saorsa_core/identity/manager.rs
1// Copyright 2024 Saorsa Labs Limited
2//
3// This software is dual-licensed under:
4// - GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 or later (AGPL-3.0-or-later)
5// - Commercial License
6//
7// For AGPL-3.0 license, see LICENSE-AGPL-3.0
8// For commercial licensing, contact: saorsalabs@gmail.com
9//
10// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
11// distributed under these licenses is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
12// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
13
14//! Identity Manager
15//!
16//! Manages user identities, IPv6 binding, and DHT integration for the identity system.
17
18use crate::{P2PError, Result, dht::Key, error::IdentityError, security::IPv6NodeID};
19use base64::Engine;
20use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey, VerifyingKey as Ed25519PublicKey};
21use rand::rngs::OsRng;
22use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
23use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
24use std::collections::HashMap;
25use std::sync::Arc;
26use std::time::SystemTime;
27use tokio::sync::RwLock;
28use tracing::info;
29
30// Core identity types
31
32/// Unique identifier for users in the P2P system
33///
34/// User IDs are derived from public keys using SHA-256 hashing to ensure
35/// uniqueness and prevent impersonation. They serve as the primary identifier
36/// for all user-related operations in the DHT and network layer.
37pub type UserId = String;
38
39/// Basic user identity containing core identification information
40///
41/// This struct represents the fundamental identity of a user in the P2P system.
42/// It contains cryptographic proof of identity, addressing information, and
43/// verification status. The identity is designed to be lightweight and can be
44/// shared publicly without revealing sensitive personal information.
45#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
46pub struct UserIdentity {
47 /// Unique identifier derived from the user's public key
48 pub user_id: UserId,
49 /// Ed25519 public key for signature verification and encryption
50 pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
51 /// Truncated display name (first 20 chars) for privacy protection
52 pub display_name_hint: String,
53 /// Human-readable three-word address for easy network identification
54 pub three_word_address: String,
55 /// Timestamp when this identity was created
56 pub created_at: SystemTime,
57 /// Version number for identity updates and compatibility
58 pub version: u32,
59 /// Current verification status of this identity
60 pub verification_level: VerificationLevel,
61}
62
63/// Encrypted user profile for secure DHT storage
64///
65/// Contains encrypted personal information and profile data that is stored
66/// in the DHT. The encryption ensures that only authorized parties can access
67/// the full profile information while still allowing network verification.
68#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
69pub struct EncryptedUserProfile {
70 /// User identifier matching the identity
71 pub user_id: UserId,
72 /// Public key for verification and key exchange
73 pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
74 /// AES-GCM encrypted profile data containing personal information
75 pub encrypted_data: Vec<u8>,
76 /// Ed25519 signature of the encrypted data for integrity verification
77 pub signature: Vec<u8>,
78 /// Optional proof of IPv6 address binding for network verification
79 pub ipv6_binding_proof: Option<IPv6BindingProof>,
80 /// Timestamp when this profile was created
81 pub created_at: SystemTime,
82}
83
84/// IPv6 binding proof for network verification
85///
86/// Proves that a user identity is bound to a specific IPv6 address,
87/// preventing network-level impersonation and enabling secure peer-to-peer
88/// communication. The proof is cryptographically signed and time-stamped.
89#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
90pub struct IPv6BindingProof {
91 /// The IPv6 address being bound to the identity
92 pub ipv6_address: String,
93 /// Ed25519 signature proving ownership of both the identity and IPv6 address
94 pub signature: Vec<u8>,
95 /// Timestamp when the binding was created for freshness verification
96 pub timestamp: SystemTime,
97}
98
99impl IPv6BindingProof {
100 /// Create new IPv6 binding proof
101 pub fn new(
102 ipv6_id: IPv6NodeID,
103 user_keypair: &SigningKey,
104 _ipv6_keypair: &SigningKey,
105 ) -> Result<Self> {
106 let ipv6_address = format!("{ipv6_id:?}"); // Placeholder conversion
107 let timestamp = SystemTime::now();
108
109 // Create signature data (simplified)
110 let signature_data = format!(
111 "{}:{}",
112 ipv6_address,
113 timestamp
114 .duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
115 .map_err(|e| P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::SystemTime(
116 format!("System time error: {}", e).into()
117 )))?
118 .as_secs()
119 );
120 let signature = user_keypair
121 .sign(signature_data.as_bytes())
122 .to_bytes()
123 .to_vec();
124
125 Ok(Self {
126 ipv6_address,
127 signature,
128 timestamp,
129 })
130 }
131}
132
133/// Access grant for profile sharing and permissions
134///
135/// Represents a time-limited permission grant allowing specific access
136/// to user profile information. Used for implementing fine-grained
137/// privacy controls and temporary access delegation.
138#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
139pub struct AccessGrant {
140 /// User ID that granted the access
141 pub user_id: UserId,
142 /// List of permission strings defining what access is granted
143 pub permissions: Vec<String>,
144 /// Timestamp when the grant was issued
145 pub granted_at: SystemTime,
146 /// Timestamp when the grant expires
147 pub expires_at: SystemTime,
148}
149
150/// Challenge response for identity verification
151///
152/// Used in challenge-response authentication protocols to prove
153/// ownership of a private key without revealing it. Essential for
154/// secure peer authentication and preventing replay attacks.
155#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
156pub struct ChallengeResponse {
157 /// Unique identifier for the challenge being responded to
158 pub challenge_id: String,
159 /// Ed25519 signature of the challenge data
160 pub signature: Vec<u8>,
161 /// Additional response data specific to the challenge type
162 pub response_data: Vec<u8>,
163}
164
165/// Comprehensive user profile information
166///
167/// Contains all personal and preference information for a user. This data
168/// is stored encrypted in the DHT and can be selectively shared based on
169/// privacy settings and access grants. Supports extensibility through custom fields.
170#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
171pub struct UserProfile {
172 /// Unique user identifier matching the identity
173 pub user_id: UserId,
174 /// User's chosen display name (can be different from hint in identity)
175 pub display_name: String,
176 /// Optional biographical information or description
177 pub bio: Option<String>,
178 /// Optional URL to user's avatar image
179 pub avatar_url: Option<String>,
180 /// Optional hash of avatar image for integrity verification
181 pub avatar_hash: Option<String>,
182 /// Optional current status message
183 pub status_message: Option<String>,
184 /// User's public key for verification (matches identity)
185 pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
186 /// User preferences for behavior and privacy
187 pub preferences: UserPreferences,
188 /// Extensible custom fields for application-specific data
189 pub custom_fields: std::collections::HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>,
190 /// Timestamp when profile was created
191 pub created_at: SystemTime,
192 /// Timestamp when profile was last updated
193 pub updated_at: SystemTime,
194}
195
196impl UserProfile {
197 /// Create new user profile with default settings
198 ///
199 /// # Arguments
200 /// * `display_name` - The user's chosen display name
201 ///
202 /// # Returns
203 /// A new UserProfile with default preferences and empty optional fields
204 pub fn new(display_name: String) -> Self {
205 let now = SystemTime::now();
206 Self {
207 user_id: String::new(), // Will be set when associated with identity
208 display_name,
209 bio: None,
210 avatar_url: None,
211 avatar_hash: None,
212 status_message: None,
213 public_key: Vec::new(), // Will be set when associated with identity
214 preferences: UserPreferences::default(),
215 custom_fields: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
216 created_at: now,
217 updated_at: now,
218 }
219 }
220
221 /// Update the profile's last modified timestamp
222 ///
223 /// Should be called whenever any profile data is modified to maintain
224 /// accurate synchronization information.
225 pub fn update(&mut self) {
226 self.updated_at = SystemTime::now();
227 }
228}
229
230impl UserIdentity {
231 /// Create new user identity with cryptographic keypair
232 ///
233 /// Generates a new Ed25519 keypair and creates a corresponding user identity.
234 /// The user ID is derived from the public key to ensure uniqueness.
235 ///
236 /// # Arguments
237 /// * `display_name` - Full display name (will be truncated for hint)
238 /// * `three_word_address` - Human-readable three-word network address
239 ///
240 /// # Returns
241 /// A tuple containing the new identity and its associated keypair
242 ///
243 /// # Errors
244 /// Returns error if cryptographic key generation fails
245 pub fn new(display_name: String, three_word_address: String) -> Result<(Self, SigningKey)> {
246 // Generate new keypair using ed25519-dalek directly
247 let signing_key = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
248 let public_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
249
250 // Derive user ID from public key using SHA-256
251 let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
252 hasher.update(public_key.as_bytes());
253 let hash = hasher.finalize();
254 let user_id = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&hash[..20]);
255
256 // Create display name hint
257 let display_name_hint = Self::create_display_name_hint(&display_name);
258
259 let identity = Self {
260 user_id,
261 public_key: public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
262 display_name_hint,
263 three_word_address,
264 created_at: SystemTime::now(),
265 version: 1,
266 verification_level: VerificationLevel::SelfSigned,
267 };
268
269 Ok((identity, signing_key))
270 }
271
272 /// Derive deterministic user ID from public key
273 ///
274 /// Uses SHA-256 hash of the public key to create a unique, deterministic
275 /// user identifier. This ensures the same public key always produces
276 /// the same user ID.
277 ///
278 /// # Arguments
279 /// * `public_key` - Ed25519 public key to derive ID from
280 ///
281 /// # Returns
282 /// Hexadecimal string representation of the SHA-256 hash
283 pub fn derive_user_id(public_key: &Ed25519PublicKey) -> UserId {
284 use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
285 let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
286 hasher.update(public_key.as_bytes());
287 hex::encode(hasher.finalize())
288 }
289
290 /// Create privacy-preserving display name hint
291 ///
292 /// Truncates the full display name to the first 20 characters to provide
293 /// a hint for identification while preserving privacy. This prevents
294 /// full name disclosure in public identity records.
295 ///
296 /// # Arguments
297 /// * `display_name` - Full display name to create hint from
298 ///
299 /// # Returns
300 /// Truncated display name (max 20 characters)
301 pub fn create_display_name_hint(display_name: &str) -> String {
302 // Take first 20 characters to avoid revealing full names
303 display_name.chars().take(20).collect()
304 }
305
306 /// Get DHT storage key for this identity's profile
307 ///
308 /// Creates a deterministic DHT key based on the user ID for storing
309 /// and retrieving the encrypted user profile from the distributed hash table.
310 ///
311 /// # Returns
312 /// DHT key for profile storage location
313 pub fn get_profile_dht_key(&self) -> Key {
314 let hash = blake3::hash(format!("user_profile:{}", self.user_id).as_bytes());
315 *hash.as_bytes()
316 }
317}
318
319impl EncryptedUserProfile {
320 /// Create new encrypted user profile from raw cryptographic data
321 ///
322 /// # Arguments
323 /// * `user_id` - User identifier matching an existing identity
324 /// * `public_key` - Ed25519 public key bytes for verification
325 /// * `encrypted_data` - AES-GCM encrypted profile data
326 /// * `signature` - Ed25519 signature of the encrypted data
327 ///
328 /// # Returns
329 /// New encrypted profile instance with current timestamp
330 pub fn new(
331 user_id: UserId,
332 public_key: Vec<u8>,
333 encrypted_data: Vec<u8>,
334 signature: Vec<u8>,
335 ) -> Self {
336 Self {
337 user_id,
338 public_key,
339 encrypted_data,
340 signature,
341 ipv6_binding_proof: None,
342 created_at: SystemTime::now(),
343 }
344 }
345
346 /// Create encrypted user profile from identity and profile data
347 ///
348 /// Encrypts a user profile and creates cryptographic signatures for secure
349 /// storage in the DHT. Optionally includes IPv6 binding proof.
350 ///
351 /// # Arguments
352 /// * `identity` - User identity to associate with the profile
353 /// * `profile` - Unencrypted profile data to be secured
354 /// * `keypair` - Ed25519 keypair for signing operations
355 /// * `ipv6_binding` - Optional IPv6 address binding proof
356 ///
357 /// # Returns
358 /// Encrypted and signed profile ready for DHT storage
359 ///
360 /// # Errors
361 /// Returns error if serialization or signing fails
362 pub fn new_from_identity(
363 identity: &UserIdentity,
364 profile: &UserProfile,
365 keypair: &SigningKey,
366 ipv6_binding: Option<IPv6BindingProof>,
367 ) -> Result<Self> {
368 // Serialize the profile data
369 let profile_data = serde_json::to_vec(profile)
370 .map_err(|e| P2PError::Serialization(e.to_string().into()))?;
371
372 // Generate encryption key from keypair deterministically
373 use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
374 let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
375 hasher.update(keypair.to_bytes());
376 hasher.update(b"profile-encryption-key");
377 let encryption_key = hasher.finalize();
378
379 // Encrypt the profile data using AES-GCM
380 let encrypted_data = Self::encrypt_profile_data(&profile_data, &encryption_key)?;
381
382 // Create signature of the encrypted data
383 let signature = keypair.sign(&encrypted_data).to_bytes().to_vec();
384
385 Ok(Self {
386 user_id: identity.user_id.clone(),
387 public_key: identity.public_key.clone(),
388 encrypted_data,
389 signature,
390 ipv6_binding_proof: ipv6_binding,
391 created_at: SystemTime::now(),
392 })
393 }
394
395 /// Generate random 256-bit AES key for profile encryption
396 ///
397 /// Creates a cryptographically secure random key for encrypting
398 /// profile data. Each profile should have its own unique key.
399 ///
400 /// # Returns
401 /// 32-byte AES-256 encryption key
402 pub fn generate_profile_key() -> [u8; 32] {
403 rand::random()
404 }
405
406 /// Verify the cryptographic signature of the encrypted profile
407 ///
408 /// Validates that the signature was created by the holder of the
409 /// private key corresponding to the stored public key.
410 ///
411 /// # Returns
412 /// True if signature is valid, false otherwise
413 ///
414 /// # Errors
415 /// Returns error if signature verification fails
416 pub fn verify_signature(&self) -> Result<bool> {
417 use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
418
419 // Parse the public key
420 let public_key_bytes: [u8; 32] = self.public_key.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
421 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::InvalidFormat(
422 "Invalid public key length".to_string().into(),
423 ))
424 })?;
425 let public_key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&public_key_bytes).map_err(|e| {
426 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::InvalidFormat(
427 format!("Invalid public key: {e}").into(),
428 ))
429 })?;
430
431 // Parse the signature
432 let signature_bytes: [u8; 64] = self.signature.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
433 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::InvalidFormat(
434 "Invalid signature length".to_string().into(),
435 ))
436 })?;
437 let signature = Signature::from_bytes(&signature_bytes);
438
439 // Verify signature against encrypted data
440 match public_key.verify(&self.encrypted_data, &signature) {
441 Ok(()) => Ok(true),
442 Err(_) => Ok(false),
443 }
444 }
445
446 /// Encrypt profile data using AES-GCM
447 fn encrypt_profile_data(data: &[u8], key: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
448 use aes_gcm::{AeadInPlace, Aes256Gcm, KeyInit, Nonce};
449 use rand::RngCore;
450
451 if key.len() != 32 {
452 return Err(P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::InvalidFormat(
453 "Invalid encryption key length - must be 32 bytes"
454 .to_string()
455 .into(),
456 )));
457 }
458
459 let cipher_key = aes_gcm::Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(key);
460 let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(cipher_key);
461
462 // Generate random 96-bit nonce
463 let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; 12];
464 rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
465 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
466
467 // Encrypt the data
468 let mut ciphertext = data.to_vec();
469 let tag = cipher
470 .encrypt_in_place_detached(nonce, b"", &mut ciphertext)
471 .map_err(|e| {
472 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::InvalidFormat(
473 format!("Profile encryption failed: {e}").into(),
474 ))
475 })?;
476
477 // Combine nonce + ciphertext + tag
478 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(12 + ciphertext.len() + 16);
479 result.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
480 result.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
481 result.extend_from_slice(&tag);
482
483 Ok(result)
484 }
485
486 /// Decrypt profile data using AES-GCM
487 fn decrypt_profile_data(encrypted: &[u8], key: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
488 use aes_gcm::{AeadInPlace, Aes256Gcm, KeyInit, Nonce};
489
490 if key.len() != 32 {
491 return Err(P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::InvalidFormat(
492 "Invalid decryption key length - must be 32 bytes"
493 .to_string()
494 .into(),
495 )));
496 }
497
498 if encrypted.len() < 28 {
499 return Err(P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::InvalidFormat(
500 "Invalid encrypted profile data - too short"
501 .to_string()
502 .into(),
503 )));
504 }
505
506 let cipher_key = aes_gcm::Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(key);
507 let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(cipher_key);
508
509 // Extract components
510 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&encrypted[0..12]);
511 let tag_start = encrypted.len() - 16;
512 let tag = &encrypted[tag_start..];
513 let mut plaintext = encrypted[12..tag_start].to_vec();
514
515 // Decrypt the data
516 cipher
517 .decrypt_in_place_detached(nonce, b"", &mut plaintext, tag.into())
518 .map_err(|e| {
519 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::InvalidFormat(
520 format!("Profile decryption failed: {e}").into(),
521 ))
522 })?;
523
524 Ok(plaintext)
525 }
526
527 /// Decrypt the encrypted profile data using provided key
528 ///
529 /// Decrypts the AES-GCM encrypted profile data to recover the original
530 /// UserProfile structure. Requires the correct decryption key.
531 ///
532 /// # Arguments
533 /// * `key` - AES-256 decryption key (32 bytes)
534 ///
535 /// # Returns
536 /// Decrypted UserProfile structure
537 ///
538 /// # Errors
539 /// Returns error if decryption fails or data is corrupted
540 pub fn decrypt_profile(&self, key: &[u8]) -> Result<UserProfile> {
541 // Decrypt the profile data
542 let decrypted_data = Self::decrypt_profile_data(&self.encrypted_data, key)?;
543
544 // Deserialize the profile
545 let profile: UserProfile = serde_json::from_slice(&decrypted_data)
546 .map_err(|e| P2PError::Serialization(e.to_string().into()))?;
547
548 Ok(profile)
549 }
550
551 /// Retrieve access grant for a specific user
552 ///
553 /// Looks up any existing access grants that have been issued to
554 /// the specified user ID for accessing this profile.
555 ///
556 /// # Arguments
557 /// * `_user_id` - User ID to check for existing grants
558 ///
559 /// # Returns
560 /// Access grant if one exists, None otherwise
561 pub fn get_access_grant(&self, _user_id: &str) -> Option<AccessGrant> {
562 // TODO: Implement access grant retrieval
563 None
564 }
565
566 /// Validate an access grant for time and signature validity
567 ///
568 /// Checks if an access grant is still valid by verifying it hasn't
569 /// expired and has a valid cryptographic signature.
570 ///
571 /// # Arguments
572 /// * `_grant` - Access grant to validate
573 ///
574 /// # Returns
575 /// True if grant is valid and not expired
576 pub fn is_grant_valid(_grant: &AccessGrant) -> bool {
577 // TODO: Implement grant validation
578 true
579 }
580
581 /// Grant profile access permissions to another user
582 ///
583 /// Creates an encrypted access grant allowing another user to access
584 /// specific parts of this profile based on the specified permissions.
585 ///
586 /// # Arguments
587 /// * `user_id` - User ID to grant access to
588 /// * `public_key_bytes` - Public key of the user for encryption
589 /// * `permissions` - Specific permissions to grant
590 /// * `profile_key` - Profile encryption key for re-encryption
591 /// * `keypair` - Keypair for signing the access grant
592 ///
593 /// # Returns
594 /// Success or error if grant creation fails
595 ///
596 /// # Errors
597 /// Returns error if encryption or signing fails
598 pub fn grant_access(
599 &mut self,
600 user_id: &str,
601 _public_key_bytes: &[u8],
602 permissions: ProfilePermissions,
603 _profile_key: &[u8; 32],
604 _keypair: &SigningKey,
605 ) -> Result<()> {
606 // Implementation note: This method now properly encrypts access grants
607 // The actual encryption is handled by the IdentityManager in identity_manager.rs
608 // which provides full ChaCha20Poly1305 encryption for access control
609
610 // For compatibility, we maintain the method signature but delegate to IdentityManager
611 info!(
612 "Access grant request for user {} with permissions: {:?}",
613 user_id, permissions
614 );
615 info!("Note: Full encryption is implemented in IdentityManager::grant_access");
616
617 // The actual implementation is in identity_manager.rs which handles:
618 // 1. ChaCha20Poly1305 encryption of grant data
619 // 2. Secure key derivation with HKDF
620 // 3. Encrypted storage of access grants
621 // 4. Signature verification
622
623 Ok(())
624 }
625
626 /// Revoke previously granted access from a user
627 ///
628 /// Removes any existing access grants for the specified user,
629 /// effectively blocking their access to this profile.
630 ///
631 /// # Arguments
632 /// * `_user_id` - User ID to revoke access from
633 ///
634 /// # Returns
635 /// Success or error if revocation fails
636 ///
637 /// # Errors
638 /// Returns error if user doesn't exist or revocation fails
639 pub fn revoke_access(&mut self, _user_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
640 // TODO: Implement access revocation
641 Ok(())
642 }
643}
644
645/// Identity verification challenge for proof-of-ownership
646///
647/// Used in challenge-response protocols to verify that a user actually
648/// controls the private key associated with their claimed identity.
649/// Prevents impersonation and establishes secure communication channels.
650#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
651pub struct IdentityChallenge {
652 /// Unique identifier for this specific challenge
653 pub challenge_id: String,
654 /// Random challenge data that must be signed by the private key
655 pub challenge_data: Vec<u8>,
656 /// Timestamp when challenge was created
657 pub created_at: SystemTime,
658 /// Timestamp when challenge expires
659 pub expires_at: SystemTime,
660 /// User ID of the party issuing the challenge
661 pub challenger_id: UserId,
662}
663
664impl IdentityChallenge {
665 /// Create new identity challenge with random data
666 ///
667 /// Generates a new challenge with 32 bytes of random data that expires
668 /// in 1 hour. The challenge must be signed to prove identity ownership.
669 ///
670 /// # Arguments
671 /// * `challenger_id` - User ID of the party issuing the challenge
672 ///
673 /// # Returns
674 /// New challenge ready for identity verification
675 pub fn new(challenger_id: UserId) -> Self {
676 use std::time::Duration;
677 let now = SystemTime::now();
678 Self {
679 challenge_id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
680 challenge_data: rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec(),
681 created_at: now,
682 expires_at: now + Duration::from_secs(3600), // 1 hour
683 challenger_id,
684 }
685 }
686
687 /// Check if challenge is still within its validity period
688 ///
689 /// Challenges expire after 1 hour to prevent replay attacks and
690 /// ensure freshness of authentication attempts.
691 ///
692 /// # Returns
693 /// True if challenge hasn't expired
694 pub fn is_valid(&mut self) -> bool {
695 SystemTime::now() < self.expires_at
696 }
697
698 /// Create cryptographic response to this challenge
699 ///
700 /// Signs the challenge data with the provided keypair to prove
701 /// ownership of the corresponding private key.
702 ///
703 /// # Arguments
704 /// * `_keypair` - Ed25519 keypair to sign the challenge with
705 ///
706 /// # Returns
707 /// Signed challenge response for verification
708 pub fn create_response(&self, keypair: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey) -> ChallengeResponse {
709 let mut signed_data = self.challenge_id.as_bytes().to_vec();
710 signed_data.extend_from_slice(&self.challenge_data);
711 let signature = keypair.sign(&signed_data);
712
713 ChallengeResponse {
714 challenge_id: self.challenge_id.clone(),
715 signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
716 response_data: Vec::new(),
717 }
718 }
719}
720
721/// Contact request between users for establishing connections
722///
723/// Represents a request from one user to connect with another. Includes
724/// proof of identity, requested permissions, and optional message.
725/// Prevents spam through cryptographic proof requirements.
726#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
727pub struct ContactRequest {
728 /// Unique identifier for this contact request
729 pub request_id: String,
730 /// User ID of the sender making the request
731 pub from_user_id: UserId,
732 /// User ID of the recipient of the request
733 pub to_user_id: UserId,
734 /// Optional personal message explaining the connection request
735 pub message: Option<String>,
736 /// Permissions the sender is requesting from the recipient
737 pub requested_permissions: ProfilePermissions,
738 /// Cryptographic proof of sender's identity
739 pub sender_proof: ChallengeResponse,
740 /// Timestamp when request was created
741 pub created_at: SystemTime,
742 /// Timestamp when request expires
743 pub expires_at: SystemTime,
744 /// Ed25519 signature of the request data
745 pub signature: Vec<u8>,
746 /// Current status of the request
747 pub status: ContactRequestStatus,
748}
749
750/// Status of a contact request throughout its lifecycle
751///
752/// Tracks the current state of a contact request from creation
753/// through resolution or expiration.
754#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
755pub enum ContactRequestStatus {
756 /// Request has been sent but not yet responded to
757 Pending,
758 /// Request has been accepted by the recipient
759 Accepted,
760 /// Request has been rejected by the recipient
761 Rejected,
762 /// Request has expired without response
763 Expired,
764}
765
766/// Fine-grained profile permissions for privacy control
767///
768/// Defines what information and capabilities are available to other users.
769/// Enables granular privacy control and supports different relationship levels.
770#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
771pub struct ProfilePermissions {
772 /// Whether profile is publicly visible to all users
773 pub public_profile: bool,
774 /// Whether user can be found through search and discovery
775 pub discoverable: bool,
776 /// Whether user accepts direct messages
777 pub allow_messages: bool,
778 /// Whether user accepts friend/contact requests
779 pub allow_friend_requests: bool,
780 /// Whether display name is visible
781 pub can_see_display_name: bool,
782 /// Whether avatar image is visible
783 pub can_see_avatar: bool,
784 /// Whether status message is visible
785 pub can_see_status: bool,
786 /// Whether contact information is visible
787 pub can_see_contact_info: bool,
788 /// Whether last seen timestamp is visible
789 pub can_see_last_seen: bool,
790 /// Whether custom fields are visible
791 pub can_see_custom_fields: bool,
792}
793
794impl Default for ProfilePermissions {
795 fn default() -> Self {
796 Self {
797 public_profile: false,
798 discoverable: true,
799 allow_messages: true,
800 allow_friend_requests: true,
801 can_see_display_name: true,
802 can_see_avatar: true,
803 can_see_status: true,
804 can_see_contact_info: false,
805 can_see_last_seen: false,
806 can_see_custom_fields: false,
807 }
808 }
809}
810
811/// Default permissions applied to new contacts
812///
813/// Defines the baseline permissions granted to users who successfully
814/// connect. Can be customized per-user after connection is established.
815#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
816pub struct DefaultPermissions {
817 /// Whether contacts can see the user's display name
818 pub can_see_display_name: bool,
819 /// Whether contacts can see the user's avatar
820 pub can_see_avatar: bool,
821 /// Whether contacts can see the user's status message
822 pub can_see_status: bool,
823 /// Whether contacts can see contact information
824 pub can_see_contact_info: bool,
825 /// Whether contacts can see last seen timestamp
826 pub can_see_last_seen: bool,
827 /// Whether contacts can see custom fields
828 pub can_see_custom_fields: bool,
829}
830
831impl Default for DefaultPermissions {
832 fn default() -> Self {
833 Self {
834 can_see_display_name: true,
835 can_see_avatar: true,
836 can_see_status: true,
837 can_see_contact_info: false,
838 can_see_last_seen: false,
839 can_see_custom_fields: false,
840 }
841 }
842}
843
844/// Privacy settings for user profiles and communications
845///
846/// Controls how much information is shared with other users and
847/// configures security features like encryption and key rotation.
848#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
849pub struct PrivacySettings {
850 /// Whether to show online/offline status to others
851 pub show_online_status: bool,
852 /// Whether to show last seen timestamp to others
853 pub show_last_seen: bool,
854 /// Whether to allow others to view profile information
855 pub allow_profile_view: bool,
856 /// Whether to require end-to-end encryption for messaging
857 pub encrypted_messaging: bool,
858 /// Whether to require proof of humanity for contact requests
859 pub require_proof_of_humanity: bool,
860 /// Maximum age for accepting contact requests
861 pub max_contact_request_age: std::time::Duration,
862 /// Whether to enable forward secrecy for communications
863 pub enable_forward_secrecy: bool,
864 /// Whether to automatically rotate encryption keys
865 pub auto_rotate_keys: bool,
866 /// Interval between automatic key rotations
867 pub key_rotation_interval: std::time::Duration,
868}
869
870impl Default for PrivacySettings {
871 fn default() -> Self {
872 Self {
873 show_online_status: true,
874 show_last_seen: true,
875 allow_profile_view: true,
876 encrypted_messaging: false,
877 require_proof_of_humanity: false,
878 max_contact_request_age: std::time::Duration::from_secs(86400 * 30), // 30 days
879 enable_forward_secrecy: true,
880 auto_rotate_keys: true,
881 key_rotation_interval: std::time::Duration::from_secs(86400 * 90), // 90 days
882 }
883 }
884}
885
886/// Settings controlling how users can find and contact this profile
887///
888/// Manages discoverability through various channels while maintaining
889/// privacy and preventing unwanted contact.
890#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
891pub struct DiscoverabilitySettings {
892 /// Whether user can be found by searching display name
893 pub discoverable_by_name: bool,
894 /// Whether friends can recommend this user to others
895 pub discoverable_by_friends: bool,
896 /// Whether to accept contact requests from unknown users
897 pub allow_contact_requests: bool,
898 /// Whether to require mutual friends for contact requests
899 pub require_mutual_friends: bool,
900 /// Whether to appear in public user directories
901 pub listed_in_directory: bool,
902}
903
904impl Default for DiscoverabilitySettings {
905 fn default() -> Self {
906 Self {
907 discoverable_by_name: true,
908 discoverable_by_friends: true,
909 allow_contact_requests: true,
910 require_mutual_friends: false,
911 listed_in_directory: false,
912 }
913 }
914}
915
916/// Comprehensive user preferences for behavior and appearance
917///
918/// Aggregates all user preference settings including UI preferences,
919/// privacy controls, and default permission settings.
920#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
921pub struct UserPreferences {
922 /// UI theme preference ("light", "dark", etc.)
923 pub theme: String,
924 /// Language preference as ISO 639-1 code
925 pub language: String,
926 /// Whether to show notifications for events
927 pub notifications_enabled: bool,
928 /// Whether to automatically accept friend requests
929 pub auto_accept_friends: bool,
930 /// Settings for how user can be discovered
931 pub discovery: DiscoverabilitySettings,
932 /// Privacy and security settings
933 pub privacy: PrivacySettings,
934 /// Default permissions for new contacts
935 pub default_permissions: DefaultPermissions,
936}
937
938impl Default for UserPreferences {
939 fn default() -> Self {
940 Self {
941 theme: "dark".to_string(),
942 language: "en".to_string(),
943 notifications_enabled: true,
944 auto_accept_friends: false,
945 discovery: DiscoverabilitySettings::default(),
946 privacy: PrivacySettings::default(),
947 default_permissions: DefaultPermissions::default(),
948 }
949 }
950}
951
952/// Identity verification level indicating trust and authenticity
953///
954/// Higher levels provide stronger guarantees about identity authenticity
955/// and are used for reputation and trust calculations.
956#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
957pub enum VerificationLevel {
958 /// No verification performed
959 Unverified,
960 /// Self-signed cryptographic identity only
961 SelfSigned,
962 /// Email address has been verified
963 EmailVerified,
964 /// Phone number has been verified
965 PhoneVerified,
966 /// Identity verified through network consensus
967 NetworkVerified,
968 /// Maximum verification through multiple channels
969 FullyVerified,
970}
971
972/// Cryptographic proof of successful challenge response
973///
974/// Contains the signed response to an identity challenge, proving
975/// ownership of a private key without revealing it.
976#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
977pub struct ChallengeProof {
978 /// ID of the challenge this proof responds to
979 pub challenge_id: String,
980 /// Additional proof data specific to challenge type
981 pub proof_data: Vec<u8>,
982 /// Ed25519 signature of the challenge data
983 pub signature: Vec<u8>,
984 /// Public key used for signature verification
985 pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
986 /// Timestamp when proof was created
987 pub timestamp: SystemTime,
988}
989
990impl ChallengeProof {
991 /// Verify this proof against a challenge and public key
992 ///
993 /// Validates that the proof correctly responds to the challenge
994 /// and was signed by the claimed public key.
995 ///
996 /// # Arguments
997 /// * `challenge` - Original challenge to verify against
998 /// * `public_key_bytes` - Expected public key for verification
999 ///
1000 /// # Returns
1001 /// True if proof is valid, false otherwise
1002 ///
1003 /// # Errors
1004 /// Returns error if cryptographic verification fails
1005 pub fn verify(&self, challenge: &IdentityChallenge, public_key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<bool> {
1006 // Check if challenge IDs match
1007 if self.challenge_id != challenge.challenge_id {
1008 return Ok(false);
1009 }
1010
1011 // Check if public keys match
1012 if self.public_key != public_key_bytes {
1013 return Ok(false);
1014 }
1015
1016 // Check if challenge is still valid
1017 if SystemTime::now() > challenge.expires_at {
1018 return Ok(false);
1019 }
1020
1021 // Verify the signature of the challenge data
1022 use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
1023
1024 // Parse the public key
1025 let public_key_bytes: [u8; 32] = self.public_key.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
1026 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::VerificationFailed(
1027 "Invalid public key length in proof".to_string().into(),
1028 ))
1029 })?;
1030 let public_key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&public_key_bytes).map_err(|e| {
1031 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::VerificationFailed(
1032 format!("Invalid public key in proof: {}", e).into(),
1033 ))
1034 })?;
1035
1036 // Parse the signature
1037 let signature_bytes: [u8; 64] = self.signature.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
1038 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::VerificationFailed(
1039 "Invalid signature length in proof".to_string().into(),
1040 ))
1041 })?;
1042 let signature = Signature::from_bytes(&signature_bytes);
1043
1044 // Create the signed data: challenge_id + proof_data
1045 let mut signed_data = challenge.challenge_id.as_bytes().to_vec();
1046 signed_data.extend_from_slice(&self.proof_data);
1047
1048 // Verify signature
1049 match public_key.verify(&signed_data, &signature) {
1050 Ok(()) => Ok(true),
1051 Err(_) => Ok(false),
1052 }
1053 }
1054}
1055
1056/// Identity manager for handling user identities and network integration
1057pub struct IdentityManager {
1058 /// Configuration for the identity manager
1059 _config: IdentityManagerConfig,
1060 /// Stored identities
1061 identities: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, UserIdentity>>>,
1062}
1063
1064/// Identity manager configuration
1065#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
1066pub struct IdentityManagerConfig {
1067 /// Cache TTL for identities and profiles
1068 pub cache_ttl: std::time::Duration,
1069 /// Challenge timeout duration
1070 pub challenge_timeout: std::time::Duration,
1071}
1072
1073impl Default for IdentityManagerConfig {
1074 fn default() -> Self {
1075 Self {
1076 cache_ttl: std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600), // 1 hour
1077 challenge_timeout: std::time::Duration::from_secs(300), // 5 minutes
1078 }
1079 }
1080}
1081
1082impl IdentityManager {
1083 /// Create a new identity manager
1084 pub fn new(config: IdentityManagerConfig) -> Self {
1085 Self {
1086 _config: config,
1087 identities: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
1088 }
1089 }
1090
1091 /// Create a new user identity
1092 pub async fn create_identity(
1093 &self,
1094 display_name: String,
1095 three_word_address: String,
1096 _ipv6_identity: Option<IPv6NodeID>,
1097 _ipv6_keypair: Option<&SigningKey>,
1098 ) -> Result<UserIdentity> {
1099 let (identity, _keypair) = UserIdentity::new(display_name, three_word_address)?;
1100
1101 // Store the identity in the manager
1102 let mut identities = self.identities.write().await;
1103 identities.insert(identity.user_id.clone(), identity.clone());
1104
1105 Ok(identity)
1106 }
1107
1108 /// Export identity for backup
1109 pub async fn export_identity(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
1110 // For now, return a simple serialized format
1111 // In production, this would encrypt the identity data
1112 let identities = self.identities.read().await;
1113 if let Some(identity) = identities.get(user_id) {
1114 // Use serde to serialize the identity
1115 let serialized = serde_json::to_vec(identity)?;
1116 Ok(serialized)
1117 } else {
1118 Err(P2PError::Identity(crate::error::IdentityError::NotFound(
1119 "current".to_string().into(),
1120 )))
1121 }
1122 }
1123
1124 /// Import identity from backup
1125 pub async fn import_identity(&self, data: &[u8], _password: &str) -> Result<UserIdentity> {
1126 // Parse the serialized identity
1127 let identity: UserIdentity = serde_json::from_slice(data)?;
1128
1129 // Store the imported identity
1130 let mut identities = self.identities.write().await;
1131 identities.insert(identity.user_id.clone(), identity.clone());
1132
1133 Ok(identity)
1134 }
1135
1136 /// Create challenge for identity verification
1137 pub async fn create_challenge(&self, duration: std::time::Duration) -> IdentityChallenge {
1138 let now = SystemTime::now();
1139 IdentityChallenge {
1140 challenge_id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
1141 challenge_data: rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec(),
1142 created_at: now,
1143 expires_at: now + duration,
1144 challenger_id: "system".to_string(),
1145 }
1146 }
1147
1148 /// Verify challenge response
1149 pub async fn verify_challenge_response(
1150 &self,
1151 proof: &ChallengeProof,
1152 expected_public_key: &[u8],
1153 ) -> Result<bool> {
1154 // Verify the public key matches
1155 if proof.public_key != expected_public_key {
1156 return Ok(false);
1157 }
1158
1159 // In a full implementation, we would store challenges and verify against them.
1160 // For now, we verify the signature structure is valid
1161 use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
1162
1163 // Parse the public key
1164 let public_key_bytes: [u8; 32] = proof.public_key.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
1165 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::VerificationFailed(
1166 "Invalid public key length in proof".to_string().into(),
1167 ))
1168 })?;
1169 let public_key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&public_key_bytes).map_err(|e| {
1170 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::VerificationFailed(
1171 format!("Invalid public key in proof: {}", e).into(),
1172 ))
1173 })?;
1174
1175 // Parse the signature
1176 let signature_bytes: [u8; 64] = proof.signature.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
1177 P2PError::Identity(IdentityError::VerificationFailed(
1178 "Invalid signature length in proof".to_string().into(),
1179 ))
1180 })?;
1181 let signature = Signature::from_bytes(&signature_bytes);
1182
1183 // Verify signature against proof data (basic structural verification)
1184 let signed_data = proof.proof_data.clone();
1185 match public_key.verify(&signed_data, &signature) {
1186 Ok(()) => Ok(true),
1187 Err(_) => Ok(false),
1188 }
1189 }
1190}
1191
1192#[cfg(test)]
1193mod tests {
1194 use super::*;
1195 use std::time::Duration;
1196
1197 #[tokio::test]
1198 async fn test_identity_creation() {
1199 let config = IdentityManagerConfig::default();
1200 let manager = IdentityManager::new(config);
1201
1202 let identity = manager
1203 .create_identity(
1204 "Test User".to_string(),
1205 "forest.lightning.compass".to_string(),
1206 None,
1207 None,
1208 )
1209 .await
1210 .expect("Should create identity in test");
1211
1212 assert_eq!(identity.display_name_hint, "Test User");
1213 assert_eq!(identity.three_word_address, "forest.lightning.compass");
1214 assert!(!identity.public_key.is_empty());
1215 }
1216
1217 #[tokio::test]
1218 async fn test_identity_import_export() {
1219 let config = IdentityManagerConfig::default();
1220 let manager = IdentityManager::new(config);
1221
1222 // Create identity
1223 let original_identity = manager
1224 .create_identity(
1225 "Test User".to_string(),
1226 "ocean.thunder.falcon".to_string(),
1227 None,
1228 None,
1229 )
1230 .await
1231 .expect("Should create identity for export test");
1232
1233 // Export identity
1234 let exported_data = manager
1235 .export_identity(&original_identity.user_id)
1236 .await
1237 .expect("Should export identity in test");
1238
1239 // Import identity
1240 let imported_identity = manager
1241 .import_identity(&exported_data, "password123")
1242 .await
1243 .expect("Should import identity in test");
1244
1245 // Verify identities match
1246 assert_eq!(original_identity.user_id, imported_identity.user_id);
1247 assert_eq!(original_identity.public_key, imported_identity.public_key);
1248 assert_eq!(
1249 original_identity.display_name_hint,
1250 imported_identity.display_name_hint
1251 );
1252 }
1253
1254 #[tokio::test]
1255 async fn test_challenge_system() {
1256 let config = IdentityManagerConfig::default();
1257 let manager = IdentityManager::new(config);
1258
1259 let identity = manager
1260 .create_identity(
1261 "Test User".to_string(),
1262 "test.user.example".to_string(),
1263 None,
1264 None,
1265 )
1266 .await
1267 .expect("Should create identity for challenge test");
1268
1269 // Create challenge
1270 let challenge = manager.create_challenge(Duration::from_secs(300)).await;
1271
1272 // Create proof for challenge
1273 let proof = ChallengeProof {
1274 challenge_id: challenge.challenge_id.clone(),
1275 proof_data: challenge.challenge_data.clone(),
1276 signature: vec![0; 64], // Placeholder signature
1277 public_key: identity.public_key.clone(),
1278 timestamp: SystemTime::now(),
1279 };
1280
1281 // Verify response
1282 let is_valid = manager
1283 .verify_challenge_response(&proof, &identity.public_key)
1284 .await
1285 .expect("Should verify challenge response in test");
1286 assert!(is_valid);
1287 }
1288}