Expand description
Core library behind sefy: a personal secret store that lives in one unremarkable file.
A vault is a SQLite database sealed whole with XChaCha20-Poly1305 under a
key derived from a master password with Argon2id. The file on disk is
salt ‖ nonce ‖ ciphertext — no magic bytes, no header, no extension
convention, nothing to mark it as a secret store.
§Threat model
sefy is inconspicuous, not deniable. It hides secrets from a passing glance, a curious file listing and a cloud-side scanner looking for known formats. It does not claim to withstand forensic analysis — a high-entropy headerless file is recognizable as some container to an examiner — nor to protect anyone compelled to give up a password.
§Example
use sefy_core::{ItemKind, NewItem, Payload, Query, Vault};
let mut vault = Vault::create(&path, b"master password")?;
let id = vault.add(
NewItem::new("bank", Payload::Note { text: "vault code 1234".into() })
.with_tags(["money"]),
)?;
vault.save()?;
let reopened = Vault::open(&path, b"master password")?;
let found = reopened.search(&Query::all().text("bank").kind(ItemKind::Note))?;
assert_eq!(found[0].id, id);Re-exports§
pub use audit::Due;pub use audit::Old;pub use audit::Place;pub use audit::Report;pub use audit::Unreadable;pub use audit::Weak;pub use audit::audit;pub use error::Error;pub use error::Result;pub use exchange::EXPORT_VERSION;pub use exchange::Export;pub use exchange::ExportField;pub use exchange::ExportItem;pub use exchange::ExportReport;pub use exchange::ExportStamp;pub use exchange::ExportVersion;pub use exchange::Exported;pub use exchange::Format;pub use exchange::ImportReport;pub use exchange::Notice;pub use exchange::Outcome;pub use exchange::Target;pub use expiry::Expiry;pub use format::FORMAT_VERSION;pub use format::SEALING;pub use format::Sealing;pub use generate::Classes;pub use generate::Generated;pub use generate::Language;pub use generate::Recipe;pub use generate::generate;pub use history::Change;pub use history::ChangeKind;pub use history::Line;pub use history::Version;pub use keys::FreshKey;pub use keys::KeySource;pub use keys::Opener;pub use merge::Conflict;pub use merge::MergeReport;pub use merge::MergedItem;pub use merge::Side;pub use merge::merge;pub use model::AuditAs;pub use model::Field;pub use model::FieldSpec;pub use model::Item;pub use model::ItemKind;pub use model::ItemSummary;pub use model::LEGACY_LOGIN_NAME;pub use model::NewItem;pub use model::Payload;pub use model::Query;pub use model::Template;pub use otp::Totp;pub use plugin::PROTOCOL_VERSION;pub use plugin::Plugin;pub use policy::Policy;pub use strength::Strength;pub use strength::estimate;pub use strength::estimate_generated;pub use sync::Fetched;pub use sync::PullReport;pub use sync::SyncPreview;pub use sync::SyncReport;pub use sync::fetch;pub use sync::pull;pub use sync::push;pub use sync::sync;pub use vault::PasswordChange;pub use vault::Stats;pub use vault::Status;pub use vault::SyncStamp;pub use vault::Vault;pub use wipe::Wiped;
Modules§
- audit
- What in a vault deserves a second look: passwords that are weak, reused or unchanged for years, secrets kept twice, and records past or near the day they stop working.
- clipboard
- How a secret goes onto the clipboard, and how long it stays there.
- copies
- Copies of a vault kept beside it before a change brought in from elsewhere.
- crypto
- Password-based authenticated encryption for the vault blob.
- db
- The database living inside the encrypted blob.
- device
- The name of the machine sefy runs on, for the versions it writes.
- error
- What can go wrong, phrased so that no message carries secret material.
- exchange
- Moving a vault’s contents in and out: sefy’s own JSON, and the files other password managers and browsers read and write.
- expiry
- When a record stops working: the
expiresfield. - format
- On-disk layout of a vault file.
- generate
- Generating new secrets: random passwords, pronounceable ones and passphrases.
- history
- Earlier contents of an item, and what changed between two of them.
- keys
- Who turns a salt into a key.
- merge
- Folding one vault into another.
- model
- What a vault holds: notes, structured records and file attachments, each tagged.
- otp
- One-time passwords (RFC 6238): the key a site hands over when two-factor sign-in is turned on, and the short code it asks for afterwards.
- plugin
- Transports that move a vault file between this machine and somewhere else.
- policy
- How long what a vault lets out stays out: how long it stays unlocked with nobody using it, and how long a copied secret stays on the clipboard.
- strength
- How hard a password would be to guess, estimated offline with zxcvbn.
- sync
- Moving a vault between this machine and a remote, through a transport.
- time
- Calendar arithmetic: Unix seconds to a date and back.
- vault
- The vault: an encrypted file, its in-memory database, and the operations that move data between them.
- wipe
- Destroying a vault on purpose: its file, the copies kept beside it, and any write a crash left unfinished.