seer_core/

lookup.rs

use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::Ipv6Addr;
use std::str::FromStr;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, Weak};
use std::time::Duration;

use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::sync::LazyLock;
use tokio::sync::Notify;
use tracing::{debug, instrument, warn};

use tokio::time::timeout as tokio_timeout;

use crate::availability::{
    classify_fallback, AvailabilityChecker, AvailabilityResult, Fallback, PriorRdap, PriorWhois,
};
use crate::cache::TtlCache;
use crate::dns::{DelegationChecker, DnsNameservers, DnsPresence, DnsResolver};
use crate::error::{Result, SeerError};
use crate::rdap::{RdapClient, RdapResponse};
use crate::whois::{get_registry_url, get_tld, WhoisClient, WhoisResponse};

/// Cache TTL for lookup results (5 minutes).
const LOOKUP_CACHE_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5 * 60);

/// Grace period for the second protocol after the first one finishes *with
/// usable data*. If RDAP answers and WHOIS hasn't responded within this
/// window (or vice versa), we use the answer in hand rather than waiting the
/// loser's full timeout. A winner that failed — or returned an unusable
/// body — grants no such truncation: the other leg is then the only possible
/// source of registry data and runs to its own bounded completion (see
/// [`race_with_grace`]).
const PROTOCOL_GRACE_PERIOD: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);

/// Maximum length for public-facing error strings.
const MAX_PUBLIC_ERROR_LEN: usize = 256;

/// Upper bound on one wait of a coalesced waiter on the owner's in-flight
/// lookup. When it elapses the waiter re-checks the cache and then the
/// in-flight map: an owner still running keeps its entry, so the waiter just
/// waits another round, and only a vanished owner (its guard dropped without a
/// cached result) lets it take over. The bound therefore need not cover a full
/// lookup — which, with WHOIS/RDAP retries, referral hops and the
/// availability fallback, can run well past a minute; it only caps how long a
/// lost notification can delay a waiter.
const DEFAULT_INFLIGHT_WAIT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);

/// Global cache for lookup results to avoid redundant network calls.
static LOOKUP_CACHE: LazyLock<TtlCache<String, LookupResult>> =
    LazyLock::new(|| TtlCache::new(LOOKUP_CACHE_TTL));

/// In-flight lookup coalescing map: normalized-domain -> `Weak<Notify>`.
/// Only one network race runs per unique domain at a time; concurrent callers
/// wait on the shared Notify and then read the result from LOOKUP_CACHE.
static LOOKUP_INFLIGHT: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, Weak<Notify>>>> =
    LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));

// Regex patterns for stripping IP literals from public error messages.
static_regex! {
    IPV4_RE = r"\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b";

    /// Candidate pattern for IPv6 literals: a hex/colon token containing either
    /// a `::` compression or at least three colons. This catches plausible IPv6
    /// addresses cheaply; each match is then validated by `Ipv6Addr::from_str`
    /// before redaction, so MAC fragments, hex hashes, and similar colon-laden
    /// tokens are left alone.
    IPV6_CANDIDATE_RE = r"\b[0-9a-fA-F:]*(?:::|(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){3,})[0-9a-fA-F:]*\b";
}

/// Redact substrings that parse as valid IPv6 addresses, leaving non-IPv6
/// tokens (e.g. `af:ba:12`) untouched.
fn strip_ipv6(msg: &str) -> String {
    IPV6_CANDIDATE_RE
        .replace_all(msg, |caps: &regex::Captures| {
            let candidate = &caps[0];
            if Ipv6Addr::from_str(candidate).is_ok() {
                "[ip-redacted]".to_string()
            } else {
                candidate.to_string()
            }
        })
        .into_owned()
}

/// Test-only hook: counts the number of times `lookup_concurrent` is actually
/// invoked (i.e., the underlying network race runs). Used to verify request
/// coalescing. Not exposed outside the crate.
#[cfg(test)]
static LOOKUP_CONCURRENT_CALLS: LazyLock<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize> =
    LazyLock::new(|| std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));

/// TTL for *degraded* lookup results: verdicts derived from DNS presence or
/// a registry refusal, and WHOIS records without registration data, rather
/// than from registry data (see [`is_degraded_result`]). Short so a transient rate limit or outage isn't
/// served back for the full [`LOOKUP_CACHE_TTL`], yet non-zero so coalesced
/// waiters (which read the owner's result from the cache) and bulk
/// duplicates still share one network race.
const DEGRADED_LOOKUP_CACHE_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);

/// Whether a lookup result is a stand-in for registry data we failed to get:
/// an inconclusive verdict, one inferred from DNS presence (`dns_present` —
/// "retry shortly for full detail" — and `dns_nxdomain`), or a WHOIS record
/// with no registration data (a thin body kept because RDAP failed or
/// returned an empty 200). Such results are cached only briefly.
fn is_degraded_result(result: &LookupResult) -> bool {
    match result {
        LookupResult::Available { data, .. } => matches!(
            data.method.as_str(),
            "inconclusive" | "dns_present" | "dns_nxdomain"
        ),
        LookupResult::Whois { data, .. } => data.is_thin(),
        LookupResult::Rdap { .. } => false,
    }
}

/// Builds the `Available` variant for the routes of
/// [`SmartLookup::lookup_concurrent`] that hold a WHOIS response. Every such
/// route goes through here so none can forget to sanitize the public RDAP
/// error string.
fn available_with_whois(
    avail: AvailabilityResult,
    rdap_error: &str,
    whois_data: WhoisResponse,
) -> LookupResult {
    LookupResult::Available {
        data: Box::new(avail),
        rdap_error: sanitize_error_for_public(rdap_error),
        whois_error: String::new(),
        whois_data: Some(whois_data),
    }
}

/// Returns true if an RDAP response carries enough data to serve as the
/// primary lookup result: the domain name plus at least one other piece of
/// information (dates, entities, nameservers, or status).
fn rdap_response_is_useful(response: &RdapResponse) -> bool {
    let has_name = response.ldh_name.is_some() || response.unicode_name.is_some();
    let has_dates = response
        .events
        .iter()
        .any(|e| e.event_action == "registration" || e.event_action == "expiration");
    let has_entities = !response.entities.is_empty();
    let has_nameservers = !response.nameservers.is_empty();
    let has_status = !response.status.is_empty();

    has_name && (has_dates || has_entities || has_nameservers || has_status)
}

/// Race predicate for the WHOIS leg of [`race_with_grace`]: only a response
/// carrying real registration data counts as "data in hand" for
/// grace-truncation purposes. A thin body — e.g. an Identity-Digital-style
/// "no WHOIS service" sentinel, or a "no match" banner — must not cut a
/// viable in-flight RDAP query down to the grace period: RDAP is then the
/// only possible source of registry data, and for "no match" bodies a late
/// RDAP 200 must remain able to veto the availability claim (v0.26.6 rule).
/// Mirrors the RDAP-side [`rdap_response_is_useful`] gate; thinness is
/// [`WhoisResponse::is_thin`], the same signal the fallback ladders use.
fn whois_leg_has_data(w: &Result<WhoisResponse>) -> bool {
    matches!(w, Ok(data) if !data.is_thin())
}

/// The availability reading of a WHOIS answer when RDAP did not answer
/// usefully. An RDAP HTTP 200 — even with a thin body — proves the domain
/// object exists, so it vetoes every WHOIS- or DNS-derived "available"
/// (WHOIS lags freshly provisioned domains; v0.26.6 rule) and the record is
/// kept. Otherwise the answer is [`classify_fallback`]'s — the same ladder
/// [`AvailabilityChecker`] uses, so the two paths cannot diverge.
/// `rdap_err` is `None` for a grace-truncated RDAP leg.
fn whois_leg_fallback(
    domain: &str,
    rdap_returned_200: bool,
    rdap_err: Option<&SeerError>,
    whois: &WhoisResponse,
) -> Fallback {
    if rdap_returned_200 {
        return Fallback::Registered;
    }
    classify_fallback(domain, rdap_err, Ok(whois))
}

/// Progress line for an availability verdict reached with WHOIS in hand.
fn verdict_progress(avail: &AvailabilityResult) -> &'static str {
    match avail.method.as_str() {
        "registrable_parent" => "Name is below a registrable domain (checked its parent)",
        "inconclusive" => "Registry gave no usable answer (availability inconclusive)",
        "dns_present" => "Domain is registered (registry detail unavailable)",
        "dns_nxdomain" => "Domain appears unregistered (no DNS presence)",
        _ if avail.available => "Domain appears unregistered",
        _ => "Domain is registered",
    }
}

/// Sanitizes an error message for inclusion in a public-facing response.
///
/// Strips IPv4 and IPv6 literals (to avoid leaking internal addresses when
/// an SSRF guard rejects a resolved URL) and caps the total length to
/// [`MAX_PUBLIC_ERROR_LEN`] characters.
fn sanitize_error_for_public(msg: &str) -> String {
    let s = IPV4_RE.replace_all(msg, "[ip-redacted]");
    let s = strip_ipv6(&s);
    if s.chars().count() > MAX_PUBLIC_ERROR_LEN {
        let mut trunc: String = s.chars().take(MAX_PUBLIC_ERROR_LEN).collect();
        trunc.push('…');
        trunc
    } else {
        s
    }
}

/// RAII guard for the in-flight-lookup slot. On drop, removes the entry
/// from `LOOKUP_INFLIGHT` and notifies any waiters so they can read the
/// freshly-populated cache.
///
/// NOTE on failed-owner retry semantics:
/// When the owning task's lookup fails, `InflightGuard::drop` runs, the
/// `HashMap` entry is removed, and `notify_waiters()` fires. Waiters wake,
/// observe an empty cache, and one of them becomes the new owner — triggering
/// a fresh network race. This means transient failures are automatically
/// retried by any concurrent waiter. Callers that observe a timeout error
/// should not assume no work is in flight; another concurrent caller may
/// already be retrying.
struct InflightGuard {
    key: String,
    notify: Arc<Notify>,
}

impl Drop for InflightGuard {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        // Always remove the entry before notifying. The earlier `try_lock`
        // design skipped removal under contention, but that left a stale
        // `Weak<Notify>` in the map: a caller arriving in the brief window
        // between `notify_waiters()` firing and the owner's `Arc<Notify>`
        // dropping could upgrade the Weak, register as a waiter on the
        // already-fired Notify, and block forever (notify_waiters only
        // wakes currently-registered waiters; it does not accumulate
        // permits for later registrations).
        //
        // Contention windows on this `std::sync::Mutex<HashMap>` are
        // microseconds — the brief block here is safer than the stale-entry
        // hazard. Poisoned-mutex recovery is preserved.
        let mut inflight = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
        inflight.remove(&self.key);
        drop(inflight);
        self.notify.notify_waiters();
    }
}

/// Outcome of one leg of the concurrent RDAP/WHOIS race.
///
/// Tracks whether the leg completed naturally or was truncated by the grace
/// period, so downstream error messages can distinguish a true timeout from a
/// loser-truncation.
enum LegOutcome<T> {
    /// The leg ran to its own completion (success or error).
    Completed(T),
    /// The leg was abandoned because the other protocol answered first with
    /// usable data and this leg did not finish within
    /// [`PROTOCOL_GRACE_PERIOD`] of that answer.
    GraceTruncated,
}

/// Races the RDAP and WHOIS legs of a smart lookup.
///
/// Whichever leg finishes first is inspected with its `*_has_data` predicate:
///
/// * Winner brought usable data → the still-running leg is merely
///   supplementary, so it gets [`PROTOCOL_GRACE_PERIOD`] to finish before
///   being truncated.
/// * Winner came back empty-handed (an error, or a response the caller's
///   predicate rejects) → the other leg is now the only possible source of
///   registry data, so it runs to its own (already timeout-bounded)
///   completion. This matters for RDAP-less TLDs such as .ru: the bootstrap
///   miss fails in microseconds and must not shave the WHOIS budget down to
///   the grace period. It also avoids pure waste — a truncated leg was
///   re-queried in full by the availability fallback anyway.
async fn race_with_grace<R, W>(
    rdap_fut: impl std::future::Future<Output = R>,
    whois_fut: impl std::future::Future<Output = W>,
    rdap_has_data: impl Fn(&R) -> bool,
    whois_has_data: impl Fn(&W) -> bool,
) -> (LegOutcome<R>, LegOutcome<W>) {
    tokio::pin!(rdap_fut);
    tokio::pin!(whois_fut);

    tokio::select! {
        rdap_res = &mut rdap_fut => {
            let whois_leg = if rdap_has_data(&rdap_res) {
                match tokio_timeout(PROTOCOL_GRACE_PERIOD, whois_fut).await {
                    Ok(res) => LegOutcome::Completed(res),
                    Err(_) => LegOutcome::GraceTruncated,
                }
            } else {
                LegOutcome::Completed(whois_fut.await)
            };
            (LegOutcome::Completed(rdap_res), whois_leg)
        }
        whois_res = &mut whois_fut => {
            let rdap_leg = if whois_has_data(&whois_res) {
                match tokio_timeout(PROTOCOL_GRACE_PERIOD, rdap_fut).await {
                    Ok(res) => LegOutcome::Completed(res),
                    Err(_) => LegOutcome::GraceTruncated,
                }
            } else {
                LegOutcome::Completed(rdap_fut.await)
            };
            (rdap_leg, LegOutcome::Completed(whois_res))
        }
    }
}

/// Public-facing error string for a grace-truncated leg. Truncation only
/// happens when the other protocol answered first with usable data (see
/// [`race_with_grace`]), so the wording says the winner "answered" — the old
/// "after RDAP won" phrasing misled when the winner had merely finished first
/// with an error.
fn grace_truncated_error(truncated: &str, winner: &str) -> String {
    format!(
        "{} did not respond within the {}s grace period after {} answered",
        truncated,
        PROTOCOL_GRACE_PERIOD.as_secs(),
        winner
    )
}

/// Internal classification of the RDAP leg of a concurrent lookup.
///
/// Distinguishing `NoData` (HTTP 200 but response was missing useful fields)
/// from `Error` lets the orchestrator prefer a thin WHOIS result over the
/// availability fallback when RDAP silently returned nothing.
enum RdapOutcome {
    Useful(RdapResponse),
    NoData(RdapResponse),
    Error(SeerError),
    /// RDAP future did not complete within the grace period after WHOIS
    /// answered with a response.
    GraceTimeout,
}

/// Progress callback for smart lookup operations.
/// Called with a message describing the current phase of the lookup.
pub type LookupProgressCallback = Arc<dyn Fn(&str) + Send + Sync>;

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "source", rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum LookupResult {
    Rdap {
        data: Box<RdapResponse>,
        #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
        whois_fallback: Option<WhoisResponse>,
    },
    Whois {
        data: WhoisResponse,
        rdap_error: Option<String>,
        #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
        rdap_fallback: Option<Box<RdapResponse>>,
        /// The live parent-zone delegation checked against WHOIS's
        /// nameservers, when RDAP had no record to cross-check against (see
        /// [`DnsNameservers`]). Absent when the DNS query failed.
        #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
        dns_nameservers: Option<DnsNameservers>,
    },
    Available {
        data: Box<AvailabilityResult>,
        rdap_error: String,
        whois_error: String,
        /// Raw WHOIS response, when one was available at routing time
        /// (Cases A and B in the design spec). `None` preserves the
        /// pre-existing "both protocols errored" semantics.
        #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
        whois_data: Option<WhoisResponse>,
    },
}

impl LookupResult {
    /// The protocol whose record this result carries — `"RDAP"` or
    /// `"WHOIS"` — or `None` for an availability verdict (neither registry
    /// had the domain). Callers pick their own fallback text.
    pub fn protocol(&self) -> Option<&'static str> {
        match self {
            LookupResult::Rdap { .. } => Some("RDAP"),
            LookupResult::Whois { .. } => Some("WHOIS"),
            LookupResult::Available { .. } => None,
        }
    }

    /// Returns the domain name from the lookup result, in seer's normalized
    /// form (lowercase A-labels) whichever protocol answered: registries
    /// spell RDAP's `ldhName` in any case (`EXAMPLE.COM`) and some send only
    /// a `unicodeName`, while WHOIS and availability results already carry
    /// the normalized queried name.
    pub fn domain_name(&self) -> Option<String> {
        match self {
            LookupResult::Rdap { data, .. } => data.domain_name().map(normalize_rdap_name),
            LookupResult::Whois { data, .. } => Some(data.domain.clone()),
            LookupResult::Available { data, .. } => Some(data.domain.clone()),
        }
    }

    /// Reads one registration field: from RDAP with the attached WHOIS record
    /// as fallback, from WHOIS alone, or `None` for an availability verdict.
    fn rdap_or_whois<T>(
        &self,
        rdap: impl FnOnce(&RdapResponse) -> Option<T>,
        whois: impl FnOnce(&WhoisResponse) -> Option<T>,
    ) -> Option<T> {
        match self {
            LookupResult::Rdap {
                data,
                whois_fallback,
            } => rdap(data).or_else(|| whois_fallback.as_ref().and_then(whois)),
            LookupResult::Whois { data, .. } => whois(data),
            LookupResult::Available { .. } => None,
        }
    }

    /// Returns the registrar name, preferring RDAP data with WHOIS fallback.
    pub fn registrar(&self) -> Option<String> {
        self.rdap_or_whois(RdapResponse::get_registrar, |w| w.registrar.clone())
    }

    /// Returns the registrant organization, preferring RDAP data with WHOIS fallback.
    pub fn organization(&self) -> Option<String> {
        self.rdap_or_whois(RdapResponse::get_registrant_organization, |w| {
            w.organization.clone()
        })
    }

    /// Returns the creation date, preferring RDAP data with WHOIS fallback.
    pub fn creation_date(&self) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>> {
        self.rdap_or_whois(RdapResponse::creation_date, |w| w.creation_date)
    }

    /// Returns the expiration date, preferring RDAP data with WHOIS fallback.
    pub fn expiration_date(&self) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>> {
        self.rdap_or_whois(RdapResponse::expiration_date, |w| w.expiration_date)
    }

    /// Returns true if the result came from RDAP.
    pub fn is_rdap(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, LookupResult::Rdap { .. })
    }

    /// Returns true if the result came from WHOIS.
    pub fn is_whois(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, LookupResult::Whois { .. })
    }

    /// Returns true if the result is an availability check fallback.
    pub fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, LookupResult::Available { .. })
    }

    /// Returns the expiration date and registrar info from the lookup result.
    pub fn expiration_info(&self) -> (Option<DateTime<Utc>>, Option<String>) {
        (self.expiration_date(), self.registrar())
    }
}

/// Normalizes a registry-reported RDAP domain name to seer's canonical
/// form: no trailing root dot, lowercase, A-labels.
fn normalize_rdap_name(name: &str) -> String {
    let name = name.trim_end_matches('.').to_lowercase();
    crate::validation::domain_to_ascii(&name).unwrap_or(name)
}

/// Truncates `s` to at most `max` bytes, backing up to the nearest UTF-8 char
/// boundary at or below `max`. `String::truncate` panics if the byte offset is
/// not a char boundary, and WHOIS `raw_response` is server-controlled and may
/// preserve multi-byte UTF-8, so we must not truncate blindly at a fixed byte
/// offset. (`str::floor_char_boundary` would do this, but it is unstable on
/// stable Rust, so we walk backwards manually.)
fn truncate_on_char_boundary(s: &mut String, max: usize) {
    if s.len() > max {
        let mut end = max;
        while end > 0 && !s.is_char_boundary(end) {
            end -= 1;
        }
        s.truncate(end);
    }
}

/// Trims an oversized WHOIS `raw_response` in place (char-boundary safe),
/// appending a truncation marker. A raw body can be up to 1 MB (the WHOIS
/// client's response cap); 32 KB is plenty for the parsed fields while
/// bounding memory wherever responses are retained — the lookup cache here
/// and the bulk executor's buffered results.
pub(crate) fn trim_whois_raw(whois: &mut WhoisResponse) {
    const MAX_RAW: usize = 32 * 1024;
    if whois.raw_response.len() > MAX_RAW {
        truncate_on_char_boundary(&mut whois.raw_response, MAX_RAW);
        whois.raw_response.push_str("\n... [truncated]");
    }
}

/// Trims any retained raw WHOIS body inside a [`LookupResult`] via
/// [`trim_whois_raw`]. Applied before caching lookups and by the bulk
/// executor before buffering results.
pub(crate) fn trim_raw_response(mut result: LookupResult) -> LookupResult {
    match result {
        LookupResult::Whois { ref mut data, .. } => trim_whois_raw(data),
        LookupResult::Rdap {
            ref mut whois_fallback,
            ..
        } => {
            if let Some(w) = whois_fallback {
                trim_whois_raw(w);
            }
        }
        LookupResult::Available {
            ref mut whois_data, ..
        } => {
            if let Some(w) = whois_data {
                trim_whois_raw(w);
            }
        }
    }

    result
}

/// Whether `result` is a WHOIS record with no RDAP record beside it — the
/// case [`SmartLookup`] cross-checks against the DNS delegation.
fn wants_dns_nameservers(result: &LookupResult) -> bool {
    matches!(
        result,
        LookupResult::Whois {
            rdap_fallback: None,
            ..
        }
    )
}

/// Attaches the delegation comparison to a result [`wants_dns_nameservers`]
/// accepts; any other result, or a failed DNS query, is returned unchanged.
fn with_dns_nameservers(mut result: LookupResult, delegated: Result<Vec<String>>) -> LookupResult {
    // Same shape as `wants_dns_nameservers`: a WHOIS record with no RDAP one.
    if let LookupResult::Whois {
        data,
        rdap_fallback: None,
        dns_nameservers,
        ..
    } = &mut result
    {
        match delegated {
            Ok(delegated) => {
                *dns_nameservers = Some(DnsNameservers::compare(&data.nameservers, delegated));
            }
            Err(e) => debug!(error = %e, "DNS delegation unavailable for the WHOIS cross-check"),
        }
    }
    result
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct SmartLookup {
    rdap_client: RdapClient,
    whois_client: WhoisClient,
    availability_checker: AvailabilityChecker,
    dns_resolver: DnsResolver,
    delegation_checker: DelegationChecker,
}

impl SmartLookup {
    /// Creates a new SmartLookup that runs RDAP and WHOIS concurrently,
    /// falling back to an availability check if both fail.
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self::default()
    }

    /// Builds a SmartLookup whose RDAP/WHOIS/DNS sub-clients honor the
    /// per-protocol timeouts in `config`.
    pub fn from_config(config: &crate::config::SeerConfig) -> Self {
        Self {
            rdap_client: RdapClient::from_config(config),
            whois_client: WhoisClient::from_config(config),
            availability_checker: AvailabilityChecker::from_config(config),
            dns_resolver: DnsResolver::from_config(config),
            delegation_checker: DelegationChecker::from_config(config),
        }
    }

    /// Performs a smart lookup for a domain, trying both RDAP and WHOIS concurrently.
    /// Falls back to an availability check if both fail.
    /// Results are cached for 5 minutes to avoid redundant network calls
    /// (30 seconds for degraded, DNS-inferred or inconclusive verdicts).
    #[instrument(skip(self), fields(domain = %domain))]
    pub async fn lookup(&self, domain: &str) -> Result<LookupResult> {
        self.lookup_with_progress(domain, None).await
    }

    /// Performs a lookup with an optional progress callback.
    /// The callback is called with messages describing the current phase.
    /// Results are cached for 5 minutes (30 seconds for degraded verdicts).
    /// Concurrent lookups for the same domain are coalesced — only one
    /// network race runs per domain at a time.
    #[instrument(skip(self, progress), fields(domain = %domain))]
    pub async fn lookup_with_progress(
        &self,
        domain: &str,
        progress: Option<LookupProgressCallback>,
    ) -> Result<LookupResult> {
        let normalized = crate::validation::normalize_domain(domain)?;

        // Check cache first
        if let Some(cached) = LOOKUP_CACHE.get(&normalized) {
            debug!(domain = %normalized, "Returning cached lookup result");
            return Ok(cached);
        }

        // Coalesce in-flight lookups: if another task is already running a
        // race for this domain, wait on its Notify rather than starting a
        // second race. Two branches:
        //   - Waiter: another task owns the slot; await its notify, then
        //     read the cache. If the cache is still empty (owner failed),
        //     loop and re-contend for ownership.
        //   - Owner: no entry exists; insert a Weak handle, hold the Arc
        //     for the duration of the work, then remove and notify on drop.
        //
        // Each iteration takes the map lock, then either claims ownership or
        // subscribes as a waiter *before* releasing it. The `MutexGuard` is
        // always dropped before any `.await`.
        let _guard = loop {
            let existing: Arc<Notify>;
            let notified = {
                // Recover from poisoning rather than panicking: a prior
                // owner's panic should not permanently wedge the in-flight
                // tracker for every future lookup.
                let mut inflight = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
                match inflight.get(&normalized).and_then(|w| w.upgrade()) {
                    Some(n) => existing = n,
                    None => {
                        let n = Arc::new(Notify::new());
                        inflight.insert(normalized.clone(), Arc::downgrade(&n));
                        break InflightGuard {
                            key: normalized.clone(),
                            notify: n,
                        };
                    }
                }
                // Subscribe while still holding the map lock. The owner's
                // `InflightGuard::drop` takes this same lock to remove the
                // entry before calling `notify_waiters()`, and a `Notified`
                // future receives `notify_waiters()` from the moment it is
                // created — so the notification cannot fire between us
                // finding the entry and subscribing. Subscribing after the
                // unlock left a gap in which a cancelled owner's
                // notification was lost and this waiter slept the full
                // `DEFAULT_INFLIGHT_WAIT`.
                existing.notified()
            };
            tokio::pin!(notified);
            // Also register eagerly as a waiter (before any await).
            notified.as_mut().enable();
            debug!(domain = %normalized, "Waiting for in-flight lookup to complete");

            // Re-check the cache now that we're subscribed: the owner may
            // already have populated it.
            if let Some(cached) = LOOKUP_CACHE.get(&normalized) {
                return Ok(cached);
            }

            // Bounded wait: if the owner's future hangs, or a notification is
            // otherwise lost, fall through and re-contend for ownership rather
            // than blocking forever.
            let _ = tokio_timeout(DEFAULT_INFLIGHT_WAIT, notified.as_mut()).await;

            if let Some(cached) = LOOKUP_CACHE.get(&normalized) {
                return Ok(cached);
            }
            // Owner finished without populating the cache (failed or
            // errored), or the wait timed out. Re-contend for ownership.
        };

        // Re-check the cache now that we own the slot: a previous owner may
        // have finished (populated the cache and released the slot) between
        // our first cache check and taking the lock, and running a second
        // full lookup for it would be pure waste. Returning drops `_guard`,
        // which releases any waiters to read the same cached value.
        if let Some(cached) = LOOKUP_CACHE.get(&normalized) {
            debug!(domain = %normalized, "Returning result cached by previous owner");
            return Ok(cached);
        }

        let result = self
            .lookup_concurrent(&normalized, progress.clone())
            .await?;
        let result = self
            .attach_dns_nameservers(&normalized, result, progress)
            .await;

        // Cache a trimmed copy to limit memory usage before releasing
        // waiters (via guard drop) so they observe the cached value. A
        // degraded verdict (no registry data) only gets a short TTL so the
        // next lookup soon retries the registries.
        let ttl = if is_degraded_result(&result) {
            DEGRADED_LOOKUP_CACHE_TTL
        } else {
            LOOKUP_CACHE_TTL
        };
        LOOKUP_CACHE.insert_with_ttl(normalized.clone(), trim_raw_response(result.clone()), ttl);

        Ok(result)
    }

    /// Adds the live parent-zone delegation to a WHOIS-sourced result that
    /// RDAP had no record for (see [`DnsNameservers`]). A DNS failure leaves
    /// it off: it is supplementary detail, never a reason to fail the lookup.
    async fn attach_dns_nameservers(
        &self,
        domain: &str,
        result: LookupResult,
        progress: Option<LookupProgressCallback>,
    ) -> LookupResult {
        if !wants_dns_nameservers(&result) {
            return result;
        }
        if let Some(ref cb) = progress {
            cb("Checking the DNS delegation");
        }
        let delegated = self.delegation_checker.delegated_ns(domain).await;
        with_dns_nameservers(result, delegated)
    }

    #[instrument(skip(self, progress), fields(domain = %domain))]
    async fn lookup_concurrent(
        &self,
        domain: &str,
        progress: Option<LookupProgressCallback>,
    ) -> Result<LookupResult> {
        #[cfg(test)]
        LOOKUP_CONCURRENT_CALLS.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);

        debug!(domain = %domain, "Attempting RDAP and WHOIS concurrently");

        if let Some(ref cb) = progress {
            cb("Querying RDAP and WHOIS concurrently");
        }

        let rdap_fut = self.rdap_client.lookup_domain(domain);
        let whois_fut = self.whois_client.lookup(domain);

        // Race: a winner with usable data grants the loser only a grace
        // period; a winner that failed (or returned an unusable body) leaves
        // the loser as the sole possible data source, so it runs to its own
        // bounded completion. Both predicates gate on usefulness — RDAP via
        // `rdap_response_is_useful`, WHOIS via `whois_leg_has_data`
        // (non-thin) — so neither side's empty answer can truncate the
        // other. See `race_with_grace`.
        let (rdap_leg, whois_leg) = race_with_grace(
            rdap_fut,
            whois_fut,
            |r| matches!(r, Ok(data) if rdap_response_is_useful(data)),
            whois_leg_has_data,
        )
        .await;

        if matches!(whois_leg, LegOutcome::GraceTruncated) {
            debug!("WHOIS did not finish within grace period after RDAP answered, proceeding with RDAP only");
        }
        if matches!(rdap_leg, LegOutcome::GraceTruncated) {
            debug!("RDAP did not finish within grace period after WHOIS answered, proceeding with WHOIS only");
        }

        // Classify the RDAP leg.
        let rdap_outcome = match rdap_leg {
            LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(data)) => {
                if rdap_response_is_useful(&data) {
                    RdapOutcome::Useful(data)
                } else {
                    RdapOutcome::NoData(data)
                }
            }
            LegOutcome::Completed(Err(e)) => RdapOutcome::Error(e),
            LegOutcome::GraceTruncated => RdapOutcome::GraceTimeout,
        };

        // Phase 1: If RDAP returned useful data, use it as primary.
        if let RdapOutcome::Useful(rdap_data) = rdap_outcome {
            debug!("RDAP lookup successful");
            let whois_fallback = match whois_leg {
                LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(w)) => Some(w),
                _ => None,
            };
            return Ok(LookupResult::Rdap {
                data: Box::new(rdap_data),
                whois_fallback,
            });
        }

        // RDAP was not useful (NoData, Error, or GraceTimeout). Prefer WHOIS
        // if it returned any response, even a thin one — this is safer than
        // falling back to the availability heuristic when we have actual
        // registry data in hand.
        //
        // We separately track whether RDAP returned an HTTP 200 (NoData):
        // even a thin RDAP 200 is positive evidence the domain object
        // exists. In that case we must NOT reclassify a WHOIS "no match"
        // signal as availability — WHOIS lag against a freshly-provisioned
        // domain would otherwise produce a false "available" verdict.
        let rdap_returned_200 = matches!(rdap_outcome, RdapOutcome::NoData(_));
        let (rdap_error_str, rdap_fallback_data, rdap_seer_error) = match rdap_outcome {
            RdapOutcome::Useful(_) => {
                // Unreachable in this branch (we returned above), but handle
                // defensively rather than panicking across the FFI boundary.
                debug!("Unexpected RdapOutcome::Useful in fallback branch");
                (String::from("RDAP ok"), None, None)
            }
            RdapOutcome::NoData(data) => (
                "RDAP response incomplete".to_string(),
                Some(Box::new(data)),
                None,
            ),
            RdapOutcome::Error(e) => (e.to_string(), None, Some(e)),
            RdapOutcome::GraceTimeout => (grace_truncated_error("RDAP", "WHOIS"), None, None),
        };

        if let LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(whois_data)) = whois_leg {
            // Read the WHOIS answer through the shared availability ladder.
            // The DNS probe runs only when the registry signals are silent,
            // so the common paths never pay for it.
            let fallback = whois_leg_fallback(
                domain,
                rdap_returned_200,
                rdap_seer_error.as_ref(),
                &whois_data,
            );
            let verdict = match fallback {
                Fallback::Registered => None,
                Fallback::Verdict(avail) => Some(avail),
                Fallback::NeedsDns(tie_break) => {
                    Some(tie_break.decide(self.dns_resolver.presence(domain).await))
                }
            };
            if let Some(avail) = verdict {
                debug!(
                    domain = %domain,
                    method = %avail.method,
                    confidence = %avail.confidence,
                    "Reading WHOIS leg as an availability verdict"
                );
                // A registry "no such domain" for a name below its
                // registrable domain (mail.google.com) is not availability.
                let avail = self.availability_checker.guard_subdomain_claim(avail).await;
                if let Some(ref cb) = progress {
                    cb(verdict_progress(&avail));
                }
                return Ok(available_with_whois(avail, &rdap_error_str, whois_data));
            }
            debug!("Using WHOIS result (RDAP not useful)");
            if let Some(ref cb) = progress {
                cb("RDAP not available (using WHOIS)");
            }
            return Ok(LookupResult::Whois {
                data: whois_data,
                rdap_error: Some(sanitize_error_for_public(&rdap_error_str)),
                rdap_fallback: rdap_fallback_data,
                dns_nameservers: None,
            });
        }

        // Both sides failed to provide useful data. Craft a precise WHOIS
        // error string that distinguishes true errors from grace-period
        // truncation. Borrow the leg here so we can move it into the reuse
        // token below.
        let whois_error_str = match &whois_leg {
            LegOutcome::Completed(Err(e)) => e.to_string(),
            LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(_)) => {
                // Already handled above; treat defensively.
                debug!("Unexpected completed-Ok WHOIS in availability fallback branch");
                "WHOIS returned but was not used".to_string()
            }
            // Unreachable under `race_with_grace` semantics: WHOIS is only
            // truncated behind a useful RDAP answer, and that path returned
            // early above. Kept as a defensive arm.
            LegOutcome::GraceTruncated => grace_truncated_error("WHOIS", "RDAP"),
        };

        // Reuse what the race already learned rather than re-querying the same
        // registries: a thin HTTP 200 still proves the object exists (feed it
        // back), a concrete error is reused as-is, and only a grace-truncated
        // leg (genuinely missing) is re-queried by the checker.
        let prior_rdap = if rdap_returned_200 {
            match rdap_fallback_data {
                // `rdap_fallback_data` is already the boxed NoData response.
                Some(resp) => PriorRdap::Response(resp),
                None => PriorRdap::Missing,
            }
        } else if let Some(e) = rdap_seer_error {
            PriorRdap::Failed(e)
        } else {
            PriorRdap::Missing
        };
        let prior_whois = match whois_leg {
            LegOutcome::Completed(Err(e)) => PriorWhois::Failed(e),
            // Handled above; the availability path never reuses an Ok WHOIS.
            LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(_)) => PriorWhois::Missing,
            LegOutcome::GraceTruncated => PriorWhois::Missing,
        };

        self.availability_fallback(
            domain,
            prior_rdap,
            prior_whois,
            rdap_error_str,
            whois_error_str,
            progress,
        )
        .await
    }

    async fn availability_fallback(
        &self,
        domain: &str,
        prior_rdap: PriorRdap,
        prior_whois: PriorWhois,
        rdap_error: String,
        whois_error: String,
        progress: Option<LookupProgressCallback>,
    ) -> Result<LookupResult> {
        if let Some(ref cb) = progress {
            cb("RDAP and WHOIS unavailable (checking availability)");
        }
        warn!(
            domain = %domain,
            rdap_error = %rdap_error,
            whois_error = %whois_error,
            "Both RDAP and WHOIS failed, falling back to availability check"
        );

        match self
            .availability_checker
            .check_with_prior(domain, prior_rdap, prior_whois)
            .await
        {
            Ok(avail) => Ok(LookupResult::Available {
                data: Box::new(avail),
                rdap_error: sanitize_error_for_public(&rdap_error),
                whois_error: sanitize_error_for_public(&whois_error),
                whois_data: None,
            }),
            Err(avail_err) => Err(SeerError::LookupFailed {
                domain: domain.to_string(),
                details: format!(
                    "RDAP failed ({}), WHOIS failed ({}), availability check failed ({})",
                    rdap_error, whois_error, avail_err
                ),
                registry_url: get_registry_url(get_tld(domain)),
            }),
        }
    }

    /// DNS presence passthrough over this lookup's private resolver, exposing
    /// the same cheap availability pre-signal the fallback ladder uses. The
    /// confusables scan uses it to skip NXDOMAIN candidates before paying for a
    /// full RDAP+WHOIS race on each one.
    pub(crate) async fn presence(&self, domain: &str) -> DnsPresence {
        self.dns_resolver.presence(domain).await
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::rdap::rdap_error_is_404;

    /// Global serialization mutex for the tests that share `LOOKUP_INFLIGHT`
    /// or `LOOKUP_CACHE` state (map coalescing, waiter coalescing, cache
    /// clear, poison recovery, drop recovery).
    /// Running them in parallel creates two races:
    ///   1. Guard drop uses `try_lock`; if another test holds the mutex, the
    ///      Drop path skips cleanup → stale entries fail later assertions.
    ///   2. Poisoning one test leaves the mutex poisoned for the next test,
    ///      which is handled by `unwrap_or_else` but still disturbs state.
    ///
    /// Per-test unique keys (see `unique_test_key`) prevent entry-level
    /// collisions; this mutex prevents lock-contention races on Drop.
    static INFLIGHT_TEST_SERIAL: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());

    #[test]
    fn test_lookup_result_domain_name_whois() {
        let result = LookupResult::Whois {
            data: WhoisResponse {
                domain: "example.com".to_string(),
                registrar: Some("Test Registrar".to_string()),
                whois_server: "whois.example.com".to_string(),
                ..Default::default()
            },
            rdap_error: None,
            rdap_fallback: None,
            dns_nameservers: None,
        };

        assert_eq!(result.domain_name(), Some("example.com".to_string()));
        assert_eq!(result.registrar(), Some("Test Registrar".to_string()));
        assert!(result.is_whois());
        assert!(!result.is_rdap());
        assert!(!result.is_available());
    }

    #[test]
    fn rdap_domain_name_is_normalized_like_the_other_protocols() {
        for (ldh, unicode) in [
            (Some("EXAMPLE.COM"), None),
            (Some("Example.Com."), None),
            (None, Some("пример.рф")),
        ] {
            let result = LookupResult::Rdap {
                data: Box::new(RdapResponse {
                    ldh_name: ldh.map(str::to_string),
                    unicode_name: unicode.map(str::to_string),
                    ..Default::default()
                }),
                whois_fallback: None,
            };
            let expected = if unicode.is_some() {
                "xn--e1afmkfd.xn--p1ai"
            } else {
                "example.com"
            };
            assert_eq!(result.domain_name().as_deref(), Some(expected));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_lookup_result_serialization() {
        let result = LookupResult::Whois {
            data: WhoisResponse {
                domain: "test.com".to_string(),
                ..Default::default()
            },
            rdap_error: Some("RDAP failed".to_string()),
            rdap_fallback: None,
            dns_nameservers: None,
        };

        let json = serde_json::to_string(&result).unwrap();
        assert!(json.contains("\"source\":\"whois\""));
        assert!(json.contains("RDAP failed"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_lookup_result_available_serialization() {
        let result = LookupResult::Available {
            data: Box::new(
                AvailabilityResult::new("test123.xyz", true, "medium", "dns_nxdomain")
                    .with_details("Registry lookups failed; domain has no DNS presence (NXDOMAIN)"),
            ),
            rdap_error: "RDAP failed".to_string(),
            whois_error: "WHOIS failed".to_string(),
            whois_data: None,
        };

        let json = serde_json::to_string(&result).unwrap();
        assert!(json.contains("\"source\":\"available\""));
        assert!(json.contains("\"available\":true"));
        assert!(json.contains("test123.xyz"));

        assert_eq!(result.domain_name(), Some("test123.xyz".to_string()));
        assert!(result.is_available());
        assert!(!result.is_rdap());
        assert!(!result.is_whois());
        assert!(result.registrar().is_none());
        assert_eq!(result.expiration_info(), (None, None));
    }

    // ---------------- trim_raw_response char-boundary safety ----------------

    #[test]
    fn truncate_on_char_boundary_does_not_panic_on_multibyte_straddle() {
        const MAX_RAW: usize = 32 * 1024;
        // Build a string longer than MAX_RAW with a 3-byte char straddling the
        // MAX_RAW byte offset: fill up to MAX_RAW-1 bytes of ASCII, then a
        // multi-byte char so byte MAX_RAW lands mid-character.
        let mut s = "a".repeat(MAX_RAW - 1);
        s.push('€'); // 3 bytes (E2 82 AC) — byte MAX_RAW is NOT a boundary
        s.push_str(&"b".repeat(100));
        assert!(!s.is_char_boundary(MAX_RAW));

        // Must not panic.
        truncate_on_char_boundary(&mut s, MAX_RAW);
        assert!(s.len() <= MAX_RAW);
        // Result is valid UTF-8 (String invariant upheld) — backed up below
        // the straddling char.
        assert_eq!(s.len(), MAX_RAW - 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn trim_raw_response_truncates_multibyte_whois_without_panic() {
        const MAX_RAW: usize = 32 * 1024;
        let mut raw = "a".repeat(MAX_RAW - 1);
        raw.push('€');
        raw.push_str(&"b".repeat(1000));

        let mut w = empty_whois("example.com");
        w.raw_response = raw;
        let result = trim_raw_response(LookupResult::Whois {
            data: w,
            rdap_error: None,
            rdap_fallback: None,
            dns_nameservers: None,
        });
        if let LookupResult::Whois { data, .. } = result {
            assert!(data.raw_response.ends_with("[truncated]"));
        } else {
            panic!("expected Whois variant");
        }
    }

    // ---------------- sanitize_error_for_public ----------------

    #[test]
    fn test_sanitize_strips_ipv4() {
        let msg = "RDAP URL resolves to reserved IP 10.0.0.1 which is forbidden";
        let sanitized = sanitize_error_for_public(msg);
        assert!(
            !sanitized.contains("10.0.0.1"),
            "IPv4 should be stripped, got: {}",
            sanitized
        );
        assert!(sanitized.contains("[ip-redacted]"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_sanitize_strips_multiple_ipv4() {
        let msg = "Could not connect to 192.168.1.1 after trying 127.0.0.1";
        let sanitized = sanitize_error_for_public(msg);
        assert!(!sanitized.contains("192.168.1.1"));
        assert!(!sanitized.contains("127.0.0.1"));
        // Two redactions expected.
        assert_eq!(sanitized.matches("[ip-redacted]").count(), 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_sanitize_strips_ipv6() {
        let msg = "RDAP URL resolves to reserved IP fe80::1 which is forbidden";
        let sanitized = sanitize_error_for_public(msg);
        assert!(!sanitized.contains("fe80::1"));
        assert!(sanitized.contains("[ip-redacted]"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sanitize_leaves_mac_address_like_tokens_alone() {
        let msg = "error code af:ba:12 at line 5";
        let out = sanitize_error_for_public(msg);
        assert!(
            out.contains("af:ba:12"),
            "MAC fragment should not be stripped: {}",
            out
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn sanitize_strips_real_ipv6() {
        let msg = "cannot reach 2001:db8::1 — timeout";
        let out = sanitize_error_for_public(msg);
        assert!(!out.contains("2001:db8::1"));
        assert!(out.contains("[ip-redacted]"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sanitize_strips_fe80_link_local() {
        let msg = "peer at fe80::1 unreachable";
        let out = sanitize_error_for_public(msg);
        assert!(out.contains("[ip-redacted]"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_sanitize_truncates_long_message() {
        // Build a 500-char message with no IPs.
        let long = "a".repeat(500);
        let sanitized = sanitize_error_for_public(&long);
        // Should cap at MAX_PUBLIC_ERROR_LEN chars + ellipsis.
        let char_count = sanitized.chars().count();
        assert_eq!(char_count, MAX_PUBLIC_ERROR_LEN + 1);
        assert!(sanitized.ends_with('…'));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_sanitize_preserves_short_messages() {
        let msg = "RDAP timed out after 15s";
        let sanitized = sanitize_error_for_public(msg);
        assert_eq!(sanitized, msg);
    }

    // ---------------- RdapOutcome classification ----------------

    #[test]
    fn test_is_rdap_response_useful_detects_no_data() {
        use crate::rdap::RdapResponse;
        // Construct a response with a name but no events, entities, NS, or status
        // — this is the "200 OK but no useful fields" case that should be
        // classified as RdapOutcome::NoData (not Useful, not Error).
        let resp = RdapResponse {
            ldh_name: Some("example.com".to_string()),
            ..Default::default()
        };
        assert!(
            !rdap_response_is_useful(&resp),
            "Response with only a name should be classified as NoData"
        );

        // And one with a name + status IS useful (sanity check).
        let useful = RdapResponse {
            ldh_name: Some("example.com".to_string()),
            status: vec!["active".to_string()],
            ..Default::default()
        };
        assert!(rdap_response_is_useful(&useful));
    }

    // ---------------- Coalescing ----------------

    // Verifies that when multiple concurrent lookups hit the in-flight map
    // for the same domain, later arrivals observe the existing Weak<Notify>
    // and become waiters rather than racing a second lookup. We test the
    // map-level primitive here because the full SmartLookup pipeline
    // requires network access to exercise.
    // INFLIGHT_TEST_SERIAL is a std Mutex held across awaits on purpose: it
    // serializes whole async tests that share process-global state; an
    // async-aware mutex would defeat that.
    #[allow(clippy::await_holding_lock)]
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_inflight_coalescing_map() {
        // Serialize with sibling poisoning tests: we share LOOKUP_INFLIGHT
        // state, and `InflightGuard::drop` uses `try_lock` — if a sibling
        // holds the mutex during drop, cleanup is skipped and assertions
        // fail.
        let _serial = INFLIGHT_TEST_SERIAL
            .lock()
            .unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
        // Poison-tolerant: the sibling poisoning regression tests may run
        // earlier under `cargo test` parallelism and leave LOOKUP_INFLIGHT
        // poisoned. The production code recovers via `unwrap_or_else`,
        // so this test does the same.
        //
        // Use a per-run unique key so this test cannot race with the other
        // tests that touch LOOKUP_INFLIGHT. Previously we `clear()`ed the
        // whole map, which raced with peer tests' entries.
        let domain = unique_test_key("__coalesce");

        // Defensive: ensure our specific key is not present.
        {
            let mut m = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
            m.remove(&domain);
        }

        // First caller: no entry → becomes owner.
        let owner_notify = Arc::new(Notify::new());
        {
            let mut m = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
            assert!(m.get(&domain).and_then(|w| w.upgrade()).is_none());
            m.insert(domain.clone(), Arc::downgrade(&owner_notify));
        }

        // Second caller: sees the existing Weak and upgrades.
        let waiter = {
            let m = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
            m.get(&domain)
                .and_then(|w| w.upgrade())
                .expect("Second caller must observe in-flight entry")
        };

        // Waiter listens in the background.
        let waiter_clone = waiter.clone();
        let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
            waiter_clone.notified().await;
        });

        // Simulate owner completing.
        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)).await;
        {
            let mut m = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
            m.remove(&domain);
        }
        owner_notify.notify_waiters();

        // Waiter should unblock quickly.
        tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), handle)
            .await
            .expect("waiter must unblock after notify")
            .expect("waiter task joined cleanly");

        // After owner removes entry and drops its Arc, the Weak is dead.
        drop(owner_notify);
        drop(waiter);
        let m = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
        assert!(m.get(&domain).and_then(|w| w.upgrade()).is_none());
    }

    // Executes the real waiter branch of `lookup_with_progress` (not just the
    // map primitive above): two concurrent `lookup_with_progress` calls find
    // an in-flight entry for their domain, subscribe to its Notify, and — once
    // the owner populates the cache, removes the entry, and notifies (the
    // exact `InflightGuard::drop` sequence) — both return the cached result
    // WITHOUT running their own network race. `LOOKUP_CONCURRENT_CALLS` is the
    // coalescing proof: it is incremented at the top of `lookup_concurrent`
    // before any I/O, so if a waiter ever falls through to ownership the
    // counter moves and this test fails deterministically.
    //
    // The owner itself is simulated (cache insert + entry removal + notify)
    // rather than a third real lookup: a real owner's `lookup_concurrent`
    // needs RDAP bootstrap + WHOIS server discovery against live endpoints,
    // and those clients expose no in-scope hermetic seam for full-path
    // injection.
    // Deliberately holds INFLIGHT_TEST_SERIAL across awaits — see
    // test_inflight_coalescing_map.
    #[allow(clippy::await_holding_lock)]
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn waiters_coalesce_on_inflight_lookup_and_read_owners_cache() {
        use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;

        let _serial = INFLIGHT_TEST_SERIAL
            .lock()
            .unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());

        let raw = unique_test_key("coalesce-waiter");
        let normalized = crate::validation::normalize_domain(&raw).expect("test key normalizes");
        LOOKUP_CACHE.remove(&normalized);

        // Simulated owner claims the in-flight slot before the waiters arrive.
        let owner_notify = Arc::new(Notify::new());
        {
            let mut m = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
            m.insert(normalized.clone(), Arc::downgrade(&owner_notify));
        }

        let calls_before = LOOKUP_CONCURRENT_CALLS.load(Ordering::SeqCst);

        // Two real concurrent callers: both must take the Waiter branch.
        let lookup = SmartLookup::new();
        let spawn_waiter = |l: SmartLookup, d: String| {
            tokio::spawn(async move { l.lookup_with_progress(&d, None).await })
        };
        let h1 = spawn_waiter(lookup.clone(), raw.clone());
        let h2 = spawn_waiter(lookup, raw);

        // Current-thread runtime: awaiting here runs both waiters up to their
        // `notified` await (their path to it is fully synchronous), so the
        // owner's completion below cannot slip in before they subscribe.
        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;

        // Owner completes: populate the cache, then remove the entry and
        // notify — the same order `InflightGuard::drop` uses.
        let canned = LookupResult::Whois {
            data: empty_whois(&normalized),
            rdap_error: None,
            rdap_fallback: None,
            dns_nameservers: None,
        };
        LOOKUP_CACHE.insert(normalized.clone(), canned);
        {
            let mut m = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
            m.remove(&normalized);
        }
        owner_notify.notify_waiters();

        // Both waiters must wake promptly (well under DEFAULT_INFLIGHT_WAIT)
        // and observe the owner's result.
        for handle in [h1, h2] {
            let result = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), handle)
                .await
                .expect("waiter must wake via notify, not the bounded-wait timeout")
                .expect("waiter task joined cleanly")
                .expect("waiter must read the owner's cached result");
            assert!(result.is_whois());
            assert_eq!(result.domain_name(), Some(normalized.clone()));
        }

        // Coalescing proof: neither waiter ran its own `lookup_concurrent`.
        let calls_after = LOOKUP_CONCURRENT_CALLS.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
        assert_eq!(
            calls_before, calls_after,
            "coalesced waiters must not start a second network race"
        );

        LOOKUP_CACHE.remove(&normalized);
    }

    /// Builds a domain key guaranteed unique per test invocation, so that
    /// tests touching the shared LOOKUP_INFLIGHT static never collide when
    /// `cargo test` runs them in parallel. We include a nanosecond timestamp
    /// plus an atomic counter to defeat even hash-identical calls within the
    /// same nanosecond.
    fn unique_test_key(prefix: &str) -> String {
        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
        use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
        static COUNTER: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
        let nanos = SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
            .map(|d| d.as_nanos())
            .unwrap_or(0);
        let n = COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
        format!("{}_{}_{}.example.", prefix, nanos, n)
    }

    // The public `rdap_error` / `whois_error` strings of every `Available`
    // result must be sanitized. These exercise the real construction paths
    // (not the sanitizer in isolation), so a construction site that stops
    // sanitizing fails here.

    #[test]
    fn available_with_whois_sanitizes_rdap_error() {
        // The constructor every WHOIS-in-hand route of `lookup_concurrent`
        // returns through.
        let avail = AvailabilityResult::new("unreg.test", false, "none", "inconclusive");
        let result = available_with_whois(
            avail,
            "RDAP URL resolves to reserved IP 10.0.0.1",
            empty_whois("unreg.test"),
        );
        let LookupResult::Available {
            rdap_error,
            whois_error,
            whois_data,
            ..
        } = result
        else {
            panic!("expected Available variant");
        };
        assert!(!rdap_error.contains("10.0.0.1"), "{rdap_error}");
        assert!(rdap_error.contains("[ip-redacted]"));
        assert!(whois_error.is_empty());
        assert!(whois_data.is_some());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn availability_fallback_sanitizes_both_error_fields() {
        // A prior RDAP 200 short-circuits the checker to `decide_from_rdap`,
        // so this runs the real fallback construction with no network.
        let lookup = SmartLookup::new();
        let prior = RdapResponse {
            ldh_name: Some("example.com".to_string()),
            status: vec!["active".to_string()],
            ..Default::default()
        };
        let result = lookup
            .availability_fallback(
                "example.com",
                PriorRdap::Response(Box::new(prior)),
                PriorWhois::Missing,
                "RDAP URL resolves to reserved IP 10.0.0.1".to_string(),
                "connection refused at 192.168.0.5 and fe80::1".to_string(),
                None,
            )
            .await
            .expect("prior-response fallback must not error");
        let LookupResult::Available {
            rdap_error,
            whois_error,
            ..
        } = result
        else {
            panic!("expected Available variant");
        };
        assert!(!rdap_error.contains("10.0.0.1"), "{rdap_error}");
        assert!(!whois_error.contains("192.168.0.5"), "{whois_error}");
        assert!(!whois_error.contains("fe80::1"), "{whois_error}");
        assert!(rdap_error.contains("[ip-redacted]"));
        assert!(whois_error.contains("[ip-redacted]"));
    }

    // ---------------- degraded-result caching ----------------

    fn available_via(method: &str, available: bool, confidence: &str) -> LookupResult {
        LookupResult::Available {
            data: Box::new(AvailabilityResult::new(
                "example.test",
                available,
                confidence,
                method,
            )),
            rdap_error: String::new(),
            whois_error: String::new(),
            whois_data: None,
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn degraded_results_are_identified_for_short_caching() {
        // Verdicts standing in for registry data we failed to get.
        assert!(is_degraded_result(&available_via(
            "inconclusive",
            false,
            "none"
        )));
        assert!(is_degraded_result(&available_via(
            "dns_present",
            false,
            "high"
        )));
        assert!(is_degraded_result(&available_via(
            "dns_nxdomain",
            true,
            "medium"
        )));
        // A WHOIS record without registration data (kept after an RDAP
        // failure or an empty RDAP 200) is a stand-in too.
        assert!(is_degraded_result(&LookupResult::Whois {
            data: empty_whois("example.test"),
            rdap_error: Some("RDAP response incomplete".to_string()),
            rdap_fallback: None,
            dns_nameservers: None,
        }));
        // Authoritative registry answers keep the full TTL.
        assert!(!is_degraded_result(&available_via("rdap", true, "high")));
        assert!(!is_degraded_result(&available_via("whois", true, "high")));
        assert!(!is_degraded_result(&LookupResult::Whois {
            data: denic_whois(),
            rdap_error: None,
            rdap_fallback: None,
            dns_nameservers: None,
        }));
        const { assert!(DEGRADED_LOOKUP_CACHE_TTL.as_secs() < LOOKUP_CACHE_TTL.as_secs()) };
    }

    #[test]
    fn rdap_error_is_404_matches_standard_404() {
        let e = SeerError::RdapError("query failed with status 404 Not Found".to_string());
        assert!(rdap_error_is_404(&e));
    }

    #[test]
    fn rdap_error_is_404_matches_without_reason_phrase() {
        let e = SeerError::RdapError("query failed with status 404".to_string());
        assert!(rdap_error_is_404(&e));
    }

    #[test]
    fn rdap_error_is_404_rejects_other_statuses() {
        let e = SeerError::RdapError("query failed with status 500 Server Error".to_string());
        assert!(!rdap_error_is_404(&e));
        let e = SeerError::RdapError("query failed with status 400 Bad Request".to_string());
        assert!(!rdap_error_is_404(&e));
    }

    #[test]
    fn rdap_error_is_404_rejects_non_http_errors() {
        let e = SeerError::RdapError("connection timeout".to_string());
        assert!(!rdap_error_is_404(&e));
        let e = SeerError::Timeout("rdap".to_string());
        assert!(!rdap_error_is_404(&e));
    }

    #[test]
    fn rdap_error_is_404_rejects_incidental_404_in_message() {
        // A 404 substring inside a non-status context must not match.
        let e = SeerError::RdapError("error 40404: database corruption".to_string());
        assert!(!rdap_error_is_404(&e));
    }

    // ---------------- WhoisResponse::is_thin ----------------

    fn empty_whois(domain: &str) -> WhoisResponse {
        WhoisResponse {
            domain: domain.to_string(),
            ..Default::default()
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn whois_response_is_thin_when_all_key_fields_missing() {
        let w = empty_whois("example.com");
        assert!(w.is_thin());
    }

    #[test]
    fn whois_response_is_not_thin_when_registrar_present() {
        let mut w = empty_whois("example.com");
        w.registrar = Some("Test Registrar".to_string());
        assert!(!w.is_thin());
    }

    #[test]
    fn whois_response_is_not_thin_when_creation_date_present() {
        let mut w = empty_whois("example.com");
        w.creation_date = Some(Utc::now());
        assert!(!w.is_thin());
    }

    #[test]
    fn whois_response_is_not_thin_when_expiration_date_present() {
        let mut w = empty_whois("example.com");
        w.expiration_date = Some(Utc::now());
        assert!(!w.is_thin());
    }

    /// DENIC-shaped parsed WHOIS: nameservers, status and a changed date,
    /// but never a registrar or creation/expiry dates (and .de has no RDAP).
    fn denic_whois() -> WhoisResponse {
        let mut w = empty_whois("example.de");
        w.nameservers = vec!["ns1.example.net".to_string()];
        w.status = vec!["active".to_string()];
        w.updated_date = Some(Utc::now());
        w.raw_response = "Domain: example.de\nNserver: ns1.example.net\nStatus: connect\n".into();
        w
    }

    #[test]
    fn whois_response_with_nameservers_is_not_thin() {
        let mut w = empty_whois("example.com");
        w.nameservers = vec!["ns1.example.net".to_string()];
        assert!(!w.is_thin());
    }

    #[test]
    fn denic_whois_stays_on_the_whois_path() {
        // Regression: every registered .de domain used to become
        // `Available { method: "dns_present" }` ("WHOIS returned no data;
        // retry shortly") with its WHOIS data discarded by DomainInfo.
        let w = denic_whois();
        let bootstrap_miss =
            SeerError::RdapBootstrapError("no RDAP server for example.de".to_string());
        assert!(!w.is_thin());
        assert!(whois_leg_has_data(&Ok(w.clone())));
        assert!(matches!(
            whois_leg_fallback("example.de", false, Some(&bootstrap_miss), &w),
            Fallback::Registered
        ));
    }

    // ---------------- whois_leg_fallback ----------------
    //
    // The ladder itself is pinned combination by combination in
    // `availability`'s tests; these cover what the lookup adds on top.

    /// Reads a fallback as (available, method), `None` for Registered.
    fn verdict_of(fallback: Fallback, dns: DnsPresence) -> Option<(bool, String)> {
        let avail = match fallback {
            Fallback::Registered => return None,
            Fallback::Verdict(v) => v,
            Fallback::NeedsDns(t) => t.decide(dns),
        };
        Some((avail.available, avail.method))
    }

    #[test]
    fn rdap_200_vetoes_whois_no_match_and_thin_bodies() {
        // Regression coverage for the v0.26.6 fix: an RDAP HTTP 200 (even a
        // thin one) proves the object exists; WHOIS propagation lag must not
        // flip it to "available", nor DNS be consulted.
        let mut no_match = empty_whois("freshly-registered.com");
        no_match.raw_response = "No match for \"FRESHLY-REGISTERED.COM\".".to_string();
        for w in [no_match, empty_whois("freshly-registered.com")] {
            assert!(matches!(
                whois_leg_fallback("freshly-registered.com", true, None, &w),
                Fallback::Registered
            ));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn whois_no_match_routes_to_available_for_any_rdap_failure() {
        let mut w = empty_whois("genuinely-free.com");
        w.raw_response = "No match for \"GENUINELY-FREE.COM\".".to_string();
        let r404 = SeerError::RdapError("query failed with status 404".to_string());
        let bootstrap = SeerError::RdapBootstrapError("all registries failed".to_string());
        // 404, a non-404 failure, and a grace-truncated RDAP leg (None).
        for rdap in [Some(&r404), Some(&bootstrap), None] {
            assert_eq!(
                verdict_of(
                    whois_leg_fallback("genuinely-free.com", false, rdap, &w),
                    DnsPresence::Unknown
                ),
                Some((true, "whois".to_string()))
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn thin_whois_with_rdap_404_is_available_via_rdap() {
        // Must read identically to `seer avail` for the same outcomes: the
        // registry's own RDAP 404 is authoritative ("high", "rdap").
        let r404 = SeerError::RdapError("query failed with status 404 Not Found".to_string());
        let fallback = whois_leg_fallback("example.xyz", false, Some(&r404), &empty_whois("x"));
        let Fallback::Verdict(v) = fallback else {
            panic!("expected a verdict");
        };
        assert_eq!(
            (v.available, v.confidence.as_str(), v.method.as_str()),
            (true, "high", "rdap")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn thin_whois_with_silent_rdap_is_decided_by_dns() {
        // The zac.email / Identity-Digital case among them: thin/no-service
        // WHOIS with RDAP unavailable. A delegated apex reads as
        // likely-registered, NXDOMAIN as likely-available, and a failed probe
        // as inconclusive — never a bare WHOIS record cached for 5 minutes.
        let rdap = SeerError::RdapError("query failed with status 429".to_string());
        let w = empty_whois("zac.email");
        let read = |dns| verdict_of(whois_leg_fallback("zac.email", false, Some(&rdap), &w), dns);
        assert_eq!(
            read(DnsPresence::Present),
            Some((false, "dns_present".to_string()))
        );
        assert_eq!(
            read(DnsPresence::Absent),
            Some((true, "dns_nxdomain".to_string()))
        );
        assert_eq!(
            read(DnsPresence::Unknown),
            Some((false, "inconclusive".to_string()))
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn thin_whois_refusal_is_inconclusive_regardless_of_dns() {
        // issue #45: a registry refusal/throttle must never be guessed into
        // "available" (from NXDOMAIN) or "registered" (from delegation).
        let rdap = SeerError::RdapError("query failed with status 503".to_string());
        let mut w = empty_whois("example.test");
        w.raw_response = "Access rate limited; please try again later.\n".to_string();
        for dns in [
            DnsPresence::Absent,
            DnsPresence::Present,
            DnsPresence::Unknown,
        ] {
            assert_eq!(
                verdict_of(
                    whois_leg_fallback("example.test", false, Some(&rdap), &w),
                    dns
                ),
                Some((false, "inconclusive".to_string()))
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn whois_with_registration_data_stays_a_whois_record() {
        let mut w = empty_whois("registered.com");
        w.registrar = Some("Example Registrar Ltd".to_string());
        let rdap = SeerError::RdapError("connection timeout".to_string());
        for rdap in [Some(&rdap), None] {
            assert!(matches!(
                whois_leg_fallback("registered.com", false, rdap, &w),
                Fallback::Registered
            ));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn verdict_progress_names_the_deciding_signal() {
        let v =
            |available, method: &str| AvailabilityResult::new("x.test", available, "high", method);
        assert_eq!(
            verdict_progress(&v(true, "rdap")),
            "Domain appears unregistered"
        );
        assert!(verdict_progress(&v(false, "inconclusive")).contains("inconclusive"));
        assert!(verdict_progress(&v(false, "dns_present")).contains("registered"));
        assert!(verdict_progress(&v(false, "registrable_parent")).contains("parent"));
    }

    // ---------------- race_with_grace ----------------
    //
    // Paused-clock tests of the RDAP/WHOIS race semantics: the losing leg is
    // grace-truncated ONLY when the winner brought usable data. A winner that
    // failed (or returned an unusable body) leaves the other leg as the sole
    // possible source of registry data, so it must run to its own completion.
    // This is the .ru case: the RDAP bootstrap miss fails in microseconds and
    // must not shave the WHOIS budget down to the grace period.

    /// A leg that resolves to `value` after `secs` of (paused, auto-advanced)
    /// tokio time.
    async fn leg<T>(secs: u64, value: T) -> T {
        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(secs)).await;
        value
    }

    #[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
    async fn race_awaits_whois_fully_when_rdap_errors_first() {
        let rdap = leg(0, Err::<&str, &str>("no RDAP server for example.ru"));
        // Well beyond the grace period, within the WHOIS client's own budget.
        let whois = leg(20, Ok::<&str, &str>("whois data"));
        let (r, w) = race_with_grace(rdap, whois, |r| r.is_ok(), |w| w.is_ok()).await;
        assert!(matches!(r, LegOutcome::Completed(Err(_))));
        assert!(
            matches!(w, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok("whois data"))),
            "WHOIS must not be grace-truncated behind an RDAP failure"
        );
    }

    #[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
    async fn race_awaits_rdap_fully_when_whois_errors_first() {
        let rdap = leg(20, Ok::<&str, &str>("rdap data"));
        let whois = leg(0, Err::<&str, &str>("connection refused"));
        let (r, w) = race_with_grace(rdap, whois, |r| r.is_ok(), |w| w.is_ok()).await;
        assert!(
            matches!(r, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok("rdap data"))),
            "RDAP must not be grace-truncated behind a WHOIS failure"
        );
        assert!(matches!(w, LegOutcome::Completed(Err(_))));
    }

    #[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
    async fn race_truncates_whois_when_rdap_answers_with_data() {
        let rdap = leg(0, Ok::<&str, &str>("useful rdap"));
        let whois = leg(20, Ok::<&str, &str>("whois data"));
        let (r, w) = race_with_grace(rdap, whois, |r| r.is_ok(), |w| w.is_ok()).await;
        assert!(matches!(r, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(_))));
        assert!(
            matches!(w, LegOutcome::GraceTruncated),
            "a data-bearing RDAP winner only owes WHOIS the grace period"
        );
    }

    #[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
    async fn race_truncates_rdap_when_whois_answers_with_data() {
        let rdap = leg(20, Ok::<&str, &str>("rdap data"));
        let whois = leg(0, Ok::<&str, &str>("whois data"));
        let (r, w) = race_with_grace(rdap, whois, |r| r.is_ok(), |w| w.is_ok()).await;
        assert!(matches!(r, LegOutcome::GraceTruncated));
        assert!(matches!(w, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(_))));
    }

    #[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
    async fn race_loser_inside_grace_period_still_completes() {
        let rdap = leg(0, Ok::<&str, &str>("useful rdap"));
        // Within the 5s grace period.
        let whois = leg(2, Ok::<&str, &str>("whois data"));
        let (r, w) = race_with_grace(rdap, whois, |r| r.is_ok(), |w| w.is_ok()).await;
        assert!(matches!(r, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(_))));
        assert!(matches!(w, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok("whois data"))));
    }

    #[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
    async fn race_awaits_whois_fully_when_rdap_wins_with_unusable_data() {
        // An Ok the predicate rejects (e.g. a thin RDAP 200 with no useful
        // fields) is not "data in hand" — WHOIS still runs to completion.
        let rdap = leg(0, Ok::<&str, &str>("thin"));
        let whois = leg(20, Ok::<&str, &str>("whois data"));
        let (r, w) = race_with_grace(
            rdap,
            whois,
            |r| matches!(r, Ok(s) if *s == "useful"),
            |w| w.is_ok(),
        )
        .await;
        assert!(matches!(r, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok("thin"))));
        assert!(matches!(w, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok("whois data"))));
    }

    #[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
    async fn race_awaits_rdap_fully_when_whois_wins_with_thin_body() {
        // The Identity-Digital case from the WHOIS side: the registry's
        // port-43 endpoint answers Ok instantly but the body carries no
        // registration data (a "no service"/"not supported" sentinel). Under
        // the old bare `is_ok()` predicate that thin win grace-truncated the
        // only viable protocol — RDAP — guaranteeing a thin result. With the
        // production `whois_leg_has_data` predicate, RDAP runs to its own
        // bounded completion, mirroring the RDAP-side usefulness gate.
        let rdap = leg(20, Ok::<&str, &str>("rdap data"));
        let whois = leg(0, Ok::<_, SeerError>(empty_whois("zac.email")));
        let (r, w) = race_with_grace(rdap, whois, |r| r.is_ok(), whois_leg_has_data).await;
        assert!(
            matches!(r, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok("rdap data"))),
            "RDAP must not be grace-truncated behind a thin WHOIS answer"
        );
        assert!(matches!(w, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(_))));
    }

    #[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
    async fn race_truncates_rdap_when_whois_wins_with_real_data() {
        // Complement: a WHOIS win that DOES carry registration data still
        // only owes RDAP the grace period.
        let mut whois_data = empty_whois("example.com");
        whois_data.registrar = Some("Mock Registrar".to_string());
        let rdap = leg(20, Ok::<&str, &str>("rdap data"));
        let whois = leg(0, Ok::<_, SeerError>(whois_data));
        let (r, w) = race_with_grace(rdap, whois, |r| r.is_ok(), whois_leg_has_data).await;
        assert!(
            matches!(r, LegOutcome::GraceTruncated),
            "a data-bearing WHOIS winner only owes RDAP the grace period"
        );
        assert!(matches!(w, LegOutcome::Completed(Ok(_))));
    }

    // ---------------- whois_leg_has_data ----------------

    #[test]
    fn whois_leg_has_data_rejects_thin_ok_and_errors() {
        // Thin Ok bodies — including "No match" availability sentinels — are
        // not data in hand: the race must keep RDAP alive so a late RDAP 200
        // can still veto a stale WHOIS "no match" (v0.26.6 rule).
        assert!(!whois_leg_has_data(&Ok(empty_whois("example.email"))));
        let mut no_match = empty_whois("example.com");
        no_match.raw_response = "No match for \"EXAMPLE.COM\".".to_string();
        assert!(!whois_leg_has_data(&Ok(no_match)));
        assert!(!whois_leg_has_data(&Err(SeerError::WhoisError(
            "connection refused".to_string()
        ))));
    }

    #[test]
    fn whois_leg_has_data_accepts_registration_data() {
        // Stays in lockstep with `WhoisResponse::is_thin`: any of the three
        // key registration signals makes the leg a data-bearing winner.
        let mut w = empty_whois("example.com");
        w.registrar = Some("Mock Registrar".to_string());
        assert!(whois_leg_has_data(&Ok(w)));
        let mut w = empty_whois("example.com");
        w.expiration_date = Some(Utc::now());
        assert!(whois_leg_has_data(&Ok(w)));
    }

    // ---------------- grace_truncated_error ----------------

    #[test]
    fn grace_truncated_error_says_answered_not_won() {
        // Truncation only happens behind a data-bearing winner, so the message
        // must say the winner *answered* — the old "after RDAP won" wording
        // misled when the winner had merely finished first with an error.
        let msg = grace_truncated_error("WHOIS", "RDAP");
        assert_eq!(
            msg,
            format!(
                "WHOIS did not respond within the {}s grace period after RDAP answered",
                PROTOCOL_GRACE_PERIOD.as_secs()
            )
        );
        assert!(!msg.contains("won"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn grace_truncated_error_is_symmetric() {
        let msg = grace_truncated_error("RDAP", "WHOIS");
        assert!(msg.starts_with("RDAP did not respond"));
        assert!(msg.ends_with("after WHOIS answered"));
    }

    // ---------------- Mutex poisoning recovery ----------------

    /// Regression: a panic inside `LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock()` must not wedge
    /// the tracker forever. After the mutex is poisoned, subsequent
    /// acquisition attempts must still succeed via `unwrap_or_else`.
    ///
    /// This isolates the lookup_with_progress acquisition site (formerly a
    /// `.expect("LOOKUP_INFLIGHT mutex poisoned")`) by exercising the same
    /// `.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner())` pattern directly.
    #[test]
    fn lookup_inflight_recovers_from_poisoned_mutex() {
        use std::panic::{catch_unwind, AssertUnwindSafe};

        // Serialize with sibling tests that also touch LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.
        let _serial = INFLIGHT_TEST_SERIAL
            .lock()
            .unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());

        // Poison the real static by panicking while holding the guard.
        let _ = catch_unwind(AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
            let _guard = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap();
            panic!("poisoning LOOKUP_INFLIGHT for test");
        }));

        // At this point LOOKUP_INFLIGHT is poisoned. Plain .lock() would
        // return Err(PoisonError). The recovery pattern used in
        // lookup_with_progress must still yield a usable guard.
        let mut guard = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
        // Use a per-run unique canary so parallel tests cannot collide.
        let canary = unique_test_key("__poison_recovery");
        guard.insert(canary.clone(), Weak::new());
        assert!(guard.contains_key(&canary));
        guard.remove(&canary);
    }

    /// Regression: InflightGuard::drop must also tolerate mutex poisoning
    /// without panicking — the Poisoned arm should still remove the entry.
    #[test]
    fn inflight_guard_drop_recovers_from_poisoned_mutex() {
        use std::panic::{catch_unwind, AssertUnwindSafe};

        // Serialize with sibling tests that also touch LOOKUP_INFLIGHT —
        // the critical race was `InflightGuard::drop` using `try_lock`
        // and silently skipping cleanup when a parallel test held the
        // mutex, leaving this test's entry in the map and failing the
        // final assertion.
        let _serial = INFLIGHT_TEST_SERIAL
            .lock()
            .unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());

        // Seed an entry and arm a guard for it. Use a per-run unique key
        // so this test can never collide with siblings under parallel
        // `cargo test` — previously a hard-coded key raced with the peer
        // coalescing test's `m.clear()` call.
        let key = unique_test_key("__drop_poison");
        let notify = Arc::new(Notify::new());
        {
            let mut map = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
            map.insert(key.clone(), Arc::downgrade(&notify));
        }
        let guard = InflightGuard {
            key: key.clone(),
            notify: notify.clone(),
        };

        // Poison the mutex.
        let _ = catch_unwind(AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
            let _g = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap();
            panic!("poisoning LOOKUP_INFLIGHT for drop test");
        }));

        // Dropping the guard must not panic and must remove the entry via
        // the Poisoned branch of the new try_lock match.
        drop(guard);

        let map = LOOKUP_INFLIGHT.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
        assert!(
            !map.contains_key(&key),
            "poisoned-mutex drop path should still remove the in-flight entry"
        );
    }

    // --- DNS delegation cross-check on WHOIS-only results --------------------

    fn whois_result(
        nameservers: &[&str],
        rdap_fallback: Option<Box<RdapResponse>>,
    ) -> LookupResult {
        LookupResult::Whois {
            data: WhoisResponse {
                domain: "nic.tg".to_string(),
                nameservers: nameservers.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(),
                ..Default::default()
            },
            rdap_error: None,
            rdap_fallback,
            dns_nameservers: None,
        }
    }

    fn delegated(hosts: &[&str]) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
        Ok(hosts.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect())
    }

    #[test]
    fn whois_only_result_gets_the_dns_delegation() {
        let result = with_dns_nameservers(
            whois_result(&["ns1.nic.tg", "ns2.nic.tg"], None),
            delegated(&["ns1.nic.tg", "ns2.nic.tg", "ns4.nic.tg"]),
        );
        let LookupResult::Whois {
            dns_nameservers: Some(ns),
            ..
        } = result
        else {
            panic!("expected a DNS delegation on {result:?}");
        };
        assert!(!ns.in_sync);
        assert_eq!(ns.missing_from_whois, vec!["ns4.nic.tg"]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn result_with_an_rdap_record_is_not_cross_checked() {
        assert!(!wants_dns_nameservers(&whois_result(
            &[],
            Some(Box::default())
        )));
        let rdap = LookupResult::Rdap {
            data: Box::default(),
            whois_fallback: None,
        };
        assert!(!wants_dns_nameservers(&rdap));
        let result = with_dns_nameservers(
            whois_result(&[], Some(Box::default())),
            delegated(&["ns1.x"]),
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            LookupResult::Whois {
                dns_nameservers: None,
                ..
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn failed_dns_query_leaves_the_result_unchanged() {
        let result = with_dns_nameservers(
            whois_result(&["ns1.nic.tg"], None),
            Err(SeerError::DnsError("no parent server answered".into())),
        );
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            LookupResult::Whois {
                dns_nameservers: None,
                ..
            }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn dns_nameservers_round_trip_and_stay_optional() {
        // History/cache entries written before the field existed still read.
        let old = r#"{"source":"whois","data":{"domain":"nic.tg","registrar":null,"registrant":null,"organization":null,"creation_date":null,"expiration_date":null,"updated_date":null,"nameservers":[],"status":[],"dnssec":null,"whois_server":"whois.nic.tg"},"rdap_error":null}"#;
        let parsed: LookupResult = serde_json::from_str(old).expect("old shape deserializes");
        assert!(matches!(
            parsed,
            LookupResult::Whois {
                dns_nameservers: None,
                ..
            }
        ));
        let with = with_dns_nameservers(whois_result(&["a.x"], None), delegated(&["a.x"]));
        let json = serde_json::to_string(&with).unwrap();
        assert!(json.contains("\"dns_nameservers\""), "{json}");
        let back: LookupResult = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            back,
            LookupResult::Whois {
                dns_nameservers: Some(_),
                ..
            }
        ));
    }
}