-first so prune + retry-after are O(window).
143 #[derive(Debug, Default)]
144 struct SlidingWindow {
145 hits: Vec<Instant>,
146 }
147
148 impl SlidingWindow {
149 fn prune(&mut self, now: Instant, window: Duration) {
150 let cutoff = now.checked_sub(window);
151 match cutoff {
152 Some(c) => self.hits.retain(|t| *t > c),
153 None => self.hits.clear(),
154 }
155 }
156 }
157
158 /// LRU-cached sliding-window rate limiter.
159 pub struct LruRateLimiter {
160 buckets: Mutex<LruCache<String, SlidingWindow>>,
161 policies: Vec<RoutePolicy>,
162 default_policy: RoutePolicy,
163 }
164
165 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
166 struct RoutePolicy {
167 route: String,
168 max: u32,
169 window: Duration,
170 }
171
172 impl LruRateLimiter {
173 /// Construct a limiter with no per-route policies and the
174 /// default fall-back (60 hits / 60 s).
175 pub fn new() -> Self {
176 Self::with_capacity_and_policies(DEFAULT_LRU_CAPACITY, Vec::new())
177 }
178
179 /// Construct a limiter with explicit per-route policies.
180 /// Routes not present in `policies` fall back to the default
181 /// (60 hits / 60 s).
182 ///
183 /// Panics if any `max` is zero or any `window` is zero — a zero
184 /// limit is non-sensical (would deny every request) and a zero
185 /// window would divide by zero when computing retry-after.
186 pub fn with_policy(policies: Vec<(String, u32, Duration)>) -> Self {
187 Self::with_capacity_and_policies(DEFAULT_LRU_CAPACITY, policies)
188 }
189
190 /// Construct with an explicit LRU capacity.
191 pub fn with_capacity_and_policies(
192 capacity: usize,
193 policies: Vec<(String, u32, Duration)>,
194 ) -> Self {
195 // SAFETY: 1 is non-zero, so this is infallible.
196 const ONE: NonZeroUsize = match NonZeroUsize::new(1) {
197 Some(v) => v,
198 None => unreachable!(),
199 };
200 let capacity = NonZeroUsize::new(capacity.max(1)).unwrap_or(ONE);
201
202 let policies = policies
203 .into_iter()
204 .map(|(route, max, window)| {
205 assert!(max > 0, "rate-limit max must be non-zero");
206 assert!(!window.is_zero(), "rate-limit window must be non-zero");
207 RoutePolicy {
208 route,
209 max,
210 window,
211 }
212 })
213 .collect();
214
215 Self {
216 buckets: Mutex::new(LruCache::new(capacity)),
217 policies,
218 default_policy: RoutePolicy {
219 route: String::new(),
220 max: DEFAULT_MAX,
221 window: DEFAULT_WINDOW,
222 },
223 }
224 }
225
226 fn policy_for(&self, route: &str) -> &RoutePolicy {
227 self.policies
228 .iter()
229 .find(|p| p.route == route)
230 .unwrap_or(&self.default_policy)
231 }
232
233 fn check_sync(&self, key: &RateLimitKey<'_>, now: Instant) -> RateLimitDecision {
234 let policy = self.policy_for(key.route);
235 let canonical = key.canonical();
236
237 let mut buckets = self.buckets.lock();
238 let bucket = buckets.get_or_insert_mut(canonical, SlidingWindow::default);
239
240 bucket.prune(now, policy.window);
241
242 let window_secs = policy.window.as_secs().max(1);
243
244 if bucket.hits.len() as u32 >= policy.max {
245 // Retry-after = time until the oldest hit falls out of
246 // the window. Ceil to whole seconds so clients never
247 // retry slightly too early.
248 let oldest = bucket.hits.first().copied().unwrap_or(now);
249 let elapsed = now.saturating_duration_since(oldest);
250 let remaining = policy.window.saturating_sub(elapsed);
251 let retry_after_secs = ceil_secs(remaining).max(1);
252
253 return RateLimitDecision::Deny {
254 retry_after_secs,
255 limit: policy.max,
256 window_secs,
257 };
258 }
259
260 bucket.hits.push(now);
261 RateLimitDecision::Allow
262 }
263 }
264
265 impl Default for LruRateLimiter {
266 fn default() -> Self {
267 Self::new()
268 }
269 }
270
271 #[async_trait]
272 impl RateLimiter for LruRateLimiter {
273 async fn check(&self, key: &RateLimitKey<'_>) -> RateLimitDecision {
274 // Synchronous under the hood — the mutex section is O(1)
275 // amortised. Exposed async so future backends (Redis,
276 // sharded) slot in without a trait change.
277 self.check_sync(key, Instant::now())
278 }
279 }
280
281 fn ceil_secs(d: Duration) -> u64 {
282 let whole = d.as_secs();
283 if d.subsec_nanos() > 0 {
284 whole.saturating_add(1)
285 } else {
286 whole
287 }
288 }
289
290 // --- unit tests ------------------------------------------------------
291
292 #[cfg(test)]
293 mod tests {
294 use super::*;
295 use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr};
296
297 fn ip() -> RateLimitSubject<'static> {
298 RateLimitSubject::Ip(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)))
299 }
300
301 #[test]
302 fn ceil_secs_rounds_up_fractional() {
303 assert_eq!(ceil_secs(Duration::from_millis(500)), 1);
304 assert_eq!(ceil_secs(Duration::from_secs(1)), 1);
305 assert_eq!(ceil_secs(Duration::from_millis(1500)), 2);
306 assert_eq!(ceil_secs(Duration::from_secs(0)), 0);
307 }
308
309 #[test]
310 fn default_policy_used_when_route_unknown() {
311 let limiter =
312 LruRateLimiter::with_policy(vec![("foo".into(), 1, Duration::from_secs(5))]);
313 let key = RateLimitKey {
314 route: "bar",
315 subject: ip(),
316 };
317 // First 60 should pass under the default policy.
318 let now = Instant::now();
319 for _ in 0..60 {
320 assert_eq!(limiter.check_sync(&key, now), RateLimitDecision::Allow);
321 }
322 // 61st denies.
323 let d = limiter.check_sync(&key, now);
324 assert!(matches!(d, RateLimitDecision::Deny { .. }));
325 }
326
327 #[test]
328 fn canonical_keys_separate_subjects() {
329 let a = RateLimitKey {
330 route: "r",
331 subject: RateLimitSubject::Ip(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(1, 2, 3, 4))),
332 };
333 let b = RateLimitKey {
334 route: "r",
335 subject: RateLimitSubject::Ip(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(1, 2, 3, 5))),
336 };
337 assert_ne!(a.canonical(), b.canonical());
338 }
339
340 #[test]
341 fn canonical_keys_separate_routes() {
342 let a = RateLimitKey {
343 route: "r1",
344 subject: ip(),
345 };
346 let b = RateLimitKey {
347 route: "r2",
348 subject: ip(),
349 };
350 assert_ne!(a.canonical(), b.canonical());
351 }
352 }
353}
354
355#[cfg(feature = "rate-limit")]
356pub use lru_impl::{LruRateLimiter, DEFAULT_LRU_CAPACITY};