Crate reallyme_crypto 

reallyme-crypto

Umbrella crate that re-exports the ReallyMe cryptographic primitives, dispatch and signer abstractions behind one dependency and a consistent feature set.

Platform lanes

Rust exposes two backend lanes selected by Cargo feature and target: native (portable Rust) and wasm (browser/Node host bindings). Swift and Kotlin provider selection lives in their package facades; those facades call this Rust workspace through FFI/JNI only for algorithms whose provider policy explicitly selects Rust. A lane never silently falls back to another backend.

The canonical contract is not the Rust API by itself. It is the shared set of protobuf/enums, package algorithm identifiers, typed error taxonomy, provider manifest, and conformance vectors. Rust is the reference implementation and the shared implementation for selected primitives; native platform routes are interchangeable only when vectors and typed-error tests prove identical input, output, failure, and edge-case behavior.

Security posture

#![forbid(unsafe_code)] here; secret material is returned in zeroizing wrappers; signature verification fails closed; and cross-implementation conformance vectors pin the Rust output against an independent oracle. See SECURITY.md and SECURITY_MEMORY_MODEL.md at the repository root.

Example: sign then verify

A detached signature round-trip through dispatch (requires the dispatch and ed25519 features, both on by default). Verification fails closed — tampering with the message yields Err, never Ok(false).

use reallyme_crypto::core::Algorithm;
use reallyme_crypto::dispatch::{generate_keypair, sign, verify};

let (public, secret) = generate_keypair(Algorithm::Ed25519)?;
let message = b"attested payload";

let signature = sign(Algorithm::Ed25519, &secret, message)?;
verify(Algorithm::Ed25519, &public, message, &signature)?;

// A signature never covers a different message: verify returns Err.
assert!(verify(Algorithm::Ed25519, &public, b"tampered", &signature).is_err());

Re-exports

pub use crypto_core as core;

pub use envelopes_jwk as jwk;

pub use envelopes_jwk_multikey as jwk_multikey;

Modules

aes

AES-GCM authenticated encryption primitives and their typed key/nonce wrappers and length constants.

aes_gcm_siv

AES-256-GCM-SIV nonce-misuse-resistant authenticated encryption primitive and its typed key/nonce wrappers and length constants.

aes_kw

AES-256 Key Wrap (RFC 3394) for wrapping compact key material.

argon2id

Argon2id password-based key derivation, including platform-tuned cost profiles and typed salt/secret/derived-key wrappers.

chacha20_poly1305

ChaCha20-Poly1305 and XChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated encryption primitives with typed key and nonce wrappers.

concat_kdf

JWA ECDH-ES Concat KDF over SHA-256 for deriving content-encryption keys from an ECDH shared secret.

constant_time

Constant-time (non-short-circuiting) byte-slice equality checks.

csprng

OS-backed cryptographically secure randomness and typed generators for AEAD nonces and Argon2 salts.

dispatch

Algorithm-selected dispatch: keygen, sign/verify, key agreement, KEM, AEAD, hashing, and multikey binding routed by an core::Algorithm selector.

ed25519

Ed25519 signatures: keypair generation, sign/verify, and public-key encoding.

hkdf

HKDF (RFC 5869) extract-and-expand key derivation over the SHA-2/SHA-3 suites, with domain-separated key derivation helpers.

hmac

HMAC authentication tags over SHA-256 and SHA-512.

hpke

RFC 9180 HPKE Base-mode encryption over supported DHKEM/HKDF/AEAD suites.

ml_dsa_44

ML-DSA-44 (FIPS 204) post-quantum signatures: keygen, sign/verify, and public-key encoding.

ml_dsa_65

ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) post-quantum signatures: keygen, sign/verify, and public-key encoding.

ml_dsa_87

ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) post-quantum signatures: keygen, sign/verify, and public-key encoding.

ml_kem_512

ML-KEM-512 (FIPS 203) post-quantum key encapsulation: keygen, encapsulate, and decapsulate.

ml_kem_768

ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) post-quantum key encapsulation: keygen, encapsulate, and decapsulate.

ml_kem_1024

ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203) post-quantum key encapsulation: keygen, encapsulate, and decapsulate.

p256

NIST P-256 (secp256r1) ECDSA over pre-hashed messages, with public-key compression and Secure Enclave handle encoding.

p384

NIST P-384 (secp384r1) ECDSA and ECDH, with public-key compression/decompression helpers.

p521

NIST P-521 (secp521r1) ECDSA and ECDH, with public-key compression/decompression helpers.

pbkdf2

PBKDF2 (RFC 8018) for legacy password-based key derivation.

rsa

RSA signature verification for PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS.

secp256k1

secp256k1 ECDSA signs SHA-256(message) once, returns compact low-S r || s, and uses compressed SEC1 public keys as the canonical API representation.

sha2

SHA-2-256 hashing and its fixed-length digest wrapper.

sha3

SHA-3-256 hashing and its fixed-length digest wrapper.

signer

Signer/verifier traits and dispatch-backed implementations for producing and checking detached signatures.

slh_dsa

SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s (FIPS 205) hash-based post-quantum signatures.

x25519

X25519 Diffie–Hellman key agreement and public-key encoding.

x_wing

X-Wing hybrid KEM suites over X25519 plus ML-KEM-768 or ML-KEM-1024.