smolvm_protocol/lib.rs
1//! Protocol types for smolvm host-guest communication.
2//!
3//! This crate defines the wire protocol for vsock communication between
4//! the smolvm host and the guest agent (smolvm-agent).
5//!
6//! # Protocol Overview
7//!
8//! Communication uses JSON-encoded messages over vsock. Each message is
9//! prefixed with a 4-byte big-endian length header.
10//!
11//! ```text
12//! +----------------+-------------------+
13//! | Length (4 BE) | JSON payload |
14//! +----------------+-------------------+
15//! ```
16
17#![deny(missing_docs)]
18
19use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
20
21pub mod guest_env;
22pub mod image_ref;
23pub mod publish_socket;
24pub mod retry;
25pub mod secrets;
26
27pub use image_ref::{image_repo, normalize_image_ref};
28pub use secrets::{SecretRef, SecretSourceKind};
29
30/// Serde helper for encoding `Vec<u8>` as a base64 string in JSON.
31///
32/// Without this, serde_json serializes `Vec<u8>` as a JSON array of numbers
33/// (e.g., `[104,101,108,108,111]`), which inflates binary data by ~4x.
34/// Base64 encoding reduces this to ~1.33x.
35pub mod base64_bytes {
36 use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, Engine};
37 use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serializer};
38
39 /// Serialize `Vec<u8>` as a base64 string.
40 pub fn serialize<S: Serializer>(data: &[u8], serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
41 serializer.serialize_str(&STANDARD.encode(data))
42 }
43
44 /// Deserialize a base64 string into `Vec<u8>`.
45 pub fn deserialize<'de, D: Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Vec<u8>, D::Error> {
46 let s = String::deserialize(deserializer)?;
47 STANDARD.decode(&s).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
48 }
49}
50
51/// Protocol version.
52pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: u32 = 1;
53
54/// virtiofs tag under which the host exposes the Rosetta 2 Linux runtime to the
55/// guest. Shared host↔guest so the launcher's `krun_add_virtiofs` tag and the
56/// guest agent's `mount -t virtiofs` source can't drift apart.
57pub const ROSETTA_TAG: &str = "rosetta";
58
59/// Guest mount point for the Rosetta 2 Linux runtime. The ptrace wrapper execs
60/// `<ROSETTA_GUEST_PATH>/rosetta` (the translator), so this path is baked into
61/// both the wrapper and the `binfmt_misc` registration.
62pub const ROSETTA_GUEST_PATH: &str = "/mnt/rosetta";
63
64/// Maximum frame size (32 MB - layer exports use chunked streaming).
65pub const MAX_FRAME_SIZE: u32 = 32 * 1024 * 1024;
66
67/// Chunk size for streaming layer data (~16 MB raw, ~21 MB as base64 JSON).
68pub const LAYER_CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
69
70/// Files at or below this size are written with a single `FileWrite`
71/// message. Larger files must stream via
72/// `FileWriteBegin` + `FileWriteChunk` so no single frame approaches
73/// [`MAX_FRAME_SIZE`] (base64 + JSON inflation is ~1.4x).
74///
75/// Chosen to keep the single-shot frame comfortably under the frame
76/// limit while preserving the fast-path latency for small config
77/// files / scripts / keys.
78pub const FILE_WRITE_SINGLE_SHOT_MAX: usize = 1024 * 1024;
79
80/// Payload bytes per streaming upload chunk. Deliberately small —
81/// equal to [`FILE_WRITE_SINGLE_SHOT_MAX`] — so each chunk's encoded
82/// frame (~1.4 MB) fits inside typical kernel Unix-socket send
83/// buffers (`SO_SNDBUF` defaults on the order of 200–256 KiB but
84/// can grow). Larger chunks would force `write_all` to spin waiting
85/// for the agent to drain, and any latency spike trips the 10 s
86/// write timeout with `EAGAIN` — exactly the failure David
87/// reproduced before this fix landed.
88///
89/// Note: [`LAYER_CHUNK_SIZE`] is 16 MiB for agent→host (download)
90/// streaming, which works because the host side of the socket has
91/// more headroom than the guest side. Upload streaming is the
92/// asymmetric case and needs a smaller chunk.
93pub const FILE_WRITE_CHUNK_SIZE: usize = FILE_WRITE_SINGLE_SHOT_MAX;
94
95/// Hard ceiling on a single file transfer in either direction.
96///
97/// On the write path: enforced at `FileWriteBegin` by the agent —
98/// `total_size > FILE_TRANSFER_MAX_TOTAL` is rejected before any
99/// staging file is created.
100///
101/// On the read path: enforced by the host's `read_file` loop —
102/// after the first chunk that pushes the accumulated total past the
103/// cap, the call bails with an error and the partial buffer is
104/// dropped. This protects the host process from OOM if the guest
105/// (compromised or merely buggy) streams unbounded data.
106///
107/// 4 GiB matches the order-of-magnitude of the default overlay disk and the
108/// `gpu_vram_mib` cap. It is the compiled-in default. The host-side transfer
109/// paths (read/export, including `pack create --from-vm`) raise it at runtime
110/// via `SMOLVM_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX_BYTES` (see
111/// `agent::client::file_transfer_max_total`) so a VM snapshot whose overlay
112/// carries a large dependency tree (e.g. a torch + CUDA-wheels environment is
113/// ~5 GiB) can be packed without lowering the DoS bound for everyone else. The
114/// guest agent's write-path check runs inside the VM and cannot see that host
115/// env var, so it always enforces this const. Callers that need to move larger
116/// blobs routinely should stage via a virtiofs mount instead of `cp`.
117pub const FILE_TRANSFER_MAX_TOTAL: u64 = 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
118
119/// Filename of the virtiofs-visible marker the agent creates when it is
120/// ready to accept vsock connections.
121///
122/// The host polls for this file through its virtiofs mount of the guest
123/// rootfs. The agent writes it (and optionally a symlink from `/oldroot/`)
124/// during deferred init, just before opening the vsock listener.
125///
126/// Both sides must agree on this name; keeping it here prevents silent drift.
127pub const AGENT_READY_MARKER: &str = ".smolvm-ready";
128
129/// Well-known vsock ports.
130pub mod ports {
131 /// Control channel for workload VMs.
132 pub const WORKLOAD_CONTROL: u32 = 5000;
133 /// Log streaming from workload VMs.
134 pub const WORKLOAD_LOGS: u32 = 5001;
135 /// Agent control port (for OCI operations and management).
136 pub const AGENT_CONTROL: u32 = 6000;
137 /// SSH agent forwarding (host SSH_AUTH_SOCK bridged to guest).
138 pub const SSH_AGENT: u32 = 6001;
139 /// DNS filtering proxy (guest forwards DNS queries to host for filtering).
140 pub const DNS_FILTER: u32 = 6002;
141 /// Docker socket bridge: the guest listens on this vsock port and proxies
142 /// each connection to the in-guest `/var/run/docker.sock`, so the host can
143 /// reach the guest's Docker daemon over a host-side Unix socket
144 /// (`DOCKER_HOST=unix://…`). Inbound (host connects in), like the agent
145 /// control channel — unlike the outbound SSH/DNS/CUDA bridges.
146 pub const DOCKER: u32 = 6003;
147 /// CUDA-over-vsock (experimental): guest CUDA client forwards Driver-API
148 /// calls to a host CUDA server that runs them on the host NVIDIA GPU.
149 pub const CUDA: u32 = 7000;
150
151 /// Base vsock port for user-published Unix-socket bridges
152 /// (`--expose-socket` / `--mount-socket`). Each published socket is assigned
153 /// `PUBLISH_SOCKET_BASE + index`. Kept clear of the fixed ports above (and of
154 /// CUDA at 7000) so a reasonable number of sockets never collides.
155 pub const PUBLISH_SOCKET_BASE: u32 = 6100;
156
157 /// Maximum number of user-published sockets per VM. Bounds the vsock-port
158 /// window (`6100..6100+MAX`) below CUDA's 7000.
159 pub const PUBLISH_SOCKET_MAX: usize = 64;
160}
161
162/// vsock CID constants.
163pub mod cid {
164 /// Host CID (always 2).
165 pub const HOST: u32 = 2;
166 /// Guest CID (always 3 for the first/only guest).
167 pub const GUEST: u32 = 3;
168 /// Any CID (for listening).
169 pub const ANY: u32 = u32::MAX;
170}
171
172/// fsnotify event masks, mirroring the kernel's `FS_*` bits in
173/// `include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h`. Shared by the host watcher (which maps a
174/// host filesystem event to one of these) and the guest agent (which forwards
175/// the raw bits to `/proc/smolvm-fsnotify`). Only the subset relevant to
176/// file-watching tools is defined.
177pub mod fsnotify_mask {
178 /// File was modified.
179 pub const FS_MODIFY: u32 = 0x0000_0002;
180 /// Metadata changed (chmod/chown/utimes).
181 pub const FS_ATTRIB: u32 = 0x0000_0004;
182 /// Writable file was closed.
183 pub const FS_CLOSE_WRITE: u32 = 0x0000_0008;
184 /// File was moved away from the watched dir.
185 pub const FS_MOVED_FROM: u32 = 0x0000_0040;
186 /// File was moved into the watched dir.
187 pub const FS_MOVED_TO: u32 = 0x0000_0080;
188 /// Subfile was created.
189 pub const FS_CREATE: u32 = 0x0000_0100;
190 /// Subfile was deleted.
191 pub const FS_DELETE: u32 = 0x0000_0200;
192 /// Event occurred against a directory.
193 pub const FS_ISDIR: u32 = 0x4000_0000;
194}
195
196/// A single host-originated filesystem change to replay into the guest.
197#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
198pub struct FsNotifyEvent {
199 /// Guest-side absolute path the event occurred on (virtiofs staging path).
200 pub path: String,
201 /// `fsnotify_mask::FS_*` bitmask for the event.
202 pub mask: u32,
203}
204
205// ============================================================================
206// Agent Protocol (OCI Operations)
207// ============================================================================
208
209/// Agent request types (for image management and OCI operations).
210#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
211#[serde(tag = "method", rename_all = "snake_case")]
212pub enum AgentRequest {
213 /// Ping to check if agent is alive.
214 Ping,
215
216 /// Inject host-originated fsnotify events into the guest.
217 ///
218 /// virtiofs does not deliver host-side file changes to the guest as
219 /// fsnotify/inotify events, so inotify-based hot-reload (Vite, webpack,
220 /// nodemon) never fires when a mounted file is edited on the host. The host
221 /// watches the mount source and sends the resulting events here; the agent
222 /// writes them to `/proc/smolvm-fsnotify`, which fires the matching event on
223 /// the guest inode so watchers on the (bind-mounted) container path wake up.
224 /// Each `path` is a guest-side absolute path (the virtiofs staging path),
225 /// `mask` an `fsnotify_mask::FS_*` bitmask.
226 FsNotify {
227 /// Host-originated filesystem changes to replay as guest fsnotify events.
228 #[serde(default)]
229 events: Vec<FsNotifyEvent>,
230 },
231
232 /// Pull an OCI image and extract layers.
233 Pull {
234 /// Image reference (e.g., "alpine:latest", "docker.io/library/ubuntu:22.04").
235 image: String,
236 /// OCI platform to pull (e.g., "linux/arm64", "linux/amd64").
237 oci_platform: Option<String>,
238 /// Optional registry authentication credentials.
239 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
240 auth: Option<RegistryAuth>,
241 /// Proxy URL applied to the registry client (sets HTTP_PROXY and HTTPS_PROXY).
242 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
243 proxy: Option<String>,
244 /// Comma-separated NO_PROXY list of hosts/CIDRs that bypass the proxy.
245 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
246 no_proxy: Option<String>,
247 },
248
249 /// Query if an image exists locally.
250 Query {
251 /// Image reference.
252 image: String,
253 },
254
255 /// List all cached images.
256 ListImages,
257
258 /// Run garbage collection on unused layers.
259 GarbageCollect {
260 /// If true, only report what would be deleted.
261 dry_run: bool,
262 /// If true, delete all image manifests and configs first,
263 /// making all layers unreferenced so they get collected.
264 #[serde(default)]
265 purge_all: bool,
266 },
267
268 /// Prepare overlay rootfs for a workload.
269 PrepareOverlay {
270 /// Image reference.
271 image: String,
272 /// Unique workload ID for the overlay.
273 workload_id: String,
274 },
275
276 /// Clean up overlay rootfs for a workload.
277 CleanupOverlay {
278 /// Workload ID to clean up.
279 workload_id: String,
280 },
281
282 /// Format the storage disk (first-time setup).
283 FormatStorage,
284
285 /// Get storage disk status.
286 StorageStatus,
287
288 /// Test network connectivity directly from the agent (not via chroot).
289 /// Used to debug TSI networking.
290 NetworkTest {
291 /// URL to test (e.g., "http://1.1.1.1")
292 url: String,
293 },
294
295 /// Shutdown the agent.
296 Shutdown,
297
298 /// Export a layer as a tar archive.
299 ///
300 /// Used by `smolvm pack` to extract OCI layers for packaging.
301 /// The agent streams the layer tar data back via LayerData responses.
302 ExportLayer {
303 /// Image digest (sha256:...).
304 image_digest: String,
305 /// Layer index (0-based).
306 layer_index: usize,
307 },
308
309 /// Execute a command directly in the VM (not in a container).
310 ///
311 /// This runs the command in the agent's Alpine rootfs without any
312 /// container isolation. Useful for VM-level operations and debugging.
313 VmExec {
314 /// Command and arguments.
315 command: Vec<String>,
316 /// Environment variables.
317 #[serde(default)]
318 env: Vec<(String, String)>,
319 /// Working directory in the VM.
320 workdir: Option<String>,
321 /// Timeout in milliseconds.
322 #[serde(default)]
323 timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
324 /// Interactive mode - stream I/O instead of buffering.
325 #[serde(default)]
326 interactive: bool,
327 /// Allocate a pseudo-TTY for the command.
328 #[serde(default)]
329 tty: bool,
330 /// Background mode - spawn and return PID immediately without waiting.
331 #[serde(default)]
332 background: bool,
333 /// Data to pipe to the command's stdin.
334 #[serde(default)]
335 stdin_data: Option<String>,
336 },
337
338 /// Run a command in an image's rootfs.
339 ///
340 /// This prepares an overlay, chroots into it, and executes the command.
341 /// Returns stdout, stderr, and exit code when the command completes.
342 Run {
343 /// Image reference (must be pulled first).
344 image: String,
345 /// Command and arguments.
346 command: Vec<String>,
347 /// Environment variables.
348 #[serde(default)]
349 env: Vec<(String, String)>,
350 /// Working directory inside the rootfs.
351 workdir: Option<String>,
352 /// User inside the rootfs. If omitted, the OCI image default applies.
353 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
354 user: Option<String>,
355 /// Volume mounts to bind into the container.
356 /// Each tuple is (virtiofs_tag, container_path, read_only).
357 #[serde(default)]
358 mounts: Vec<(String, String, bool)>,
359 /// Timeout in milliseconds. If the command exceeds this duration,
360 /// it will be killed and return exit code 124.
361 #[serde(default)]
362 timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
363 /// Interactive mode - stream I/O instead of buffering.
364 /// When true, output is streamed via Stdout/Stderr responses,
365 /// and stdin can be sent via the Stdin request.
366 #[serde(default)]
367 interactive: bool,
368 /// Allocate a pseudo-TTY for the command.
369 /// Enables terminal features like colors, line editing, and signal handling.
370 #[serde(default)]
371 tty: bool,
372 /// Detached mode — start the container and return immediately with the
373 /// container ID. Only meaningful when `persistent_overlay_id` is set.
374 /// Returns a `Completed` response with `stdout` containing the container ID.
375 #[serde(default)]
376 detached: bool,
377 /// Run the workload as an unprivileged container: restricted capabilities,
378 /// read-only cgroup, and no extra tmpfs. The default (false) is "VM-grade"
379 /// — since the microVM is the isolation boundary, the workload gets a full
380 /// capability set and the mounts an init system needs (so any image, incl.
381 /// systemd, boots). Opt in for defense-in-depth when running untrusted code.
382 #[serde(default)]
383 unprivileged: bool,
384 /// If set, use a persistent overlay that survives across exec sessions.
385 /// The overlay is identified by this ID (typically the machine name)
386 /// and reused on subsequent runs. If not set, an ephemeral overlay is
387 /// created and destroyed after the run.
388 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
389 persistent_overlay_id: Option<String>,
390 /// Data to pipe to the command's stdin (non-interactive runs only).
391 /// The pipe is closed after writing, so the command sees EOF.
392 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
393 stdin_data: Option<String>,
394 /// Spawn the container and return immediately with the crun PID.
395 /// The container runs detached; stdout/stderr go to /dev/null.
396 /// Incompatible with `interactive` and `tty`.
397 #[serde(default)]
398 background: bool,
399 },
400
401 /// Send stdin data to a running interactive command.
402 Stdin {
403 /// Input data to send to the command's stdin.
404 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
405 data: Vec<u8>,
406 },
407
408 /// Resize the PTY window (for TTY mode).
409 Resize {
410 /// New width in columns.
411 cols: u16,
412 /// New height in rows.
413 rows: u16,
414 },
415
416 // ========================================================================
417 // File I/O
418 // ========================================================================
419 /// Write a file inside the VM in a single message.
420 ///
421 /// Use only for files up to [`FILE_WRITE_SINGLE_SHOT_MAX`]. Larger
422 /// files must stream via [`Self::FileWriteBegin`] +
423 /// [`Self::FileWriteChunk`] to avoid exceeding [`MAX_FRAME_SIZE`]
424 /// after base64 + JSON inflation.
425 FileWrite {
426 /// Absolute path in the VM filesystem.
427 path: String,
428 /// File contents.
429 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
430 data: Vec<u8>,
431 /// File mode (e.g., 0o644). None = default (0644).
432 #[serde(default)]
433 mode: Option<u32>,
434 },
435
436 /// Open a streaming file upload session on this connection.
437 ///
438 /// Must be followed by one or more [`Self::FileWriteChunk`]
439 /// requests. The final chunk sets `done: true` to finalize.
440 /// Dropping the connection (or sending any non-chunk request)
441 /// before `done` aborts the session and leaves no partial file
442 /// at `path`.
443 ///
444 /// Sessions are per-connection — one session at a time.
445 FileWriteBegin {
446 /// Absolute path in the VM filesystem.
447 path: String,
448 /// File mode (e.g., 0o644). None = default (0644).
449 #[serde(default)]
450 mode: Option<u32>,
451 /// Expected total size in bytes. Rejected if it exceeds
452 /// [`FILE_TRANSFER_MAX_TOTAL`]. The agent uses this for an
453 /// early-fail check only; the actual size written is the sum
454 /// of chunk byte lengths.
455 total_size: u64,
456 },
457
458 /// Append a chunk to the currently open streaming upload.
459 /// If `done` is true, the agent fsyncs and atomically renames the
460 /// staging file onto the target path.
461 FileWriteChunk {
462 /// Chunk bytes. Typically [`FILE_WRITE_CHUNK_SIZE`] except
463 /// for the last chunk.
464 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
465 data: Vec<u8>,
466 /// True on the final chunk; closes and renames the staging
467 /// file. False on intermediate chunks.
468 done: bool,
469 },
470
471 /// Read a file from the VM.
472 FileRead {
473 /// Absolute path in the VM filesystem.
474 path: String,
475 },
476
477 /// Create (without starting) a Kubernetes pod container whose rootfs is a
478 /// virtiofs-shared host directory (containerd snapshotter output) and whose
479 /// process definition comes from the host's OCI config. The agent builds
480 /// its crun bundle around the shared rootfs; nothing runs until
481 /// `PodStart`. Part of the containerd shim v2 datapath
482 /// (docs/kubernetes-runtime.md).
483 PodCreate {
484 /// Container ID (containerd task id).
485 id: String,
486 /// Rootfs path relative to the sandbox's shared virtiofs mount. The
487 /// shim boots the sandbox VM with ONE shared dir and bind-mounts each
488 /// container's rootfs under it (virtiofs shares are fixed at boot, but
489 /// pod containers are created afterwards), so the guest resolves this
490 /// as `<sandbox-share-mount>/<rootfs_rel>`.
491 rootfs_rel: String,
492 /// The host OCI runtime spec (config.json bytes). The agent extracts
493 /// process/env/cwd/user/mounts/resources and grafts them onto its own
494 /// guest bundle template; host-specific namespaces/paths are ignored.
495 spec_json: String,
496 /// Allocate a PTY for the init process.
497 #[serde(default)]
498 tty: bool,
499 },
500
501 /// Start a pod container created by `PodCreate` (or an exec process
502 /// registered by `PodExec`), streaming its I/O on THIS connection:
503 /// `Started` → `Stdout`/`Stderr`... → `Exited`. Stdin arrives via `Stdin`
504 /// requests; PTY resize via `Resize`.
505 PodStart {
506 /// Container ID.
507 id: String,
508 /// Exec process to start instead of the init process.
509 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
510 exec_id: Option<String>,
511 },
512
513 /// Register an exec process for a running pod container. Started later by
514 /// `PodStart { exec_id }`.
515 PodExec {
516 /// Container ID.
517 id: String,
518 /// Exec process ID (unique within the container).
519 exec_id: String,
520 /// OCI Process JSON (containerd's ExecProcessRequest spec).
521 process_json: String,
522 /// Allocate a PTY for the exec process.
523 #[serde(default)]
524 tty: bool,
525 },
526
527 /// Signal a pod container's init process (or one exec process).
528 PodSignal {
529 /// Container ID.
530 id: String,
531 /// Exec process to signal instead of init.
532 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
533 exec_id: Option<String>,
534 /// Signal number (SIGKILL = 9, SIGTERM = 15, ...).
535 signal: u32,
536 /// Signal the whole container process group.
537 #[serde(default)]
538 all: bool,
539 },
540
541 /// List PIDs inside a pod container (guest view).
542 PodPids {
543 /// Container ID.
544 id: String,
545 },
546
547 /// Sample a pod container's resource usage (guest view). The agent reads the
548 /// container's process tree from /proc (there is no per-container cgroup); the
549 /// shim maps the reply into containerd's cgroups metrics for CRI stats.
550 PodStats {
551 /// Container ID.
552 id: String,
553 },
554
555 /// Remove a pod container's (or exec process's) guest resources after
556 /// exit: bundle, cgroup, PTY. Exit status was already streamed by
557 /// `PodStart`'s `Exited`.
558 PodDelete {
559 /// Container ID.
560 id: String,
561 /// Exec process to remove instead of the whole container.
562 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
563 exec_id: Option<String>,
564 },
565}
566
567impl AgentRequest {
568 /// A log-safe one-line summary of the request.
569 ///
570 /// This string is written to the machine's console log, which is exposed
571 /// over the logs API — so it must NEVER include credential- or data-bearing
572 /// fields: registry `auth`, `env` (which can carry host-resolved secrets),
573 /// `proxy` (may embed credentials), or `data` (file/stdin bytes). Only the
574 /// variant name plus a non-secret identifier (image) is emitted.
575 ///
576 /// The match is exhaustive with no catch-all on purpose: adding a new
577 /// variant forces a compile error here, so redaction is a deliberate
578 /// decision rather than an accidental leak in some future request type.
579 pub fn log_summary(&self) -> String {
580 match self {
581 AgentRequest::Ping => "Ping".into(),
582 AgentRequest::FsNotify { events } => format!("FsNotify {{ count: {} }}", events.len()),
583 AgentRequest::Pull { image, .. } => format!("Pull {{ image: {image} }}"),
584 AgentRequest::Query { image, .. } => format!("Query {{ image: {image} }}"),
585 AgentRequest::ListImages => "ListImages".into(),
586 AgentRequest::GarbageCollect { .. } => "GarbageCollect".into(),
587 AgentRequest::PrepareOverlay { .. } => "PrepareOverlay".into(),
588 AgentRequest::CleanupOverlay { .. } => "CleanupOverlay".into(),
589 AgentRequest::FormatStorage => "FormatStorage".into(),
590 AgentRequest::StorageStatus => "StorageStatus".into(),
591 AgentRequest::NetworkTest { .. } => "NetworkTest".into(),
592 AgentRequest::Shutdown => "Shutdown".into(),
593 AgentRequest::ExportLayer { .. } => "ExportLayer".into(),
594 AgentRequest::VmExec { .. } => "VmExec".into(),
595 AgentRequest::Run { image, .. } => format!("Run {{ image: {image} }}"),
596 AgentRequest::Stdin { .. } => "Stdin".into(),
597 AgentRequest::Resize { .. } => "Resize".into(),
598 AgentRequest::FileWrite { .. } => "FileWrite".into(),
599 AgentRequest::FileWriteBegin { .. } => "FileWriteBegin".into(),
600 AgentRequest::FileWriteChunk { .. } => "FileWriteChunk".into(),
601 AgentRequest::FileRead { .. } => "FileRead".into(),
602 // Pod requests: spec/process JSON may carry env secrets — emit ids only.
603 AgentRequest::PodCreate { id, .. } => format!("PodCreate {{ id: {id} }}"),
604 AgentRequest::PodStart { id, exec_id } => match exec_id {
605 Some(e) => format!("PodStart {{ id: {id}, exec: {e} }}"),
606 None => format!("PodStart {{ id: {id} }}"),
607 },
608 AgentRequest::PodExec { id, exec_id, .. } => {
609 format!("PodExec {{ id: {id}, exec: {exec_id} }}")
610 }
611 AgentRequest::PodSignal {
612 id, signal, all, ..
613 } => format!("PodSignal {{ id: {id}, signal: {signal}, all: {all} }}"),
614 AgentRequest::PodPids { id } => format!("PodPids {{ id: {id} }}"),
615 AgentRequest::PodStats { id } => format!("PodStats {{ id: {id} }}"),
616 AgentRequest::PodDelete { id, exec_id } => match exec_id {
617 Some(e) => format!("PodDelete {{ id: {id}, exec: {e} }}"),
618 None => format!("PodDelete {{ id: {id} }}"),
619 },
620 }
621 }
622}
623
624/// Agent response types.
625#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
626#[serde(tag = "status", rename_all = "snake_case")]
627pub enum AgentResponse {
628 /// Operation completed successfully.
629 Ok {
630 /// Response data (varies by request type).
631 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
632 data: Option<serde_json::Value>,
633 },
634
635 /// Pong response to ping.
636 Pong {
637 /// Protocol version.
638 version: u32,
639 },
640
641 /// Progress update (for long operations like pull).
642 Progress {
643 /// Human-readable message.
644 message: String,
645 /// Completion percentage (0-100).
646 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
647 percent: Option<u8>,
648 /// Current layer being processed.
649 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
650 layer: Option<String>,
651 },
652
653 /// Operation failed.
654 Error {
655 /// Error message.
656 message: String,
657 /// Error code (for programmatic handling).
658 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
659 code: Option<String>,
660 },
661
662 /// Command execution completed (non-interactive mode).
663 Completed {
664 /// Exit code from the command.
665 exit_code: i32,
666 /// Standard output (may be truncated). `Vec<u8>` preserves binary
667 /// output (image bytes, tarballs, etc.) that would be truncated by
668 /// `String` at the first non-UTF-8 byte. Serialized as base64 JSON
669 /// string — the same format as the streaming `Stdout` variant.
670 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
671 stdout: Vec<u8>,
672 /// Standard error (may be truncated).
673 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
674 stderr: Vec<u8>,
675 },
676
677 /// Command started (interactive mode).
678 /// Indicates the command is running and ready to receive stdin.
679 Started,
680
681 /// Stdout data from a running command (interactive mode).
682 Stdout {
683 /// Output data.
684 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
685 data: Vec<u8>,
686 },
687
688 /// Stderr data from a running command (interactive mode).
689 Stderr {
690 /// Error output data.
691 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
692 data: Vec<u8>,
693 },
694
695 /// Command exited (interactive mode).
696 Exited {
697 /// Exit code from the command.
698 exit_code: i32,
699 /// The container was terminated by the cgroup OOM killer. The shim
700 /// turns this into a TaskOOM event so the CRI reports
701 /// `reason=OOMKilled`. Only ever set on a pod container's init exit.
702 #[serde(default)]
703 oom: bool,
704 },
705
706 /// PIDs inside a pod container (`PodPids` reply).
707 Pids {
708 /// Guest PIDs, container-init first when known.
709 pids: Vec<u32>,
710 },
711
712 /// Resource usage sample for a pod container (`PodStats` reply). Summed over
713 /// the container's process tree read from /proc (no per-container cgroup).
714 Stats {
715 /// Cumulative CPU time of the process tree, in nanoseconds.
716 cpu_usage_ns: u64,
717 /// Resident memory of the process tree, in bytes.
718 memory_bytes: u64,
719 },
720
721 /// Streaming binary-data chunk.
722 ///
723 /// Used by every streaming download direction: the agent sends
724 /// one or more `DataChunk` responses in sequence, with `done: true`
725 /// on the final chunk. Current producers: `ExportLayer` and
726 /// `FileRead`.
727 ///
728 /// Payload size per chunk should stay under
729 /// [`LAYER_CHUNK_SIZE`] so the encoded frame (~1.33× after
730 /// base64) fits inside [`MAX_FRAME_SIZE`] with JSON overhead to
731 /// spare.
732 DataChunk {
733 /// Chunk bytes. Empty allowed on the final frame (common for
734 /// EOF-on-clean-boundary cases).
735 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
736 data: Vec<u8>,
737 /// True on the final chunk of the stream.
738 done: bool,
739 },
740}
741
742// ============================================================================
743// Error Code Constants
744// ============================================================================
745//
746// Standard error codes for AgentResponse::Error. Using constants ensures
747// consistency across the codebase and makes error handling more reliable.
748
749/// Error codes for agent responses.
750pub mod error_codes {
751 /// Request payload was invalid or malformed.
752 pub const INVALID_REQUEST: &str = "INVALID_REQUEST";
753 /// Requested resource was not found.
754 pub const NOT_FOUND: &str = "NOT_FOUND";
755 /// Internal error during operation.
756 pub const INTERNAL_ERROR: &str = "INTERNAL_ERROR";
757 /// Image pull operation failed.
758 pub const PULL_FAILED: &str = "PULL_FAILED";
759 /// Image query operation failed.
760 pub const QUERY_FAILED: &str = "QUERY_FAILED";
761 /// Command execution failed.
762 pub const RUN_FAILED: &str = "RUN_FAILED";
763 /// Command execution failed in container.
764 pub const EXEC_FAILED: &str = "EXEC_FAILED";
765 /// Process spawn failed.
766 pub const SPAWN_FAILED: &str = "SPAWN_FAILED";
767 /// Mount operation failed.
768 pub const MOUNT_FAILED: &str = "MOUNT_FAILED";
769 /// File I/O operation failed.
770 pub const FILE_IO_FAILED: &str = "FILE_IO_FAILED";
771 /// Overlay filesystem operation failed.
772 pub const OVERLAY_FAILED: &str = "OVERLAY_FAILED";
773 /// Cleanup operation failed.
774 pub const CLEANUP_FAILED: &str = "CLEANUP_FAILED";
775 /// Storage format operation failed.
776 pub const FORMAT_FAILED: &str = "FORMAT_FAILED";
777 /// Storage status query failed.
778 pub const STATUS_FAILED: &str = "STATUS_FAILED";
779 /// List operation failed.
780 pub const LIST_FAILED: &str = "LIST_FAILED";
781 /// Garbage collection failed.
782 pub const GC_FAILED: &str = "GC_FAILED";
783 /// Container creation failed.
784 pub const CREATE_FAILED: &str = "CREATE_FAILED";
785 /// Container start failed.
786 pub const START_FAILED: &str = "START_FAILED";
787 /// Container stop failed.
788 pub const STOP_FAILED: &str = "STOP_FAILED";
789 /// Container delete failed.
790 pub const DELETE_FAILED: &str = "DELETE_FAILED";
791 /// Export operation failed.
792 pub const EXPORT_FAILED: &str = "EXPORT_FAILED";
793 /// Serialization error.
794 pub const SERIALIZATION_ERROR: &str = "SERIALIZATION_ERROR";
795 /// Message size exceeds maximum.
796 pub const MESSAGE_TOO_LARGE: &str = "MESSAGE_TOO_LARGE";
797 /// Process wait operation failed.
798 pub const WAIT_FAILED: &str = "WAIT_FAILED";
799}
800
801impl AgentResponse {
802 /// Create an error response with the given message and code.
803 ///
804 /// # Example
805 ///
806 /// ```
807 /// use smolvm_protocol::{AgentResponse, error_codes};
808 ///
809 /// let response = AgentResponse::error("image not found", error_codes::NOT_FOUND);
810 /// ```
811 pub fn error(message: impl Into<String>, code: &str) -> Self {
812 AgentResponse::Error {
813 message: message.into(),
814 code: Some(code.to_string()),
815 }
816 }
817
818 /// Create an error response from a Result's error, with the given code.
819 ///
820 /// # Example
821 ///
822 /// ```ignore
823 /// let response = some_operation()
824 /// .map(|data| AgentResponse::ok_with_data(data))
825 /// .unwrap_or_else(|e| AgentResponse::from_err(e, error_codes::PULL_FAILED));
826 /// ```
827 pub fn from_err<E: std::fmt::Display>(err: E, code: &str) -> Self {
828 AgentResponse::Error {
829 message: err.to_string(),
830 code: Some(code.to_string()),
831 }
832 }
833
834 /// Create an Ok response with optional JSON data.
835 pub fn ok(data: Option<serde_json::Value>) -> Self {
836 AgentResponse::Ok { data }
837 }
838
839 /// Create an Ok response with JSON-serializable data.
840 ///
841 /// Returns an error response if serialization fails.
842 pub fn ok_with_data<T: serde::Serialize>(data: T) -> Self {
843 match serde_json::to_value(data) {
844 Ok(value) => AgentResponse::Ok { data: Some(value) },
845 Err(e) => AgentResponse::error(
846 format!("failed to serialize response: {}", e),
847 error_codes::SERIALIZATION_ERROR,
848 ),
849 }
850 }
851
852 /// Convert a Result into an AgentResponse.
853 ///
854 /// On success, serializes the value to JSON. On error, creates an error response.
855 ///
856 /// # Example
857 ///
858 /// ```ignore
859 /// let response = AgentResponse::from_result(
860 /// storage::pull_image(image),
861 /// error_codes::PULL_FAILED,
862 /// );
863 /// ```
864 pub fn from_result<T, E>(result: Result<T, E>, error_code: &str) -> Self
865 where
866 T: serde::Serialize,
867 E: std::fmt::Display,
868 {
869 match result {
870 Ok(data) => Self::ok_with_data(data),
871 Err(e) => Self::from_err(e, error_code),
872 }
873 }
874}
875
876/// Image information returned by Query/ListImages.
877#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
878pub struct ImageInfo {
879 /// Image reference.
880 pub reference: String,
881 /// Image digest (sha256:...).
882 pub digest: String,
883 /// Image size in bytes.
884 pub size: u64,
885 /// Creation timestamp (ISO 8601).
886 pub created: Option<String>,
887 /// Platform architecture.
888 pub architecture: String,
889 /// Platform OS.
890 pub os: String,
891 /// Number of layers.
892 pub layer_count: usize,
893 /// Layer digests in order.
894 pub layers: Vec<String>,
895 /// Image entrypoint (from OCI config).
896 #[serde(default)]
897 pub entrypoint: Vec<String>,
898 /// Image default command (from OCI config).
899 #[serde(default)]
900 pub cmd: Vec<String>,
901 /// Image environment variables (from OCI config).
902 #[serde(default)]
903 pub env: Vec<String>,
904 /// Image working directory (from OCI config).
905 #[serde(default)]
906 pub workdir: Option<String>,
907 /// Image default user (from OCI config).
908 #[serde(default)]
909 pub user: Option<String>,
910}
911
912/// Overlay preparation result.
913#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
914pub struct OverlayInfo {
915 /// Path to the merged overlay rootfs.
916 pub rootfs_path: String,
917 /// Path to the upper (writable) directory.
918 pub upper_path: String,
919 /// Path to the work directory.
920 pub work_path: String,
921}
922
923/// Storage status information.
924#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
925pub struct StorageStatus {
926 /// Whether the storage is formatted and ready.
927 pub ready: bool,
928 /// Total size in bytes.
929 pub total_bytes: u64,
930 /// Used size in bytes.
931 pub used_bytes: u64,
932 /// Number of cached layers.
933 pub layer_count: usize,
934 /// Number of cached images.
935 pub image_count: usize,
936}
937
938/// Registry authentication credentials for pulling images.
939///
940/// `Debug` is hand-written to redact the password: this value is carried inside
941/// `AgentRequest::Pull`, and any `{:?}` of that request (e.g. a tracing span)
942/// would otherwise serialize the token verbatim into the machine's console log,
943/// which is exposed over the logs API.
944#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
945pub struct RegistryAuth {
946 /// Username for authentication.
947 pub username: String,
948 /// Password or token for authentication.
949 pub password: String,
950}
951
952impl std::fmt::Debug for RegistryAuth {
953 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
954 f.debug_struct("RegistryAuth")
955 .field("username", &self.username)
956 .field("password", &"***")
957 .finish()
958 }
959}
960
961// ============================================================================
962// Workload VM Protocol (Command Execution)
963// ============================================================================
964
965/// Messages from host to workload VM.
966#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
967#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
968pub enum HostMessage {
969 /// Authentication request.
970 Auth {
971 /// Authentication token (base64).
972 token: String,
973 /// Protocol version.
974 protocol_version: u32,
975 },
976
977 /// Run a command.
978 Run {
979 /// Request ID for correlating responses.
980 request_id: u64,
981 /// Command and arguments.
982 command: Vec<String>,
983 /// Environment variables.
984 env: Vec<(String, String)>,
985 /// Working directory.
986 workdir: Option<String>,
987 },
988
989 /// Execute a command in running VM.
990 Exec {
991 /// Request ID.
992 request_id: u64,
993 /// Command and arguments.
994 command: Vec<String>,
995 /// Allocate a TTY.
996 tty: bool,
997 },
998
999 /// Send a signal to a running command.
1000 Signal {
1001 /// Request ID of the command.
1002 request_id: u64,
1003 /// Signal number.
1004 signal: i32,
1005 },
1006
1007 /// Request graceful shutdown.
1008 Stop {
1009 /// Timeout in milliseconds.
1010 timeout_ms: u64,
1011 },
1012}
1013
1014/// Messages from workload VM to host.
1015#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
1016#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
1017pub enum GuestMessage {
1018 /// Authentication successful.
1019 AuthOk,
1020
1021 /// Authentication failed.
1022 AuthFailed,
1023
1024 /// VM is ready to receive commands.
1025 Ready,
1026
1027 /// Command started.
1028 Started {
1029 /// Request ID.
1030 request_id: u64,
1031 },
1032
1033 /// Stdout data from command.
1034 Stdout {
1035 /// Request ID.
1036 request_id: u64,
1037 /// Output data.
1038 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
1039 data: Vec<u8>,
1040 /// Whether output was truncated.
1041 truncated: bool,
1042 },
1043
1044 /// Stderr data from command.
1045 Stderr {
1046 /// Request ID.
1047 request_id: u64,
1048 /// Output data.
1049 #[serde(with = "base64_bytes")]
1050 data: Vec<u8>,
1051 /// Whether output was truncated.
1052 truncated: bool,
1053 },
1054
1055 /// Command exited.
1056 Exit {
1057 /// Request ID.
1058 request_id: u64,
1059 /// Exit code.
1060 code: i32,
1061 /// Exit reason.
1062 reason: String,
1063 },
1064
1065 /// Error occurred.
1066 Error {
1067 /// Request ID (if applicable).
1068 request_id: Option<u64>,
1069 /// Error message.
1070 message: String,
1071 },
1072}
1073
1074// ============================================================================
1075// Wire Format Helpers
1076// ============================================================================
1077
1078/// Envelope that wraps any message with an optional trace ID for correlation.
1079///
1080/// On the wire, the trace_id is flattened into the JSON alongside the message
1081/// fields: `{"trace_id":"abc123","method":"ping"}`.
1082#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
1083pub struct Envelope<T> {
1084 /// Trace ID for correlating host API requests to agent operations.
1085 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none", default)]
1086 pub trace_id: Option<String>,
1087 /// The wrapped message.
1088 #[serde(flatten)]
1089 pub body: T,
1090}
1091
1092impl<T> Envelope<T> {
1093 /// Create an envelope with no trace ID.
1094 pub fn new(body: T) -> Self {
1095 Self {
1096 trace_id: None,
1097 body,
1098 }
1099 }
1100
1101 /// Create an envelope with an optional trace ID.
1102 pub fn with_trace_id(body: T, trace_id: Option<String>) -> Self {
1103 Self { trace_id, body }
1104 }
1105}
1106
1107/// Encode a message to wire format (length-prefixed JSON).
1108pub fn encode_message<T: Serialize>(msg: &T) -> Result<Vec<u8>, serde_json::Error> {
1109 let json = serde_json::to_vec(msg)?;
1110 let len = json.len() as u32;
1111
1112 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(4 + json.len());
1113 buf.extend_from_slice(&len.to_be_bytes());
1114 buf.extend_from_slice(&json);
1115
1116 Ok(buf)
1117}
1118
1119/// Decode a message from wire format.
1120pub fn decode_message<T: for<'de> Deserialize<'de>>(data: &[u8]) -> Result<T, DecodeError> {
1121 if data.len() < 4 {
1122 return Err(DecodeError::TooShort);
1123 }
1124
1125 let len = u32::from_be_bytes([data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3]]) as usize;
1126
1127 if len > MAX_FRAME_SIZE as usize {
1128 return Err(DecodeError::TooLarge(len));
1129 }
1130
1131 if data.len() < 4 + len {
1132 return Err(DecodeError::Incomplete {
1133 expected: len,
1134 got: data.len() - 4,
1135 });
1136 }
1137
1138 serde_json::from_slice(&data[4..4 + len]).map_err(DecodeError::Json)
1139}
1140
1141/// Error decoding a wire message.
1142#[derive(Debug)]
1143pub enum DecodeError {
1144 /// Data too short to contain length header.
1145 TooShort,
1146 /// Frame size exceeds maximum.
1147 TooLarge(usize),
1148 /// Incomplete frame.
1149 Incomplete {
1150 /// Expected length.
1151 expected: usize,
1152 /// Actual length.
1153 got: usize,
1154 },
1155 /// JSON parse error.
1156 Json(serde_json::Error),
1157}
1158
1159impl std::fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1160 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
1161 match self {
1162 DecodeError::TooShort => write!(f, "data too short for length header"),
1163 DecodeError::TooLarge(size) => write!(f, "frame too large: {} bytes", size),
1164 DecodeError::Incomplete { expected, got } => {
1165 write!(
1166 f,
1167 "incomplete frame: expected {} bytes, got {}",
1168 expected, got
1169 )
1170 }
1171 DecodeError::Json(e) => write!(f, "JSON decode error: {}", e),
1172 }
1173 }
1174}
1175
1176impl std::error::Error for DecodeError {}
1177
1178#[cfg(test)]
1179mod tests {
1180 use super::*;
1181
1182 #[test]
1183 fn test_encode_decode_roundtrip() {
1184 let req = AgentRequest::Pull {
1185 image: "alpine:latest".to_string(),
1186 oci_platform: Some("linux/arm64".to_string()),
1187 auth: None,
1188 proxy: None,
1189 no_proxy: None,
1190 };
1191
1192 let encoded = encode_message(&req).unwrap();
1193 let decoded: AgentRequest = decode_message(&encoded).unwrap();
1194
1195 let AgentRequest::Pull {
1196 image,
1197 oci_platform,
1198 auth,
1199 proxy,
1200 no_proxy,
1201 } = decoded
1202 else {
1203 panic!("expected Pull variant, got {:?}", decoded);
1204 };
1205 assert_eq!(image, "alpine:latest");
1206 assert_eq!(oci_platform, Some("linux/arm64".to_string()));
1207 assert!(auth.is_none());
1208 assert!(proxy.is_none());
1209 assert!(no_proxy.is_none());
1210 }
1211
1212 #[test]
1213 fn test_encode_decode_with_auth() {
1214 let req = AgentRequest::Pull {
1215 image: "ghcr.io/owner/repo:latest".to_string(),
1216 oci_platform: None,
1217 auth: Some(RegistryAuth {
1218 username: "testuser".to_string(),
1219 password: "testpass".to_string(),
1220 }),
1221 proxy: None,
1222 no_proxy: None,
1223 };
1224
1225 let encoded = encode_message(&req).unwrap();
1226 let decoded: AgentRequest = decode_message(&encoded).unwrap();
1227
1228 let AgentRequest::Pull {
1229 image,
1230 oci_platform,
1231 auth,
1232 proxy: _,
1233 no_proxy: _,
1234 } = decoded
1235 else {
1236 panic!("expected Pull variant, got {:?}", decoded);
1237 };
1238 assert_eq!(image, "ghcr.io/owner/repo:latest");
1239 assert!(oci_platform.is_none());
1240 let auth = auth.expect("auth should be Some");
1241 assert_eq!(auth.username, "testuser");
1242 assert_eq!(auth.password, "testpass");
1243 }
1244
1245 #[test]
1246 fn test_encode_decode_with_proxy() {
1247 let req = AgentRequest::Pull {
1248 image: "alpine:latest".to_string(),
1249 oci_platform: None,
1250 auth: None,
1251 proxy: Some("http://192.168.127.254:3128".to_string()),
1252 no_proxy: Some("127.0.0.1,localhost,.internal".to_string()),
1253 };
1254
1255 let encoded = encode_message(&req).unwrap();
1256 let decoded: AgentRequest = decode_message(&encoded).unwrap();
1257
1258 let AgentRequest::Pull {
1259 proxy, no_proxy, ..
1260 } = decoded
1261 else {
1262 panic!("expected Pull variant, got {:?}", decoded);
1263 };
1264 assert_eq!(proxy.as_deref(), Some("http://192.168.127.254:3128"));
1265 assert_eq!(no_proxy.as_deref(), Some("127.0.0.1,localhost,.internal"));
1266 }
1267
1268 #[test]
1269 fn test_decode_too_short() {
1270 let data = [0u8; 2];
1271 let result: Result<AgentRequest, _> = decode_message(&data);
1272 assert!(matches!(result, Err(DecodeError::TooShort)));
1273 }
1274
1275 #[test]
1276 fn test_decode_incomplete() {
1277 let mut data = vec![0, 0, 0, 100]; // claims 100 bytes
1278 data.extend_from_slice(b"{}"); // only 2 bytes of payload
1279 let result: Result<AgentRequest, _> = decode_message(&data);
1280 assert!(matches!(result, Err(DecodeError::Incomplete { .. })));
1281 }
1282
1283 #[test]
1284 fn test_agent_request_serialization() {
1285 let req = AgentRequest::Ping;
1286 let json = serde_json::to_string(&req).unwrap();
1287 assert!(json.contains("ping"));
1288
1289 let req = AgentRequest::PrepareOverlay {
1290 image: "ubuntu:22.04".to_string(),
1291 workload_id: "wl-123".to_string(),
1292 };
1293 let json = serde_json::to_string(&req).unwrap();
1294 assert!(json.contains("prepare_overlay"));
1295 }
1296
1297 #[test]
1298 fn test_agent_response_serialization() {
1299 let resp = AgentResponse::Pong {
1300 version: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1301 };
1302 let json = serde_json::to_string(&resp).unwrap();
1303 assert!(json.contains("pong"));
1304
1305 let resp = AgentResponse::Progress {
1306 message: "Pulling layer 1/3".to_string(),
1307 percent: Some(33),
1308 layer: Some("sha256:abc123".to_string()),
1309 };
1310 let json = serde_json::to_string(&resp).unwrap();
1311 assert!(json.contains("progress"));
1312 }
1313
1314 #[test]
1315 fn file_write_begin_roundtrips() {
1316 let req = AgentRequest::FileWriteBegin {
1317 path: "/tmp/target".into(),
1318 mode: Some(0o600),
1319 total_size: 123_456_789,
1320 };
1321 let bytes = encode_message(&req).unwrap();
1322 let back: AgentRequest = decode_message(&bytes).unwrap();
1323 match back {
1324 AgentRequest::FileWriteBegin {
1325 path,
1326 mode,
1327 total_size,
1328 } => {
1329 assert_eq!(path, "/tmp/target");
1330 assert_eq!(mode, Some(0o600));
1331 assert_eq!(total_size, 123_456_789);
1332 }
1333 _ => panic!("wrong variant"),
1334 }
1335 }
1336
1337 #[test]
1338 fn file_write_chunk_roundtrips_binary_data() {
1339 // Binary data (bytes outside UTF-8) must survive the base64
1340 // trip intact. If the encoding ever silently lossifies, this
1341 // fires.
1342 let payload: Vec<u8> = (0u8..=255).collect();
1343 let req = AgentRequest::FileWriteChunk {
1344 data: payload.clone(),
1345 done: true,
1346 };
1347 let bytes = encode_message(&req).unwrap();
1348 let back: AgentRequest = decode_message(&bytes).unwrap();
1349 match back {
1350 AgentRequest::FileWriteChunk { data, done } => {
1351 assert_eq!(data, payload);
1352 assert!(done);
1353 }
1354 _ => panic!("wrong variant"),
1355 }
1356 }
1357
1358 #[test]
1359 fn file_write_size_constants_are_frame_safe() {
1360 // Sanity: a single streaming chunk at FILE_WRITE_CHUNK_SIZE
1361 // must fit inside MAX_FRAME_SIZE after base64 (+ ~33%) and
1362 // JSON overhead. If anyone bumps CHUNK_SIZE past the limit,
1363 // this test fires before production does.
1364 let chunk_bytes = FILE_WRITE_CHUNK_SIZE as u64;
1365 let base64_bytes = chunk_bytes.div_ceil(3) * 4; // ceil(n/3)*4
1366 let json_overhead = 256u64; // method tag, done bool, quotes
1367 let total = base64_bytes + json_overhead;
1368 assert!(
1369 total < MAX_FRAME_SIZE as u64,
1370 "FILE_WRITE_CHUNK_SIZE of {} bytes would produce a frame \
1371 of ~{} bytes which exceeds MAX_FRAME_SIZE of {}",
1372 chunk_bytes,
1373 total,
1374 MAX_FRAME_SIZE
1375 );
1376
1377 // Single-shot threshold must be <= chunk size. They can be
1378 // equal (a 1 MiB file is a single shot; a 1 MiB + 1 byte
1379 // file streams as two chunks); but SINGLE_SHOT > CHUNK would
1380 // be incoherent — a file slightly over the shot threshold
1381 // would need to stream as... a single oversized chunk.
1382 assert!(FILE_WRITE_SINGLE_SHOT_MAX <= FILE_WRITE_CHUNK_SIZE);
1383 }
1384
1385 #[test]
1386 fn test_ports_constants() {
1387 assert_eq!(ports::WORKLOAD_CONTROL, 5000);
1388 assert_eq!(ports::WORKLOAD_LOGS, 5001);
1389 assert_eq!(ports::AGENT_CONTROL, 6000);
1390 assert_eq!(ports::SSH_AGENT, 6001);
1391 }
1392
1393 #[test]
1394 fn test_cid_constants() {
1395 assert_eq!(cid::HOST, 2);
1396 assert_eq!(cid::GUEST, 3);
1397 }
1398
1399 #[test]
1400 fn test_envelope_serialization_with_trace_id() {
1401 let req = AgentRequest::Ping;
1402 let envelope = Envelope::with_trace_id(&req, Some("abc123".to_string()));
1403 let json = serde_json::to_string(&envelope).unwrap();
1404
1405 // trace_id should be flattened alongside the method tag
1406 assert!(json.contains("\"trace_id\":\"abc123\""));
1407 assert!(json.contains("\"method\":\"ping\""));
1408
1409 // Deserialize back — Envelope<AgentRequest> with flatten
1410 let parsed: Envelope<AgentRequest> = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
1411 assert_eq!(parsed.trace_id.as_deref(), Some("abc123"));
1412 assert!(matches!(parsed.body, AgentRequest::Ping));
1413 }
1414
1415 #[test]
1416 fn test_envelope_without_trace_id() {
1417 let req = AgentRequest::Ping;
1418 let envelope = Envelope::new(&req);
1419 let json = serde_json::to_string(&envelope).unwrap();
1420
1421 // No trace_id field (skip_serializing_if = None)
1422 assert!(!json.contains("trace_id"));
1423 assert!(json.contains("\"method\":\"ping\""));
1424 }
1425
1426 #[test]
1427 fn test_envelope_backward_compat_bare_request() {
1428 // A bare AgentRequest (no Envelope) should fail to parse as Envelope
1429 // but succeed as bare AgentRequest — this is the agent's fallback path
1430 let bare_json = r#"{"method":"ping"}"#;
1431
1432 // Envelope parse should fail (no body field to flatten into)
1433 // Actually with flatten, this may work — let's verify
1434 let envelope_result = serde_json::from_str::<Envelope<AgentRequest>>(bare_json);
1435 let bare_result = serde_json::from_str::<AgentRequest>(bare_json);
1436
1437 // At least one must succeed for backward compat
1438 assert!(
1439 envelope_result.is_ok() || bare_result.is_ok(),
1440 "Neither Envelope nor bare parse succeeded"
1441 );
1442
1443 // Bare parse must always work
1444 assert!(bare_result.is_ok());
1445 assert!(matches!(bare_result.unwrap(), AgentRequest::Ping));
1446
1447 // If Envelope works, trace_id should be None
1448 if let Ok(env) = envelope_result {
1449 assert!(env.trace_id.is_none());
1450 }
1451 }
1452}