Crate sec[][src]


The sec crate prevent secrets from accidentally leaking through Debug or Display implementations. It does so by wrapping any kind of confidential information in a zero-overhead type:

use sec::Secret;

struct User {
    id: usize,
    username: String,
    session_token: Secret<String>,

let alice = User{
    id: 1,
    username: "alice".to_owned(),
    session_token: Secret::new("no one should see this".to_owned()),

println!("Now talking to: {:?}", alice);

This will yield the following output:

Now talking to: User{ id = 1, username: String("alice"), session_token: "..." }

This functionality is very useful when dealing with data that should always be prevented from accidentally leaking through panics, log files.

The contained data can be accessed by any of the reveal methods:

println!("Don't tell anyone, but Alice's token is: {}",

Only methods that contain reveal in their name actually allow accessing the secret value.

Serde support (deserialize/serialize features)

If the deserialize feature is enabled, any Secret<T> will automatically implement Deserialize from Serde:

struct AuthRequest{
    username: String,
    password: Secret<String>,

AuthRequest will be deserialized as if password was a regular String, the result will be stored as a Secret<String>. Additionally, if any deserialization errors occur, the resulting serde error will be replaced to avoid leaking the unparsed value.

Serialization can be enabled through the serialize feature.

IMPORTANT: Serializing data to a readable format is still a way to leak secrets. Only enable this feature if you need it.

Diesel support (diesel_sql feature)

Limited support for inserting and loading Secret<T> values through Diesel can be enabled by the diesel_sql feature.

IMPORTANT: The database may log and echo back (on error) any query that fails, takes to long or is otherwise deemed interesting. Using Secret values in expressions should be avoided.

no_std support

By disabling the default features, no_std is supported. It can be re-enabled through the std feature.

Additional traits

The traits PartialEq, Eq and Hash are implemented for Secret, by simply passing through the operation to the underlying type. These traits should be safe in a way that they will not accidentally leak the enclosed secret.

Additional, by enabling the ord feature, the PartialOrd and Ord traits will be implemented. Since ordering could potentially leak information when a collection order by a Secret is printed in-order, these are opt-in by default.


While sec usually does a good job from preventing accidentally leaks through logging mistakes, it currently does not protect the actual memory (while not impossible, this requires a lot of extra effort due to heap allocations). The data protected by sec is usually sent across the network and passed around among different applications (e.g. a token authorizing a client) or could reasonably be used as a key for a HashMap.

To prevent copies inside an application, data is usually allocated on the heap only and scrubbed afer deallocation. sec makes a trade-off in favor of performance and generality here by not supporting this pattern. It is not written to protect your GPG private key from core dumps, but rather login tokens from accidental disclosure.

If protecting cryptographic secrets in-memory from stackdumps and similar is a concern, have a look at the [secrets] (, [secstr] ( or similar crates.



Wraps a type T, preventing it from being accidentally revealed.