Expand description
Caller-identity resolution for forge requests.
Three schemes, tried in order (cites JSS forge auth by name only):
- Forge push token —
Authorization: Bearer f1.…verified bycrate::token::verify(cheap HMAC, no signature per call). - Pod session — the embedding server’s own
getAgent/WAC layer resolves a pod account and passes aForgeAgent::Poddirectly tocrate::ForgeService::handle; this module does not re-resolve it. - NIP-98 —
Authorization: Nostr <base64>verified by the coresolid_pod_rs::auth::nip98verifier (real Schnorr when thenip98-schnorrfeature is unified in, fail-closed otherwise).
Any failure resolves to ForgeAgent::Anonymous; the service’s
guards then decide, fail-closed.
Functions§
- resolve_
agent - Resolve a
ForgeAgentfrom the request’sAuthorizationheader.token_keyis the forge instance HMAC key;nowis the current Unix time (injected for deterministic testing).