seer_core/

caa.rs

//! CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) lookup and policy comparison.
//!
//! CAA records (RFC 8659) let domain owners declare which Certificate
//! Authorities may issue certificates for the domain. They are consulted
//! by CAs at issuance time only; they are *not* part of certificate
//! validation. A presented certificate whose issuer is not in the current
//! CAA policy is therefore not necessarily invalid — it may have been
//! issued before the policy was updated, or via a parent zone. See
//! [`ISSUANCE_TIME_NOTE`].

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

use crate::dns::{DnsResolver, RecordData, RecordType};

/// Informational note surfaced alongside every CAA report.
///
/// Explains why an issuer/CAA mismatch is not the same as an invalid cert.
pub const ISSUANCE_TIME_NOTE: &str = "CAA is checked by CAs at issuance time, not by \
clients at validation time. A cert whose issuer is not in the current CAA policy is \
not invalid — it may have been issued before the policy was set, or under a parent \
zone. Treat mismatches as informational.";

/// A single CAA resource record.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct CaaRecord {
    /// CAA flags (only `issuer_critical` = 128 is defined).
    pub flags: u8,
    /// Property tag (e.g., `issue`, `issuewild`, `iodef`).
    pub tag: String,
    /// Property value (e.g., `letsencrypt.org` or a URI for `iodef`).
    pub value: String,
}

impl CaaRecord {
    /// The lowercased CA-domain part of an `issue`/`issuewild` value — RFC 8659
    /// §4.2 values are "<CA domain> [; <parameters>]". Empty for a bare `";"`,
    /// which means "forbid all".
    fn ca_domain(&self) -> String {
        self.value
            .split(';')
            .next()
            .unwrap_or(&self.value)
            .trim()
            .to_ascii_lowercase()
    }
}

/// Result of how a presented cert's issuer relates to the CAA policy.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum IssuerCaaMatch {
    /// No CAA records exist (any CA may issue per default).
    NoPolicy,
    /// CAA records exist and at least one `issue`/`issuewild` value plausibly
    /// matches the presented issuer.
    Permitted,
    /// CAA records exist but none of the allowed CAs appear to match the
    /// presented issuer. Informational, not a validation failure.
    Mismatch,
    /// CAA records exist but only contain `iodef` / unknown tags — no
    /// authoritative answer about issuance.
    Indeterminate,
}

/// CAA policy collected for a domain, plus the informational note that
/// callers should surface to users.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct CaaPolicy {
    /// Records discovered (may be empty if no policy is set).
    pub records: Vec<CaaRecord>,
    /// Domain at which the records were found. Per RFC 8659 the resolver
    /// climbs the tree until a CAA RRset is encountered, so this may be a
    /// parent of the queried name.
    pub effective_domain: Option<String>,
    /// True iff at least one CAA record was found in the tree-walk.
    pub has_policy: bool,
    /// Result of comparing a presented cert's issuer against the policy.
    /// `None` if no cert was supplied for comparison.
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub issuer_match: Option<IssuerCaaMatch>,
    /// `iodef` incident-reporting contacts declared in the policy (RFC 8659
    /// §4.4) — a takedown/abuse channel available nowhere else in seer.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
    pub iodef: Vec<String>,
    /// A note when the wildcard issuance policy (`issuewild`) is *broader* than
    /// the base (`issue`) policy — i.e. a CA may issue wildcard certs it is not
    /// permitted to issue named certs for. `None` when the policies are
    /// consistent, or `issuewild`/`issue` is absent (RFC 8659 §4.3: absent
    /// `issuewild` inherits `issue`, which is NOT a gap).
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub wildcard_note: Option<String>,
    /// Informational note about CAA semantics. Always populated.
    pub note: String,
}

impl CaaPolicy {
    /// Empty policy — used when no CAA records were found anywhere in the tree.
    pub fn empty() -> Self {
        Self {
            records: Vec::new(),
            effective_domain: None,
            has_policy: false,
            issuer_match: None,
            iodef: Vec::new(),
            wildcard_note: None,
            note: ISSUANCE_TIME_NOTE.to_string(),
        }
    }

    /// Builds a populated policy from discovered records, deriving the `iodef`
    /// contacts and the wildcard-vs-base consistency note.
    fn from_records(records: Vec<CaaRecord>, effective_domain: String) -> Self {
        let iodef = records
            .iter()
            .filter(|r| r.tag == "iodef")
            .map(|r| r.value.clone())
            .filter(|v| !v.is_empty())
            .collect();
        let wildcard_note = analyze_wildcard(&records);
        Self {
            has_policy: true,
            records,
            effective_domain: Some(effective_domain),
            issuer_match: None,
            iodef,
            wildcard_note,
            note: ISSUANCE_TIME_NOTE.to_string(),
        }
    }
}

/// The non-empty CA-domain values permitted by a given tag (`issue` /
/// `issuewild`). An empty value (from a bare `";"`) means "forbid all" and is
/// filtered out here so callers reason only about explicitly-permitted CAs.
fn permitted_cas(records: &[CaaRecord], tag: &str) -> Vec<String> {
    records
        .iter()
        .filter(|r| r.tag == tag)
        .map(CaaRecord::ca_domain)
        .filter(|v| !v.is_empty())
        .collect()
}

/// Detects the genuine wildcard-policy asymmetry: when both `issue` and
/// `issuewild` are present and `issuewild` permits a CA that `issue` does not,
/// wildcard issuance is broader than named issuance. Returns a describing note,
/// or `None` when the policies are consistent.
///
/// Note the RFC 8659 §4.3 subtlety: an *absent* `issuewild` inherits the
/// `issue` policy, so absence is NOT a gap and is deliberately not flagged.
fn analyze_wildcard(records: &[CaaRecord]) -> Option<String> {
    let has_issue = records.iter().any(|r| r.tag == "issue");
    let has_issuewild = records.iter().any(|r| r.tag == "issuewild");
    if !has_issue || !has_issuewild {
        return None;
    }
    let issue = permitted_cas(records, "issue");
    let issuewild = permitted_cas(records, "issuewild");
    let looser: Vec<String> = issuewild
        .iter()
        .filter(|w| !issue.iter().any(|i| i == *w))
        .cloned()
        .collect();
    if looser.is_empty() {
        None
    } else {
        Some(format!(
            "issuewild permits CA(s) not allowed by issue ({}) — wildcard issuance is broader than named issuance",
            looser.join(", ")
        ))
    }
}

/// Looks up CAA records for `domain`, climbing the DNS tree per RFC 8659
/// section 3 until a record set is found or only a TLD remains.
///
/// Returns an [`CaaPolicy::empty`] on resolver errors — CAA is advisory,
/// so we never want to fail a higher-level check just because a CAA query
/// did not return.
pub async fn lookup_caa(resolver: &DnsResolver, domain: &str) -> CaaPolicy {
    let mut current = domain.trim_end_matches('.').to_ascii_lowercase();

    loop {
        match resolver.resolve(&current, RecordType::CAA, None).await {
            Ok(records) if !records.is_empty() => {
                let caa: Vec<CaaRecord> = records
                    .into_iter()
                    .filter_map(|r| match r.data {
                        RecordData::CAA { flags, tag, value } => Some(CaaRecord {
                            flags,
                            tag: tag.to_ascii_lowercase(),
                            value,
                        }),
                        _ => None,
                    })
                    .collect();

                if !caa.is_empty() {
                    return CaaPolicy::from_records(caa, current);
                }
            }
            Ok(_) | Err(_) => {}
        }

        // Strip the leftmost label. Stop when only one label (TLD) remains.
        match current.split_once('.') {
            Some((_, rest)) if rest.contains('.') => current = rest.to_string(),
            _ => return CaaPolicy::empty(),
        }
    }
}

/// Compares a presented certificate's issuer string against a CAA policy
/// and returns a classification. Pure function — no I/O.
pub fn classify_issuer(issuer: &str, policy: &CaaPolicy) -> IssuerCaaMatch {
    if !policy.has_policy {
        return IssuerCaaMatch::NoPolicy;
    }

    // RFC 8659 §4.1: if any CAA record has the Issuer Critical flag (bit 7,
    // 0x80) set AND its tag is unknown to us, the spec mandates that
    // issuance be treated as forbidden — we cannot honor a critical
    // property we don't understand. Surface that as `Mismatch` so callers
    // see a non-permitted verdict.
    const KNOWN_TAGS: &[&str] = &["issue", "issuewild", "iodef"];
    let critical_unknown = policy
        .records
        .iter()
        .any(|r| (r.flags & 0x80) != 0 && !KNOWN_TAGS.contains(&r.tag.as_str()));
    if critical_unknown {
        return IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch;
    }

    let issue_values: Vec<String> = policy
        .records
        .iter()
        .filter(|r| r.tag == "issue" || r.tag == "issuewild")
        .map(CaaRecord::ca_domain)
        .collect();

    // Empty values are kept up to here: a policy of only `";"` entries has
    // issuance tags (so it is not Indeterminate) yet forbids every CA.
    if issue_values.is_empty() {
        return IssuerCaaMatch::Indeterminate;
    }

    let issuer_lc = issuer.to_ascii_lowercase();
    if issue_values
        .iter()
        .any(|v| !v.is_empty() && ca_value_matches_issuer(v, &issuer_lc))
    {
        IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
    } else {
        // Includes the forbid-all case: issuance is explicitly forbidden, yet a
        // cert exists. Either way it is informational, not a validation failure.
        IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch
    }
}

/// Best-effort comparison between a CAA `issue` value (a CA's domain) and a
/// certificate issuer string (typically a CN/O like "Let's Encrypt").
///
/// CAA values are short reverse-DNS-ish labels; issuer strings vary by CA.
/// We use a small alias table for the common public CAs and fall back to a
/// direct substring check.
fn ca_value_matches_issuer(caa_value: &str, issuer_lc: &str) -> bool {
    // 1. The CAA value appears verbatim in the issuer (e.g. "ssl.com"), but
    //    only when it is long enough AND lands on a word boundary. A
    //    pathologically short value ("ca", "ssl") would otherwise blanket-match
    //    any issuer that merely contains those letters — the same over-match the
    //    base-label fallback guards against (issue #56). Length is gated by
    //    MIN_FALLBACK_BASE_LEN so the verbatim and base paths share one bar.
    if caa_value.len() >= MIN_FALLBACK_BASE_LEN && contains_word(issuer_lc, caa_value) {
        return true;
    }
    // 2. Curated aliases for well-known CAs — preferred over the generic base
    //    fallback so a precise mapping wins (e.g. "ssl.com" -> "ssl.com",
    //    never bare "ssl"). Matched as whole words like everything else here:
    //    a plain substring test let "entrust" match inside "IdenTrust".
    for (cv, aliases) in CA_ALIASES {
        if caa_value == *cv && aliases.iter().any(|a| contains_word(issuer_lc, a)) {
            return true;
        }
    }
    // 3. Generic fallback for CAs not in the alias table: the base label (the
    //    CAA value minus its trailing TLD) appears in the issuer AS A WHOLE
    //    WORD. Guarded by a minimum length so a short, ambiguous base — "ssl"
    //    from "ssl.com" — can't collide with unrelated issuer text like
    //    "...SSL CA..." and report a genuine mismatch as Permitted (issue #56).
    let base = caa_value
        .rsplit_once('.')
        .map(|(b, _)| b)
        .unwrap_or(caa_value);
    base.len() >= MIN_FALLBACK_BASE_LEN && contains_word(issuer_lc, base)
}

/// Minimum base-label length for the generic substring fallback in
/// [`ca_value_matches_issuer`]. Shorter bases (e.g. "ssl", "ca", "pki") are too
/// ambiguous to match by substring and must go through the curated alias table
/// or a verbatim value match instead.
const MIN_FALLBACK_BASE_LEN: usize = 6;

/// Returns true if `needle` occurs in `haystack` as a whole word — i.e. bounded
/// by string start/end or a non-alphanumeric character on each side — so a base
/// like "examplecorp" matches "ExampleCorp Root" but not "NotExamplecorporated".
/// Both arguments are expected lowercase.
///
/// Both strings come from untrusted data (a CAA record and a certificate
/// issuer), so this must be panic-free on any UTF-8: after a rejected match
/// the search resumes one whole *character* later, never mid-character.
fn contains_word(haystack: &str, needle: &str) -> bool {
    if needle.is_empty() {
        return false;
    }
    let bytes = haystack.as_bytes();
    let mut from = 0;
    while let Some(rel) = haystack[from..].find(needle) {
        let start = from + rel;
        let end = start + needle.len();
        let before_ok = start == 0 || !bytes[start - 1].is_ascii_alphanumeric();
        let after_ok = end == bytes.len() || !bytes[end].is_ascii_alphanumeric();
        if before_ok && after_ok {
            return true;
        }
        // `start + 1` would split a multi-byte first character (e.g. `é`) and
        // panic on the next slice. `start` is a char boundary (it begins a
        // `find` match), so step over exactly that character.
        let first_len = haystack[start..].chars().next().map_or(1, char::len_utf8);
        from = start + first_len;
    }
    false
}

/// Hand-maintained map from common CAA `issue` values to substrings that
/// frequently appear in the issuer CN/O of certs from that CA.
const CA_ALIASES: &[(&str, &[&str])] = &[
    ("letsencrypt.org", &["let's encrypt", "letsencrypt"]),
    ("pki.goog", &["google trust services", "gts"]),
    ("digicert.com", &["digicert"]),
    ("sectigo.com", &["sectigo", "comodo"]),
    ("globalsign.com", &["globalsign"]),
    ("amazon.com", &["amazon"]),
    ("amazontrust.com", &["amazon"]),
    ("zerossl.com", &["zerossl"]),
    ("buypass.com", &["buypass"]),
    ("entrust.net", &["entrust"]),
    ("ssl.com", &["ssl.com"]),
    ("certum.pl", &["certum"]),
    ("identrust.com", &["identrust"]),
];

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn policy_with(records: Vec<(&str, &str)>) -> CaaPolicy {
        // Route through the real constructor so tests also exercise iodef +
        // wildcard-note derivation.
        let records = records
            .into_iter()
            .map(|(tag, value)| CaaRecord {
                flags: 0,
                tag: tag.to_string(),
                value: value.to_string(),
            })
            .collect();
        CaaPolicy::from_records(records, "example.com".to_string())
    }

    #[test]
    fn iodef_contacts_are_extracted() {
        let policy = policy_with(vec![
            ("issue", "letsencrypt.org"),
            ("iodef", "mailto:security@example.com"),
        ]);
        assert_eq!(policy.iodef, vec!["mailto:security@example.com"]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn wildcard_note_flags_broader_wildcard_policy() {
        // issue locks named issuance to Let's Encrypt, but issuewild also
        // permits DigiCert for wildcards — genuinely broader.
        let policy = policy_with(vec![
            ("issue", "letsencrypt.org"),
            ("issuewild", "digicert.com"),
        ]);
        let note = policy
            .wildcard_note
            .expect("looser wildcard policy flagged");
        assert!(
            note.contains("digicert.com"),
            "note names the extra CA: {note}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn wildcard_note_absent_when_issuewild_missing() {
        // RFC 8659 §4.3: absent issuewild inherits issue — NOT a gap.
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "letsencrypt.org")]);
        assert!(policy.wildcard_note.is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn wildcard_note_absent_when_policies_consistent() {
        let policy = policy_with(vec![
            ("issue", "letsencrypt.org"),
            ("issuewild", "letsencrypt.org"),
        ]);
        assert!(policy.wildcard_note.is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_no_policy() {
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("Let's Encrypt R3", &CaaPolicy::empty()),
            IssuerCaaMatch::NoPolicy
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_indeterminate_when_only_iodef() {
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("iodef", "mailto:sec@example.com")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("Let's Encrypt R3", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Indeterminate
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_permitted_letsencrypt() {
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "letsencrypt.org")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=R3, O=Let's Encrypt", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_permitted_via_alias() {
        // Issuer CN/O does not literally contain "pki.goog"; alias table
        // maps it to "Google Trust Services".
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "pki.goog")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=GTS CA 1C3, O=Google Trust Services LLC", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_mismatch_when_only_other_ca_allowed() {
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "digicert.com")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=R3, O=Let's Encrypt", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_verbatim_match_is_length_guarded() {
        // A pathologically short CAA `issue` value (here "ca") must not
        // blanket-match an unrelated issuer just because the two letters appear
        // verbatim somewhere in the issuer string. The verbatim path is now
        // length-guarded just like the base-label fallback (issue #56 follow-up).
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "ca")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=Verisign Class 3 CA, O=Symantec", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch,
            "two-letter verbatim CAA value must not over-match unrelated issuers"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_full_domain_verbatim_still_matches() {
        // A real, full-domain CAA value that appears verbatim in the issuer is
        // still Permitted — the length guard must not break the common case.
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "letsencrypt.org")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=R3, O=letsencrypt.org", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted,
            "full-domain verbatim value must still match"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_does_not_overmatch_short_base_substring() {
        // CAA `issue "ssl.com"` must NOT mark an unrelated issuer that merely
        // contains the substring "ssl" as permitted — the base "ssl" is too
        // short/ambiguous for the generic fallback (issue #56).
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "ssl.com")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=WoanWolf SSL Root CA, O=Other", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch,
            "bare 'ssl' substring must not over-match"
        );
        // The genuine SSL.com issuer (value appears verbatim) is still permitted.
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=SSL.com RSA SSL subCA, O=SSL Corp", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_unknown_ca_base_matches_only_on_word_boundary() {
        // A long, distinctive base still matches via the guarded fallback — but
        // only as a whole word, never buried inside a larger token (issue #56).
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "examplecorp.test")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=ExampleCorp Root, O=ExampleCorp", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
        );
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=NotExamplecorporated CA", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch,
            "base inside a larger word must not match"
        );
    }

    /// Regression: a remote-controlled crash. After a rejected match
    /// `contains_word` resumed at `start + 1`, which splits a multi-byte
    /// first character — CAA `issue "éabcdef.com"` plus a (self-signed) cert
    /// issued by `CN=xéabcdef.com` panicked `seer ssl` / `seer status` with
    /// "byte index N is not a char boundary".
    #[test]
    fn classify_does_not_panic_on_multibyte_rejected_match() {
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "éabcdef.com")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=xéabcdef.com", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch
        );
        // Directly, including a later whole-word hit after the rejected one.
        assert!(!contains_word("xéabc", "éabc"));
        assert!(contains_word("xéabc éabc", "éabc"));
    }

    /// Regression: aliases were substring-matched, so the `entrust` alias of
    /// CAA `issue "entrust.net"` matched an IdenTrust-issued cert.
    #[test]
    fn classify_alias_requires_whole_word() {
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", "entrust.net")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=TrustID Server CA O1, O=IdenTrust", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch,
            "entrust must not match inside identrust"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer(
                "CN=Entrust Certification Authority - L1K, O=Entrust, Inc.",
                &policy
            ),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
        );
        // The trimmed `gts` alias still matches Google's intermediates.
        let google = policy_with(vec![("issue", "pki.goog")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=WR2, O=GTS", &google),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_mismatch_when_issuance_forbidden() {
        // A bare `issue ";"` forbids all issuance, yet a cert exists.
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issue", ";")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=R3, O=Let's Encrypt", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_issuewild_treated_like_issue() {
        let policy = policy_with(vec![("issuewild", "letsencrypt.org")]);
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=R3, O=Let's Encrypt", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_policy_has_no_issuer_match_set() {
        let p = CaaPolicy::empty();
        assert!(p.records.is_empty());
        assert!(!p.has_policy);
        assert!(p.issuer_match.is_none());
        assert_eq!(p.note, ISSUANCE_TIME_NOTE);
    }

    /// RFC 8659 §4.1: a CAA record carrying an unknown tag with the Issuer
    /// Critical flag (bit 7 of `flags`) set MUST be treated as forbidding
    /// issuance — we cannot honor a critical property we don't understand.
    #[test]
    fn classify_unknown_critical_tag_forces_mismatch() {
        let policy = CaaPolicy {
            records: vec![
                // Valid issue that would otherwise match Let's Encrypt.
                CaaRecord {
                    flags: 0,
                    tag: "issue".to_string(),
                    value: "letsencrypt.org".to_string(),
                },
                // Unknown tag with critical flag — must veto issuance.
                CaaRecord {
                    flags: 0x80,
                    tag: "auth".to_string(),
                    value: "future-extension".to_string(),
                },
            ],
            effective_domain: Some("example.com".to_string()),
            has_policy: true,
            issuer_match: None,
            iodef: Vec::new(),
            wildcard_note: None,
            note: ISSUANCE_TIME_NOTE.to_string(),
        };
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=R3, O=Let's Encrypt", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Mismatch,
            "critical unknown tag must veto otherwise-matching issue"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_unknown_non_critical_tag_does_not_veto() {
        // Same shape but flags = 0 (non-critical). Per RFC the unknown tag
        // is ignored; the matching `issue` carries through.
        let policy = CaaPolicy {
            records: vec![
                CaaRecord {
                    flags: 0,
                    tag: "issue".to_string(),
                    value: "letsencrypt.org".to_string(),
                },
                CaaRecord {
                    flags: 0,
                    tag: "auth".to_string(),
                    value: "future-extension".to_string(),
                },
            ],
            effective_domain: Some("example.com".to_string()),
            has_policy: true,
            issuer_match: None,
            iodef: Vec::new(),
            wildcard_note: None,
            note: ISSUANCE_TIME_NOTE.to_string(),
        };
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=R3, O=Let's Encrypt", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_critical_known_tag_does_not_veto() {
        // A critical `issue` (a known tag) is just a normal critical-issue.
        // It must NOT trip the unknown-critical veto.
        let policy = CaaPolicy {
            records: vec![CaaRecord {
                flags: 0x80,
                tag: "issue".to_string(),
                value: "letsencrypt.org".to_string(),
            }],
            effective_domain: Some("example.com".to_string()),
            has_policy: true,
            issuer_match: None,
            iodef: Vec::new(),
            wildcard_note: None,
            note: ISSUANCE_TIME_NOTE.to_string(),
        };
        assert_eq!(
            classify_issuer("CN=R3, O=Let's Encrypt", &policy),
            IssuerCaaMatch::Permitted
        );
    }
}