secmem_proc/

lib.rs

#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "std"), no_std)]
#![forbid(future_incompatible, unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn)]
#![warn(missing_docs)]
#![warn(clippy::cast_possible_truncation, clippy::cast_sign_loss)]
#![warn(clippy::must_use_candidate)]
#![allow(clippy::needless_lifetimes)]
//! `secmem-proc` is a crate designed to harden a process against
//! *low-privileged* attackers running on the same system trying to obtain
//! secret memory contents of the current process. More specifically, the crate
//! disables core dumps, makes a best effort to disable the ability to trace it,
//! and makes a minimal effort to detect already attached tracers.
//!
//! __Note__: all the crate does is *hardening*, i.e. it tries to make attacks
//! *harder*. It can by no means promise any security! In particular, when an
//! attacker ptrace attaches to the process before `harden_process` is
//! executed, it is game over for the process. This crate is no substitute for
//! properly hardening your OS (configuration)!
//!
//! Note that hardening the process also severely limits the ability to debug
//! it. Therefore you are advised to only harden release builds, not debug
//! builds.
//!
//! # Windows
//! On Windows, [`harden_process`] sets a severly restricted DACL for the
//! process. (More precisely, only the `PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION`,
//! `PROCESS_TERMINATE` and `SYNCHRONIZE` permissions are enabled.) This could
//! be too restrictive for the application to function correctly. When more
//! permissions are required, the safe API in the [`win_acl`] module can be used
//! to create and set a custom DACL instead.
//!
//! On windows, this crate depends on `std` via a dependency on the [`windows`
//! crate].
//!
//! # Examples
//! In the below example the main function of some application calls the main
//! hardening function provided by this crate: `harden_process`. This will
//! perform all available hardening steps (except unstable ones) on the target
//! platform. When one of the hardening steps fails or a debugger is detected,
//! the function returns an error. It is advised to terminate the application on
//! any error.
//!
//! ```
//! fn main() {
//!     // call `secmem_proc::harden_process` before doing anything else, to harden the process
//!     // against low-privileged attackers trying to obtain secret parts of memory which will
//!     // be handled by the process
//!     if let Err(e) = secmem_proc::harden_process() {
//!         println!("ERROR: could not harden process, exiting");
//!         println!("ERROR: {}", e);
//!         return;
//!     }
//!     // rest of your program
//! }
//! ```
//!
//! It is also possible to configure what kind of hardening steps are performed.
//! For this, the API in [`config`] can be used. An example is shown below:
//!
//! ```
//! fn main() {
//!     // harden before doing anything else
//!     let mut config = secmem_proc::Config::DEFAULT;
//!     config.set_anti_tracing(false);
//!     config.set_fs(false);
//!     if let Err(e) = config.harden_process() {
//!         println!("ERROR: could not harden process, exiting");
//!         println!("ERROR: {}", e);
//!         return;
//!     }
//!     // rest of your program
//! }
//! ```
//!
//! In the last example we use the API in [`win_acl`] to set a custom DACL on
//! Windows. In the example we grant the `PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD` permissions in
//! addition to the default ones. Note that in this particular use case the same
//! could have been achieved using [`Config::set_win_dacl_custom_user_perm`],
//! which is clearly a lot easier. The below approach is, however, a lot more
//! flexible.
//!
//! ```
//! #[cfg(windows)]
//! fn set_windows_dacl() -> secmem_proc::Result {
//!     use windows::Win32::System::Threading::{
//!         PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_SYNCHRONIZE,
//!         PROCESS_TERMINATE,
//!     };
//!     use windows::Win32::Security::WinCreatorOwnerRightsSid;
//!
//!     use secmem_proc::win_acl::{AddAllowAceAcl, EmptyAcl, SidRef, WellKnownSidBuffer};
//!
//!     // First obtain the well-known owner rights SID
//!     let mut buf = WellKnownSidBuffer::new();
//!     let sid = SidRef::well_known(&mut buf, WinCreatorOwnerRightsSid)?;
//!
//!     // Now specify the ACL we want to create
//!     // Only things explicitly allowed with `AddAllowAceAcl` will be allowed; nothing else
//!     let acl_spec = EmptyAcl;
//!     let access_mask = PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION
//!         | PROCESS_TERMINATE
//!         | PROCESS_SYNCHRONIZE
//!         | PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD;
//!     let acl_spec = AddAllowAceAcl::new(acl_spec, access_mask, sid);
//!
//!     // Create ACL and set as process DACL
//!     let acl = acl_spec.create()?;
//!     acl.set_process_dacl_protected()?;
//!     Ok(())
//! }
//!
//! fn main() {
//!     // harden before doing anything else
//!     let mut config = secmem_proc::Config::DEFAULT;
//!     #[cfg(windows)]
//!     config.set_win_dacl_custom_fn(set_windows_dacl);
//!     config.set_fs(false);
//!     if let Err(e) = config.harden_process() {
//!         println!("ERROR: could not harden process, exiting");
//!         println!("ERROR: {}", e);
//!         return;
//!     }
//!     // rest of your program
//! }
//! ```
//!
//! # Cargo features
//! - `std` (default): Enable functionality that requires `std`. Currently
//!   required for anti-tracing on Linux via `/proc/self/status`. This feature
//!   is enabled by default.
//! - `unstable`: Enable functionality that depends on undocumented or unstable
//!   OS/platform details. This feature only enables support for these; to
//!   actually enable these anti-debugging methods, they have to be specifically
//!   enabled in the [configuration].
//! - `dev`: This feature enables all features required to run the test-suite,
//!   and should only be enabled for that purpose.
//!
//! # Implementation
//! - Disable ptrace and core dumps for the process on linux using prctl
//! - Disable ptrace and core dumps for the process on freebsd using procctl
//! - Disable ptrace on macos using ptrace
//! - Disable core dumps for the process on posix systems using rlimit
//! - Set restricted DACL for the process on windows
//! - When the `std` feature is enabled, detect debuggers on linux by reading
//!   `/proc/self/status` (std, anti-tracing)
//! - Detect debuggers on windows using `IsDebuggerPresent` and
//!   `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` (anti-tracing)
//! - With unstable enabled, hide the thread from a debugger on windows
//!   (unstable, anti-tracing)
//! - With unstable enabled, detect debuggers on windows by reading from the
//!   kernel structure `KUSER_SHARED_DATA` (unstable, anti-tracing)
//!
//! # Anti-tracing
//! The hardening methods employed by this crate can be divided into two groups:
//! * security related process hardening, and
//! * anti-tracing.
//!
//! The difference between the two lies in the thread model. Process hardening
//! mostly assumes the process is not yet under attack, e.g. it is not yet being
//! traced. Hardening methods then make changes to the configuration of the
//! process to limit access other processes have to it, e.g. disable tracing of
//! the process or disable core dumps. Anti-tracing assumes the process is
//! already traced/debugged by a malicious process (malware). The goal is then
//! to detect the tracer/debugger. Anti-tracing methods can always be subverted
//! by a tracer/debugger, though some are harder to work around than others.
//! (The `KUSER_SHARED_DATA` unstable anti-tracing method on windows is a
//! difficult one to work around.) Anti-tracing can be disabled using
//! [`Config::set_anti_tracing(false)`].
//!
//! [`windows` crate]: https://crates.io/crates/windows
//! [configuration]: config::Config
//! [`Config::set_anti_tracing(false)`]: Config::set_anti_tracing

#[cfg(windows)]
extern crate alloc;

mod internals;

pub mod components;
pub mod config;
pub mod error;
pub mod harden;
pub mod macros;

#[cfg(windows)]
pub mod win_acl;
/// This module is only available on windows.
#[cfg(not(windows))]
pub mod win_acl {}

pub use config::Config;
pub use error::Result;
pub use harden::harden_process;

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    /// > Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two makes four.
    ///
    /// Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell
    #[test]
    fn freedom() {
        assert_ne!(2 + 2, 5);
        assert_eq!(2 + 2, 4);
    }
}