Struct schnorrkel::musig::MuSig

pub struct MuSig<T: SigningTranscript, S> { /* fields omitted */ }

Schnorr multi-signature (MuSig) container generic over its session types

Methods

impl<T: SigningTranscript, S> MuSig<T, S>

pub fn public_keys(
    &self,
    require_reveal: bool
) -> impl Iterator<Item = &PublicKey>

Iterates over public keys.

If require_reveal=true then we count only public key that revealed their R values.

pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey

Aggregate public key given currently revealed R values

pub fn expected_public_key(&self) -> PublicKey

Aggregate public key expected if all currently committed nodes fully participate

impl<T: SigningTranscript, S: TranscriptStages> MuSig<T, S>

pub fn transcript(&mut self) -> &mut T

We permit extending the transcript whenever you like, so that say the message may be agreed upon in parallel to the commitments. We advise against doing so however, as this requires absolute faith in your random number generator, usually rand::thread_rng().

impl<'k, T: SigningTranscript> MuSig<T, CommitStage<'k>>

pub fn our_commitment(&self) -> Commitment

Our commitment to our R to send to all other cosigners

pub fn add_their_commitment(
    &mut self,
    them: PublicKey,
    theirs: Commitment
) -> SignatureResult<()>

Add a new cosigner's public key and associated R bypassing our commitmewnt phase.

pub fn reveal_stage(self) -> MuSig<T, RevealStage<'k>>

Commit to reveal phase transition.

impl<'k, T: SigningTranscript> MuSig<T, RevealStage<'k>>

pub fn our_reveal(&self) -> Reveal

Reveal our R contribution to send to all other cosigners

pub fn add_their_reveal(
    &mut self,
    them: PublicKey,
    theirs: Reveal
) -> SignatureResult<()>

Include a revealed R value from a previously committed cosigner

pub fn add_trusted(
    &mut self,
    them: PublicKey,
    theirs: Reveal
) -> SignatureResult<()>

Add a new cosigner's public key and associated R bypassing our commitmewnt phase.

Avoid using this due to the attack described in "On the Provable Security of Two-Round Multi-Signatures" by Manu Drijvers, Kasra Edalatnejad, Bryan Ford, and Gregory Neven https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/417 Avoid using this for public keys held by networked devices in particular.

There are however limited scenarios in which using this appears secure, primarily if the trusted device is (a) air gapped, (b) stateful, and (c) infrequently used, via some constrained channel like manually scanning QR code. Almost all hardware wallets designs fail (b), but non-hardware wallets fail (a), with the middle ground being only something like Pairty Signer. Also, any public keys controlled by an organization likely fail (c) too, making this only useful for individuals.

pub fn cosign_stage(self) -> MuSig<T, CosignStage>

Reveal to cosign phase transition.

impl<T: SigningTranscript> MuSig<T, CosignStage>

pub fn our_cosignature(&self) -> Cosignature

Reveals our signature contribution

pub fn add_their_cosignature(
    &mut self,
    them: PublicKey,
    theirs: Cosignature
) -> SignatureResult<()>

Include a cosignature from another cosigner

pub fn cosigned(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &PublicKey>

Interate over the cosigners who successfully revaled and later cosigned.

pub fn uncosigned(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &PublicKey>

Interate over the possible cosigners who successfully committed and revaled, but actually cosigned.

pub fn sign(&self) -> Option<Signature>

Actually computes the cosignature

impl<T: SigningTranscript> MuSig<T, CollectStage>

pub fn add(
    &mut self,
    them: PublicKey,
    their_reveal: Reveal,
    their_cosignature: Cosignature
) -> SignatureResult<()>

Adds revealed R and cosignature into a cosignature collector

pub fn signature(&self) -> Signature

Actually computes the collected cosignature.