sequoia_openpgp/packet/pkesk/v6.rs
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//! PublicKey-Encrypted Session Key packets version 6.
//!
//! The session key is needed to decrypt the actual ciphertext. See
//! [Version 6 Public Key Encrypted Session Key Packet Format] for
//! details.
//!
//! [Version 6 Public Key Encrypted Session Key Packet Format]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580.html#name-version-6-public-key-encryp
#[cfg(test)]
use quickcheck::{Arbitrary, Gen};
use crate::packet::key;
use crate::packet::Key;
use crate::Fingerprint;
use crate::crypto::Decryptor;
use crate::crypto::mpi::Ciphertext;
use crate::Packet;
use crate::PublicKeyAlgorithm;
use crate::Result;
use crate::SymmetricAlgorithm;
use crate::crypto::SessionKey;
use crate::packet;
/// Holds an asymmetrically encrypted session key.
///
/// The session key is needed to decrypt the actual ciphertext. See
/// [Version 6 Public Key Encrypted Session Key Packet Format] for
/// details.
///
/// [Version 6 Public Key Encrypted Session Key Packet Format]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580.html#name-version-6-public-key-encryp
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct PKESK6 {
/// CTB header fields.
pub(crate) common: packet::Common,
/// Fingerprint of the key this is encrypted to.
///
/// If the value is `None`, the recipient has not been specified
/// by the sender to decrease metadata leakage.
recipient: Option<Fingerprint>,
/// Public key algorithm used to encrypt the session key.
pk_algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm,
/// The encrypted session key.
esk: Ciphertext,
}
assert_send_and_sync!(PKESK6);
impl PKESK6 {
/// Creates a new PKESK6 packet.
pub fn new(recipient: Option<Fingerprint>, pk_algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm,
encrypted_session_key: Ciphertext)
-> Result<PKESK6>
{
Ok(PKESK6 {
common: Default::default(),
recipient,
pk_algo,
esk: encrypted_session_key,
})
}
/// Creates a new PKESK6 packet for the given recipient.
///
/// The given symmetric algorithm must match the algorithm that is
/// used to encrypt the payload.
pub fn for_recipient<P, R>(session_key: &SessionKey,
recipient: &Key<P, R>)
-> Result<PKESK6>
where
P: key::KeyParts,
R: key::KeyRole,
{
// ElGamal is phased out in RFC 9580.
#[allow(deprecated)]
if recipient.pk_algo() == PublicKeyAlgorithm::ElGamalEncrypt
|| recipient.pk_algo() == PublicKeyAlgorithm::ElGamalEncryptSign
{
return Err(crate::Error::InvalidOperation(
"MUST NOT encrypt with version 6 ElGamal keys".into())
.into());
}
Ok(PKESK6 {
common: Default::default(),
recipient: Some(recipient.fingerprint()),
pk_algo: recipient.pk_algo(),
esk: packet::PKESK::encrypt_common(
None, session_key,
recipient.parts_as_unspecified().role_as_unspecified())?,
})
}
/// Gets the recipient.
pub fn recipient(&self) -> Option<&Fingerprint> {
self.recipient.as_ref()
}
/// Sets the recipient.
pub fn set_recipient(&mut self, recipient: Option<Fingerprint>)
-> Option<Fingerprint> {
std::mem::replace(&mut self.recipient, recipient)
}
/// Gets the public key algorithm.
pub fn pk_algo(&self) -> PublicKeyAlgorithm {
self.pk_algo
}
/// Sets the public key algorithm.
pub fn set_pk_algo(&mut self, algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm)
-> PublicKeyAlgorithm {
std::mem::replace(&mut self.pk_algo, algo)
}
/// Gets the encrypted session key.
pub fn esk(&self) -> &Ciphertext {
&self.esk
}
/// Sets the encrypted session key.
pub fn set_esk(&mut self, esk: Ciphertext) -> Ciphertext {
std::mem::replace(&mut self.esk, esk)
}
/// Decrypts the encrypted session key.
///
/// If the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the message is
/// known in advance, it should be given as argument. This allows
/// us to reduce the side-channel leakage of the decryption
/// operation for RSA.
///
/// Returns the session key and symmetric algorithm used to
/// encrypt the following payload.
///
/// Returns `None` on errors. This prevents leaking information
/// to an attacker, which could lead to compromise of secret key
/// material with certain algorithms (RSA). See [Avoiding Leaks
/// from PKCS#1 Errors].
///
/// [Avoiding Leaks from PKCS#1 Errors]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580.html#name-avoiding-leaks-from-pkcs1-e
pub fn decrypt(&self, decryptor: &mut dyn Decryptor,
sym_algo_hint: Option<SymmetricAlgorithm>)
-> Option<SessionKey>
{
self.decrypt_insecure(decryptor, sym_algo_hint).ok()
}
fn decrypt_insecure(&self, decryptor: &mut dyn Decryptor,
sym_algo_hint: Option<SymmetricAlgorithm>)
-> Result<SessionKey>
{
packet::PKESK::decrypt_common(&self.esk, decryptor, sym_algo_hint, false)
.map(|(_sym_algo, key)| key)
}
}
impl From<PKESK6> for packet::PKESK {
fn from(p: PKESK6) -> Self {
packet::PKESK::V6(p)
}
}
impl From<PKESK6> for Packet {
fn from(p: PKESK6) -> Self {
Packet::PKESK(p.into())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
impl Arbitrary for PKESK6 {
fn arbitrary(g: &mut Gen) -> Self {
let (ciphertext, pk_algo) = loop {
let ciphertext = Ciphertext::arbitrary(g);
if let Some(pk_algo) = ciphertext.pk_algo() {
break (ciphertext, pk_algo);
}
};
PKESK6::new(bool::arbitrary(g).then(|| Fingerprint::arbitrary_v6(g)),
pk_algo, ciphertext).unwrap()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::parse::Parse;
use crate::serialize::MarshalInto;
quickcheck! {
fn roundtrip(p: PKESK6) -> bool {
let q = PKESK6::from_bytes(&p.to_vec().unwrap()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(p, q);
true
}
}
}